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ABSTRACT 
 
In January 1957, Merle Curti published “The History of American Philanthropy as a 
Field of Research.” Curti believed the time was right for historians to ask: “how important 
has relatively disinterested benevolence been in giving expression to, and in promoting at 
home and abroad, a major American value—human welfare?” Historians have done much 
research over fifty years to answer Curti’s question. Some historians argue that philanthropic 
benevolence has been relatively unbiased when supporting research to solve social and 
economic problems; these historians interpret philanthropic support of social research as 
generally “compatible” with unbiased selection of research problems and methods. Other 
historians believe philanthropic financial assistance has been incompatible with the ideal of 
neutral and detached social research, that is, that philanthropic support is often in “conflict” 
with this ideal. During the first half of the twentieth century, the premier philanthropic 
organizations supporting social research to lift the human prospect were the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. In this dissertation, I work with 
published literature and archival materials to show that Rockefeller philanthropies were 
important between 1911 and 1946 in promoting an improved human condition in the United 
States and around the world. I respond to previous historians with my thesis that neither the 
“compatibility” nor “conflict” explanations best describe the relationship between 
Rockefeller philanthropy and social science. The best description is what some recent 
historians describe as a “complexity” relationship.
1CHAPTER 1. ROCKEFELLER PHILANTHROPY AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 
 
1.1 Introduction 
During the first half of the twentieth century, Rockefeller philanthropy found ways to 
support social science without getting in trouble. I study this accomplishment over the period 
from 1911 to 1946. The year 1911 was when the United States Supreme Court decided 
United States of America v. Standard Oil Corporation, while 1946 was when the U.S 
Congress passed the “Full Employment Act.” In the Standard Oil decision, basic economic 
logic was used to argue that a new corporate structure called a “trust” was an excessive 
restraint on free market competition. Thirty-five years later, economic policy advisors used 
sophisticated, empirical science to argue that the federal government could use policy tools to 
achieve full labor employment. Social science of quite differing levels of maturity was at the 
basis of these two government decisions. In this dissertation, we go through this thirty-five-
year period and discover how economics and other social sciences changed from abstract 
argument to rigorous discovery of knowledge. 
 
1.2 Rockefeller philanthropy and my thesis 
In 1911 the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the break-up of John D. Rockefeller’s 
Standard Oil Corporation. The American public took the news as confirming what they 
already knew: Rockefeller business practices were criminal. Ida Tarbell had, after all, 
exposed Rockefeller activities in her serialized “History of the Standard Oil Company,” 
published in McClure’s between 1902 and 1905. Over these same years, various media 
2pieces reported negatively on operations at a “Sociological Department” at the Rockefeller’s 
mining company in Colorado. President Theodore Roosevelt was willing to label Rockefeller 
himself as an “evil” and “sinister” man.1
But also by 1911, John D. Rockefeller was in the business of donating large sums of 
money to charity concerns. Rockefeller established his first philanthropic organization in 
1901 as the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, and by 1911 he was making 
arrangements to create an umbrella organization to be called the “Rockefeller Foundation.” 
The Rockefeller Foundation indeed got its legal charter in 1913 and quickly became one of 
the most powerful philanthropies of all time.2
Historians, since at least the 1950s, have asked the question: For what reasons did the 
Rockefellers donate great sums of money? Was the primary reason pure disinterested 
benevolence, or did the Rockefellers have a different objective? Was there some feeling of 
guilt that motivated Rockefeller philanthropic gifts? Were Rockefeller donation practices in 
some sense to launder ill-gotten gains? Were the Rockefellers’ massive donations parts of a 
strategic design to support the long-term success of capitalism? Perhaps Rockefeller gifts 
somehow really stemmed from a genuine philanthropic spirit? These are the kinds of 
 
1 Ida Tarbell interviewed Standard Oil’s customers, competitors, business partners, and company officials. She 
provided some response to Rockefeller’s 1899 congressional testimony, when it seemed to many observers that 
nothing could be extracted from Rockefeller in the way of useful information; see “Testimony of John D. 
Rockefeller,” U.S. Industrial Commission, Preliminary Report on Trusts and Industrial Combinations, 56th 
Congress, 1st Session (December 30, 1899), Document No. 476, Part 1, 794-97. Tarbell’s conclusion was that 
Rockefeller used bribery, espionage, and played with “loaded dice.” Tarbell’s view was that the Rockefellers’ 
financial fortune came from exploitation of workers and consumers; see Robert C. Kochersberger, Jr., 
“Introduction,” in Robert C. Kockersberger, Jr., ed., More than a Muckraker: Ida Tarbell’s Lifetime in 
Journalism, xxiv-xxv, 66-86. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1994). For information on the 
“Sociological Department” see Frank J. Weed, “The Sociological Department at the Colorado Fuel and Iron 
Company, 1901 to 1907: Scientific Paternalism and Industrial Control,” Journal of the History of the 
Behavioral Sciences 41 (2005): 269-84. For Roosevelt’s opinion of Rockefeller see Ron Chernow, Titan: The 
Life of John D. Rockefeller (New York: Random House, 1998). 
2 A basic introduction to the history of Rockefeller philanthropy has already been published, and shall be cited 
here; Gerald Jonas, The Circuit Riders: Rockefeller Money and the Rise of Modern Science (New York and 
London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989). 
3questions historians have asked since at least 1957, when historian Merle Curti spoke 
programmatically to historians and asked, “who can doubt that the character and dimensions 
of American civilization may be illuminated by sustained inquiries into American experience 
in giving?” My own belief is that John D. Rockefeller and his son John D. Rockefeller Jr. 
donated money because they held a certain kind of model of the appropriate roles of business 
leaders, politicians, non-profit leaders (including philanthropists), and scientists and 
technocrats in capitalist society.3
Historians have long debated whether the Rockefellers had ulterior motives when 
deciding to support social research. Some historians argue that the Rockefellers seem to have 
given money in an attempt to direct social research in ways that would help Rockefeller 
business interests. Other historians declare the Rockefellers did not try to do this. Not much 
middle ground has been tried, perhaps because there has been no firm principle on which to 
base such inquiry. My thesis is that such middle ground does exist, and that what the 
Rockefellers tried to accomplish was to remedy an essential missing piece in the modern 
business-politics-society model: that there were not yet enough well-trained scientists to play 
a needed role of detached experts responsible to study whatever social problems might arise 
from all participants in capitalism acting in good faith. 
 
1.3 The initial idea for Rockefeller support of social research 
John D. Rockefeller had a family. By 1911, Rockefeller’s son was firmly joined in 
the project to use the family’s financial fortune for philanthropic purposes. Rockefeller Jr. 
 
3 Merle Curti, “The History of American Philanthropy as a Field of Research,” American Historical Review 62 
(January 1957): 352-63, 363. 
4established himself through eight years’ experience leading operation of the Rockefeller 
family’s General Education Board (created 1902), a philanthropic branch designed primarily 
to allocate funds to promote better education, especially in the American South. In 1911 
Rockefeller Jr. opened the question whether to use Rockefeller money to support social 
science, when he created his own philanthropy that he initially called the “Committee,” but 
which was soon named the “Bureau of Social Hygiene.” However within a couple years 
Rockefeller Jr. decided it was not the right time to get involved in supporting social research; 
his new philanthropy should focus instead on assisting education programs. But what 
Rockefeller Jr. really established between 1911 and 1913 was that he could make his own 
philanthropic decisions. Rockefeller Jr.’s benefactor commitment was welcomed by his 
father, and also approving of Rockefeller Jr.’s preferred life dedication was Frederick T. 
Gates, long-time assistant to Rockefeller. Once the Rockefeller Foundation was legally 
established, Rockefeller handed the rein to his son, with Gates staying on as an advisor.4
Rockefeller Jr.’s decision to create a Bureau of Social Hygiene began a long-running 
project at the Rockefeller philanthropies to regularly evaluate how active Rockefeller giving 
should be in supporting social research to lift human welfare, and perhaps even promote 
specific directions of social change. Any decisions whether to get involved in supporting 
social research would be ultimately up to Rockefeller Jr. to make. All evidence suggests that 
Rockefeller Jr. had a deep concern about the condition of society. In fact, another decision 
Rockefeller Jr. made in 1911 was to assign his major business duties to a roster of 
 
4 Raymond B. Fosdick, Adventure in Giving: The Story of the General Education Board (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1962): 3-12; Raymond B. Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, Jr.: A Portrait. (New York: Harper and Row, 
1956): 116-120. 
5professional managers, which was the final decision he believed was required to begin 
applying Rockefeller wealth to “social purposes.”5
The Rockefeller Foundation was created at a time when American society was widely 
recognized as riddled with deep problems of poverty, alcoholism, race conflict, crime 
epidemics, labor violence, and the like. Societal leaders were taking on a reformist mindset. 
Initially they called for reform through a mix of ameliorative charities, but they soon 
recognized the need to add scientific research aimed at social control. Some of the nation’s 
wealthiest industrialist families – families such as the Carnegies, Rockefellers, and Sages – 
were especially concerned about the viable future of capitalism. All three of these families 
got interested in becoming philanthropists. The so-called “Progressive” period was the time 
when philanthropic activity made a shift away from remedial, patch-work strategies to focus 
on addressing fundamental causes of social problems. All three leading industrialist families 
developed a hope that modern scientific methods could provide the knowledge necessary for 
real and genuine reform. The Rockefellers, in particular, began a process that would become 
a long-running experiment to discover how philanthropic funds might be used to support 
scientific social research to help make the world a better, healthier and happier place.6
1.4 Periods of Rockefeller support of social science 
 
5 Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 142. For general information about research on poverty during the early-
twentieth century see Alice O’Conner, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in 
Twentieth-Century U.S. History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
6 Since about the 1950s, numerous books and articles have been written about the influence of philanthropic 
benevolence on human welfare during the twentieth century. The most complete survey study of Rockefeller 
philanthropy, in particular, is Gerald Jonas, The Circuit Riders: Rockefeller Money and the Rise of Modern 
Science (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989). Many other relevant publications are cited 
throughout this dissertation. 
6Four distinct periods are identifiable in the Rockefeller experiment to support 
economics and related social research. During the 1910s, persons at the Rockefeller 
Foundation interacted with a small number of economists to debate whether to establish a 
division at the Foundation that would do economic research and dispense economic ideas. 
The Foundation decided not to do this. For about a three-year period, however, they tried a 
small-scale version of such a research division.7
Between 1918 and 1922, a new branch of Rockefeller philanthropy known as the 
“Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial” began supporting welfare agencies specializing in 
assisting mothers and children. In 1922 and 1923, the Memorial moved to begin supporting 
scientific social research for the reason that many kinds of problems impacting mothers and 
children stemmed from broader economic and social causes. For about eight years the 
Memorial supported social research by various means: fellowships for university researchers; 
grants for specific projects done by teams of university researchers; block grants to support 
large clusters of projects pursued by major academic research centers; an independent 
endowment for a “Social Science Research Council” responsible for dispensing money to 
research projects; and, support of a small number of independent economic research 
institutes led by trusted economists who were free to pick their preferred research topics. The 
period between 1922 and 1929 was a trial-and-error phase designed to determine how much 
success could be attained by using these methods to support social research.8
7 Discussions of this episode include David Grossman, “American Foundations and the Support of Economic 
Research, 1913-29,” Minerva 20, 1-2 (Spring-Summer 1982): 59-82; and Soma Hewa, “Toward the Well-Being 
of Mankind: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the Problem of Economic Research,” International Journal of 
Sociology and Social Policy 18, 11/12 (1998): 85-129. 
8 Up to the present time the most thorough study of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial remains Martin 
Bulmer and Jean Bulmer, “Philanthropy and Social Science in the 1920s: Beardsley Ruml and the Laura 
Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1922-29,” Minerva 19, 3 (Autumn 1981): 347-407.  
7The Memorial’s social science program ended in early 1929 and was absorbed into a 
new Division of Social Science at the Rockefeller Foundation. Methods of supporting 
economics and related social research turned more self-initiated, as the Foundation responded 
to Depression-era conditions which suggested that radical change might be needed. Perhaps 
society even gave implicit permission for the Foundation – one of few deep pockets 
remaining in society – to step forward and direct economic and social change. More directive 
attention went to identifying specific economic research projects, and independent economic 
research institutes were created, mostly in Europe. Efforts were made to turn university-
based research centers more in the direction of economic research as well.9
Late in the 1930s and into the period of the Second World War, another phase 
unfolded as what was called the “new” social science program at the Division of Social 
Science turned its focus toward specific research fields. The Rockefeller Foundation phased 
out the project to develop broad, fundamental social science, as a conclusion was reached 
that whatever had been accomplished along such lines was perhaps the best that could be 
expected at that time.10 
1.5 Previous research and my thesis 
A question to be asked of all four periods is whether persons in power at the 
Foundation and the Memorial attempted to promote preferred research agendas and even 
preferred policy implementations. In other words, were financial awards in conflict with the 
 
9 The best study to date of this period of Rockefeller support of economic research is Earlene Craver, 
“Patronage and the Directions of Research in Economics: The Rockefeller Foundation in Europe, 1924-1938,” 
Minerva 24, 2-3 (Summer-Autumn 1986): 204-22. 
10 This shift, taking place between about 1938 and 1946, has not really been explored in detail yet. One study 
focusing on European attention during this period is Darwin H. Stapleton, “Joseph Willits and the Rockefeller’s 
European Programme in the Social Sciences,” Minerva 41 (2003): 101-114. 
8potential for truly objective and unbiased social research? Or, did persons responsible for 
awarding grants for social research succeed at producing a sufficiently diverse range of 
projects and research results as to neutralize any danger of ideological, cultural, economic, or 
political bias? I will argue that many important questions can be asked in response to these 
“conflict” and “compatibility” positions. Leaders at the Rockefeller philanthropies 
responsible for supporting social research did have their biases; yet they also created 
principles and mechanisms to successfully neutralize these biases. We cannot really 
understand the true nature of potential bias, or the principles and mechanisms to neutralize 
such bias, until we gather enough cases of grant proposals and awards to allow our 
observation of complex dynamics within and between grant decisions. A restatement of my 
thesis, then, is that a particular idea overrode the question of whether Rockefeller 
philanthropy did or did not attempt to direct social research toward preferred research 
problems and policy solutions. 
To further communicate my thesis, I would like to explain a new concept used by 
historians – especially historians of religion & natural science – that can succeed in the 
history of philanthropy & social science: the so-called “complexity” thesis. Historians of 
science and religion have developed a fine historiography to hash out the development of the 
“conflict,” “compatibility,” and “complexity” arguments in their discipline. Most prevalent 
of these arguments has been the conflict view, which holds that science conflicts with 
religion in the sense that science and religion are two systems of ideas each trying to hold 
their boundaries, and occasionally expanding to interact with each other (for example when 
religious leaders approve or disapprove of specific scientific ideas, or when leaders in science 
approve or disapprove of religious explanations). By the early-twentieth century, a series of 
9important works supported the “conflict view” that there was “warfare” between science and 
religion.11 
By the 1950s, historians responded with a second possible position: that although 
they are different systems of ideas, science and religion are not necessarily separate systems 
of explanation, and are actually “compatible” with each other. New notions were introduced 
that religious ideas can be studied as historical evidence, and that new scientific worldviews 
can help provide clearer interpretations of established religious ideas. Yet both the “conflict” 
and “compatibility” interpretations still included an idea that religious institutions have a 
choice whether to attempt to control the use of new scientific understanding. Historians of 
science and religion introduced a compromise position by the 1980s and 1990s: that in 
virtually every major episode in the history of science and religion, scientific ideas and 
religious ideas are actually a single combined system. A kind of test was even enacted, of 
whether an historian can take a scientific idea that eventually proved odd and mistaken, and 
somehow come to a sympathetic account of how the idea could have been held. This latter 
group of historians – proponents of the “complexity” thesis – emphasizes that to reach full 
understanding of earlier scientific ideas requires detailed analysis of specific case studies – 
an analysis which uncovers evidence from actual thoughts, words, and actions at an earlier 
time.12 
11 Two introductions to this debate are Ronald L. Numbers, “Science and Religion,” Osiris 1 (1985): 59-80; 
David B. Wilson, “The Historiography of Science and Religion,” in Gary B. Ferngren, et al., eds., The History 
of Science and Religion in the Western Tradition (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000): 3-11. 
12 A study representing the complexity approach is John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical 
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). A familiar case study in the history of science 
and religion is the Genesis account of six days of divine creation and the question whether this account fits with 
scientific understanding of billions of years of natural creation. To some people the two creation descriptions 
are irreconcilably in conflict, while to others the two descriptions can be interpreted as compatible. To other 
persons still, the real issue is that religious ideas and scientific ideas are not separate systems of ideas but are 
each capable of affecting each other and changing with each other, so that neither body of ideas is fixed. Other 
10
The main point about this “complexity” idea within the history of religion and natural 
science is that certain attributes of the move toward this view are recognizable in the history 
of philanthropy and social science. Today’s historians studying the “progressive” era in U.S. 
history have made great strides toward understanding what happened during the transition 
from ameliorative charity to support of fundamental social research. Historians studying 
societal effects of philanthropy begin in the period around 1900 to 1910, and they ask how 
the great philanthropies really came to be? Why did a few incredibly wealthy families create 
foundations, and what were goals did they have for these foundations? Merle Curti directed 
historians in 1957 when he asked, “how important has relatively disinterested benevolence 
been in giving expression to, and in promoting at home and abroad, a major American 
value—human welfare?”13 
In 1981, historians of American philanthropy, Barry Karl and Stanley Katz, 
summarized one strain of thought by saying that “Foundations came into existence because 
American society was unable to maintain a social order which corresponded to its 
passionately held localist ideals.” Karl and Katz argued that creators of the great foundations 
wanted to help define a new social order and were willing to support social research to do 
this. Major foundations emerged at a time of uncertainty among the nation’s ruling elite 
about how to solve serious problems accompanying the industrialization process. To Karl 
and Katz, the worry among philanthropists at the beginning of the twentieth century was that 
 
well-known case studies are whether the Bible allows that a Copernican earth can orbit the sun, whether 
Newtonian gravitation can allow a God to come along from time to time and reset a destabilized arrangement of 
planets and stars, whether Darwinian evolution by natural selection can allow any place for divine guidance of 
the direction of evolution, and whether quantum mechanics can allow a God that “throw’s dice.” Recent 
scholarship tends to argue there are few if any major case studies fitting solely the “conflict” or “compatibility” 
positions; i.e., that what generally is at play is a complex combination of maturing religious ideas and changing 
scientific findings, such that one side or the other in the supposed ‘warfare’ between religion and science is 
never really reacting to a fixed and stationary other. 
13 Curti, “The History of American Philanthropy as a Field of Research,” 352. 
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political reform activities would soon create a business climate devoid of opportunities for 
business success. Big and powerful federal government therefore should be avoided, 
especially if the nation’s business leaders could accomplish the correction themselves. The 
great foundations were created to direct scientifically-founded reform activities so that the 
public would never reach a point of crying for government to lead the reform. Such an 
argument represents one possible explanation for the rise of the great foundations; it is a 
“conflict” explanation.14 
In another series of writings through the 1970s and into the 1980s, historian of 
progressivism Ellis Hawley studied the origin of the great foundations from an alternative 
framework of a “managed society.” In various writings, Hawley explored a “search for 
order” that took place within an anti-statist American political mindset between the 1900s 
and 1920s. The rise of a “technocratic” elite in American society resulted in a new kind of 
state-society relationship that corresponded with a decline of popular democracy and public 
participation in policy formation. Hawley’s view has been summarized recently by Meg 
Jacobs: “As philanthropic organizations made the transition from agents of ameliorative 
relief to centers of social-scientific investigation, they helped to spawn the birth of a new 
technocratic elite culture.” Newly trained communities of scientific and technology experts 
participated in designing an administrative state, which was a new kind of state far removed 
from everyday politics. The main idea to Hawley’s line of explanation would be that 
philanthropic foundations arose because of an opportunity to support the work of scientific 
experts who could truly do good things to help government guide society. Scientists and 
 
14 Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, “The American Private Philanthropic Foundation and the Public Sphere, 
1890-1930,” Minerva 19 (Summer 1981): 236-270. 
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technocrats would take over leadership of economy and the state. These scientists and 
technocrats also needed to show that capitalism worked. Here, then, was a second possible 
reason for the origin of America’s great foundations: to financially support the science and 
technology experts who had good motives and would accurately recognize that capitalist 
society works. This is a “compatibility” explanation.15 
Two alternative explanations have thus been developed. Persons such as Karl and 
Katz and their followers on the one hand, and persons such as Hawley and his adherents on 
the other, have developed two ways to see that the period from the 1900s to the 1920s was an 
experimental time for finding new institutional arrangements in a society increasingly 
managed by scientists and technocrats. There was also third possibility for the relationship 
between business, government, and society – which was the view the Rockefellers adhered 
to. For our purposes, it is this third possible relationship between business, government and 
society which represents the framework for a “complexity” explanation in the history of 
philanthropy and social science. 
Recent historians developing positions between the extremes of “conflict” and 
“compatibility” have recognized that the founders and leaders of America’s great 
philanthropies were, fundamentally, caring people. Yet these founders and leaders were also 
people who held specific models of what kinds of duties successful business leaders had as 
 
15 See Ellis Hawley, “Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an ‘Associative State,’ 
1921-1928,” Journal of American History 61 (1974): 116-40; Hawley, The Great War and the Search for a 
Modern Order, 1917-1933 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979). Supporting Hawley’s view are such historians 
of American philanthropy as Guy Alchon and Meg Jacobs: Guy Alchon, The Invisible Hand of Planning: 
Capitalism, Social Science and the State in the 1920s (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985): 118-20; 
Alchon, “Mary Van Kleeck and Socio-Economic Planning,” Journal of Policy History 3, 1 (1991): 1-23; Meg 
Jacobs, “Constructing a New Political Economy: Philanthropy, Institution-Building, and Consumer Capitalism 
in the Early Twentieth Century,” in Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, ed., Philanthropic Foundations: New 
Scholarship, New Possibilities (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999): 101-18, esp. 
101. 
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reform leaders as well. A couple middle-position arguments have recently been tried, yet 
these arguments lack any middle position founded on a fundamental principle such as the 
organizing frameworks of “power interests” (which supports the conflict view) and 
“scientific expertise” (which supports the compatibility view).16 
The conflict-compatibility debate about Rockefeller philanthropy and its impact on 
social research has been pushed forward by Donald Fisher and Martin Bulmer. Fisher allies 
himself more with the Karl-Katz explanation, whereas Bulmer defends a stance fitting more 
with Hawley’s perspective. Fisher thus tends to be highly critical, interpreting the use of 
social science grants by Rockefeller philanthropy as manipulative, and even as captured by 
capitalist goals. Fisher’s position is that unfettered scientific inquiry was incompatible with 
Rockefeller funding of it. Bulmer’s opposite view is that Rockefeller philanthropy has been 
quite compatible with scientific freedom, and that leaders at Rockefeller philanthropy tried 
hard to ensure that scientific freedom was maintained. Fisher and Bulmer thus adopt polar 
positions that create space for the kind of challenging case study needed to clarify the reality 
of a middle position. Filling this intermediate ground will be exciting work. 
The development of the complexity model works best for major case studies 
possessing rich historical detail. When it comes to philanthropy and social science, it seems 
no case study provides more evidence than Rockefeller philanthropy. The kind of complex 
interplay now recognized in major revolutions in natural science may also hold true for the 
relationship between Rockefeller philanthropy and social research – meaning that a similar 
 
16 Examples of the idea that some kind of a middle position may be best in the end include Salma Ahmad, 
“American Foundations and the Development of Social Sciences between the Wars: Comment on the Debate 
between Martin Bulmer and Donald Fisher,” Sociology 25, 3 (August 1991): 511-20; Theresa Richardson and 
Donald Fisher, “Introduction: The Social Sciences and Their Philanthropic Mentors,” in Theresa Richardson 
and Donald Fisher, eds., The Development of the Social Sciences in the United States and Canada: The Role of 
Philanthropy (Stamford, CN: Ablex Publishing Co., 1999): 3-21. 
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analytical framework used by historians of religion and natural science can apply to 
accumulated evidence in the history of philanthropy and social science. The question faced 
by Rockefeller philanthropists was how much control to attempt to exert over scientific 
methods and discoveries. Early leaders of Rockefeller philanthropy knew they were part of a 
societal experiment to discover the best arrangement of modern social institutions: What 
would be the best mix of public, profit, non-profit, and professional/expert institutions to 
foster a society best allowing for progress by means of competitive business enterprise? As 
those persons who endowed and oversaw Rockefeller philanthropy favored some kind of 
long-term capitalist system, the question – emphasized again – was this: Was Rockefeller 
support of social research disinterested with respect to specific class interests? 
I aim to discover what impacts Rockefeller philanthropy had on social research. I study 
whether leaders of Rockefeller philanthropy pursued personal goals and ideologies through 
their grant decisions. I answer that, for the most part, they did not. I determine what these 
leaders did was try to work out a new model of institutional arrangements in a society in 
which a philanthropic duty was to decide how active philanthropists needed to be in 
supporting social research. The two realms of philanthropy and social research were not 
really separate after all, partly because discovery of successful philanthropic strategy was, 
itself, a kind of research project. The two realms also were not separate because in the 
modern business-government-society model, there was a missing piece, a fourth component 
that was to be the detached and objective “social research establishment.” The new model 
needed to be a business-government-society-science model, and the structure of social 
science within this model needed to be developed without business, government, or society 
15
gaining primary control over the content of scientific social research. Creation of such 
structure was what persons at Rockefeller philanthropy worked to accomplish. 
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CHAPTER 2. EARLY APPROACHES TO PHILANTHROPIC 
SUPPORT OF SOCIAL RESEARCH–1902-14 
 
2.1 Introduction 
America’s first great philanthropic foundations – the Carnegie Institution, the Russell 
Sage Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation – were established between 1900 and 
1913. Early in their development, all three foundations looked for ways to support social 
research. The difficult issue was how to support research that might reach conclusions about 
particular social and economic policies that the American public should prefer. The 
organization most carefully evaluating potential problems associated with supporting social 
and economic research was the Rockefeller Foundation. 
 
2.2 Early foundation support of “scientific” social research–1902-15 
Early in the twentieth century, a handful of social research projects were financially 
supported by major philanthropies. These applications of foundation funds tended to be 
limited in scope and executed under the leadership of a single social scientist.17 
Andrew Carnegie established the Carnegie Institution of Washington in 1900. 
Motivated by a unique blend of philanthropic philosophy with social Darwinism, an early 
idea at the Carnegie Institution was to identify particular social groups in suffering who truly 
merited financial charity. Two years after its founding the Carnegie Institution established a 
division of economics and sociology, appointing Carroll D. Wright, an established industrial 
economist, as director. Wright’s responsibility was to adhere to the Carnegie Institution’s 
 
17 Early recognition of the “great American foundations” is in Leonard P. Ayres, Seven Great Foundations 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1911). 
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now-formalized mission: “to encourage, in the broadest and most liberal manner, 
investigation, research, and discovery, and the application of knowledge to the improvement 
of mankind.” Wright put together a team of researchers, some fifteen in number, to evaluate 
social and economic consequences of state-level social legislation. The one substantial 
project eventually completed by the division was a labor history. The division of economics 
and sociology at the Carnegie Institution never became more than a few economists working 
on separate parts of one project, as the division’s studies were mostly completed by 1909 (the 
year of Wright’s death). The Carnegie Institution closed its division of economics and 
sociology in 1917, and its multi-volume report, History of Labor in the United States, was 
published the following year.18 
Social research was also supported by the Russell Sage Foundation (founded in 
1907). Beginning in 1907, the Sage Foundation conducted research for municipalities 
interested in contracting research services. The Sage Foundation’s research strategy became 
an important part of what is known as the “social survey movement.” Social surveys, 
typically taking place in urban settings, were considered useful to help guide reform efforts. 
Researchers doing the surveys accumulated data on urban areas, most notably Springfield, 
Massachusetts, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania – the latter famously known as the “Pittsburgh 
Survey.” These two surveys had a positive impact on the development of social science, 
particularly through the work of sociologist Robert E. Park at the University of Chicago. The 
 
18 Carnegie Institution, History of Labor in the United States (New York: Macmillan Co., 1918). See Nathan 
Reingold, “National Science Policy in a Private Foundation: The Carnegie Institution of Washington,” in 
Alexandra Oleson and John Voss, eds., The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 1860-1920 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979): 190-223. For information on the completion of Wright’s 
project after his passing, see Malcolm Rutherford, “Wisconsin Institutionalism: John R. Commons and His 
Students,” Labor History 47, 2 (May 2006): 161-180. 
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Sage Foundation’s survey studies contributed to the creation, in 1916, of a “Division of 
Industrial Studies.”19 
The Pittsburgh Survey, in particular, was conceived in 1906 and executed between 
1907 and 1912. Done under the leadership of Paul Kellogg of the New York Charity 
Organization Society, the survey was the first one made of a major city. Kellogg directed 
several dozen researchers to try and somehow measure all conditions of life and labor in the 
Pittsburgh “district,” which at the time was among the nation’s most intensively 
industrialized regions. In addition to a large number of iron and steel factories included in the 
survey, also included was the town of Homestead, a nearby milling and textile center. 
Research for the Pittsburgh Survey produced six volumes of reports which came to 
symbolize the severity of urban industrial problems for society as a whole. The Pittsburgh 
Survey was primarily a record of problems, however, and not of proposed solutions.20 
19 John M. Glenn et al., The Russell Sage Foundation, 1907-1946 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1946); 
Michael Gordon, “The Social Survey Movement and Sociology in the United States,” Social Problems 21 (Fall 
1973): 284-298. The Sage Foundation supported the research of Mary Van Kleeck who by 1906 concluded that 
such problems as child labor and excessive daily work hours for women “could not be controlled by prosecuting 
one employer, but required a concerted effort to stimulate public opinion on the basis of facts secured from the 
workers themselves”; see Mary Van Kleeck, “Working Hours of Women in Factories,” Charities and the 
Commons (October 16, 1906): 13-21. Van Kleeck started a “Committee on Women’s Work,” which officially 
was brought into the Sage Foundation in 1910 to investigate working conditions of New York City women. In 
1916 the Sage Foundation connected Van Kleeck’s committee and the social survey project in a “Division of 
Industrial Studies”; see Guy Alchon, “Mary Van Kleeck and Social-Economic Planning,” Journal of Policy 
History 3, 1 (1991): 1-23. 
20 In addition to the seven volumes of data, the survey itself was published as Paul U. Kellogg, ed., The 
Pittsburgh Survey (New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1910). Other important studies in the social-
survey movement were Manuel C. Elmer, Technique of Social Surveys (Lawrence, Kansas: World Co., 1917); 
Shelby M. Harrison, Social Conditions in an American City (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1920).  For 
useful histories of the Russell Sage Foundation, see David C. Hammack and Stanton Wheeler, Social Science in 
the Making: Essay on the Russell Sage Foundation, 1907-1972 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1994); 
see also William J. Breen, “Foundations, Statistics, and State-Building: Leonard P. Ayres, The Russell Sage 
Foundation, and U.S. Government Statistics in the First World War,” Business History Review 68 (1994): 451-
82. For more information on the Pittsburgh Survey and its importance in the history of social science, see the 
collected essays in Maurine W. Greenwald and Margo Anderson, eds., Pittsburgh Surveyed: Social Science and 
Social Reform in the Early Twentieth Century (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996). 
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At the Rockefeller philanthropies, John D. Rockefeller Jr. made a decision to get 
involved in supporting social research in 1910. The precipitating event was his being named 
chairman of a grand jury investigating the so-called “white slave traffic” in New York City. 
The grand jury hearings revealed that no such traffic existed, but that what really existed was 
much prostitution and police corruption. Recognition of the particular “social evil” of 
prostitution prompted Rockefeller Jr. to create his own philanthropy as the “Bureau of Social 
Hygiene,” established in 1911. The purpose of Rockefeller’s new bureau was to investigate 
problems of prostitution and associated issues of police work. Rockefeller Jr. hired a young 
New York attorney, Raymond B. Fosdick (formerly a student of Woodrow Wilson at 
Princeton University), to study European police handling of alcoholism, pauperism, and 
prostitution. Rockefeller also recruited Abraham Flexner to undertake a survey study of 
prostitution in major cities across Europe. The goal in combining Fosdick’s study and 
Flexner’s study was to learn what kinds of policies might be suited to the American situation. 
The Bureau of Social Hygiene had four founding trustees and worked with no permanent 
endowment, as instead each year Rockefeller Jr. provided the bureau with a yearly budget.21 
In 1913, sociologist Havelock Ellis published an independent report on prostitution, 
pauperism, alcoholism, and the like. In The Task of Social Hygiene, Ellis defined social 
hygiene not in the usual connotation of treating specific situations one at a time, but as an 
idea to execute a purifying reorganization of all of society. In sweeping language he 
 
21 The four trustees were: Rockefeller Jr., Jerome Greene (advisor to the Rockefeller family), Starr Murphy 
(personal attorney to the Rockefeller family), and Paul Warburg (an economist friend of Rockefeller Jr.). See 
Jennifer Gunn, “A Few Good Men: The Rockefeller Approach to Population, 1911-1936,” in Theresa 
Richardson and Donald Fisher, eds., The Development of the Social Sciences in the United States and Canada: 
The Role of Philanthropy (Stamford, Conn.: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1999): 97-115, esp. 102-3; also Charles E. 
Harvey, “John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and the Social Sciences: An Introduction,” Journal of the History of 
Sociology 4, 3 (Fall 1981): 1-31, esp. 2-3, 11. Abraham Flexner’s report on medical education was financially 
supported primarily by the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Medical Institute; see Raymond B. 
Fosdick, Chronicle of a Generation: An Autobiography (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958). 
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declared: “It is the control of reproduction of the race which renders possible the new 
conception of Social Hygiene” As a result of such public attention to the subject of social 
hygiene, the main approach taken by Rockefeller Jr.’s bureau was to not get involved in this 
increasingly controversial research, but to help financially support an independent 
organization, the American Social Hygiene Association, which was created in 1913 as an 
educational organization. Rockefeller Jr.’s Bureau of Social Hygiene would continue such 
support into the early 1920s.22 
Another early example of social research begun by a philanthropic organization was 
at the Carnegie Corporation of New York, founded in 1911 with an endowment of 
$125,000,000. The Carnegie Corporation was designed as a channel through which some of 
Andrew Carnegie’s immense wealth could begin supporting education. The Carnegie 
Corporation moved quickly and within two years managed to outspend even the federal 
government in the support of education, by $5.6 million to $5.0 million. Within their focus 
on education, the Carnegie Corporation decided to include some research aimed not so much 
at discovering scientific truths about human learning, but at teaching ideas about American 
values. By about 1919, the Carnegie Corporation’s initiation of this project was dubbed the 
“Americanization Study.” The project, which involved a series of commissioned studies, was 
directed primarily by University of Chicago sociologists, especially Robert E. Park and 
William I. Thomas. Commissioned studies aimed to understand processes whereby new 
immigrants get re-socialized as Americans. A policy objective also existed, which was to 
help states and cities better handle their burgeoning immigrant populations. The 
 
22 Havelock Ellis, The Task of Social Hygiene (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), p. 16. See also 
Linda J. Rynbrandt, “Caroline Bartlett Crane and the History of Sociology: Salvation, Sanitation, and the Social 
Gospel,” American Sociologist 29, 1 (1998): 71-82. 
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Americanization Study produced some noteworthy publications by the early 1920s, however 
the study ended by about 1922.23 
2.3 Ideas for a Rockefeller-supported “Institute of Economic Research” 
In May 1913, John D. Rockefeller worked with his son, John D. Rockefeller Jr., as 
well as a small group of trusted advisors to legally create the Rockefeller Foundation. One of 
these advisors, a long-time Rockefeller friend and associate, Frederick T. Gates, wrote the 
Foundation’s mission statement and charter. The mission for the Foundation was to serve 
“The Well-being of Mankind Throughout the World.” Gates also stated the goal for the 
Foundation was “to promote the well-being and to advance the civilization of the United 
States and its territories and possessions and of foreign lands in the acquisition and 
dissemination of knowledge, in the prevention and relief of suffering, and in the promotion of 
any and all the elements of human progress.” Included in the Foundation’s purposes were to 
support ongoing research by other agencies and institutions, as well as to assist in the 
“establishment and maintenance” of new agencies and institutions.24 
23 Noteworthy products of the Americanization Study were Sophonsba Preston Breckenridge, New Homes for 
Old (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1921); W.I. Thomas, Robert E. Parks, and Herbert Miller, Old World 
Traits Transplanted (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1921). See Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, “The Politics of 
Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation and the Formation of Public Policy,” History of Education Quarterly 27, 
2 (Summer 1987): 205-20; Ernest W. Burgess, “In Memoriam: Robert E. Park, 1864-1944,” American Journal 
of Sociology 49, 5 (March 1944): 478. Some additional background concerning social science in the 
“Progressive Era” is in John L. Recchiuti, “The Rand School of Social Science during the Progressive Era: Will 
to Power of a Stratum of the American Intellectual Class,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 31 
(1995): 149-61. 
24 “Charter of the Rockefeller Foundation,” Chap. 488, Laws of New York, for 1913. Reprinted as “Schedule 
A” in “Information Furnished by The Rockefeller Foundation in response to Questionnaires Submitted by 
United States Commission on Industrial Relations,” submitted 25 January 1915. Nine persons were included in 
the “Charter of the Rockefeller Foundation,” entered into New York State records on May 14, 1913. The stated 
purpose of the charter was to create a body corporate “for the purpose of receiving and maintaining a fund or 
funds and applying the income and principal thereof to promote the well-being of mankind throughout the 
world.” In addition to Rockefeller Sr. and Rockefeller Jr., the other seven charter members were: Frederick T. 
Gates, Harry Pratt Judson, Simon Flexner, Starr J. Murphy, Jerome D. Greene, Wickliffe Rose, and Charles O. 
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By the time of official creation of the Rockefeller Foundation, an idea in the mind of 
the Rockefellers was to consider creating a division at the Foundation that would focus on 
supporting social research. During 1912 and 1913, Foundation representatives participated in 
an ongoing conference with economists to determine if the time was right to create an 
economic research institute. A number of America’s economists and business leaders had a 
notion that opponents of bug business were in the business of peddling misinformation. Such 
mischief needed to be countered, and a way to do so would be to provide true facts – which 
presumably would favor big business. The conference, organized by AT&T’s president 
Theodore N. Vail, was attended by such leading scholars as Edwin F. Gay, Dean of the 
Harvard Business School, and Harry Pratt Judson, President of the University of Chicago. 
Also attending was Jerome D. Greene, Secretary of the Rockefeller Foundation. In listening 
to business proponents voice their opinions, Greene observed that a common goal was “to 
see whether something might be done to relieve the general unrest” so prevalent between 
workers and management in the industrial workplace. Conference participants generally held 
a view that much unrest owed to “agitators” and “demagogues” dispensing “misinformation” 
about the doings of America’s businesses. The economists and business leaders seemed 
agreed that the spread of false ideas needed to be countered. “What was needed,” Greene 
took note, “was a constant chain of correct information, put before the public by a sort of 
publicity bureau, with the special idea of reaching not so much the better educated members 
 
Heydt. See Barbara Howe, “The Origins of the Rockefeller Foundation,” in Robert F. Arnove, ed., Philanthropy 
and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundation at Home and Abroad, 1-25 (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980); see also 
Raymond B. Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 15. 
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of the community, as the middle and lower classes upon which the demagogues chiefly 
preyed.”25 
Greene communicated with the Rockefellers regarding the perceived need for such an 
institute. He agreed with conference participants that the primary need for the institute was to 
get the public to better understand real facts about the American economy, with the idea 
being that once accurate facts were communicated, the public would be more sensible in 
what kinds of government policies it supported. The chief benefiting party, Greene explained 
to the Rockefellers, would be “the business interests of the country [who] as a whole have 
everything to gain and nothing to lose by the dissemination of accurate information as the 
starting point for intelligent public opinion and wise legislation.”26 
Around the year 1913, situations in the American industrial workplace were changing 
rapidly. The American public viewed big business quite differently than just a decade or so 
earlier. Much industrial conflict was taking place, and such violence seemed highly 
irrational. The United States Congress even created a “Commission on Industrial Relations,” 
whose purpose was to discover why such conflict was happening. The commission held 
congressional hearings, and among those called to testify was John D. Rockefeller.27 
25 Jerome Greene, “Principles and Policies of Giving: Memorandum,” Rockefeller Foundation Draft Report, 12 
(1913), pp. 15-16, RAC–RF, R.G. 3, Series 910, Box 10, Folders 10-11. Worthy of note is that as early as 1907, 
Theodore Vail expressed an idea that business leaders could benefit by forming such a research institute. This 
earliest idea for such an institute came about when Vail introduced a plan to support business leaders in a 
project to compile accurate and untainted information. Such a research group, Vail believed, could be seen as 
sufficiently unbiased that their arguments and recommendations would be accepted by the American public. See 
David M. Grossman, “American Foundations and the Support of Economic Research, 1913-29,” Minerva 20, 1-
2 (Spring-Summer 1982), 59-82, esp. 59-62; see also John M. Jordan, ed., “To Educate Public Opinion: John D. 
Rockefeller, Jr., and the Origins of Social Scientific Fact-Finding,” New England Quarterly 64, 2 (June 1991): 
292-7. 
26 “Rockefeller Foundation, History Source Material,” RAC–History-Source Material, Volume 3, Series 900, 
pp. 676-677. 
27 See Graham Adams Jr., The Age of Industrial Violence, 1910-1915: Activities and Findings of the United 
States Commission on Industrial Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). 
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The Foundation’s own conference participants discussed what a new economics 
research institute might do. There were two basic ideas. In addition to the idea to dispense 
accurate information to counter misinformation, an alternative purpose might be to do 
research to discover new facts about the economy. The latter expectation was that any new 
facts would likely help big business. While proponents of the research-based approach for an 
institute believed what was urgently needed were basic facts, they also agreed with the need 
to counter misinformation. Yet most conference participants supported only an information 
bureau, tending to believe the state of economic knowledge was sufficient as it was – i.e., 
that better distribution of existing knowledge was all that was needed. Yet on this point 
Greene disagreed. His personal experience involved years of contact with economists, 
including in particular Edwin Gay. Over the next year or so, Greene and Gay would each 
play influential roles at the personal attention of the Rockefellers.28 
2.4 Gates’s philanthropic model for the Rockefeller Foundation–by 1913 
Frederick Gates, the author of the Rockefeller Foundation’s motto and charter, joined 
Greene in considering alternative ideas for an economics institute. As a long-time associate 
of Rockefeller Sr., Gates actively assisted Rockefeller philanthropy for nearly a quarter 
century. By the 1910s he trusted friend and counsel. Gates’s consistent ideal was to focus on 
discovering fundamental facts about the forces underlying social progress. Yet the question, 
as always, was how best to do this. Gates addressed this question over the preceding quarter 
 
28 See Herbert Heaton, A Scholar in Action: Edwin F. Gay (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968). 
25
century by developing a framework of rules for philanthropic giving – a framework actually 
developed by focusing on medical and public health examples.29 
Gates’s framework for philanthropic giving is worth understanding. Gates came to the 
attention of Rockefeller Sr. during the late 1880s while assisting fundraising efforts for a new 
Baptist academy of higher education in the Midwest. George A. Pillsbury, owner of the 
famous flour mills in Minneapolis, began the endowment campaign and appointed Gates as 
Executive Secretary of the American Baptist Education Society. It was in this capacity that 
Gates personally obtained a $600,000 pledge from Rockefeller Sr., who made the donation 
on a condition that $400,000 more be raised in matching funds. The raising of these matching 
funds became the test of Gates’s abilities, and he earned Rockefeller’s trust by successfully 
executing the challenge. Although Rockefeller initially hesitated to support the new academy 
any further than this, Gates remained confident that he could “immediately convince 
Rockefeller and others both of the crying need for a strong university in the West, and the 
possibility of enlisting a broad popular support for it.” Gates successfully recommended 
Chicago as the best location for the school, and indeed, the new institution became the 
University of Chicago – founded in 1889, and opened in 1892.30 
Rockefeller hired Gates by the end of 1891. He brought Gates to New York City to 
help fix some difficulties in his gift-giving efforts. Gates assumed directorship of 
 
29 A variety of general works dealing with the subject of Rockefeller philanthropy discuss the role of Gates. See 
Raymond B. Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952); 
Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, Jr.: A Portrait (New York: Harper and Row, 1956); Allen Nevins, A Study in 
Power: John D. Rockefeller, Industrialist and Philanthropist (New York: Scribner, 1953); see also James E. 
Fell, Jr., “Rockefeller’s Right-hand Man: Frederick T. Gates and the Northwestern Mining Investments,” 
Business History Review 52, 4 (1978): 537-61. Gates personally described different positions he held in 
Rockefeller philanthropy, including chairmanship of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, the General 
Education Board, and the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission; see Frederick T. Gates to A.S. Ochs, Editor of New 
York Times, January 18, 1912, RAC–RF, Gates Collection, Box 3, Folder 5. 
30 Frederick T. Gates, Chapters in My Life (New York: Free Press): 86-7; Allen Nevins, John D. Rockefeller 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1940): 210-1. 
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Rockefeller’s charity organization, at a time when Rockefeller was still focused mostly on his 
business interests. What Gates found was a mess. Rockefeller’s philanthropic efforts were 
being overrun by thousands of appeals for money each year. (Gates even once counted as 
many as an estimated fifty thousand appeals in one month.) Grant applications came from all 
over the world, and control mechanisms were entirely absent for monitoring what was done 
with the money. Gates began formulating guiding principles as a way to end the waste of 
funds, and he also created directorship boards and instituted a competitive system for the 
winning of grants. Above all, Gates recognized the importance of knowing where money 
went, and why it went where it did.31 
One of Gates’s early projects for Rockefeller was to reign in confusion over various 
branches of Baptist Foreign Mission Societies receiving Rockefeller funds. These societies 
tended to compete with each other to obtain their shares of Rockefeller’s generosity. Often 
times these societies duplicated each others’ activities, with resultant squabbling coming off 
as “selfish” and “unjust.” Gates tackled the problem by cutting off direct funding and 
employing review boards to account for every dollar. With the accounting approach in place, 
Gates could now create what he called a “principle of wholesale giving.” He promoted 
competition to get rid of “worthless” and “redundant” organizations, and every grant 
application was scrutinized. No longer were many small grants awarded to many different 
charities, as fewer large grants were now to be awarded to fewer recipient groups, who would 
 
31 Gates, Chapters in My Life, 159-64. The fourteen guiding rules are stated in Frederick T. Gates to John D. 
Rockefeller, January 18, 1892, RAC–RF, Gates Collection, Box 3, Folder 57. 
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then oversee additional rounds of distribution of funds, reporting back to Rockefeller 
essentially as “wholesalers.”32 
Gates quickly established “guiding principles” for fundraising. The main idea of 
“wholesale giving” was to avoid excessive scattering of donations, or what Gates called the 
“sins of scatteration.” Gates recorded twenty-two rules of fundraising. These rules ranged 
from the importance of a clean and well-dressed appearance, to speaking in finely enunciated 
language, to adoption of a “gentle management” approach. One rule was to convince any 
potential donor “that he is giving it, not that it is being taken from him with violence.” Gates 
also had an especially revealing rule: “Let the victim talk freely, especially in the earlier part 
of the interview, while you use the opportunity to study his peculiarities. Never argue with 
him…Give your fish the reel, and listen with deep interest.” Clearly Gates wanted to 
emphasize a range of points, but above all his point was to have an accounting system in 
place and to be forward-thinking in one’s philanthropic work.33 
From the early 1890s to the early 1910s, Gates continued developing his rule-
governed system of philanthropy. He refined an idea of “scientific philanthropy” along the 
way. With the accounting system and the stated principles and wholesale method in place, a 
chief objective for Gates was that the successful giving of funds must be that which “work[s] 
for all humanity, which penetrates everywhere.” Rejection should be made of any grant 
proposal unable to meet rigorous standards of “how” money would be used, and “why” it 
was to be used. The idea of “scientific philanthropy” was based on a notion of long-term 
 
32 Gates, Chapters in My Life, 161-3, 277; Nevins, John D. Rockefeller, 294-5. See also John Ettling, The Germ 
of Laziness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981): 66. 
33 Frederick T. Gates, “How to Canvas for Money,” April 20, 1891, RAC–RF, Gates Collection, Box 3, Folder 
61. This 1891 letter evidently was found by chance, many years later, and somehow made its way into the Gates 
Collection at the Rockefeller Archives. 
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efficiency in giving. It was an idea that philanthropy was a kind of social science in and of 
itself – that, in other words, philanthropists needed to experiment to discover what methods 
of philanthropy work best. The notion of scientific philanthropy was consistent with 
Rockefeller Sr.’s own idea, as he expressed it in 1909, that “the best philanthropy” is that 
which worked on “finalities,” and which aims to “cure evils at their source.” By the time of 
the Foundation’s meetings with economists, the idea of “scientific philanthropy” was in place 
as an idea to target grants to the most effective places for promoting social progress.34 
Gates also had ideas about how scientific progress works. In particular he studied the 
relationship of anatomy and physiology to medical applications. In exploring the nature of 
medical research, he was struck by how far certain aspects of medicine were from being 
scientific. Doctors were still very limited as to what they could usefully do, and what was 
needed was to strengthen the scientific basis of medical knowledge. As Gates got informed 
about the relationship between fundamental science and medical application, he came to 
believe what was crucially important was the careful targeting of available funds. Gates 
founded his medicine-based model on high optimism that all problems are solvable so long 
as they are pursued with direct, plug-ahead persistence – that well-placed research funds 
should be able to produce progress in medicine as well as in all other scientific fields. A 
common source of many social problems, Gates even believed, was physical disease – the 
“prolific root of every conceivable ill,” be it economic, mental, physical, moral, or social. 
 
34 The idea of “scientific philanthropy” was probably in place as early as about 1897; see Frederick T. Gates, 
Chapters in My Life, 185-6; John D. Rockefeller, Random Reminiscences of Men and Events (New York: 
Doubleday, Page & Company, 1909): 112. As Rockefeller wrote at length in his chapter on “The Difficult Art 
of Giving”: “The best philanthropy, the help that does the most good and the least harm, the help that nourishes 
civilization at its very root, that most widely disseminates health, righteousness, and happiness, is not what is 
usually called charity. It is, in my judgment, the investment of effort or time or money, carefully considered 
with relation to the power of employing people at a remunerative wage, to expand and develop the resources at 
hand, and to give opportunity for progress and healthful labour where it did not exist before.”(p. 2 of ch. 6). 
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With all society’s problems ultimately stemming from physical sources, scientific 
philanthropy needed to focus on discovering “urgently needed solutions.”35 
By the time of the 1912-13 discussion about a possible Institute of Economic 
Research, Gates’s philanthropic model (with its focus on a small number of competitive grant 
recipients) was in place at the Rockefeller Foundation. Gates had even shown how to apply 
such a model in 1912, when he helped the wife of Rockefeller, Laura Spelman Rockefeller, 
allocate grant awards to four Baptist welfare organizations. In that particular case, 
Rockefeller called upon Gates to help evaluate the quality of each applicant organization. 
Gates recommended the awards be focused away from church endowments, and he strongly 
hoped Rockefeller’s wife would follow this recommendation to ensure that no unfortunate 
gift-giving precedent would be established.36 
2.5 The debate over an “Institute of Economic Research” 
Discussion about the proposed economics institute got serious through 1913. Greene, 
secretary of the Rockefeller Foundation, recorded his belief that an economics institute 
should be created, and he introduced the idea to the Foundation trustees. The trustees then 
discussed whether more outside advice was needed, and on October 22, 1913, they approved 
a plan for preliminary personal conferences about possibly creating a “Committee of Leading 
 
35 Gates, Chapters in My Life, 180-1, 186. As Gates described in a later letter to John D. Rockefeller Jr., 
“scientific philanthropy is not attained with superficial remedies, palliatives, artificial reliefs. It seeks, insofar as 
it is wise, to find out the underlying causes and remove them, and will be content with nothing else.” Frederick 
T. Gates to Rockefeller, Jr., May 7, 1924, RAC–RF, Gates Collection, Box 3, Folder 59. 
36 Starr J. Murphy to Frederick T. Gates, June 19, 1912; Frederick T. Gates to John D. Rockefeller, Sr., June 22, 
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Economists and Business Men.” The goal for such conferences, as stated by Greene, was “to 
invite suggestions as to the desirability of establishing an organization for the study of 
important social and economic questions vitally affecting the welfare of society at the present 
time.” Five one-on-one meetings were held by December, and Greene concluded these 
meetings showed economists “were favorable to the establishment of some sort of agency for 
the scientific investigation of economic subjects.” Greene informed the Foundation trustees 
of this conclusion in their December meeting. The trustees then recommended that further 
conferences be held, and Greene quickly arranged for an outside group of economists, led by 
Wesley C. Mitchell of Columbia University, to submit a preliminary proposal for an 
economic research institute, by January 1914.37 
Greene then set about assembling an advising committee of economists. Most of 
these economists believed, as did Greene, that better fundamental research was needed in 
economics, because society’s most urgent problems were fundamentally economic in nature. 
By April Greene got some committee feedback: significant value should exist in establishing 
an institute to do basic research, as it would be through better science that the path to social 
reform would be made clear. Perhaps, then, the goal for an institute should be more than to 
merely dispense information. Greene’s economist friend, Edwin Gay, described a reason for 
favoring an institute to do fundamental research: “The work now done in the universities is 
 
37 See “Information Furnished By The Rockefeller Foundation In Response to Supplementary Questionnaire 
Submitted by the United States Commission on Industrial Relations,” 19 pp., esp. p. 43, January 7, 1915. The 
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a Proposed Economic Bureau,” January 21, 1914, RAC–RF, R.G. 3, Series 910, Box 2, Folders 10-11. See also 
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almost entirely the work of individual students writing theses for their doctorates, necessarily 
circumscribed in scope, usually far from thorough, and by the very nature of things apt to be 
scattered.” Such research was not scientific. Yet there was potential for rigorous economic 
science to be practiced. Gay believed any initial projects for an economics research institute 
were unlikely “to be comprehensive and thorough investigations of large subjects,” but that 
work needed to begin somewhere; “there is a real need for such an institute.” In a follow-up 
statement, Gay further emphasized that it ought to be “insisted” at the outset “that the 
primary purpose is the discovery of truth,” and that any dissemination of information by an 
institute would be “only incidental.” With Gay’s strong shift away from any information-
and-persuasion role for an institute, some serious debate was now initiated.38 
Greene found the economists willing to explore various alternative arrangements for 
an institute that might get Foundation approval. Special issues of importance were to 
maintain political neutrality and scholarly integrity beyond reproach. Scientific methods 
would need to be emphasized, and appropriate management oversight also needed to be 
implemented. Mitchell, for example, explained that any potential real-world relevance for 
such an institute “would depend primarily upon the impartiality of its management and the 
strictly scientific character of its productivity.” “[I]n the long run,” he added, “the practical 
benefits of science can be secured more quickly following the natural growth of knowledge 
than in following the natural growth of popular issues.” Mitchell favored an institute to do 
fundamental research first. He believed in the need to expand knowledge before attempting 
 
38 Edwin F. Gay to Jerome D. Greene, March 4, 1914, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 2, Folders 10-11; 
Edwin F. Gay to J. Laurence Laughlin, April 21, 1914, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 2, Folders 10-11; see 
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to apply it: “Just as science affords the chief means of improving the practice of medicine, so 
science affords the chief means of improving the practice of social regulation.”39 
Greene strongly wanted an institute to pursue a comprehensive research program. He 
wanted something beyond the kinds of single-project forays being tried by other major 
philanthropies. These other research approaches, Greene even suggested in a January 1914 
report, held little promise of getting “to the very foundations of the great economic and social 
problems of the day.” Greene, in drawing on the analogy to medical research, believed an 
economics institute should operate in ways resembling the workings of the Rockefeller 
Institute of Medical Research (over which Greene was also in charge as general manager). 
Greene declared that the best kind of economics institute would be one active in conducting 
fundamental research.40 
As to Rockefeller Jr., he recorded thoughts on the matter, saying that “For several 
years I have been discussing with various people the desirability and possibility of 
establishing an Institute of Economic Research.” Rockefeller Jr. believed in research 
objectives as well as persuasion objectives for the institute, saying that what was needed 
 
39 Wesley Clair Mitchell, “Memorandum,” Rockefeller Foundation Draft Report, January 1914; also F.W. 
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before anything else was “to create a saner attitude on economic and social problems by 
providing a center for scientific examination of questions of the day uninfluenced by politics 
or business gain, whose function would be to make accessible in popular form the results of 
scientific study, to stimulate understanding of economics, and attract the ablest young men to 
find careers in that field.” Rockefeller Jr. – under the outside advisement of Edwin Gay in 
particular – was willing to consider establishing an entire division at the Foundation to focus 
on economic research.41 
The trustees approved an exploratory committee of economists “to make a selection 
of problems of economic importance which could be advantageously studied.” On March 18, 
1914, the conference was held at the home office of the Rockefeller Foundation. In 
attendance were Charles Elliot and Edwin F. Gay of Harvard, J. Lawrence Laughlin and 
Leon C. Marshall of Chicago, Wesley Mitchell and John Bates Clark of Columbia 
University, Henry C. Emery and Arthur Hadley of Yale University, and John Koren of the 
American Statistical Association. Representing the Rockefeller Foundation were Gates, 
Greene, and Rockefeller Jr. Attending economists supported the idea for a new institute 
primarily to study economic problems “as would require the accumulation of a large body of 
statistics or the extension of research in different parts of the world.” Participants considered 
whether any new and important economic findings were likely in the near-term, or only as a 
long-term prospect. A main topic of discussion was to compare a research focus against a 
publicity focus, and Greene and Gates began developing opposing views on this subject. 
 
41 “Rockefeller Foundation, History Source Material,” RAC–History-Source Material, Volume 3, Series 900, 
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Whereas Greene supported a research focus, Gates preferred a main focus on public 
persuasion. Rockefeller Jr. would start tending toward the latter view as well.42 
The economists all favored an institute to bolster the scientific status of economics. 
They wanted fundamental research to promote “better conditions for the cultivation of the 
social sciences than were possible under any university or government auspices.” They also 
wanted an institute that “would have the necessary funds to provide investigators whose 
whole time would be given uninterruptedly to the work and to assure them the support of an 
adequate staff.” The economists were basically agreed that the main goal should be to 
advance basic knowledge.43 
Opinions were freely shared by many participants at the March conference. Koren 
believed the primary purpose for an institute “was necessarily the collection of facts to 
perform the same service in the field of economics and sociology as an institution for 
medical research in the domain of public health.” Mitchell argued that rapid industrialization 
in many nations “is proceeding by an extremely crude method of trial and error, sadly 
wasteful of money, time and human strength.” What was needed to prevent any more 
“blundering experiments” was “to acquire and to disseminate genuine knowledge in the field 
of economics and other social sciences.” Laughlin made a point about a need to prevent 
outside observers from seeing the new institute as a competitive rival to university-based 
research; avoiding any such perception would minimize the chance of universities reacting 
 
42 Frederick T. Gates, “In Opposition to Endowment of Economic Research,” 1914, RAC–RF, Gates Collection, 
Box 2, File 24. The direct words from the Rockefeller Foundation are from their description of goals submitted 
to Congress in January 1915. “Information Furnished By The Rockefeller Foundation In Response to 
Supplementary Questionnaire Submitted by the United States Commission on Industrial Relations,” 19 pp., esp. 
44, January 7, 1915. See also Henry C. Emery, “Memorandum,” Rockefeller Foundation Draft Report, March 
1914, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 2, Folders 10-11. 
43 “Rockefeller Foundation, History Source Material,” RAC–History-Source Material, Volume 3, Series 900, 
679-80. 
35
coldly to such an institute. Laughlin added a succinct analogy to help distinguish between 
discovery of knowledge and dispensing of knowledge: “The carp must be caught before it 
can be cooked; investigative results and new ones yet to come must be had before any 
distribution can take place.” What was urgently needed, all were agreed, was better factual 
understanding of complex problems of a modern industrial economy. Following the meeting, 
Greene, in a report, decided that an economics institute was to be officially recommended.44 
Immediately following the conference, the Foundation’s Executive Committee 
authorized the next step: an “exploratory committee” of five persons (namely, Gay, Laughlin, 
Thomas W. Page, Victor Morawetz, and Harry A. Wheeler) who were assigned the task “to 
consider further the desirability of establishing an Institute for Economic Research, to make a 
selection of such problems of economic importance as would in their judgment be 
advantageously studied through such an agency, to recommend a method of organization, 
and to present an estimate of the approximate cost of initiating and carrying on the work to 
be first proposed.”45 
Also following the conference, Gates provided Rockefeller Jr. with a report. If the 
main purpose of an institute was to do fundamental research, then Gates ought to lead the 
opposition. Gates recommended an institute focusing only on problems already present in 
society, and in most cases such problems boiled down to faulty information dispersal. 
Economic research was different from medical research, as basic economic research was 
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actually unnecessary. “Life is short; time is fleeting,” Gates declared. “We cannot do 
everything, we can do only a few things. The selection of the things we undertake to do is 
therefore of the first importance. Now, if we are to do something in the field of economics, it 
seems to me that we ought to select, if we can, that department which is most urgent and of 
most practical importance.” The only “urgent” matter was better distribution of existing 
ideas. There was no place for the word “urgent” when it came to fundamental economic 
research. Gates made an analogy: “Medical research is urgent; but…the sort of economic 
research that [researchers] can do with this fund is not at all urgent, because its results will 
have no immediate and perhaps not even a distant practical value. What is urgent in 
economics is not research, but a clearer apprehension by the masses of the people and the 
voters of the United States of the simpler and more fundamental economic laws.” Economics 
is merely made up of obvious and well-known principles, Gates believed, and all that is 
known in economics is all that needs to be known. Of the nature of economics, Gates 
believed “the field of research is perfectly clear-cut. The ills to be remedied are well known; 
they are catalogued.” The fundamental truths of economics are, as Gates told Rockefeller, 
“just as well known by economists and people of culture as the bones that make up the bony 
structure of the body are known to physicians.” There was another problem as well, which 
was that an economics institute likely could not get hold of enough economic data to make 
any real progress, as businesses were unlikely to relinquish current data, and “the data 
valuable yesterday is useless today”; here, then, was another reason why there could be no 
scientific truths discoverable by economists. Whereas researchers in medicine could identify 
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causes of ailments; “you are going to be handicapped always in economic science, as you are 
not in the physical sciences and in medicine.” Gates recommended a “modest” approach.46 
Gates took some time to explore what the word “urgent” might mean. Whereas Gay 
believed fundamental research was urgently needed on its own terms (i.e., that fundamental 
research was needed even if such research was not quickly directed to any pressing needs), “I 
agree with him,” offered Gates, “that the sort of economic research that he can do with this 
fund was not at all urgent, because its results will have no immediate and perhaps not even a 
distant practical value.” To Gates, the really urgent need was for public calm, for a decrease 
in “all the violence and the strikes of the country.”  The chosen topic for study by an 
economics institute ought to be “most urgent and of most practical importance,” it should be 
readily solvable, and it should be of a kind “that can be solved by the researches of one man.” 
These were tough criteria to meet.47 
The trustees met in April. They invited Harvard’s Edwin Gay to help guide their 
discussion. They debated possible first research projects for an institute, and to foster useful 
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debate the trustees made some effort to include a mix of views in an exploratory committee. 
Gay, at one extreme, advocated for an institute to do fundamental research. Victor A. 
Morawetz, a New York attorney friend of the Rockefellers, was there to represent the 
position favoring an institute based solely on a “propagandistic point of view.” Morawetz 
had, earlier in that year, contacted Rockefeller Jr. to express his preference for a “bureau of 
economic publicity,” and so Morawetz was suited to defend such a position.48 
This trustee’s exploratory committee held at least two group meetings, and on August 
4, 1914, they unanimously recommended that an institute be created, and that a first project 
be started and carried on for one year. The project would be a test for whether a permanent 
institute would then be suitable. Four members of the exploratory committee said they 
wanted to study prices, which was an economic problem connected to many other economic 
problems. One committee member recommended focusing on a “concrete” problem such as 
profit sharing. All committee members were agreed that no person at the Rockefeller 
Foundation was to do any of the actual research. The committee prepared a report stating 
what was needed was to consider “the general character of the work to be undertaken by a 
proposed Institute of Economic Research and, if possible, to recommend a subject or subjects 
appropriate for its initial investigation.” The committee declared its belief that a single team 
of economists “could not prepare and fully discuss a comprehensive list of topics which 
would require a careful survey of the whole economic field.” “[I]n the opinion of the 
committee, it is expedient that the proposed Institute should address itself primarily to the 
full and dispassionate investigation of problems of fundamental scientific interest, and that 
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the work it does should be of such solidity as to establish firmly its repute as a competent and 
indispensable organ of research.” The report of the trustee’s exploratory committee favored 
an institute for basic research.49 
The report dated August 4th and officially compiled by Gay was then submitted to all 
the Foundation’s trustees. The specific proposal in the report was that the first project should 
be a study of prices. Criteria were that the selected problem should be something difficult for 
government to get involved in, and that it should be one that was too big for university 
resources. The economists who settled on a study of prices saw the problem of price levels as 
an undisputed public concern. As Gay put it, a study of prices would produce results 
“singularly adapted to the use of methods that are in the strictest sense scientific.” The price 
study would be one from which “results of great value could be obtained without arousing 
suspicions that the study was carried on for selfish or for class interests.” Along with Gay’s 
report, Victor Morawetz was invited to submit a minority statement recommending an 
alternative first project aimed at explaining to the public the nature of industrial problems of 
profit sharing. Such a problem seemed urgent, to Morawetz, and even seemed likely to be 
more successful than any study of prices.50 
Gates read Gay’s report and sent a response letter to Rockefeller Jr. Gates asked the 
question: What does the Rockefeller Foundation believe economics to be? Gates again 
emphasized that economics was not a clear-cut science. Unlike medical research on disease, 
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Gates knew of no particular problem in economics that “urgently needs solution.” He saw no 
need for an institute to do basic research. Only an institute aimed at persuading the public 
would be valuable to America’s business leaders. “Beware of an institute of economic 
research. It is the last thing needed. But create if you can a bureau of economic publicity that 
for once shall be really popular and efficient and do not count the cost.”51 
Rockefeller Jr. personally applied some thought to points presented by the two 
opposing camps. He decided he wished to leave open an option to pursue perhaps a little of 
both kinds of activities, that is, some basic research and some dispersal of information. 
“Perhaps we can hit upon some medium of course,” Rockefeller Jr. wrote to Gates, “which 
will give us the things most desirable from each point of view.”52 
2.6 Real-world labor unrest–1913-14 
All the while that Foundation trustees and the participating economists debated 
alternative objectives for an economics institute, a new factor unfolding in the United States 
was an upwelling of violent events in western mining country. A series of embroiling 
troubles arose, which by the end of 1914 would contribute mightily to preventing any 
economics research institute from happening.53 
51 Frederick T. Gates to John D. Rockefeller Jr., August 18, 1914, RAC–RF, Gates Collection, Box 3, Folder 
58. Gates also provided Rockefeller with an additional memorandum describing his worries about public 
criticism of any research institute; Gates said: “Insofar as the disbursements of the Rockefeller incorporated 
philanthropies have been rigidly confined to two fields of philanthropy [i.e., medicine and public health] they 
have been almost universally commended at home and abroad. Where they have inadvertently transgressed 
these limits, they have been widely and in some particulars perhaps not unfairly condemned”; see Frederick T. 
Gates, “Principles of Philanthropy as a Science and Art,” RAC–RF, Gates Collection, Box 2, Folder 26. 
52 John D. Rockefeller Jr. to Frederick T. Gates, August 24, 1914, RAC–RF, Gates Collection, Box 3, Folder 
58. 
53 Raymond B. Fosdick discusses Ludlow briefly in Raymond B. Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller Jr.: A Portrait 
(New York: Harper, 1956): 144, 158. 
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During the period of about 1910 to 1914 (and especially during the latter couple years 
of the period), severe labor conflicts transpired in various industries in the United States. 
Particularly brutal were conflicts at mining locations in the West. As the public learned about 
labor unrest at the mines, they got angry with the Rockefellers, who were majority owners of 
the largest mining company in the United States, the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company.54 
On April 20, 1914, after a year and a half of conflicts and strikes in western mining 
regions, violence broke out at the mining camps at Ludlow, Colorado. An infamous case of 
deadly violence soon called the “Ludlow massacre” resulted in no fewer that thirteen women 
and children burned to death by evidently out-of-control state militia – militia who were said, 
in the press, to have been recruited by the Rockefellers to squelch the strike. As the militia 
opened fire on striking miners, they killed at least forty men as well. The Ludlow tragedy 
enraged thousands of miners and sympathizers throughout the region, resulting in mass 
property destruction. Events reached a point that President Woodrow Wilson sent in federal 
troops, who while ostensibly not taking sides, soundly defeated the unionized miners. And 
so, as in 1902 when Tarbell published her exposé, and as in 1911 when the Supreme Court 
ruled against the Rockefeller’s Standard Oil trust, the public again saw the Rockefellers as an 
enemy. And this time the Rockefellers were especially vilified in the media. As today’s 
historians have concluded, not only was the situation at Ludlow a costly ‘victory’ for the 
Rockefeller family, “John D. Rockefeller, Jr., never entirely overcame the onus of his 
disastrous intractability against the union nor, in the eyes of many early-twentieth-century 
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Americans, did the enormous philanthropies of the Rockefeller family fully compensate for 
the tragedy at Ludlow.”55 
To make matters worse, on April 6th, just two weeks prior to the Ludlow tragedy, 
Rockefeller Jr. had been called to testify before the U.S. House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Mines and Mining. Rockefeller spoke in vigorous defense of his mining 
company and its management practices. The Rockefeller family was thus on record in the 
nation’s newspapers as seeming to believe little was wrong with the way their mines and 
mining camps were operated.56 
The matter of what Rockefeller Jr. really tried to communicate to Congress was that 
he did care. Rockefeller Jr. was clear in his words making the recurring point that he worried 
but was constrained to doing so in a context of a modern business-society model. It was this 
model that was really the key issue, as it was the basis for what Rockefeller Jr. believed 
about how to handle industrial conflict. The model was also the basis for Rockefeller Jr.’s 
beliefs about the roles of philanthropic organizations and social scientific research. When 
Rockefeller Jr. was asked by the subcommittee on April 6th whether he believed one director 
of a public company “should take the responsibility for the conduct of the company?,” he 
answered, in principle, “no.” “[I]t would be impossible for any man to be personally 
responsible for all of the management of the various concerns in which he might be a larger 
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or small stockholder. It would be simply impossible to do that, and all that any man can do is 
to find the ablest men that he can find, and put the responsibility squarely on them.” 
Rockefeller relied on a modern model of stockholdership in asking: Could every stockholder 
be responsible for actions by a manager of a company? No, he answered. Furthermore, he 
had attended no meetings of the company’s board of directors since the strike activities began 
in September 1913, and neither had his father. This lack of personal attention was despite 
months of media reports concerning the urgency of the situation, which therefore meant to 
the public that Rockefeller Jr. had not tried to personally confirm whether media reports of 
intimidation, violence, and militia activities were true.57 
2.7 Not the time for economic research 
Rockefeller Jr.’s trusted advisor, Gates, offered some relevant opinion during the time 
of escalation to the Ludlow tragedy. Early on in the period of conflict, Gates decided the time 
was not right to establish an economics institute, of any kind. As early as March, in an 
aforementioned memorandum to Rockefeller Jr., Gates recommended backing away from 
any kind of institute that might have more than just one leading scientist. “I would,” he 
stated, “…put far forward into the indefinite the dream of an Institute of Economic Research 
as an organization corresponding in any way to research institutions as we know them.” 
Gates placed his sights at finding one trial project that would rely on one economist studying 
one urgent and solvable problem. Any research findings should even be solvable in a year’s 
 
57 “Statement of John D. Rockefeller, Jr.,” 2851-2. Rockefeller also answered questions about how much 
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time, and would need to be easily tested and related to concrete matters. So once Ludlow 
happened, would others at the Foundation decide Gates’s idea was the right path to follow?58 
Even though any kind of approach for an economics institute was made less likely to 
be workable after Ludlow, one specific kind of publicity project was now truly “urgent.” The 
project was a reactionary publicity campaign funded directly by the Rockefeller family, 
which began when Rockefeller Jr. brought in Ivy Lee, a noted public relations expert of the 
day, to try and reduce what the Rockefellers interpreted as the main problem still: public 
misunderstanding.59 
Also in the aftermath of Ludlow, Rockefeller Jr. committed himself to one particular 
idea of Gates: that a single notable economist should be recruited to make one study. Greene, 
as Foundation Secretary, was asked to contact an old friend, William Lyon Mackenzie King. 
King, who was an economist trained at the University of Chicago and Harvard University, 
was a reputable labor expert (who would later be Prime Minister of Canada). Greene asked 
King through June and July 1914 – even prior to Gay’s August report then – if enough of a 
break from any partisan engagement was believed achievable that “would permit you to 
advise large interests I represent in regard to present labor difficulties and probable far-
reaching studies looking toward the future.” Here, then, was the urgent problem that might be 
studied by an economics research institute: not prices (as many wanted), and not profit 
sharing (as Morawetz wanted), but labor difficulties in general. Potentially such a study 
could be an acceptable middle course.60 
58 Gates, “In Opposition to Endowment,” March 19, 1914, 6-7. 
59 Grossman, “American Foundations and the Support of Economic Research,” 69. 
60 Correspondence between Jerome D. Greene and W.L. Mackenzie King, June-July 1914, RAC–RF, R.G.3, 
Series 910, Box 2, Folders 10-11. King’s expertise was trade unions. A political science undergraduate at the 
University of Toronto (1895), King studied trade unions as early as the late 1890s while a graduate student at 
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King responded positively to the idea. He visited New York City on August 1 – again 
prior to Gay’s report – and met with Rockefeller Jr. to agree on industrial relations as the 
focus. Gates then appointed King and arranged a one-year contract with the Foundation. The 
goal for King was to discover a path to improved labor-management relations, and King 
agreed to investigate the “great problems of industrial relations” and to do a project that was, 
as King saw it, “to be intensive study rather than extensive investigation.”61 
King’s contract began officially on October 1, 1914. As a result of preliminary 
meetings between King, Rockefeller Jr. and Greene, the Foundation stated King’s project as 
to conduct “an investigation of the great problem of industrial relations, with a special view 
to the discovery of some mutual relationship of labor and capital which would afford labor 
the protection it needs against oppression and exploitation, while at the same time promoting 
its efficiency as an instrument of economic production.” King was invited to outline his 
method for an investigation that would make the largest possible contribution to solving the 
labor-conflict problem. “It is our desire,” expressed the Foundation, “that the scope should be 
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as broad and comprehensive as possible, for only as a result of such an intensive 
investigation can we hope to be in a position to make helpful suggestions looking toward the 
improvement in industrial relations.”62 
When the decision was made to bring King on board, the idea to create an Institute of 
Economic Research, perhaps as a division at the Rockefeller Foundation, was still considered 
a possibility. Greene continued studying whether to bring such an institute into existence. He 
was even pleased when King’s research got underway, seeing King’s project as evidence that 
a broader research program might be undertaken. In a letter to Gay, Greene acknowledged 
“the close relationship which the work [of King] may have to the subjects in which an 
Institute of Economic Research will be interested.” He recommended that any expanded 
research program, “preceding any report that Mr. King may make within the next year or 
two, ought to be of the kind that an Institute of Economic Research would most appropriately 
father.” Of special continuing importance would be “keeping clear of controversial issues.”63 
When Gay’s and Morawetz’s reports came on August 4th, Greene still had in mind an 
institute to perform data collection and analysis. Writing in response to the two reports he 
reiterated for the Foundation’s Executive Committee that the existence of King’s research did 
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not preclude pursuit of expanded research projects by an economics institute. A full-scale 
research institute could even assist King’s efforts, as “The great undertaking Mr. King is 
about to enter will require a large amount of data; we will need an instrument for research 
and for the proper collection of material such as a properly organized Institute of Economic 
Research could furnish.”64 
Greene also responded to Gay’s and Morawetz’s reports. He asked for some 
clarifications and said he approved of the idea to initially study prices. Yet he wanted to 
know more about discussions concerning alternative forms of possible directorship for the 
institute. The official recommendation in Gay’s report was that the institute should be run by 
three economists. Yet Gay’s personal preference, as Greene had also learned, was for Wesley 
Mitchell as a lone director. There was also the dissenting report by Morawetz which 
recommended something of a rotating directorship. Greene asked Gay: “Will you consider 
the advisability of writing me a letter which will serve both as a rejoinder to Mr. Morawetz’s 
proposition and an elaboration of the argument in favor of the majority report.” Greene 
recognized a study of prices would be useful, especially given that research into price 
problems would “be fundamental to almost all other possible or profitable studies, and that is 
the only reason you have recommended it.”65 
Gay’s report received attention from Gates as well, who still supported the 
propaganda approach. In a letter to Rockefeller Jr. (already noted), Gates opined that the 
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truly urgent objective was to “get before all reading and thinking people,” from the lowest 
demagogues to the finest ministers, “a few of the elemental principle of economics.”66 
No doubt by late August people in the Rockefeller Foundation knew that events at 
Ludlow, though over with in terms of physical violence, were just beginning to have their 
potential impact of negative publicity on the Rockefellers. The United States Congress was 
calling for investigative hearings, which indeed would take place in just a few months’ time. 
Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation met, on October 21, 1914, and they discussed Gay’s 
and Morawetz’s reports. The trustees decided no immediate action should be taken. A main 
reason stated by the trustees was “the fact that since the question of establishing an Institute 
for Economic Research had been under consideration, an Investigation of Industrial Relations 
had been instituted under the direction of Mr. W.L. Mackenzie King.” Gates and Rockefeller 
Jr. quickly expressed agreement with the trustees, and by the end of October it was made 
official: no economics institute. Greene also accepted the decision, though he had to express 
it was “a disappointment,” partly out of his personal confidence that “King’s work will 
demonstrate the need for the Institute.”67 
We will see in the next chapter that King’s appointment to make the intensive study 
of industrial relations – a study motivated by Rockefeller interests at Ludlow – would soon 
be interpreted as the creation of an experimental social science division at the Foundation. 
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CHAPTER 3. NEW PRINCIPLES FOR PHILANTHROPIC 
SUPPORT OF SOCIAL RESEARCH–1914-23 
 
3.1 Introduction 
By late 1914, the Rockefeller Foundation had a new division to do social research: a 
“Division of Industrial Relations,” headed by William Lyon Mackenzie King. The division 
was envisioned so that King could develop one major study that would resemble what was 
already accomplished with the Sage Foundation’s survey of urban working and living 
conditions, as well as what was nearing completion by the Carnegie Institution’s division of 
economics and sociology. Like the tentative steps taken by the Sage Foundation and the 
Carnegie Institution, what was created by the Rockefeller Foundation was a project headed 
by one important figure willing to comprehensively study of one concrete and important 
problem: industrial labor conflict. King’s study – although it ended up being published 
outside the Rockefeller Foundation – would help pave the way for a new branch of 
Rockefeller philanthropy to be created between 1918 and 1923. 
 
3.2 King’s industrial research study–1914-15 
In October 1914, W. L. Mackenzie King began his project for the Rockefeller 
Foundation. King followed a research approach that he personally explained to the 
Foundation, as in a letter to Edwin Gay, King recorded that he and Rockefeller Jr. believed 
the planned study of labor issues would meet “the desire to make an important contribution 
toward our knowledge of the causes of the prevailing unrest.” King intended to use rigorous 
and objective methods to explain what was happening to cause such events as the tragedy at 
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Ludlow. King’s research was supported by the Foundation trustees, who favored a project to 
discover “if any substantial improvement in the relations between capital and labor could be 
worked out on a basis compatible with sound economics.” King’s research was also approved 
by Foundation Secretary Jerome C. Greene, who saw it as a starting point toward a “far-
reaching study of the labor question in America.” Greene believed in the value of social 
research for gathering facts on important problems, and he supported the idea that King 
should undertake “investigation of the great problem of industrial relations, with a special 
view to the discovery of some organization or union, or at any rate of some mutual 
relationship of capital and labor which could afford to labor the protection it needs against 
oppression and exploitation while at the same time promoting its efficiency as an instrument 
of economic production.” The main idea, in other words, was that King’s research findings 
ought to be able to help improve the conditions of workers as well as owners.68 
What was still needed was to precisely define the boundaries on King’s relationships 
to the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller family. Officially King worked for the 
Foundation, as direct ties to the Foundation seemed far preferable to having the public 
perceive King as working for the Rockefeller family. Yet what the public would end up 
seeing was, to some extent, beyond the Foundation’s control. The public tended to see King 
and his research activities as further evidence of Rockefeller wrongdoing. And in reality 
King did end up having various kinds of contact with Rockefeller Jr. King conveyed to 
Rockefeller Jr. some personal estimation of potential impacts of European war conditions on 
business interests in oil and mining. King groomed Rockefeller Jr. for personal meetings to 
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be held with workers and management at Ludlow. King even made personal trips to 
Colorado during 1915 to form first-hand understanding of local conditions. Finally King 
groomed Rockefeller Jr. for a series of appearances before the United States Congress.69 
3.3 Rockefeller Jr.’s congressional testimony–1914-15 
Through the latter two-thirds of 1914 the nation stood stunned by news of labor 
violence, especially what happened at Ludlow. The U.S. Congress had questions for 
Rockefeller Jr., and on December 4, 1914, Rockefeller Jr. met a request for information by 
submitting responses to a series of twenty-nine questions. A number of the questions aimed 
to learn about King and the purpose for the Foundation’s Division of Industrial Relations. In 
addressing the question, “What were the facts, reasons and considerations which led to the 
establishment of the Industrial Relations Division of the Foundation?,” the Rockefeller 
Foundation said that labor violence was an urgent problem and that the research goal was to 
use social science to discover its causes. The Foundation took time to describe in basic detail 
the work they asked King to perform.70 
A month later, on January 7, 1915, the Foundation was called again to testify to 
subcommittee questions. Asked if King had reported anything about his methods and the 
organization of his research, the Foundation stated: “He is proceeding as a student who is 
carefully surveying a special field of work, with a view to ascertaining in the first instance 
how far investigation of the great problem of Industrial Relations has been already profitably 
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carried out by others, and determining as to wherein further investigation may be made to 
advantage.” The Foundation emphasized for the subcommittee that it would make no attempt 
to influence King in “the questions he may wish to ask or the course he may wish to follow, 
in pursuing the work he has undertaken for the Foundation.” Also noted by the Foundation 
was that no interim progress reports were being asked for.71 
Rockefeller Jr. was brought back before Congress again, this time on January 25, 
1915. He prepared an eleven-page statement which noted in opening that “The Commission 
has asked my view as to what extent the stockholders and directors of a corporation are 
responsible for the labor conditions which are produced.” Rockefeller’s answer was 
essentially no different from his previous testimony, only a bit more detailed. He explained 
that in any publicly-owned business there are many different responsibilities that have “to be 
divided and vested” in many different persons, including stockholders, directors, officers, 
managers, workers, and others as well. The one legitimate thing that a large stockholder such 
as Rockefeller Jr. can do is attempt to exercise “moral influence” over persons who actually 
run the daily operations of a company. Such influence was what Rockefeller said he tried to 
exert. When it comes to labor conditions in particular, “so far as they are within the control 
of a corporation, [they] are a matter for which the officers of the corporation are primarily 
responsible and with which they, by reason of their experience and their first-hand 
acquaintance with the facts, are best qualified to deal.” When asked if he believed it was 
wrong for laborers to strike, Rockefeller Jr. stated: “I believe it to be just as proper and 
advantageous for labor to associate itself into organized groups for the advancement of its 
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legitimate interests, as for capital to combine for the same objects.” Only in this way, 
Rockefeller Jr. believed, could collective bargaining processes accomplish the fairest results 
for all parties. Rockefeller Jr. added, with some emphasis, that he had the “deepest concern” 
about the suffering that has happened among laborers and their families at Ludlow. He hoped 
there could be found adequate ways to prevent this from happening in the future, and this 
was what King’s study was all about. The Foundation’s new division was needed because in 
terms of making a modern business-society model work, what was needed was more 
scientific research aimed at getting the mechanism of public stock ownership to succeed.72 
Rockefeller Jr. was invited once more to testify, this time on May 20, 1915. In 
response to much public and media reaction to what he supposedly previously told the 
commission about having “no knowledge” of conditions in the Colorado coal fields, 
Rockefeller Jr. stressed he indeed had kept quite informed. “I have sought to inform myself 
and have not hesitated to make suggestions looking towards more adequate representation on 
the part of the employees and participation by them in the determining of matters pertaining 
to their working conditions.” Rockefeller Jr. again stressed his earlier words to Congress, 
“that I have studiously avoided anything that might afford ground…for the belief that in any 
particular I was seeking to dictate a policy or to arbitrarily control any situation.” Rockefeller 
Jr. wanted it clear on the record that all policies in Colorado prior to the strike “were decided 
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upon and carried out by the executive officers at Denver without asking our advice.” Yet he 
also wanted it known that, in December 1913, his New York office even directly invited an 
investigation of the ongoing mining-camp unrest by three federal judges. Finally he wanted 
put on record the many things he and others in the New York office did in the two months 
following the Ludlow tragedy: such as providing for injured employees and their families, 
asking for intervention by disinterested mediators, and even requesting that an adjudication 
board to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.73 
When Rockefeller Jr.’s four testimonies from December 1914 to May 1915 are taken 
altogether, what stands out is that the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations asked him 
tough questions. They investigated the Rockefeller family’s business and philanthropic 
motives, and they called upon Rockefeller Jr. and others to testify on relationships between 
the Rockefeller family, the Rockefeller philanthropies, King’s activities, and various other 
research organizations. One such organization, the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, 
reported to the commission that they had received direct support from the Rockefellers since 
1907. The original director of the bureau, Frederick A. Cleveland, even recalled for the 
commission that his dismissal from his directorship was partly because he disagreed with 
certain conditions attached to receiving financial support from Rockefeller Sr. Also brought 
up by the commission was the issue of Rockefeller Sr.’s previous offers to help financially 
support publications by the United States Chamber of Commerce. This attempt, which was 
not accepted by the Chamber of Commerce, became further evidence held against the 
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Rockefellers as persons attempting to gain too much power over potential government 
oversight of business.74 
Much criticism by the House commission during the four hearings perhaps had some 
basis. During the early 1910s, for example, the Rockefellers indeed gave money to the New 
York Bureau of Municipal Research. Both Rockefeller Sr. and Jr. had also considered 
providing financial support to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to help in publishing 
economic data. One lesson to be learned from the concerns of the House commission was 
that direct donations by the Rockefeller family could prove problematic.75 
Following all of Rockefeller Jr.’s congressional testimonies, more than ever the 
public turned to questioning King’s relationship to the Rockefeller family. In addition to the 
congressional criticism and media distain, many intellectuals and scholars were also 
increasingly critical of the Rockefellers. Particularly disapproved of was Rockefeller Jr.’s 
testimony in which he claimed that, when it came to King’s studies, in no way was the 
Rockefeller Foundation attempting to control the uses of social science for Rockefeller 
business purposes. Particularly Rockefeller Jr. emphasized the large number of academic 
economists who were being consulted by the Rockefeller Foundation. Rockefeller Jr.’s 
congressional testimony showed him believing that the problem of industrial relations around 
the nation was a problem that social scientists could speedily discover solutions to. When 
Rockefeller Jr. hired King, he was doing what was right according to a framework of modern 
business-society relations. The framework was one in which different groups all needed to 
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play their part, and the real problem resulting in all the violence was that social scientists had 
been slow to make their required contribution. The Rockefeller Foundation, with its new 
division, was trying to help remedy this. Rockefeller Jr. had been thinking “there was 
something fundamentally wrong in the condition of affairs which rendered possible the loss 
of human lives, engendered hatred and bitterness and brought suffering and privation upon 
hundreds of human beings.” In fact it was Rockefeller Jr.’s resolve to help perfect the new 
business-society model that led him to appoint King: “I determined that insofar as lay within 
my power I would seek means of avoiding the possibility of similar conflicts arising 
elsewhere…It was in this way that I came to recommend to my colleagues in the Rockefeller 
Foundation the instituting of a series of studies into the fundamental problems arising out of 
industrial relations.”76 
3.4 King’s project continues–1915-17 
As to King and his study of labor problems, the purpose of the project got adjusted 
slightly in response to everything that was happening. In some of their testimony for 
Congress, the Foundation emphasized that King’s project fit with the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s mission statement: 
Having in mind that hardly any relation in life is more far reaching than the industrial 
relation, and particularly having in view the growing tendency to misunderstanding 
and lack of harmony between employers and employees, resulting in great injury to 
both as well as to the general public, the Foundation has felt that no subject could be 
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more worthy of study, and that if it could work out sound and substantial 
improvements in the relation of capital and labor, it could hardly do anything better 
calculated ‘to promote the well-being of mankind,’ for which purpose the Foundation 
was created.77 
The Foundation emphasized that in no sense would King’s research “be local or 
restricted, or carried on with particular reference to any existing situation, or to the conditions 
in any one country.” King’s research was to be objective in spirit and execution in every way. 
When asked by Congress what kinds of investigations King aimed to pursue, the Foundation 
answered this was being “left to Mr. King to decide.” The hope was simply “that by careful 
study of world experience there may be disclosed methods of adjusting individual relations 
which if applied will prove of permanent value.” King’s work, “in spirit and in method, will 
be akin to that of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research. In so far as Mr. King’s 
inquiries have to do with industrial controversies, his attitude will be that of a physician who 
investigates the nature and causes of the pathological conditions with which he has to deal, 
with a view, if possible, to the discovery of effective remedies.”78 
The Foundation redefined King’s role in October 1915, clarifying his position solely 
as a scientific researcher, and not as an advisor. Foundation trustees placed King’s one-year 
budget entirely within the Division of Industrial Relations and made clear that King’s duty 
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was to produce a broad and general study, with no special focus on the Ludlow situation. 
King would, indeed, continue with the broader approach until completing his report.79 
Also in October 1915, Rockefeller Jr. made a personal trip to Colorado to make his 
first-ever visit with employee representatives of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. 
Speaking with employees, company officials, and other miners’ representatives, Rockefeller 
Jr. outlined his vision of what he wanted to convince the group of workers is “the best thing 
for us all.” Rockefeller Jr. spoke in terms of all groups in society obligated to work together 
to make capitalism work. Workers must fulfill their appropriate economic and social roles. 
Managers and owners are to play their roles as well. Rockefeller could not have endeared 
himself highly to the workers when he emphasized his belief that miners and their families 
always get their fair pay. Furthermore, it is actually the Rockefeller family that often gets 
nothing, if not even less than nothing (i.e., a financial loss), by the simple act of operating the 
company which always makes sure to pay workers’ wages first. Employee representatives 
were quite unable to relate to Rockefeller Jr.’s notion that workers, managers, and company 
officials are all “in our own family.”80 
Mackenzie King completed his study by the end of 1916. What King created was a 
somewhat idiosyncratic method of scientific presentation. He blended together an extensive 
quantity of data summaries and tables with various personal observations in an attempt to 
introduce his observations and conclusions in ways that would to lend an air of objectivity to 
the overall enterprise. King’s numerous tables and charts seemed especially designed to put a 
scientific gloss to the whole affair. All the Foundation leaders, including Rockefeller Jr., it 
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turned out were dissatisfied with King’s results. George E. Vincent, the new President of the 
Foundation, freed King to publish the report on his own accord, and King officially ceased 
his work for the Foundation. He published his extremely detailed study as Industry and 
Humanity, in 1918.81 
Dissatisfaction at the Rockefeller Foundation with the results of King’s research left 
the Foundation wondering if research on any kind of social problems might face fundamental 
limits of practicality and execution. Perhaps, they alternatively wondered, the Foundation 
might have insisted on tighter control over what they wanted from King (even though, of 
course, there were many reasons at the time why the Foundation had decided not to do this). 
If the Foundation was to be a grant-awarding institution with an interest in social research, 
then a question needed to be addressed: How might prospective projects in social science be 
evaluated for Foundation financial support without overly evaluating any potential research 
findings and their implications? 
By 1916 and 1917 the Rockefeller Foundation recognized they needed to consider 
ways to attain sufficient separation between the Rockefeller family, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and any research supported by the Foundation. The family moved to further 
dissociate themselves from decisions at the Foundation, as Jerome Greene and Ivy Lee drew 
lines between ties to be continued and ties to be severed. The Foundation needed to place a 
tight definition on what it would mean to not be an “operating” institution (i.e., an institution 
doing research), but a grant-awarding institution only.82 
81 McGregor, Fall and Rise of Mackenzie King, 215-26, 247-8. See also William B. Spaulding, “Why 
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82 See Grossman, “American Foundations and the Support of Economic Research,” 75. 
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3.5 Principles for establishing new institutes–1915-20 
In the aftermath of the abandoned attempt to create an economics institute and of the 
failure of King’s project to meet expectations, Foundation Secretary Jerome Greene initiated 
new discussion concerning potential requirements for creating a Rockefeller-supported social 
research division. One person with whom he interacted was Edward C. Pickering, a leading 
physicist of the day. If the idea for any kind of “Division of Social Research” was now 
eliminated, Greene wondered if a long-term partnership could even work between a 
philanthropic organization and university-based research. To get such a partnership to work, 
what would be important would be to identify legitimate rationale to serve the interests of 
both parties. Through his discussion with Pickering, Greene hoped to better understand the 
appropriate degree of separation between a philanthropic foundation, university researchers, 
and any eventual uses of research results. Pickering, actually, initiated the exchange of ideas 
by asking for $50,000 from the Foundation. Pickering hoped to disperse the money as small 
grants-in-aid to established “men of genius” in physics.  Dispersal of funds was to be 
administered solely by a committee comprised of members of the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science. Pickering’s request provided Greene with an opportunity to 
think through a tangible situation, and to state some rules. Though Greene respected 
Pickering, he had to decline the request. It would be in poor judgment, Greene determined, to 
begin “diverting a great Foundation from its true function of experiment, discovery, 
initiative, and demonstration, to being a mere bag of money.” One extreme solution thus was 
out, as a foundation could not react to each and every research problem simply by handing 
over money. The long-running principle of philanthropy at the Rockefeller Foundation – 
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espoused for roughly a quarter century by Gates, as well as by Rockefeller Sr. – forbid such a 
thing anyhow. Yet how much could the Rockefeller Foundation direct overall actions taken 
with granted money? Again a medium position needed to be found. The question therefore 
was: How to find a middle course between no control and complete control over the direction 
of philanthropically supported research?83 
The Rockefeller Foundation already recognized they did not want to have too much 
input into any specific social research to be done on Foundation funds. Perhaps some 
guidance could be obtained from what was happening in the physical sciences? Philanthropic 
support of research in the physical sciences was beginning to be done by establishing entirely 
independent research institutes. Notable cases were the Rockefeller Institute for Medical 
Research (created by John D. Rockefeller in 1901) and certain dimensions of the Carnegie 
Institution of Washington (created by Andrew Carnegie in 1902). These institutes were 
showing that philanthropic organizations could help develop research communities in the 
physical sciences on a fairly large scale. Yet still unshown was that financial support could 
be successfully directed to individual researchers.84 
Pickering, a national leader in the “endowment of research” cause, did not give up 
exploring the problem at hand. He got into additional discussion with geneticist Thomas 
Hunt Morgan, who like Pickering was a Foundation-supported scientist. The two discussed 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s proper role in supporting research, and in particular, they 
discussed possible frameworks that might allow Rockefeller funds to be used for grants to 
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train specific individual researchers. Pickering recognized that such grants could help 
improve education, whereas Morgan emphasized that such grants could be used to assist 
researchers to try new scientific methods potentially capable of producing examples of 
outstanding science – examples of a kind that could then be used to instruct entire scientific 
communities how to do better science. Pickering and Morgan may or may not have shared 
specific details of their discussion with Greene, but their basic ideas were surely present in 
the thinking that Greene and others were doing at the time.85 
The kinds of discussion represented by the exchanges between Greene, Pickering, and 
Morgan are typical of what leading scientists were considering by 1916. Greene, in 
particular, came to recognize one field of social research that could probably be financially 
supported: that the Rockefeller Foundation should establish an independent organization as 
an “Institute for Government Research” (IGR). Greene got an exploratory committee 
approved to assess the idea, and with a Foundation grant of $50,000 the committee did good 
work. They asked: How might problems of federal and state governance be studied with truly 
scientific methods? The committee recommended creating a private research organization 
with responsibilities to study the efficiency of federal government. An assumption was that 
such research would be relatively uncontroversial, given that whatever government was 
doing, it should at least be doing it efficiently. There was, therefore, a valid place for social 
research to determine whether efficient action was really what government was doing. The 
goals of government were not going to be questioned, but what would be studied was how 
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well government met its specified goals. Under the directorship of Greene as well as 
Frederick A. Cleveland (who had been director of New York’s Bureau of Municipal 
Research), the exploratory committee worked to develop a research program for an IGR, and 
the Foundation officially established the IGR in 1916 “to make investigations on problems of 
governmental administration and advise legislators and administrators upon request.” Robert 
S. Brookings, a reputable young economist, was appointed as director of the IGR, and the 
institute quickly built a solid program under financial support of the Foundation.86 
Also in 1916 another noteworthy organization was established as the National 
Research Council (NRC). Spearheaded in large part by Pickering, specifically as a solution to 
the problem he discussed with Greene and Morgan, the NRC was an organization to help 
coordinate and financially support the physical sciences. Inaugural chairman of the NRC was 
James Rowland Angell, under whose leadership the NRC quickly proved its value. Before 
long the NRC got itself considered for philanthropic support, which it received from both the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation in 1919. The major endowment – to 
the tune of five million dollars – came from the Carnegie Corporation. Initial interest of 
Rockefeller philanthropy was to learn how to administer fellowships, and the Foundation 
proposed supporting fellowships in the physical sciences to be administered by the NRC.87 
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With a goal to better connect private science to public purpose, the NRC succeeded in 
persuading philanthropists that scientists truly care about the public welfare. The NRC 
showed that scientists could be trusted to use grants in the interest of pursuing unbiased 
research, which therefore served the public interest. The NRC worked according to a 
committee structure, with different committees responsible for organizing cooperative 
research projects in different fields as well as between overlapping fields. The NRC 
committees were responsible for selecting fellowship recipients, and any philanthropists who 
gave money to the NRC quickly learned the NRC could be trusted to direct funds to useful 
research areas.88 
With its Rockefeller and Carnegie funds, the NRC did good work showing how to 
administer research fellowships. They also showed how to begin building “research centers.” 
In fact these two levels of attention – individual fellowships and research centers – were 
connected, in that fellowships could be used to draw the best talent into specific disciplines 
as well as to particular locations (such as up-and-coming science schools like Caltech, 
Stanford, and MIT). In both cases fellowships could be used to help build research 
communities.89 
Although the NRC was an organization of physical scientists, the chairman of the 
organization, James Angell, was actually a behavioral scientist. Angell had been one of the 
founders of the psychology department at the University of Chicago at a time when 
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psychology was generally considered to be the most matured of the social and behavioral 
sciences. Angell would leave the NRC in 1920 to take his experience leading a successful 
five-year building period and assume directorship of the Carnegie Corporation. Once at the 
Carnegie Corporation, Angell hired a former student of his, Beardsley Ruml. As Angell’s 
assistant, Ruml (a 1915 psychology Ph.D. from the University of Chicago under Angell’s 
directorship) joined Angell for Angell’s one year at the helm of the Carnegie Corporation. 
Angell implemented a major organizational shift at the Carnegie Corporation by directing an 
increased level of financial resources toward developing university-based research centers. 
While continuing to support both the IGR and the NRC, the Angell-led Carnegie Corporation 
got some new programs started. Whereas the previous main purpose for the Carnegie 
Corporation had been to distribute money to other Carnegie programs, the shift made by 
Angell was to use Carnegie money as block grants to directly build university graduate 
schools in the physical sciences. Here, then, was an additional part of the picture for how to 
help develop scientific communities.90 
Angell’s point of view had been influenced by Pickering’s long-running message, as 
well as by discussion with NRC activist Robert Millikin. Millikin even published an open 
recommendation in 1919, calling on philanthropists to take the lead in helping develop 
university-based research centers. Millikin’s plan, which encouraged philanthropic awards of 
direct aid to universities, was along the line of a question still open at the Rockefeller 
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Foundation: Should any amount of the Rockefeller Foundation philanthropy be used to 
directly support specific research areas in university settings?91 
3.6 The social sciences during the World War–1915-19 
The First World War was a watershed event in many ways, including in the history of 
social science. Some of this importance had to do with psychological testing, which was 
refined substantially during the war. Within the military’s program of administering 
psychological tests, a number of newly minted psychology Ph.D.s experienced first-hand the 
use of behavioral science in society. Among persons receiving training in developing and 
administering psychology tests for prospective soldiers were Robert Yerkes, James Angell, 
and Beardsley Ruml. Also during the war there were other applied uses of social science. 
One example was to help formulate government policy as, notably, the War Industries Board 
drew on the expertise of economists and other social scientists, including Robert S. 
Brookings, to identify effective monetary allocations to different wartime needs. Some social 
scientists were also employed in governmental information and war-support campaigns, the 
idea being that social scientists could be specialists at persuading people. This latter idea, in 
fact, was catching on in the business world as well, as psychologists were already being used 
to help develop advertising campaigns for various consumer products.92 
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When the war ended, a shortage of scientific manpower suddenly existed in certain 
fields in the United States; for as the economy improved, businesses recruited more 
researchers than ever before. Business needs included specialists in physical sciences of 
various sorts, and also included social scientists. A response to this needed to be to encourage 
more partnership between philanthropies and university-based science departments. 
Universities were beginning to increase their emphasis on research prestige, and as university 
status was getting judged more and more on the basis of research production, universities 
needed money to help increase such production; the supply of science graduates to 
universities definitely needed to be boosted. By about 1920, one of the first persons in a 
philanthropic position of power to recognize this demand factor was Wickliffe Rose, at the 
Rockefeller Foundation. Rose – who we will discuss in a moment – tended to believe 
scientists inherently bring with them a progressive way of thinking.93 
3.7 The NBER and the Institute of Economics–1918-20 
Meanwhile, the Harvard economist Edwin Gay interacted again with persons at 
AT&T and the Rockefeller Foundation. Gay initiated a new appeal for an economics 
institute, specifically proposing a study of income distribution in the United States, which 
was a newly recognized problem during a brief but severe post-war recession. In 
communication with Malcolm C. Rorty, a vice president at AT&T, Gay argued that an 
income-distribution study was urgently needed in the interest of national economic 
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performance. A goal already of some interest to Rorty was the possibility that “a 
considerably greater degree of political stability than exists now could be brought about if 
certain of the fundamental facts of industry and business were determined with accuracy or 
within reasonable limits of error.” Rorty was willing to offer his company’s data, thus taking 
care of that recognized need, and Gay and Rorty began considering whether the Harvard 
Business School might be appropriate as home base for a new economics research institute.94 
Gay, however, lacked confidence that Harvard’s resources were up to the task. He 
decided to put Rorty in touch with Columbia University economist Wesley Mitchell, who 
along with Gay had already been through the in-depth discussion that was part of the earlier 
effort at the Rockefeller Foundation to establish an economics research institute. Gay and 
Mitchell each recognized the basics about what was needed for institutional independence for 
such an institute, and it was in the context of such recognition that Gay encouraged Rorty to 
consider Mitchell’s qualifications as a possible director of such an institute. Mitchell liked 
the ideas that Rorty and Gay presented. And so, based loosely out of Columbia, Mitchell, 
Gay and Rorty quickly established what was initially named the “Committee on National 
Income” (CNI). Mitchell got some committee working rules stated at the outset, and he made 
clear his belief that the “character of economics is such as to require co-operation” between 
many researchers representing many subfields of economics. The committee would need to 
be made fairly sizeable if it was to be truly useful, as well as to be neutralized in any political 
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views. The founding parties were all agreed that much more was needed than merely a single 
researcher studying a single problem.95 
In the winter of 1919-20, from out of the CNI a national research organization was 
born: the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). At a much larger scale than the 
original CNI, the NBER was in a way a successor organization to the U.S. government’s 
Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, a wartime organization that had ceased receiving 
governmental support after the war. Gay and Mitchell had both been active in helping direct 
projects at the Central Bureau, and now they worked together to establish the National 
Bureau as an independent institution with an aim to provide scientific data analysis for 
policymakers. Consistent with the idea to seek out greater fundamental knowledge, the 
explicit mission of the NBER was “to encourage in the broadest and most liberal manner 
investigations, research and discovery and the application of knowledge to the well-being of 
Mankind.” NBER procedures were established to try and assure objective research results: 
“…to conduct, or assist in making of, exact and impartial investigations in the field of 
economics, social and industrial science, and to this end co-operate with governments, 
universities, learned societies and individuals.” Mitchell asked whether some way might be 
found to achieve social progress that would be better than the “jerky” old reformist 
movements that resulted from so many waves of agitators over preceding decades. Mitchell 
wanted high quality scientific planning for social change. “Are we not intelligent enough to 
devise a steadier and more certain method of progress?,” he asked. The NBER was, to 
Mitchell, an organization to help with the “intelligent experimenting and detailed planning” 
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that modern society needs. The NBER, without any direct connections to government, was to 
be a truly independent and professional social science organization. Mitchell wanted a blend 
of theoretical and empirical methods to be practiced in the NBER, and he especially 
emphasized the need for systematic interplay between the two – thereby making the two 
really become part of one method. Mitchell was adamant about the need to transform 
economics from a field based on dusty old theory to one founded on tangible, factual 
research; this was what the NBER needed do if it was to show it deserved Rockefeller 
support.96 
What needed to be proven to Rockefeller philanthropists was that the NBER could 
succeed as a truly non-ideological, non-partisan research organization. One of the first 
projects the NBER completed was Income in the United States, a report going a long way 
toward establishing that the NBER could do objective and unbiased research. The NBER 
earned its first major endowment from the Carnegie Corporation, when Angell provided 
funds for general research support. With this money a series of NBER research successes 
were quick to follow. NBER researchers showed ways to deal with large quantities of data, 
as well as how to obtain accurate measures of total national income, income distribution, 
rates of unemployment, and temporal patterns within business cycles. The Carnegie 
Corporation also allowed some funds to be earmarked for specific research projects at the 
NBER, with one such project, recommended in December 1921 by Secretary of Commerce 
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Herbert Hoover, being a study of labor unemployment rates during business cycles. Hoover 
asked that research results be obtained in less than six month’s time, to be presented to 
President Warren G. Harding. The NBER undertook the project on the understanding that 
their duties were strictly limited to fact-finding, and that they were to make no policy 
recommendations. The NBER completed the project.97 
During the middle 1920s, another line of commissioned NBER projects aimed at 
policymakers was one involving investigation of immigration. Yet another line of studies 
was initiated when Hoover, in his service to President Calvin Coolidge, requested a study 
focusing on recent changes in the U.S. economy. This latter study got published in 1929, 
under the title Recent Economic Changes. The point about these NBER accomplishments 
was that an independent economic research group showed they could achieve professional 
and scientific status – doing so by about 1921 or so.98 
In February 1922, the Carnegie Corporation began financial support of another new 
research organization, which was the brainchild of Robert Brookings. The new group, the 
“Institute of Economics” (IE), was directed by Harold Glenn Moulton, a professor of 
political economy at the University of Chicago. Brookings’s plan for the new institute drew 
on his experience with the Rockefeller-created IGR, which was still in operation. The IE 
would be structured not as teams of economists working on one or two projects at a time (as 
with the NBER), and certainly not as a single economist working on a single project (as with 
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the Rockefeller Foundation’s short-lived Division of Industrial Research), but would try 
another approach. The IE was to be structured as a loose-knit collection of economists 
dealing with many projects at once. Through communications with Henry C. Pritchett of the 
Carnegie Corporation, Brookings had it arranged that the IE could be established as an 
organization separate from the IGR. A main objective for any research project at the IE was 
not to evaluate government efficiency (as the IGR was doing), but was to gather data useful 
to provide to civil servants and government policymakers. Director Moulton had it placed 
into the IE’s by-laws “that the primary function of the trustees is not to express their views 
on the scientific investigations conducted by the Institute, but only to make it possible for 
such scientific work to be done under the most favorable auspices.”99 
Moulton dealt with the matter of arranging IE economists into different research 
fields within the institute. He assembled a staff carefully arranged to study four main areas of 
economics: agricultural economics; industrial and labor issues; international commerce; 
economic reconstruction problems (particularly those in Europe). Moulton recruited Edwin 
G. Nourse, an Iowa State College professor of agricultural economics, to direct the 
agricultural economics section. He placed Thomas Walter Page, a University of Virginia 
economist and former member of the U.S. Tariff Commission (i.e., the ‘Taft Tariff Board’), 
in charge of research in international commerce. Isadore Lubin, a Michigan-trained 
economist with experience on the War Industries Board, was deemed well-suited to guide IE 
research on industrial and labor issues. Moulton personally directed research dealing with 
international economic reconstruction. Moulton’s research group produced a notable study in 
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1923 on Germany’s Capacity to Pay, the argument of which was that post-war reparations 
and the reconstruction plan imposed by the Treaty of Versailles were scientifically 
impractical. When evaluated with solid economic analysis, the only possible conclusion was 
that Germany could not afford to do what other nations ordered it to do. A thin line rested 
between data analysis and policy advocacy in the study, but at least the policy conclusions 
were fairly uncontroversial, and were widely agreed upon at the time.100 
The IE proved successful, and five years after its creation, Robert Brookings came up 
with yet another idea. Seeing that the Rockefeller-initiated IGR and the Carnegie-supported 
IE were both successful, Brookings decided in 1927 that the two organizations should be 
joined. In fact there was another organization that Brookings also had helped create in the 
early 1920s which was the Brookings Graduate School – as a place where many Memorial- 
and Social Science Research Council-supported fellowship recipients went to school. In 1927 
the Brookings Graduate School would be joined with the IGR and the IE to become the 
“Brookings Institution.” However the moves to create the IE and later to put the IE within the 
Brookings Institution were not moves directly instigated by the Rockefeller Foundation or by 
the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial.101 
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3.8 Guiding principles at the Rockefeller Foundation–1918-23 
When we left things with the Rockefeller Foundation we had Jerome Greene in 
discussions with Edward Pickering, in 1916, about how to build university-based research 
communities. We also had an idea that another figure at the Foundation, namely Wickliffe 
Rose, was thinking about the same problem. 
Also at the Foundation was George E. Vincent, who did not side with any plan for 
direct financial aid of the kind that was proposed by NRC advocate Robert Millikin in 1919, 
and which Angell at the Carnegie Corporation was in fact willing to try. Vincent, who served 
as Foundation President from 1917 until 1928, was a sociologist, trained University of 
Chicago, who knew something about the social sciences. Vincent was also familiar with the 
committee structure created by the NRC. Approving of the value of such a structure as a way 
to minimize any potential troubles for philanthropists, Vincent directed the Rockefeller 
Foundation to begin providing money to the NRC – which in turn could direct money to 
universities.102 
Another leader at the Foundation between the mid-1910s and mid-1920s was, as 
stated, Wickliffe Rose. By about 1920, Rose got to a point that he was permitted to try such a 
plan as Angell instituted at the Carnegie Corporation. Rose began work at the Rockefeller 
Foundation as director of the International Health Board (IHB) in 1914. One of the 
Foundation’s first major projects at the IHB, taking place immediately after Rose’s 
appointment, was to send Rose around the world to visit countries experiencing greatest 
incidence of hookworm. Rose’s next project, which stemmed partly from his discoveries with 
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the hookworm study, was to address a shortage of public health administrators around the 
world. Rose set up a system of public health agencies, as well as helped establish rigorous 
standards for health officials. Rose then focused on establishing schools of public health at 
certain universities. This work, which in ways followed Angell’s approach at the Carnegie 
Corporation, included establishment of a fellowships program aimed at recruiting talented 
researchers and teachers to these programs. Rose brought in Simon Flexner (who was already 
connected with the Rockefeller Institute of Medicine) to help out, and with Flexner focusing 
on selecting prospective research fellows, Rose could focus on administering field 
operations. It seems it was through his contact with Simon Flexner that Rose clarified some 
ideas about the relationship between fundamental science and real-world applications, as an 
idea similar to what Gates expressed during the 1913-14 deliberation over a possible 
economics institute.103 
Following rapid success at the IHB, in 1919 Rose was selected by Rockefeller Jr. to 
take the helm of the Rockefeller Foundation’s General Education Board (GEB), where Rose 
introduced a program to offer general endowment money to U.S. colleges and universities. 
The money at first tended to be pledged on a matching funds basis, but because matching 
funds too often failed to come through as advertised, a backlog of GEB commitments soon 
accumulated. In 1920 the GEB had $9.4 million in outstanding commitments it was prepared 
to pay but could not. Such a backlog placed a severe limit on the kinds of new grant pledges 
the GEB could make. Rose reacted by getting GEB efforts reorganized according to a 
strategy of “regional centers.” Following a model again resembling what Angell was 
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developing, Rose used his available money at the GEB to begin selecting the best 
universities, including some regional choices (such as Vanderbilt and Texas), as well as some 
land-grant selections (including Cornell and Wisconsin).104 
Rockefeller Jr. came to quite appreciate Rose, and in 1923 Rose was moved from the 
GEB to the helm of the International Education Board (IEB), where Rose could further apply 
the philanthropic model he was helping develop. Rose put into action a direct-aid program by 
connecting together a network of advisors already existing in Europe (and with whom Rose 
was acquainted through his earlier directorship of the IHB), who could help in selecting grant 
recipients in their respective home countries.105 
Through all his appointments from 1914 to 1923, Rose became a leader in helping 
form a post-war vision for the Rockefeller Foundation. Rose had his central principle, which 
was to focus on a limited number of high-quality research groups as his preferred grant 
recipients. He also had an idea that grants were to be made only to those persons who seemed 
best prepared to lead “community development.” Rose’s objective, in his own words, was to 
“make the peaks higher.” In community development, the main goal is to find ways to 
develop the collective ability of an entire community of scientific experts. What Rose refined 
between 1914 and 1923 was, in a real sense, a new version of “scientific philanthropy” – 
which was that idea Gates introduced even prior to official creation of the Rockefeller 
Foundation. An important lever point for Rose’s version of such an approach was to award 
grants to particular individuals who were seen as the most favorable recipients based largely 
on their anticipated abilities to lead research-community development. A follow-up hope was 
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that the few supported leaders and their expert communities would proceed to produce fine 
examples of educational centers that other schools would then emulate. The challenging 
requirement was to find the right places to inject the always-limited philanthropic funds. 
Rose was one person in a series of philanthropy directors who had built and refined a 
valuable model. It was a model that was about to be followed by another leader of a 
Rockefeller philanthropic organization.106 
There is one more preliminary note to be made: Jerome Greene was still an important 
figure at the Rockefeller Foundation into the 1920s. While serving as Secretary of the 
Foundation, Greene became aware of Angell’s new approach at the Carnegie Corporation. 
Similar in ways to Angell’s method as well as to the approach enacted by Rose, Greene 
agreed that a measure of philanthropic success should be the measure of stimulating specific 
scientific communities. Greene wanted the Foundation to avoid supporting plain and 
undistinguished research, believing it was too easy for returns on financial support to be 
measured by a mere quantity of research papers produced. An alternative and superior 
measure could involve keeping track of links between research grants and expansion of 
graduate training – where training of new researchers could, in turn, lead to the building of 
better research programs. Grants could be targeted to stimulate specific research areas, which 
would grow with expanding quantities of innovation and discovery. For Greene, as for 
others, the “community development” approach was based on an idea that resulting benefits 
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would ultimately exceed initial investments, perhaps doing so by a kind of ‘multiplier effect.’ 
This idea of ‘exponential’ results from infused funds was perhaps the fundamental idea 
underlying a financial move about to be made with one Rockefeller philanthropic 
organization in particular.107 
3.9 The “Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial”–1918-22 
In October 1918, John D. Rockefeller Sr. established a philanthropic organization in 
memory of his late wife, Laura Spelman Rockefeller, who died three years earlier. The new 
organization was named the “Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial.” The “Memorial,” as it 
was known, was the fifth philanthropic organization established by the Rockefellers. 
Beginning with an initial capital endowment of $74 million, the Memorial had a charter 
purpose to make donations in the interest of women and children, which had been of greatest 
concern to Rockefeller’s wife. Through its first few years in existence, the Memorial firmly 
maintained its focus on such concerns.108 
Activities supported by the Memorial were oriented around reform movements 
directly concerning the welfare of women and children. Early grant recipients included the 
American Child Health Association, the East Harlem Health Center, and the Maternity 
Center Association of Manhattan. Among other grant recipients were such social welfare 
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organizations as the Young Men’s Christian Association, the Young Women’s Christian 
Association, the Boy Scouts of America, the Girl Scouts of America, and the Salvation 
Army. Other donations went to famine relief in Asia, emergency relief for post-war 
reconstruction in Europe, and to Baptist churches around the world. In all cases the main goal 
was to help women and children. A primary objective of early grants by the Memorial was 
stated by the Memorial as “promoting on interdenomination[al] lines the physical, 
intellectual and moral welfare of the young men and women of this country.”109 
Early work of the Memorial was based on five “fields” of interest. Religious 
organizations were considered important as channels for getting aid to women and children, 
and roughly one-third of total dispersed funds between 1919 and 1922 went to religious 
organizations, the majority to Baptist churches in the United States and Canada. Another 
substantial portion of funds – approximately 16% of total funds allocated between 1919 and 
1922 – went to emergency relief in post-war Europe and in famine-stricken China. Here, 
again, feeding and sheltering of women and children was a primary concern. Approximately 
7% of funds went to the field of public health, mostly to treat infants and younger children. 
Educational work accounted for 9% of funds, most of which went to Christian educational 
organizations in Asia and the Near East. The fifth field of donations was child development 
programs. During and immediately following World War I, the umbrella raison d’être for all 
projects supported by the Memorial was consistently and always the health and well-being of 
mothers and children. Within such a framework, however, it started making some sense that 
parent education concerning matters of child development could also be supported. But what 
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kinds of parent education programs, and what kinds of other grant assistance, could be 
rationalized as fitting with the Memorial’s stated purpose?110 
From 1918 to 1922, the Memorial operated directly out of the office of John D. 
Rockefeller Jr., with the main executive overseeing the Memorial being W. S. Richardson. In 
tune with the philosophy of the Rockefeller Foundation, an ideal goal held by those at the 
Memorial was to not merely address symptoms but to discover ways to prevent problems. 
Yet although such a goal was true from the beginning of the Memorial, Memorial activities 
during its first four years had little connection to studying fundamental causes. By 1921 there 
was some dissatisfaction with the Memorial’s performance, as much of what was done 
during its first four years could be evaluated, especially by persons within the Rockefeller 
Foundation, as quite unremarkable in nature. To trustees and officials at the Rockefeller 
philanthropies, there was no question but that the Memorial lacked direction. Management 
procedures at the Memorial were an unorganized hodge-podge of interactions between 
trustees and officials, with nothing particularly decisive resulting along the line of 
discovering true causes of social problems.111 
110 Between 1919 and 1922, the Memorial added a small level of funds (less than one-half of one percent of 
total appropriations) to support projects in scientific research. Some support was provided for scientific work 
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processed December 10, 1969. A more detailed history is Leonard Outhwaite, “The Life and Times of the Laura 
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In November 1921, Edward Embree, Greene’s successor as Foundation Secretary, 
contemplated the Memorial’s admirable ideals. He observed that certain areas of science, 
such as child nutrition and pre-natal care, might fit well with the Memorial’s stated purpose. 
The Memorial might also try supporting research on infant and maternal illness and 
mortality, and might even find benefits from studying the impact of housing conditions on 
infant and maternal health. These were all interesting possibilities – and there were other, 
similar possibilities to be thought of as well.112 
An important person at the Rockefeller Foundation who stated an opinion on the 
subject of the Memorial’s undistinguished performance was Rockefeller Jr., doing so at the 
end of 1922: “It is becoming more and more clearly recognized that unless means are found 
of meeting the complex social problems that are so rapidly developing, our increasing control 
of the physical forces may prove increasingly destructive of human values.” Rockefeller Jr.’s 
point was that the social sciences needed to stop lagging so far behind the rate of 
technological progress made possible by advancements in the physical sciences. The idea 
that it was not good enough to address symptoms alone was an idea shared by many at the 
Foundation and the Memorial. The Memorial decided, by late 1921, to search for a new, full-
time director.113 
3.10 Appointment of Beardsley Ruml–1922 
In fairly quick time, certain leaders at the Rockefeller Foundation and the Memorial 
expressed their support for Beardsley Ruml, the former student and protégé of James Angell. 
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Ruml was 27 years old at the time. Ruml’s supporters included George Vincent, President of 
the Foundation, and Raymond Fosdick, a Memorial trustee. Another who supported Ruml for 
the position was Angell, who was now president of Yale University. Various respected 
scientists in academia also supported Ruml. So, Fosdick contacted Rockefeller Jr. in 
December 1921 to make the official recommendation. Fosdick believed Ruml would 
emphasize a scientific focus while sticking close enough to the Memorial’s charter concerns. 
In the letter that made the recommendation, Fosdick expressed his own idea of a somewhat 
expanded program for the Memorial that would increase the emphasis on such fields as pre-
natal care, child nutrition, nurse training, and the like. Ruml was soon hired as Director of the 
Memorial.114 
Ruml came to the Memorial with knowledge of psychology research that, as 
historians note, showed him “the intellectual power of a scientific approach to human 
problems.” Although Ruml was still quite young in 1922, when he began his directorship 
duties he had done many things to distinguish himself. A graduate of Dartmouth College in 
1915, Ruml earned a psychology Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in two years, with a 
dissertation on mental testing. He then worked on personnel selection for the War 
Department, followed by a brief period spent assisting Angell at the Carnegie Corporation. 
Ruml was even appointed directly by Rockefeller Jr. during 1921 to make informational 
surveys of the New York Public Library, the American Museum of Natural History, and the 
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Metropolitan Museum of Art – all as prospective grant recipients for Rockefeller Jr.’s 
personal funds.115 
Ruml arrived at the Memorial in late spring 1922. Substantial redirection of Memorial 
funds was under serious discussion at the time, and various in-house communications helped 
prepare the Memorial to develop a new focus. As already noted, Embree, prior to Ruml’s 
hiring, emphasized maintaining the traditional focus on health and welfare of children and 
mothers while also developing new facets of support so long as these were of related 
concern. Fosdick went a bit further than Embree, and in October 1922 he drew a distinction 
between two basic kinds of programs capable of receiving attention: an “education and food 
program,” representing projects to improve the conditions of “backward” peoples; and a 
“social science program,” aimed at improving the conditions of “advanced” peoples. Both 
programs would go beyond focusing only on children and mothers, as success of the social 
sciences program “must depend not on the application of methods now known, but on 
methods yet to be discovered.” Here was a far-reaching idea: begin focusing on developing 
new scientific methods. Embree and Fosdick expressed views typical of the kinds of ideas 
available for Ruml to consider when he arrived at the Memorial. Another, complementary 
new idea came from Leonard Outhwaite, a newly hired assistant to Ruml, who in 1923 
explored areas of research that ought to be in line with the Memorial’s traditional focus, and 
added an ideal to promote “the status of the social sciences and the development of scientific 
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studies in the social science field.” Outhwaite recommended more study be made of contact 
points between “social science” and “social technology” – that is, of contacts between 
discovery of knowledge and applications of knowledge.116 
Ruml came to the Memorial at a time when new ideas were clearly being bandied 
about. It was also a time when the Memorial’s endowment was substantially increased by the 
Rockefellers. Yet with the increased endowment and with the hiring of Ruml there was also a 
sense in the works that the Memorial might not last very long. From the beginning of Ruml’s 
tenure, the sense was that a new kind of emphasis for the Memorial was to be something of a 
crash program to discover, once and for all, if a philanthropic foundation really could 
successfully support fundamental social science. Though there perhaps was some license for 
Memorial leaders to use the enlarged endowment quickly, there was also a need to use it 
carefully; it was, after all, a potentially one-time opportunity to build some really good 
things. By October 1922, Ruml clarified his directive ideas, which he presented in a 
memorandum that is well-known in the history of social science. Ruml stated in the 
memorandum – which will be studied in opening the next chapter – that he envisioned 
building a new kind of social science that could attack real-world problems. The new science 
would be capable of bridging the cultural lag between the science of physical nature and the 
science of man and society. One key to success for the Memorial’s new program would be to 
create a more equal relationship between natural science and social science. Also important 
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would be to find meaningful lines that might be drawn through the division of labor in social 
science – lines that would be useful for more clearly defining the different social sciences in 
order to build “scientific communities.”117 
117 Beardsley Ruml, “General Memorandum by the Director,” Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (also titled: 
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CHAPTER 4. RUML’S PLAN AND SUPPORT OF RESEARCH 
IN PSYCHOLOGY–1922-28 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In late spring 1922, Beardsley Ruml began his work at the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial. By that fall he had a comprehensive plan in place, which he presented 
to the Memorial trustees as a “General Policy Memorandum.” Ruml described a plan for 
what to do with many millions of dollars available to kick-start a worldwide program of 
social research based on rigorous scientific methods. Ruml’s number one advisor at the 
Memorial, Lawrence K. Frank, quickly produced a companion memorandum to further help 
guide new Memorial policy. One of the first projects pursued by Ruml, Frank, and others 
who led the Memorial into a new phase in its existence was to support psychology research 
aimed at helping the general public adapt to a rapidly industrializing world. 
 
4.2 Ruml’s policy statement–1922 
Shortly after arriving at the Memorial, Ruml began clarifying his expectations for 
what needed to be done. An early offering of Ruml’s perspective is in a Memorial summary 
statement of results for its first four years. Ruml used the opportunity to introduce his ideas 
to Memorial personnel and to emphasize the need for greater support of scientific research. 
He believed in attending to research that would show “rather immediate relations to measures 
of human welfare”; yet he also added that “The Memorial’s interest in scientific research is 
essentially humanitarian, having as its foundation a belief that knowledge and understanding 
of the natural forces that are manifested in the behavior of people and of things will result 
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concretely in the improvement of conditions of life.” New knowledge needed to be 
discovered, Ruml believed, and knowledge also needed to be assessed for what it could 
contribute to “concrete” social improvement over the long run.118 
In October 1922, Ruml presented his “General Memorandum on Memorial Policy.” 
The centerpiece idea in the memorandum was a goal to rigorously study social conditions 
and their causes. Ruml spoke optimistically of a world of impending breakthroughs in the 
body of substantiated knowledge about human beings and their societies. He also used a 
familiar analogy to communicate a message of lament: “All who work toward the general 
end of social welfare are embarrassed by the lack of that knowledge that the social sciences 
provide. It is as though engineers were at work without an adequate development in the 
sciences of physics or chemistry, or as though physicians were practicing in the absence of 
the medical sciences.” Ruml identified that “The direction of work in the social fields is 
largely controlled by tradition, inspiration and expediency, a natural condition in view of our 
ignorance of individual and social forces.” A better scientific program needed to be 
established, and it needed to be a program based on demonstrated principles.119 
Ruml’s memorandum can be studied in detail. Ruml took time in the memo to 
summarize the past and present of social science, but what he really cared about was setting a 
future course. He noted that the Memorial had a discretionary budget of approximately two 
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million dollars for 1923, and that to use the money wisely it would be “desirable to choose 
the general field of endeavor so that it will be rich enough in opportunities to measure up 
fully to the resources available for its cultivation.” Ruml wanted to use principles of 
scientific philanthropy and the model of community development. He wanted to find the best 
entry points for injected money, which would be locations capable of getting to root causes. 
Ruml identified eight fields that might be considered to be social “sciences,” and he believed 
all these fields were needed.120 
In addition to scientific philanthropy and community development, Ruml recognized 
that another guiding principle should be to discover what kinds of scientific programs could 
be directly extended from established Memorial interests. He kept in mind established 
interests in social welfare as he focused on developing the social sciences as a whole. He 
explained: “An examination of the operations of organizations in the field of social welfare 
shows as a primary need the development of the social sciences and the production of a body 
of substantiated and widely accepted generalizations as to human capacities and motives and 
as to the behavior of human beings as individuals and groups.”121 
It was clear to Ruml that many university researchers were not yet doing true social 
science. University faculty spent too much time teaching, and university research facilities 
were typically too few in number. Social research in the universities remained “largely 
deductive and speculative,” typically performed “on the basis of second-hand observations, 
documentary evidence and anecdotal material.” Such sources of knowledge were little help 
to anyone wanting truly progressive “social engineering.” Ruml used an idea of “cultural lag” 
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to argue what was urgently needed from social scientists was to match realized results of 
technological control over society with scientific understanding of what is really happening 
in society. The idea of “cultural lag” was a kind of catchphrase in 1922, owing to a recent 
academic treatment by Columbia University sociologist William Fielding Ogburn, in the 
1922 book Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature. Ogburn’s thesis was 
that acute social problems owed to an imbalance between the technological and economic 
sectors on one hand, and the cultural and political sectors on the other – and that new policies 
of social control therefore were needed.122 
Ruml proposed a fundamental shift for the social sciences. Ameliorative grants were 
no longer the proper goal, as the social sciences were to be tools for a cadre of experts to use 
to help lift human welfare. All that was needed was more fundamental knowledge in the 
experts’ tool kits. The increase in fundamental knowledge should be attainable by putting 
social scientists in “a far more intimate contact…with concrete social phenomena.” Ruml 
believed the best place from which to launch the scientific attack on social problems was the 
university setting, as universities possessed “stability of organization” and maintained a 
“wide range of professional opinion” alongside “scholarly and scientific standards of work.” 
University researchers were also creating “reasonably effective channels of inter-university 
communications” which could be further strengthened. The Memorial was well positioned to 
help build on a base already present in the universities, to create scientific research 
communities.123 
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Ruml recognized that guiding principles and goals were needed. The chief principles 
were that scientific research needed to be done by permanent organizations, and that the 
Memorial should never carry out its own investigations. Organizations doing Memorial-
supported research ideally should feature a combination of graduate and undergraduate 
programs, so that research activities could be closely connected to teaching. Fellowship 
programs were to be used to bring quality faculty into university-based social science. New 
journals and book presses were needed to enable social scientists to make their discoveries 
known. Ruml discussed a series of strategies to make all this happen: strengthen a few 
existing reputable research centers; get some fellowships programs into operation; help 
create a guiding committee of perhaps ten or so leading social scientists who would advise on 
important research problems and methods; do real-world experiments; continue to assist the 
advancement of knowledge in parent education and child development, particularly in real-
world conditions such as New York City. Persons doing science needed to be connected to 
persons applying scientific findings, thereby showing that science could truly benefit from 
access to real-world “laboratories.”124 
A key instrument for putting the whole process into action would be multi-year 
grants. A few philanthropies – including the Memorial as well as the Russell Sage and 
Carnegie organizations – were in good positions for doing this. “Their resources are large 
enough and permanent enough to make it possible by planning over a period of years to 
attack really fundamental situations and to reach relatively remote ends. Work of this kind 
the contemporary generation is not organized to do.” Ruml added that “the responsibility of 
the foundations would seem to be most satisfactory assumed through the choice of a program 
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requiring effort and support, which they are uniquely qualified to render.” The Memorial was 
ready to help lead the way by supporting a limited number of established institutions, 
primarily universities. Ruml strongly recommended the Memorial should leave it mostly to 
grant recipients to determine their preferred usage of funds, and that there was real value in 
placing as much responsibility as possible on those persons actually overseeing and 
conducting the research. All parties needed to know that what was ahead would be “the work 
of a period of years, perhaps a decade.”125 
Ruml’s policy statement was approved by the trustees and quickly became well-
known among leading social scientists. James Angell, now President of Yale University, 
received a copy of the memorandum from Ruml and replied that Ruml’s proposal seemed 
“sufficiently flexible and at the same time sufficiently specific to try out what could be 
done.” John M. Glenn, Director of the Russell Sage Foundation, also contacted Ruml, hoping 
to learn more about the new policy. Ruml shortly provided Glenn with copies of various 
grant proposals as the Memorial started to receive them from different universities. These 
proposals revealed the extent to which universities were responding positively to the new 
policy.126 
Ruml’s other main project was to begin surrounding himself with a fine group of 
officers. He met fairly often with George Vincent, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, 
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to exchange ideas and gain advice. He also interacted with Arthur Woods and Raymond 
Fosdick, both of whom were already at the Foundation as trustees. Ruml appointed Woods as 
acting president of the Memorial, a position Woods would hold from November 1922 
through December 1928. Fosdick would remain a Foundation trustee, but over the next six 
years would have much input to the guidance of the Memorial. As a legal scholar who had 
helped Rockefeller Jr. do research on municipal problems in New York City and on reform 
efforts of interest to the New York Bureau of Social Hygiene, Fosdick was keenly interested 
in social science, believing the social sciences were finally beginning to approach “the 
growing edge of things.” Throughout the life of the Ruml-led Memorial, Fosdick would 
serve as the Rockefeller family’s most direct contact to the Memorial.127 
Ruml moved quickly to recruit new assistants. In 1923 he recruited Lawrence K. 
Frank, a Columbia-trained economist. Frank taught business and commerce at the New 
School for Social Research between 1920 and 1922, and had interests in anthropological and 
psychiatric approaches to behavior analysis as well. Frank also had seen social problems 
first-hand while studying mortality in New York’s Lower West Side. Frank came in to 
specialize in child development and welfare programs, and he was asked by Ruml to evaluate 
these programs and develop future plans. Ruml brought in Leonard Outhwaite the same year. 
Outhwaite had wide-ranging sociological interests, including race and race relations. Over 
the next few years Ruml also brought in Sydnor Walker, Edmund E. Day, and Guy Stanton 
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Ford. Walker specialized in overseeing the Memorial’s support of social welfare research. 
Day, originally a professor of history at the University of Michigan, had interests in history 
as well as economics, and would (in 1929) be made head of the social science division of the 
Rockefeller Foundation. Ford, a history professor at the University of Minnesota, seems to 
have been more of a generalist in his Memorial duties.128 
Ruml also began setting a manner of interaction with Memorial trustees. He adopted a 
consistent approach, whereby he would present policy resolutions to the trustees as these 
were drafted by himself. When it came to a specific grant application that Ruml wanted 
approved, his style was to present the original application to the trustees. However in cases 
that he did not favor, Ruml attempted to save the trustees any trouble by summarizing the 
application’s content and indicating his preference for decline. It seems clear that the 
trustees, who were responsible for awarding the money, typically knew what Ruml wanted. 
Ruml thus placed the trustees within the fold of his all-important goal to separate decisions 
about financial support from all specific matters concerning the research to be supported.129 
4.3 Program clarifications–1923 
Shortly after presenting his policy memorandum, Ruml asked Frank, the trained 
economist in the group, to produce a companion policy memorandum in the form of a survey 
report. Frank’s task was to determine, somewhat more tangibly, what was needed to put 
Ruml’s new policy into action. Frank’s background suited the task of making a detailed 
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survey of the condition of all social science programs in American colleges and 
universities.130 
By March 1923, Frank produced a lengthy report aimed at exploring what social 
science is. “The Status of Social Science” overviewed where social science came from and 
where it might be able to go. Frank evaluated five main social sciences (economics, 
sociology, political science, psychology, and anthropology) and recognized how historical 
circumstances helped cause all five social sciences to be mostly non-empirical in their 
methods. Fortunately some hints existed at least of a quantitative shift in the works. Frank 
found that fifteen universities maintained doctoral programs in the social sciences, but he 
also noted that few recent doctoral dissertations made empirical investigations of concrete 
situations. Frank tallied a list of subjects studied by recent doctorates to establish that nearly 
all dissertations were “works of scholarship, involving library studies and consultations of 
records.” The “backwardness of the social sciences” was to be lamented; in an especially 
sorry state was training “in scientific methods,” as even a most basic statistics course was 
required curriculum at only a couple of schools. Two main reasons accounted for the 
backwardness of the social sciences: “the tendency toward work of scholarship and the 
absence of training in scientific method are ultimately attributable to the dominant tradition 
of the social sciences and to the lack of adequate funds to support investigations and 
experiment.” There just wasn’t enough money in the universities to allow teachers to escape 
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from crushing teaching loads. “The most promising method of giving assistance to these 
teachers would be to establish a research bureau or institute,” Frank advised, “which would 
supply the needed clerical, statistical, and other help required for any worthwhile 
investigation.” Publishable research could especially be improved by putting researchers in 
touch with statistical assistants. “[T]he growth of science was ultimately conditioned by the 
availability of scientists,” who needed to have opportunities to actually to do science. If the 
old ways were to be broken, much money would be needed.131 
The field of economics served Frank as a clear illustration. Various aspects of 
economics were worth exploring to find out how best to begin supporting the social sciences 
as a whole. The “scientific output has been very small” in economics, and economists 
themselves recognized “there is an absence of real scientific work in their field.” Deficiencies 
in methodological training owed partly to the fact that a limited number of fellowships were 
available for economics graduate students; and this was a situation similar to other social 
sciences. Economics and other social sciences genuinely progress only when “concrete 
problems” are addressed: “…it is just in proportion that a science has addressed itself to 
specific problems that scientific progress has been made, for obviously the most general 
questions are not susceptible of treatment until a body of proximate facts and a knowledge of 
relationships have been obtained by study of specific, concrete situations and conditions.” 
The older approach to social research based on “speculative” studies to “purify definitions” 
and “classify” cases was faulty. Such science was stuck in typological thinking and used data 
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just as “the naturalist who classifies, compares and judges animal forms and activities, but 
stops with the superficial aspects.”132 
Frank agreed with Ruml that it would be “necessary to take a long term view” to 
build a new structure of social science based on rigor and experimentation. Again Frank 
illustrated with economics, as he asked what kind of social science do businessmen now 
want? “[B]usiness men find that the academic economic science tells them little about the 
concrete situation with which they are concerned. Economists are looking at the whole of 
economic life in its long term trend, seeking wide generalizations, while business men are 
concentrated upon scientific situations.” Social science research was being done in many 
businesses mostly to understand economic forecasting and managerial efficiency. Business 
organizations were getting ahead in the world of social science not only because they valued 
it more, but also because they “have the funds to pay for investigations and tabulations, while 
the universities have not.” As a result, “the scientifically inclined men in the universities are 
being taken over by business organizations.” More of the modern, empirical kind of 
economic science was needed in universities, and this science would need to be built in two 
phases: first develop a truly scientific “habit of mind”; then focus on improving scientific 
methods and discovering knowledge. Research fellowships could help in both phases. 
Fellowships would support younger scholars while they got better training in scientific 
methods. Frank admitted, however, that “it would require a period of years to work out 
methods of research and experiment, to train investigators and to clear the ground.”133 
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An experimental mindset would be key. “[E]xperiments, by varying conditions and 
circumstances, bring out and disclose what ordinary observation had failed to note.” The 
older-style work on classification and definition-building would even benefit from “the 
stimulus of experimental work because the prevailing categories of social science are so 
largely inherited from moral and ethical disputes of the past.” One way to get past problems 
associated with the older, morally-weighted social science would be to emphasize better, 
more objective methods. “One aspect of social science which is related to this question of 
experimental study is this: in general, efforts at social research are classified as radical, 
liberal or conservative.” Frank meant by this that “agencies doing research work today in 
economics and sociology are known…under one of these three classifications,” and that this 
was a serious problem that could be helped by doing more experiments. “[S]ocial research in 
the absence of experimental work, tends inevitably to become or to appear apologetic or 
polemic, to play the role of disputant and attorney, rather than that of scientific inquirer.” An 
objective stance would be able to help social scientists avoid being pejoratively labeled as 
possessing one or another kind of political bias.134 
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Frank made three recommendations for the way forward: lighten teaching loads; 
change teaching methods to be more in contact with research activities; increase research 
fellowships. All three changes would help make social scientists more available to do actual 
science. Graduate-level training in methods of scientific research needed to be strengthened, 
and one idea was to have a research fellowships program run by having teachers recommend 
students believed worthy of support. Ultimately the best solution would be to focus on the 
younger generation, who were the ones who would need to break the chains of the old ways. 
“[T]he processes of changing the formalized teaching of social science would be started with 
the young students of today and a way out of the speculative inertia of social science 
opened.” The younger generation indeed really yearned for this.135 
Frank’s overall message fit well with Ruml’s presentation of five months earlier. As 
revealed in the words of Ruml from October 1922 and Frank from March 1923, a recognized 
tension in social science was between historical and empirical research. By no means were 
Ruml and Frank the only ones who recognized such a tension. The tug between the two 
styles of social science had been long-debated, at least since the 1880s. It could seem no side 
was yet winning, and so perhaps some added money could be a tipping force. The traditional, 
archival method of social science was inexpensive, based as it was on existing materials, 
largely historical in nature. Library and archival materials typically were used to try and 
establish regularities in human behaviors and social institutions over time. Newer approaches 
to social research were beginning to get based more on empirical observation. The shift to the 
uncertain world of empiricism was a change trying to take place across the social sciences. 
Psychologists began such a move as early as the 1870s and 1880s. Other fields trying to 
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make the move included sociology, where researches since the 1900s were establishing 
increasingly empirical methods, as well as political science since the 1910s. Economists, 
although they had begun developing more mathematical approaches during the 1870s and 
1880s, were lagging a bit. Yet recent economic studies (such as by Irving Fisher in the 
United States and Arthur Pigou in Great Britain) were beginning to change this. An 
increasingly valuable research tool for all the social sciences by the 1920s was statistics.136 
Ruml and Frank joined in stating the primary objective for the Memorial: to promote 
empirical science. Even though Ruml had to wait about a year before various financial 
commitments at the Memorial could let up enough to loosen the leash on grant awards, he 
would definitely make the move when he could. In preparation for the opportunity, Ruml 
consulted with leading thinkers in social science. With G. Elton Mayo, for example, Ruml 
discussed problems in industrial research. Mayo’s research impressed Ruml mightily, and he 
obtained for Mayo a three-year personal grant so that Mayo could continue at the University 
of Pennsylvania rather than return to his home institution, the University of Queensland, in 
Australia. Ruml also shared ideas with Charles Merriam, of the University of Chicago. 
Merriam’s ideas for rigorous social science interested Ruml, and the two communicated 
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often on the subject of Merriam’s ideas to develop a national-level organization that might 
help promote better methods of social research.137 
Ruml recognized he arrived at the Memorial at an important time in the history of 
social science. It was a time when society was trying to determine what social science was, 
and what it could do. The big question was how best to support social science. There was 
little if any government support of social science during the early 1920s (with one minor 
exception being a small amount of support for rural sociology), and Rockefeller philanthropy 
was in a powerful position. Ruml had much money to work with, and he and Frank a plan: 
discover how to award money so that social science could have the best chance to do the 
most good.138 
4.4. A possible “research center” at the University of Pennsylvania–1923-28 
The year 1923 was when Ruml began using Memorial funds the way he wanted. The 
first month of the year he received the university contact that initiated his effort to try 
building his first research “center.” The letter came from the University of Pennsylvania, and 
it proposed developing a psychology project capable of connecting to other social 
sciences.139 
By about 1920, psychology was likely the most developed of the social and 
behavioral sciences. What was called the “new” psychology had been emerging by the 
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1890s, and psychologists increasingly considered themselves professional experts. 
Psychologists respected early experimental work by German “psychophysicists” dealing with 
matters of sensation and perception, often by using reaction-time experiments. Also admired 
was William James’s 1890 book, Principles of Psychology, which strongly emphasized the 
need for empirical methods. James’s own method, which he called upon other psychologists 
to accept, was called “functionalism.” The idea of functionalism was to study habits and 
other measurable behaviors as adaptive functions; even the human mind could be included in 
functional analysis, in that it was seen as adapted to its environment. Two years following 
James’s Principles, twenty-six charter members established the American Psychological 
Association, and in 1894 the new organization helped establish the Psychological Journal.
(A smaller group of psychologists had actually begun the American Journal of Psychology in 
1887, but their journal was not particularly scientific until its editors moved to match the 
journal of the American Psychological Association.)140 
Closer to the period of Penn’s application to the Memorial, John B. Watson published 
an important paper in 1913, on “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It.” Watson advocated 
the use of objective, empirical science, based exclusively on externally observable behaviors. 
Watson’s message was deterministic, however, in believing that the way an organism 
interacts with its environment owes to an aggregate of inborn, innate properties that await 
awakening by environmental stimuli. In 1916, the famous “Stanford-Binet test” – i.e., the 
“IQ test” – made its public debut telling psychologists that a specific objective measure 
might even exist for the qualities of what are inherently in a particular human brain. The IQ 
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test, like Watson’s argument-based metaphysical assumption, relied on a deterministic 
construct.141 
Enter, now, the new psychological projects of the 1920s, which could make use of 
deep pockets. Research of the 1920s would be research marking the beginning of the so-
called “age of learning” in professional psychology. It is in this context that Penn’s research 
proposal came forth.142 
In January 1923, faculty members at the University of Pennsylvania responded to 
Ruml’s statement of Memorial policy by inquiring whether the school might receive a block 
grant, which was a grant of a kind that would be largely left to the institution to determine 
how to use. Penn researchers had an interest in the relationship between harsh industrial 
working conditions and problems of psychological well-being. A high level of maladjustment 
of mental habits and beliefs seemed to be a working out of a powerful “irrationality” 
principle in industrial society. Penn researchers needed to study industrial workers in real-
world situations. The school’s Department of Industrial Research was unique, they argued, in 
being “the only [department] in the country which has effectively brought into association a 
group of employers of a community for the study of personnel problems under university 
auspices.” As led by industrial economist Joseph Willits, the department noted they had 
forged contact between business interests and university researchers, and that such contact 
 
141 See John M. O’Donnell, The Origins of Behaviorism: American Psychology, 1870-1920 (New York: New 
York University Press, 1985). See also Hamilton Cravens, The Triumph of Evolution: American Scientists and 
the Heredity-Environment Controversy, 1900-1941 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), esp. 
cha. 2; Cravens, “The Behavioral and Social Sciences,” in Mary Kupiec Cayton and Peter W. Williams, eds., 
Encyclopedia of American Cultural & Intellectual History, vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2001): 
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142 By the end of the 1920s it would be possible for psychologists suddenly to believe there were “seven 
psychologies”; see Edna Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies (New York: Century, 1933). Also useful for 
understanding the diversity suddenly present in psychological thought by about 1930 is Edwin G. Boring, A
History of Experimental Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950). 
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seemed a promising way to better understand the “irrationality” principle as it pervaded 
everyday life.143 
Shortly following Penn’s initial inquiry, Penn’s industrial sociologist and 
psychologist, G. Elton Mayo, also submitted a project description. Mayo reported he had 
observed an extreme psychological manifestation during wartime, and he now recognized a 
milder version of the same manifestation in everyday life. “Probably the work done by 
psychiatrists in ‘shell-shock’ hospitals with soldiers has, more than any other psychological 
achievement, drawn attention to the curability of many mental disorders. It has also drawn 
attention to the wide distribution of mental disorder, lack of ‘balance’ and unhappiness 
through the modern community.” Wide-spread occurrence of low-level ‘shell-shock’ is “an 
untouched social problem of large dimension”; it is a widespread occurrence bringing not 
“reason” in the economy and society, but much “unreason.” It seemed beyond doubt, to 
Mayo, “that prejudice, emotion and unreason are responsible for the origin and perpetuation 
of a great part of our social ills.” Unlike what had been believed by earlier social scientists, 
“irrationality of the type discussed by the crowd psychologists is not an inborn character of 
the human mind, but originates during the lifetime of the individual.” Mayo advocated not an 
innate biological approach, but an approach much more environmental in nature.144 
Mayo was a well-known scientist, known personally by Ruml, and whose work 
Arthur Woods was also familiar with. Born in Australia, Mayo was a professor of 
 
143 The University of Pennsylvania’s request for funding, dated January 17, 1923, was interpreted by the 
Memorial as “too industrial in nature”; see “University of Pennsylvania, Department of Industrial Research.” 
Penn next recommended exploring an area that “in time may result in opening a field of real usefulness.” The 
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something Penn believed put Penn in position to extend from studying “problems of an economic nature” (i.e., 
sources of labor supply, labor turnover as a community problem) to problems spanning a broader context. 
RAC–LSRM, Series III. Box 75, Folders 790-791. 
144 G. Elton Mayo, Project Description, March 1, 1923, pp. 1-2, RAC–LSRM, Series III. Box 75, Folders 790-
791. 
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psychology and physiology at the University of Queensland when the “Great War” broke out. 
He had been developing a kind of medical psychology, based on recognition that physical 
ailments can provoke psychological ailments, and also sometimes visa-versa. Shortly before 
the war, Mayo got a chance to make friends with British anthropologist Bronislaw 
Malinowski, while the latter was visiting instructor at the University of Melbourne. The two 
spent many hours together discussing anthropology and sociology, and Mayo learned 
especially about the cultural role of superstition and irrational belief. Mayo was thus well-
prepared in a range of social sciences when he got an opportunity in 1923, with Memorial as 
well as NRC support, to come to the University of Pennsylvania. Mayo’s goal at Penn was to 
expand his medical psychology by doing research on the impact of factory work on workers’ 
bodies and minds. Mayo worked under the direction of Joseph Willits to explore ideas to 
connect medical research and industrial institutions.145 
Ruml arranged personal meetings with Mayo and Willits by May, reporting back to 
Woods that he “had a profitable day in Philadelphia…going over the work of Willits and 
Mayo. I was very favorably impressed, not only by the quality of the work Mayo has done, 
but by the way he has interested manufactures in the possibilities.”146 
Penn got its grant, and its research program got started and grew over time. Mayo 
guided researchers doing studies in Philadelphia factories, especially in a number of large 
textile works. Another group of Penn researchers joining the project under Willits’s guidance 
was at Penn’s Wharton School of Commerce. An idea connecting Willits’s business-school 
researchers into the larger project at Penn was an idea that “social science” needed to be 
 
145 See Richard C.S. Trahair, The Humanist Temper: The Life and Work of Elton Mayo (New Brunswick and 
London: Transaction Books, 1984): esp. 83-5, 171-95. 
146 Beardsley Ruml to Arthur Woods, May 20, 1923, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 25. 
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joined with a university department representing “social technology,” which was what the 
Wharton School represented. Potential research areas for Willits’s group, as he stated in May 
1923, included such things as medical insurance issues, labor turnover rates, and studies of 
wages and earnings. The central idea remained, however, that all these areas might be 
connected to a study of the irrationality principle in society. The connection between 
psychology research and the projects to be studied by the commerce professors, began, 
Willits explained, from the “original idea [of Mayo] to treat a factory as if it were a ‘shell-
shock’ hospital and to examine every individual in it with the object of discovering: 1st, In 
what respect his attitude to life was abnormal or defective. 2nd, The effect of such 
abnormality or defect upon collaboration in work within the factory.” The goal for Willits’s 
research team was to discover what kinds of things the harsh factory environment of the day 
could do to workers in terms of their quality of everyday life.147 
Penn’s program branched into a number of projects through the 1920s. The central 
focus of all projects was to explain economic and social conditions in terms of psychological 
causes. Penn’s program achieved some successes, and by 1927, researchers in the Wharton 
School tied their projects together under the idea of “Industrial Problems of Individual 
Adjustment, which involves cooperation of the Physiologist, the Psychologist and the 
Economist for effective solution.” The operative word, here, was “cooperation.” Penn 
 
147 By May 1923, Penn prepared reports (e.g., “Studies in Process in the Industrial Research Department”) 
identifying six projects, all fairly economic in nature. Joseph Willits, a professor in Penn’s Wharton School of 
Commerce, corresponded with Ruml regarding connections between economics and psychology; see Beardsley 
Ruml to Joseph Willits, January 29, 1923; Willits to Ruml, May 14, 1923; Willits to Ruml, May 29, 1923; 
Willits to Ruml, October 1, 1923; RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 75, Folders 790-791. In the submission by 
Willits of May 14th, he explained that work he was doing under an earlier, direct endowment from John D. 
Rockefeller, Jr., “related very closely to the work of the psychiatrist.” This was also the letter in which Willits 
explored the psychology-economics connection as it began from the “original idea” of Mayo. Communications 
between Mayo, Willits and Ruml continued over many years; see RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 75, Folders 790-
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researchers were aware that many social problems needed the attention of specialists in 
multiple fields of social science. All lines of research pursued by Penn researchers aimed to 
discover what kinds of impacts modern society can have on the mental well-being of people. 
Willits, writing in 1927, emphasized that perhaps the greatest benefit to be achieved from 
connecting all these projects together “has been the gradual extension of scientific contacts 
that are available for effective cooperation.”148 
Penn researchers worked to change people in order to better orient them to a changed 
world. This was no ameliorative program. It was a program aimed at fundamental change, 
even if there was some acceptance of the status quo. If the research choice was between 
changing a person’s environment or changing a person to fit their environment, Penn tended 
to choose the latter; they chose, in other words, to advance their research with a kind of 
ceteris paribus assumption to deal with a changed world as it happened to be. This was not 
the only way to try and change things, of course, as projects could also be aimed at 
discovering ways to change people’s economic, social, and cultural environments. Such 
projects were parts of other fields in the division of labor in social science, as Ruml set to 
building it. 
 
4.5 Other industrial psychology programs–1923-26 
Another university interested in building a research program based on psychology 
was Yale University. Yale researchers wanted to focus on developing basic psychological 
research. On Yale’s faculty was the eminent figure, Robert M. Yerkes, who was a friend of 
Ruml. Similar to the situation at Penn, Yale’s faculty had theoretical as well as applied 
 
148 Joseph Willits to Beardsley Ruml, April 25, 1927, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 75, Folder 792.  
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interests. Yale shared Penn’s idea to help orient people to a changed world, and Yale’s grant 
application, pursued through much of 1923 and 1924, declared that suddenly rapid social 
changes were resulting in maladjustments requiring new methods of “social control.”149 
In May 1923, Yale President James Angell contacted his old friend Ruml to test the 
prospect of a new psychology institute at Yale. Ruml invited a proposal, and Angell 
complied by stating the argument: 
 
There is unquestionably great need at the present moment for the development of 
psychology – using the term in the broadest sense – to contribute light and guidance 
for the solution of many problems of our present social order. In part this light should 
come from a thoroughgoing study of the earliest conditions out of which humanity 
has developed, not only our human ancestors, but also the more primitive types of 
animal life in whose activities we may hope to discover some of the deep lying 
factors in human nature which occasion in us perplexity, both as individuals and as 
members of civilized society.150 
Rather than focus on environmental explanations, as Penn was doing, Yale 
recognized the need to do more work on biological explanations. The goal still remained to 
use environmentalist methodology to redirect behaviors, and Angel believed it even 
“conservative” to say “we are at the very threshold of the most important advances in our 
 
149 Yale University File, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 79, Folders 823-828. See also James Reed, “Robert M. 
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108
understanding of human activities and our ability, particularly through educational methods, 
to control human life for the betterment of all future generations.” Psychologists were at the 
threshold of a new age, and with the help of other social sciences, psychologists would soon 
be able to better “orient” people’s “social bearings” to a changed world.151 
Yale psychologists wanted to tackle projects in at least five areas: normal human 
behavior; comparative psychology; testing methods; aberrant mental behavior; and “racial, 
and particularly primitive, human behavior in its cultural and social aspects.” In the latter 
category was included “sex research.” Angell advertised the presence at Yale of Robert 
Yerkes, who was a scientist generally considered on par with Mayo. Following some 
clarifying interaction between Ruml and Angell, Yale submitted a revised proposal stating 
their goal that “the field of study will include the basic psycho-biological factors, with due 
emphasis upon the neurological and instinctive aspects of behavior, upon the social traits of 
man, both primitive and civilized, upon peculiarities of race, climatic habitat, and cultural 
and economic status.” Yale’s main goal was to do research on the natural bases of 
psychological science; this would be research, Angell added, that “will especially stress 
aberrant forms of behavior,” attempting “to orient…forms of abnormality in their individual 
and social bearings.”152 
Yale’s proposal clearly was a bit different from the one submitted by Penn. Whereas 
Penn’s interest centered one a particular principle of social psychology, Yale’s program 
 
151 An interest that Angell expressed was for a “Psycho-Biological Institute,” which Yerkes also supported; see 
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aimed to learn about a wide range of deep bases of behavior. The scientific ideas and 
research methods of Yerkes – who was originally a specialist in animal behavior – were 
much respected by social scientists, and Yale’s research rationale fit with what Ruml and the 
Memorial trustees could approve. Yale received a fine block grant, to be used for projects 
that Yerkes and Angell were trusted to use keen discretion to select. The research program 
underway at Yale would, by the late 1920s, turn into a pair of fine institutes: an Institute of 
Psychology and an Institute of Human Relations.153 
In addition to the workplace-psychology studies at Penn, another group interested in 
such studies was the National Research Council, which as early as 1922 indicated their 
interest to study psychological problems associated with the industrial workplace. What the 
NRC recognized was that numerous research groups in industrial and occupational 
psychology needed some kind of coordinative body to assist in sharing results. Also likely to 
be useful, according to the NRC, would be increased research coordination in the 
development of occupational “fitness” tests. The NRC advocated a “purely psychological” 
approach to “the study of techniques of setting tests of fitness for certain occupations found 
in civil service, business, and industry.” Ruml believed the Memorial should help by 
providing some assistance for this coordinative research need, and the Memorial did so, 
beginning in 1923.154 
153 James H. Capshew, “The Yale Connection in American Psychology: Philanthropy, War, and the Emergence 
of an Academic Elite,” in Theresa Richardson and Donald Fisher, eds., The Development of the Social Sciences 
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Another research group interested in studying psychology issues in the industrial 
workplace was the National Institute of Industrial Psychology. In 1923, the NIIP declared a 
need to better understand the changing harshness of the industrial workplace. The NIIP could 
help develop better occupational fitness measures, and they received Memorial funds for a 
five-year project to research ways to make life better for industrial workers. The NIIP’s 
application openly disclosed their willingness to “undertake on behalf of Industrial and 
Commercial firms private investigations.” The group’s official statement of purpose 
reiterated the same message, recording that “Communications are invited from firms in 
regard to any problems in which they think the Institute may be able to render them 
assistance.” So, in possibly recognizing that Penn’s field studies in Philadelphia factories 
necessarily interacted with private business interests (because this was an interaction perhaps 
required to gain access to useful data), the Memorial was willing to support research by 
another organization interested in working directly with private requests.155 
The idea to do industrial psychology research for private interests was not even new 
with the NIIP. During the decades preceding Charlie Chaplin’s famous, neurotically 
twitching, assembly line worker in Modern Times (1936), the problem of an industrially 
damaged “psyche” was fairly familiar. One of the nation’s more prominent psychologists, 
James McKeen Cattell, founded the Psychological Corporation in 1921, as a kind of contact 
organization through which social scientists could be located and hired as private consultants. 
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The best-known example of such consultancy, of course, was the famous “Hawthorne 
Studies.”156 
The rapid rise of the “new” behavioral science is typified by the series of experiments 
done in 1924 in an AT&T-Western Electric factory at Hawthorne, Illinois, on the west side 
of Chicago. A team of MIT electrical engineers with sociological interests set up the 
experiment with the support of the NRC’s psychology research group. The engineers 
arranged a classic experimental design with a control group and an experimental group. 
Work conditions were systematically altered for the experimental group, including such 
things as changing work station positions, changing lighting levels, and the like. However 
when the engineers measured for any productivity changes they actually found both the 
control group and the experimental group got more productive. Both groups, it turned out, 
knew one basic fact about the experiments: the experimenters were measuring whether 
productivity improved. This fact alone led both groups to want to produce more. A 
subsequent series of experiments between 1927 and 1931 tried various adjustments, 
including clustering employees into smaller work groups. Yet by the end of the additional 
experiments the researchers still could only conclude that each factor in the workers’ 
environment was so interconnected with all other factors that no single factor could be 
isolated for its measurable contribution to productivity. Eventually one researcher would 
work on clarifying what the Hawthorne studies truly revealed, and this person was Elton 
Mayo.157 
156 For some information on private-sector hiring of social scientists, see Loren Baritz, The Servants of Power: 
A History of the Use of the Social Sciences in American Industry (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1960). 
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4.6 The beginning of a research center at Harvard University–1926-28 
In 1926, at the encouragement of Lawrence Joseph Henderson, an eminent Harvard 
University biochemist and physiologist, Mayo moved from the University of Pennsylvania to 
Harvard University’s School of Business Administration. Harvard researchers expressed 
interest of their own in studying psychological adjustment problems in the workplace, and 
soon it would be Harvard, rather than Penn, that would become one of Ruml’s major research 
centers.158 
The scientific status of social research at Harvard was fairly advanced in many fields 
by the middle 1920s – except, it turns out, sociology and industrial psychology. 
Anthropology research was underway at Harvard’s Peabody Museum since the late 1860s, 
and a department of political economy was established in 1879 at the school. Departments of 
psychology and of government were established during the 1890s. However Harvard had not 
established a sociology department (and would not until 1931). A key question is why 
Harvard waited so long to establish sociology, and the direct answer is sociology was not 
seen as scientifically “rigorous” enough to fit with the established organizational structure at 
Harvard. This changed when money came in.159 
The major framework for social research at Harvard into the 1920s was a long-
running Department of Social Ethics, which in a sense oversaw all other social research and 
inquiry at the school. Charles William Eliot, Harvard’s president of forty-one years (1869-
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1909), strongly favored an activist, reformist approach to social inquiry, and in 1905 he 
spearheaded creation of the social ethics program.160 
When Harvard made its Memorial grant proposal in 1926, psychological research was 
at the center of the proposal, especially for an experimental program to study mental health 
problems in the workplace. Harvard believed that great benefit might result from applying 
Mayo’s approach to a program focusing on connections between human physiology, 
psychology, and the workplace. Harvard’s James Curtis declared “that the cultural benefits of 
Dr. Mayo’s work to industry and business are of tremendous importance,” and Leonard 
Outhwaite, at the Memorial, informed Ruml that Mayo’s newest ideas made sense as a way 
to deal “with maladjusted individuals in industrial life and with the conditions in industry 
which tend to generate and foster maladjustment.” Harvard’s proposal was fairly similar to 
Penn’s successful proposal three years earlier. Harvard’s reputation and Mayo’s presence 
there basically were the only factors really needed for grant approval, especially in that Mayo 
was one about whom Ruml said “it is always great fun to have a party with.” In early 1927, a 
grant was approved for Harvard to study various facets of workplace psychology, including 
industrial fatigue, within a program dubbed “individual industrial efficiency” studies. Soon 
enough Harvard became one of Ruml’s four major university research centers in the United 
States.161 
What grew especially quickly on Memorial funds were the Harvard Psychological 
Clinic, created during 1926, and the Fatigue Laboratory (in the Harvard School of Business 
Administration), which opened in 1927. One specifically advertised goal at Harvard was to 
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make progress at separating psychology from philosophy, which ended up happening, 
although not completely until 1934. Additionally impacted by the infusion of funds was the 
end of the social ethics program, which came in 1927.162 
By 1929, the year that the Memorial’s program was absorbed into the Rockefeller 
Foundation, Harvard’s main research attention would also include economic studies of 
industrial hazards. It seems that in many ways Harvard’s new programs were an expansion of 
what was initially begun at the University of Pennsylvania, when Mayo was there. 
Something also added at Harvard was an emphasis in international relations, which – as we 
will see – was actually part of an entire field of social science that Ruml and the Memorial 
worked to promote. The case of Harvard is one in which much more detail surely could stand 
to be understood than is done herein. The research center created at Harvard had the central 
methodological goal to transform fields of social research that were still in the philosophical, 
even “social gospel,” tradition into genuinely scientific fields. The Harvard research center – 
it should also be noted – was actually the last of Ruml’s five university-based research 
centers to come into shape.163 
The idea that Ruml and the Memorial worked to help develop certain new “fields” of 
social science will be taken up in Chapters 6 and 7. In those two chapters, our focus will turn 
to understanding how many smaller-scale projects were supported at a variety of universities, 
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in coordinated ways. Before that, however, four other university-based research centers are 
studied in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5. RESEARCH “CENTERS” IN ECONOMICS, 
SOCIOLOGY, AND POLITICAL SCIENCE–1922-28 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Between 1923 and 1928, the Memorial built five major university “research centers.” 
Each center had its own special focus. Fields of focus at Harvard University, as explored in 
the last chapter, included industrial psychology and industrial sociology. Also developed as 
part of Harvard’s project to transform ethical inquiry into empirical analysis, was 
international affairs. We will now learn, in some detail, about the Memorial’s four other 
centers, at the London School of Economics (focusing on wide-ranging economic studies), 
the University of Chicago (focusing on cultural “assimilation” and “local community 
building”), the University of North Carolina (focusing on race-relations research), and 
Columbia University (focusing on law, economics, and politics). 
 
5.2 Professional political science, sociology, and economics by the 1920s 
In differing degrees, persons involved in research in political science, sociology, and 
economics made serious strides by the 1920s. All three of these social sciences were on their 
way to becoming professionalized as fields of expertise. 
The idea of a “science” of humans and societies of course far predates the 1920s. 
After all, David Hume wrote in 1741 his essay “That Politicks may be reduc’d to a Science.” 
The field of political science began turning professional in certain ways between the 1880s 
and 1910s. The journal Political Science Quarterly got started in 1886, yet seventeen more 
years went by before the American Political Science Association got off the ground. The new 
117
association started the American Political Science Review in 1906. But still Arthur Bentley 
could famously declare in 1908: “We have a dead political science.” After a dozen or so 
more years, Charles E. Merriam finally declared, in 1921, that the research tools were 
beginning to exist for a “new science of politics.” Merriam had in mind an empirical science 
that would be based on testable hypotheses. Merriam believed, specifically, that rigorous 
methods for political science would build directly upon the “behaviorist” approach in 
psychology. So, in the face of some resistance – notably Charles A. Beard’s “anti-scientism” 
– a project was underway to see what could be done to build a new, empirical political 
science.164 
Sociology became an academic, professional enterprise in certain ways as early as the 
1860s, when the American Social Science Association was created (in 1865) as an effort to 
bring organized attention to problems of crime and pauperism. The first sociology 
professorship in the United States waited, however, until 1893, when social gospel minister 
Albion Small received an appointment at the University of Chicago’s new sociology 
department, begun one year earlier. Small initiated the journal American Journal of 
Sociology in 1895. Still, for about the first ten to fifteen years of the journal, little was 
accepted for publication that could reasonably be called rigorous science. In 1905, academic 
sociologists began meeting as a national organization, the American Sociological Society. 
One breakthrough empirical work that these scientists could fruitfully discuss was W.E.B. 
Du Bois’s recent case study, The Philadelphia Negro (1899). But in terms of any 
 
164 Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures (Evanston: Principia Press of 
Illinois, 1949 [1908]); Albion Small, The Meaning of Social Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1910); Charles A. Beard, “Political Science in the Crucible,” New Republic 13 (November 17, 1917): 3-4; 
Charles E. Merriam, “The Present State of the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review 16 
(August 1922): 274-81. See also Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of American Political 
Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1982). 
118
breakthrough methodologies that could enable sociological conclusions to transcend any 
singular case study, it was the “social survey” approach, created during the 1890s and 1900s 
outside of the universities, which provided such a thing. Persons such as Jane Addams and 
others in the “settlement-house movement” became leaders in the use of the social survey 
method during these decades, using the method with a social and political agenda. And so, 
into the 1920s a problem with sociology, much like that with economics, was the continuing 
danger of insufficient separation between objectivity and advocacy.165 
The situation in economics was fairly similar to sociology and political science by the 
1920s. The period of professionalizing economics began as early as the 1880s and took place 
mostly in the United States. The American Economics Association was formed in 1885, and 
the next half dozen years saw the creation of multiple scholarly journals in the field. 
However persons purporting themselves to possess unique “expertise” in economics (as 
obtained through graduate-level training) regularly got involved political arguments, which 
was a potential problem persisting into the 1920s. Eventually the rise of new mathematical 
methods (such statistics in the 1930s, and proof-based methods and “model-building” in the 
1940s) would provide ways for economists to attempt to fully separate themselves from 
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Transaction Books, 1918). 
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politics. A first step towards this separation was the availability of new financial resources 
during the 1920s.166 
The social sciences of political science, sociology and economics were well split from 
each other by the 1920s. A main reason for this separation was the effort by practitioners of 
the different social sciences to each be recognized as persons with specialized knowledge and 
abilities, i.e., as experts. Many social scientists had an idea that the 1920s and 1930s would 
be the time to reintegrate the social sciences into a unified package.167 
5.3 The London School of Economics–1923-28 
In September 1923, the London School of Economics began a long-running 
relationship with Rockefeller philanthropies. The LSE was in a process of trying to 
reestablish all its programs thoroughly on a foundation of the latest research in social science. 
LSE administrators contacted persons at the Memorial to introduce their understanding that 
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the Memorial “may be prepared to consider a proposal for assisting research in Economics 
and Social Science” at the school. LSE faculty had two lines of projects in mind. One line 
would depend upon “immediate opportunities for investigation,” and might include a range 
of economic and sociological problems to be studied. Likely projects ranged from economic 
resources of undeveloped lands, to causes of unemployment, to population studies of various 
sorts (including eugenics). The second, much longer-term focus would be to “make a 
systematic study of economic phenomena in their bearing on social welfare.” Within a few 
months, in the following January, the Memorial awarded a five-year, $1.4 million grant, 
supporting both options.168 
Ruml particularly liked the relationship begun in September between the Memorial 
and the LSE. Founded twenty-eight years earlier, the LSE was becoming the preeminent 
British university for the study of economics, sociology, and political science. LSE faculty 
paid special attention to research and teaching at the graduate level. In the September 1923 
correspondence, Ruml shared ideas with William Beveridge, the school’s director, as the two 
struck a friendship. In particular they shared ideas about the need to promote social research 
addressing “concrete” problems. Important for Ruml’s assessment of LSE prospects was the 
way Beveridge displayed an interest to transform the school from an institution based on 
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part-time students and instructors (as well as burdened by housing and endowment shortages) 
into an elite institution.169 
The Memorial’s decision in January was to grant extensive general support. Awarded 
money included funds for general endowment, for library and building improvements, and 
for research. Development of a program in international studies was included, as was a 
decision to endow a chair of political economy to allow visiting professors, such as 
Harvard’s Allyn Young, to teach there. LSE researchers had many choices they were free to 
make about how to use their Memorial funds, and they decided to use a sizeable amount of 
their money to help minimize teaching loads of senior faculty, thereby allowing more 
research to be done.170 
In July 1925, LSE faculty members shared with the Memorial some new ideas they 
were formulating about the foundation and structure of social science. LSE social scientists 
wanted to clarify dividing lines between different social sciences, as well as make a “study of 
the borderlands” between social science, other sciences, and non-sciences. Fitting with what 
many social scientists were beginning to recognize, a unity of social science was believed 
needed because most kinds of social problems required cooperative attention of more than 
one social science. LSE researchers aimed to “deal first with the study of the natural bases of 
the social sciences, as the most important development now to be made in the field of the 
social sciences.” The “natural bases” of social science would serve to link together the 
school’s two research lines, in “economic relations” and in “politics and social relations.” 
 
169 Additional useful information about the history of the London School of Economics is in Sydney Caine, The 
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“To complete the circle of the social sciences a third group of studies is required, dealing 
with the natural bases of economics and politics, with the human material and with its 
physical environment, and forming a bridge between the natural and the social sciences.” The 
LSE faculty believed the “addition of the missing third to the existing structure of the School 
would be perhaps the most important step that could be taken now for the development of the 
social sciences.” To complete the continuity of social science, more development was needed 
in such fields as anthropology, social biology, economic psychology, geography, agriculture 
studies, and public health. Work to unify all the social sciences into a seamless web was 
immensely important: “Apart from its direct value in advancing the borders of human 
knowledge, it would confer a great indirect benefit by bringing the natural and social 
sciences into contact and importing the methods of the former into the latter.” The LSE 
faculty concluded their aim was to make the social sciences methodologically more like the 
natural sciences.171 
LSE researchers’ work with Memorial funds included efforts to introduce new 
methods of analysis across the social sciences. One such method, originally developed by 
anthropologists, was known as functional analysis. The “functionalist” method was 
developed as a way to make anthropology a social science capable of studying all aspects of 
a society. The method was used to learn how any society meets its various necessary 
functions. Similar to certain ideas being explored by anthropologists at the University of 
Chicago and Columbia University (as we will see), LSE social scientists wondered if their 
new “functionalist” research method might apply to contemporary problems even in 
 
171 LSE faculty presented their ideas on the structure of social science in “Memorandum from the London 
School of Economics and Political Science,” July 1925, esp. 1-2, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 55, Folder 592. 
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industrialized societies. Industrialized societies may be more functionally differentiated than 
primitive ones, largely because of greater specialization of labor, but the same basic life-
supporting functions still must be met by any society. At the LSE, the functionalist approach 
was advocated particularly by Bronislow Malinowski, who expressed to the Memorial his 
goal to broadly apply the method. Malinowski, an aforementioned friend of Mayo at the 
University of Pennsylvania, specialized in studying the benefits that primitive societies 
receive from their variety of superstitions and other unusual beliefs. Malinowski centered his 
interest on learning about “the practical influence of social science upon policies.”172 
Malinowski developed his ideas at a time when anthropology was, in a sense, just 
ready for development of the functionalist method. In addition to case studies made by living 
among natives (which was a method also superbly employed by Malinowski), a newer 
research approach in anthropology was Franz Boas’s emphasis that language, culture, and 
race are distinctly separate attributes of humans living in society. Through a series of studies 
dating from the 1890s, Boas and his followers (the so-called “American Historical School”) 
supported the view that race differences are not fixed and are not measurable with 
anthropometric methods, i.e., that the ideas and values of different peoples are dependent on 
their cultures which produce them. With Boas’s contributions and his many followers, 
anthropology became something of a profession. Boas’s researches prepared anthropologists 
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to develop the functionalist analysis by delving into commonalities between wide-ranging 
cultures, based on a confidence that all societies ultimately must solve the same core group of 
problems.173 
The main focus for Memorial funds at the LSE was economics, helping to produce 
numerous noteworthy publications. Some publications dealt with concrete problems, though 
others dealt with abstract theories and concepts. LSE researchers accepted their freedom to 
try just about any kind of research method they wished. Perhaps their expression to the 
Memorial of an interest to complete the unity of social science corresponded with some 
allowance they had to include projects not obviously “concrete” in the usual sense. Notable 
among early Memorial-supported research accomplishments at the LSE were such landmark 
studies in economic theory and economic history as R.H. Tawney and Eileen Power’s Tudor 
Economic Documents (1924), A.L. Bowley’s and Margaret Hogg’s Has Poverty Diminished? 
(1925), T.E. Gregory’s The First Year of the Gold Standard (1926), and R.H. Tawney’s 
Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (1926).174 
Memorial funds were also used to recruit established economists to the LSE from 
other institutions, which 1928-29 research appointments of Harvard economist Allyn Young 
and Oxford economist Lionel Robbins being most noteworthy. While Young stayed for just 
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one year, Robbins remained for the remainder of his long career as a joint appointment of the 
University of London and the London School of Economics. Probably the most famous LSE 
study supported by the Memorial’s block grant was, in fact, Robbins’ Essay on the Nature 
and Significance of Economic Science, published in 1932. Also worthy of note is one type of 
research favored by the Memorial and performed by LSE social scientists, which was the 
empirical social survey; a major project, begun in 1927 by a team of economists and 
sociologists, was the “New Survey of London Life and Labour.”175 
These and other works at the LSE were not the result of Memorial and LSE leaders 
agreeing on particular problems to study, but were the product of block-grant money 
generally allocated so that researchers could figure out how best to enhance an overall 
framework of unified social science. As Nobel laureate economist Friedrich Von Hayek later 
pointed out, Memorial funds helped out a great deal at the LSE. “It is scarcely too much to 
say that during most of the Beveridge era the growth of the School was dominated by the 
new developments, financed mainly from Rockefeller funds, which affected chiefly the 
library, the development of entirely new fields of teaching, and the provision for research.” 
Perhaps the new fields of research and teaching would not have been so readily achieved if 
LSE researchers had limited their attention to fields already comfortably concrete in nature. 
The infusion of Memorial funds to the LSE produced, in fairly short time, Ruml’s sole 
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European university research center – as well as one of the premier social science universities 
in the world.176 
5.4 The University of Chicago–1923-28 
The University of Chicago was established in 1892, with significant financial support 
from John D. Rockefeller Sr. Chicago’s main focus from the outset was to sustain an 
outstanding graduate program, and by the 1920s, one of the premier graduate programs there 
was sociology, which was strongly influenced by the Sage-supported survey movement as 
well as by the Carnegie-supported Americanization Study. These methods were getting 
combined and extended into a program of community studies that was something of a social-
ecology approach soon dubbed the “Chicago School” of sociology. Robert E. Park’s research 
for the Americanization Study brought notice to Chicago by the late 1910s, as did the superb 
ethnographic study by William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in 
Europe and America (1918-21), which introduced the pure and unsentimental concepts of 
“social disorganization” and “social reorganization.”177 
In 1921, Park and Ernest Burgess published their breakthrough textbook, Introduction 
to the Science of Sociology, which aimed to prove that “all social problems turn out to be 
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problems of social control.” Another Chicago social scientist, Charles Merriam, wondered if 
actual exertion of social control might help solve the problem that people were not 
participating effectively in the political process. This notion – “social control” – was a key 
idea that brought the philanthropic foundations and the social scientists together. An idea at 
Chicago was that survey methods joined with applied experiments in cities would produce 
answers as to what the mechanisms of social control could really accomplish. The city of 
Chicago itself was seen as a “research laboratory,” and in 1929 Park wrote the seminal 
chapter generalizing the method: “The City as a Social Laboratory.”178 
The University of Chicago began receiving substantial Memorial support in late 1923, 
and by the end of 1928 grants to Chicago would exceed $3 million. Ruml approved of the 
Chicago social scientists and their framework for analysis, called “local community 
research.” The main idea, stimulated by Park and Burgess, was to perform rigorous social 
analysis by “mapping” all the regularities of encounters and interactions in a community. 
This method recognized that all people as well as social groups interact in a great societal 
web, or “social ecology.” Local community research projects pursued at Chicago employed 
research skills of economists, sociologists, political scientists, and even psychologists. Social 
scientists in all these fields interacted with social workers.179 
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In March 1924, Chicago received a substantial, three-year Memorial grant for its 
community research program. Similar to researchers at other schools, Chicago researchers 
focused attention on a rapidly changing world. They proposed wide-ranging projects, but 
with central concerns focused on problems of immigrant housing, immigrant welfare, ethnic 
and race relations, criminality, and issues of inter-group violence. The best-known studies by 
Chicago social scientists dealt with problems associated with immigrant assimilation and 
with conflict between racial and ethnic groups. Chicagoans strongly emphasized a need to 
obtain uniform, “scientific forms” of data measurements for all social problems, which would 
be measures that would help their research be relevant as a general method.180 
A number of noteworthy studies were made of the assimilation of different racial and 
immigrant groups into the city of Chicago. Charles S. Johnson, on appointment of the 
Chicago Commission of Race Relations, produced The Negro in Chicago, in 1922. Social 
problems of urgent concern were interpreted as consequences of greatly increased black 
migration to northern cities following the world war. An especially brutal result had been 
Chicago’s 1919 race riots. In addition to matters of race relations after the war, the 
“nationality question” was significant. An important study of immigrant assimilation was Old 
World Traits Transplanted, published in 1921 by W.I. Thomas (in collaboration with Robert 
Park and Herbert A. Miller). Thomas focused on group relations, especially between a 
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majority white culture and minority immigrant or “racial” groups. While any group conflict 
could be either minor or severe, the ultimate outcome of group conflict would inevitably be 
assimilation. In 1928, in The Ghetto, Louis Wirth showed such a process in action for the 
history of Chicago’s Jews. The Memorial thought of the Chicago community research 
method in terms of possibilities for extending it to include “the negro in industry and negro 
employment.”181 
Leon C. Marshall, a University of Chicago economist, served as director of the 
National Council of Social Sciences. This new organization had a goal to make social 
research studies as useful as possible for educational purposes. Marshall believed in 
promoting greater communication between social scientists, which should help toward this 
goal. Ruml was friends with Marshall as well as with Charles Merriam. Merriam did wide-
ranging research in political science, and he was an established leader in social science. 
Merriam was recognized especially for his spearheading efforts to establish the Social 
Science Research Council in 1923. Through the 1920s, Marshall and Merriam each shared 
ideas with Ruml.182 
Marshall’s way of sharing ideas was through pamphlets and reports, which he 
authored and provided to Ruml. Probably in late 1923 or early 1924, Marshall produced a 
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pamphlet titled “Introduction to Social Studies” in which he explored relations between the 
social sciences. Ruml appreciated the pamphlet and freely handed out copies of it. Ruml then 
requested a second report from Marshall, one aimed at exploring ideas about social science 
education for engineers, which included technological engineers as well as social engineers. 
This memorandum, quickly provided in February 1924, had a central concern that there be 
“general recognition” that “an outstanding deficiency in the preparation of engineers is in the 
realm of the social sciences and business administration.” Marshall held optimism that 
enough progress was already made in the social sciences “to enable interesting experiments 
to be made rather quickly and with quite as much probability of successful outcome as one 
could ask in experimental work.” The idea of “experimental work” was, to Marshall, to be 
considered in the context of an engineering mindset for social scientists – an idea, in essence, 
that social knowledge must be put into action.183 
In November 1925, Marshall put together another report on the question of social 
science education for engineers. This time he aimed to bolster experimental applications of 
knowledge by “indicat[ing] the importance of instruction in economics and the other social 
sciences in an engineering curriculum.” Marshall emphasized a belief that “Engineers are 
concerned with the effective control of natural materials and forces – usually in terms of 
costs and returns, and always in terms of the social and economic institutions of our day.” 
Persons receiving an engineering education – i.e., an education which at the Memorial would 
have been called a “social technology” education – needed to know the latest discoveries 
about social, economic, and political institutions of the day. Only with such knowledge could 
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engineers be the best possible engineers serving the public welfare. The urgent goal was to 
overcome cultural lag, which was the perceived fact that applications of new technologies 
generally occur before society’s social, economic, and political institutions are prepared to 
handle them.184 
Some persons at Chicago, like some at the LSE, worked to explore potential wide 
application of anthropology’s functionalist method. The hope was that the functionalist 
approach would prove suitable for the study of modern problems in industrial societies. In 
addition to the block-grant funds, a supplemental grant was made to Chicago’s anthropology 
department in 1925, enabling, among other things, the three-year appointment of Edward 
Sapir, a follower of Boas’s environmentalist view and leader in the functionalist movement. 
The preeminent functionalist, Bronislaw Malinowski, also joined Chicago’s faculty, brought 
over from the LSE on a Memorial fellowship in 1926. Writing to Ruml, Malinowski reported 
his greatest interests were to work on “the practical influence of social science upon policies” 
and to help clarify “the place assumed by science in American life, especially by social 
science.”185 
A noteworthy effort to apply anthropology’s functionalist method to modern society 
was Chicago-trained sociologist Robert S. Lynd’s pursuit of his “Middletown” project, which 
received Memorial funding in 1924. In at least two ways Lynd’s project fit with the kind of 
social science Ruml wanted. It was a project in unified social science, and it was a study 
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attempting to reduce the level of “irrationality” in an industrializing community. Lynd 
adopted a “sociological-anthropological” method for studying the town of Muncie, Indiana, 
as a kind of average American town.186 
Additional grants were made to Chicago for the appointment of full-time research 
professorships in the social sciences. Appointed to different Chicago departments in 1927, 
for example, were Simon Leland, Henry Schultz, and L.L.Thurstone. The same year, the 
Memorial gave $1.1 million to be used for building a new Social Sciences Research Building 
at Chicago. Among still other Memorial grants made to Chicago during the middle to late 
1920s were grants of $60,000 going to Charles Merriam to study civic education and of 
$30,000 to L.C. Marshall to study business education. The University of Chicago Press 
received $100,000 to support social science publications. Between 1923 and 1928, the 
Memorial granted approximately 3.4 million dollars to the school, making Chicago its largest 
university recipient of Memorial funds.187 
In 1927, Max Mason, President of the University of Chicago, wrote a letter to Ruml 
about the possibility of creating a unified social science. Mason expressed a view that all 
sciences – social as well as physical – were really one body of science. It was time, he 
 
186 Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, Middletown (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1928). For a lengthy critical 
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believed, to move from studying “pathological incidents in society” to making scientific 
discoveries concerning “the great fundamental processes in society.” Mason asked for a 
combination of grants exceeding 1.7 million dollars, and with his request he submitted a 
statement of research needs in the social sciences. The overriding view at Chicago was that 
“All science is one; but clearly the particular branches of science which can best serve man in 
mastering and shaping his social environment to the end of effective living together are the 
social sciences.” Mason proposed that Chicago researchers could critically revamp graduate 
education to establish the following: 
 
[That] the present welter of miscellaneous formal factual courses dealing usually in a 
routine way with ‘problems of the day’ – and thus often more concerned with 
pathological incidents in society than with the great fundamental processes – must 
yield to a functional arrangement in which a relatively small amount of formal 
instruction will open the student’s mind to a preliminary understanding of the 
framework, the fundamental processes, the driving forces and the institutions of 
social living, and another amount of formal instruction to equip the student with 
essential methodological tools. 
 
The two keys would be the distinction between formal instruction and methodological tools, 
and the idea of a “functional arrangement” of graduate course materials.188 
188 Max Mason to Beardsley Ruml, April 23, 1927. A report that the full award was made is in Beardsley Ruml 
to Max Mason, May 10, 1927, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 70, Folders 744-745. 
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Another person at Chicago who especially supported the new overall approach to 
social science education was Marshall. Writing in 1928, Marshall agreed with Mason’s 
emphases and wrote that social science education ought to target the discovery of 
fundamental processes. Marshall presented his matured thinking for a social science graduate 
program centering on a “tool-skills and tool-knowledges” approach. He described an idea to 
connect the program in “the engineering aspect” of social science to a corresponding “fusion 
program” in basic social research. What was needed for a high-quality graduate education 
was a rigorous approach, and Memorial support was needed to develop teaching materials for 
a tightly arranged, eight-part course of study in “Tool-Skills and Tool-Knowledges 
Foundational for Advanced Work.” The eight courses, mixing formal instruction and 
methodological tools, were to be: quantitative methods, accounting and statistics; societal 
background (i.e., “the economic and political order”); historical background of economic and 
business life; historical background of conceptual thinking; legal background and legal 
technique; technological background and scientific training; language skills; modern 
conceptual thinking.189 
Marshall even added a corresponding 1928 memorandum on the “three schools of 
social technology” in operation at the University of Chicago, which were the law school, the 
school of social service administration, and the school of commerce and administration. 
These schools represented the university’s educational arrangement for “the engineering 
aspect of the so-called social sciences.” In all fields of social science and social technology, 
Marshall wanted to find the way to “A greater amount of research work of a true rather than a 
 
189 L.C. Marshall, “University Work in Economics and Business,” February 23, 1928, RAC–LSRM, Series III, 
Box 70, Folders 744-745. See also F. Stuart Chapin, “Methods of Conducting Research Courses for College 
Students,” Publications of the American Sociological Society 17 (December 1922): 168-77; Leon C. Marshall, 
“The Development of the Social Sciences,” Journal of Political Economy 35 (April 1927): 292-8. 
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formal cooperative character.” What was needed, he emphasized, was encouragement of 
“true cooperation and synthesis in social science work.”190 
The history of changing ideas at Chicago from the early to late 1920s seems quite 
representative of the kind of overall change in the Memorial’s interaction with social science. 
Ruml was consistently impressed by Chicago’s efforts to build connections between social 
science and social technology.191 
5.5 University of North Carolina–1924-28 
In early 1924, Ruml was struck by some ideas of another friend, Howard W. Odum, a 
sociology professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A subject of Odum’s 
thinking that especially interested Ruml was a theory of leadership evolution in the American 
South. Odum wanted to explain why the South was so acutely maladjusted, lagging so far 
behind the rest of the nation. The South could be helped by applying all the social sciences, 
Odum argued, and he specifically recommended that some useful new research programs 
could be run at his school. Ruml responded by traveling to Chapel Hill to meet with 
Odum.192 
190 L.C. Marshall to Beardsley Ruml, March 28, 1928, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 70, Folders 744-745. 
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Ruml and others at the Memorial had a growing interest to support studies of race and 
race relations. Perhaps a major research center could even be supported to specialize in 
studying conditions of African-American communities in the United States. Odum was 
optimistic that the new center (a “Negro studies” program) would come to exist at the 
University of North Carolina; but it turned out Ruml needed to do much interacting with 
Odum to get this project underway. Meeting in May 1924, Ruml and Odum talked about 
building UNC into a Memorial-supported research center, believing there was great potential 
to develop the social sciences at UNC. The two also discussed an idea “to make a general 
survey of the different [southern] institutions which are offering training for social work, to 
discover what this field of activity might offer for the Memorial.”193 
Following the meeting, Odum began an effort to summarize in writing his concerns 
about leadership evolution in the South. He produced a paper to explain the shortage of 
national leadership produced by southern schools, declaring the South had real potential for 
progressive improvement, and that turning this potential into reality “is a Southern promise.” 
One deficiency in the South, he declared, was “the failure so far to make quick adjustments 
to social change and to the shortness of time for the evolution of new types” of leaders. 
Southern social institutions, like institutions in the North, were lagging; and they were even 
worse off than in the North. A deficiency related to this was “that the South lacks experience 
and training for the newer leadership” needs for a changed world. The South is in such 
“poverty…in experience and training,” Odum explained, as to need real help from the 
outside. In a follow-up letter to Ruml, Odum recommended particular developments that 
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could greatly help the South. Above all he advocated exchange fellowships and exchange 
professorships, each of which could be used to transport leading scholars “south to east, east 
to west, east to south, south to west, and so on” – thus ensuring that more leading scholars 
would spend time in the South.194 
The University of North Carolina would indeed become a major research center of 
the kind Ruml appreciated. Although UNC was fairly small and financially poorly endowed 
during the early 1920s, Ruml evidently was friends not only with Odum, but with the 
school’s president, Harry Woodburn Chase. Ruml appreciated the southern location of UNC, 
as well as some research work already in progress at the school. Ruml’s purpose in his first 
visit with Odum at Chapel Hill really was to encourage UNC to apply for a major block 
grant. Following his visit, Ruml shared thoughts on the value of bringing UNC into the fold. 
“I have never seen a university where the desire to serve the people of the state is as strong as 
in North Carolina,” he said, as he cited strong connections between social science and social 
technology, and between university departments and state agencies. “The Engineering 
Department advises the Highway Commission, the School of Commerce is a member of the 
State Harbor and Shipping Board, the School of Public Welfare is technical advisor to the 
State Public Welfare Commission. The scientific people are both competent and aggressive 
and all ready for cooperative work.” UNC had all the basic prerequisites to satisfy Ruml: a 
science focus; an applications focus; a willingness to connect the two; and an established 
pattern of interaction with policymakers. Ruml appreciated some particular efforts by Odum 
as well, who between 1924 and 1926 constructed a comprehensive survey course to deal with 
 
194 Howard Odum, “A Southern Promise,” RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 74, Folder 776, 4-7, 23. The follow-up 
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all major issues in social science. UNC was considered an outstanding candidate for a major 
grant.195 
Odum submitted a broad grant proposal to Ruml in May 1925. The proposal included 
a range of projects, including some focusing on the Memorial’s interest in projects extending 
beyond the state-level of interest. One idea was to publish African-American traditional 
songs. Other ideas were to study black migration around the South, as well from the South to 
the North. Odum also had in mind a comparative study of economic concerns facing African 
Americans in North Carolina and Mississippi. He supported an idea, expressed by UNC 
sociologist Guy B. Johnson, to generally study Southern community interaction from the 
point of view “of two races living progressively together.”196 
Unlike what had happened so quickly for Penn, Yale, Harvard, LSE and Chicago, 
Odum’s grant proposal for UNC was not ready for immediate approval. Leonard Outhwaite 
stepped in to provide some assistance. He informed Odum that proposed projects needed to 
be stated with greater clarity, and that one area of research that quite interested Ruml – yet 
which Odum was having some difficulty getting concrete with – was the study of race and 
race relations. In a flurry of letters between the two, Outhwaite and Odum tried to get at this 
greater clarity. Outhwaite finally came to the point that he emphasized a request of a dear 
friend: “Now be a good fellow. Forget everything else for a while, get an old hat, a pipe, go 
for a walk and think over exactly what it is that you think you might do by way of Negro 
study during the current year at North Carolina. Set down the specific topics of Negro study 
that you feel you are best equipped to deal with adequately.” Outhwaite hoped Odum could 
 
195 Quotation from Beardsley Ruml to Arthur Woods, May 12, 1924, RAC–LSRM, Series II, Box 3, Folder 39. 
Correspondence between Ruml and Chase is in RAC–LSRM, Series III, SS6, Box 74, Folder 781. 
196 Howard Odum to Leonard Outhwaite, May 12, 1925, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 103, Folder 1039. 
139
be coaxed to set to paper “the whole plan [that] will be consonant both with the purposes of 
your Institute and the University situation, and also with the known priorities of the 
Memorial.” Outhwaite asked Odum to “Set down something of the scope and the method that 
you think will be involved in each study,” as Ruml is “clamoring for just this type of 
statement from you.”197 
In the case of the Outhwaite-Odum interaction during late-summer 1925, we find 
exact evidence of the kind of encouragement that might lead an historian to conclude the 
Memorial only granted funds for research projects that it could agree with at the outset. 
However an alternative interpretation could fairly be that Ruml simply wanted enough 
concreteness to a project, any project, to be able to make a large grant truly feasible. 
Odum successfully crystallized a proposal with research projects fitting with the 
“concrete problems” approach. By the end of September 1925, he listed seven specific fields 
for study. The fields were race and race relations in the South, projects covering negro 
business enterprise, credit facilities for negroes, studies of county convict camps, a statistical 
study of crime in North Carolina, a study of negro offenders, studies of negroes given the 
death penalty in North Carolina, and cultural studies of negro song and folk beliefs. With this 
particular proposal from UNC, the Memorial was able to get started building the desired 
major research center focusing on race and race relations. Such a center was potentially a 
controversial, high-stakes game for the Memorial, and Ruml at least had some comfort 
knowing the basic directions in which trusted friends would take the program.198 
197 Quotation from Leonard Outhwaite to Howard Odum, September 19, 1925. RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 
103, Folder 1039. 
198 Howard Odum to Leonard Outhwaite, September 19, 1925; “Preliminary Suggestions for Studies of 
Concrete Negro Problems,” September 23, 1925; Beardsley Ruml to H.W. Chase, October 7, 1925. RAC–
LSRM, Series III, Box 103, Folders 1039-1042, esp. 1039. 
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The Memorial made an initial award to UNC of only $97,500, which was to be used 
to help establish an Institute for Research in Social Science. The Institute was run by a small 
board of university administrators and senior faculty, with Odum – who was already director 
of UNC’s School of Public Welfare – appointed director of the new institute. Between 1924 
and 1928, the Memorial further supported the institute to a tune of over $400,000. UNC 
social scientists and graduate students studied many aspects of life in the South, focusing 
especially on living and working conditions of blacks, factory relations between workers and 
management, and economic problems throughout North Carolina. A number of projects were 
of previously established importance to the Memorial, such as studies of fundamental causes 
of criminal behavior, agricultural market problems, and industrial working conditions. Other 
projects related to specific conditions in North Carolina. UNC did especially fine research on 
traditional music and culture in African-American communities. Ultimately the problem 
areas studied at UNC involved nearly the totality of economic and social life in the South. 
Furthermore, with the use of Memorial funds, UNC’s School of Public Welfare also quickly 
became recognized as a leading southern program in social work.199 
The most important factor underlying Memorial support of UNC as a research center 
was probably the fact that Odum was a well-regarded social scientist. Even prior to 1924, 
Odum was building a project to better interconnect the social sciences at UNC. He had 
published Social and Mental Traits of the Negro in 1919, had a comprehensive social-science 
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course in place, and was known to be working on a textbook to help unify the social sciences, 
which he produced in 1927.200 
In addition to everything else getting started at UNC, Odum found something kind of 
fun he wanted to do. In September 1924 he recommended a car trip. The idea stemmed from 
Odum’s dream to start “an all Southern renaissance.” Odum got into an exchange of letters 
with Ruml as the two hashed out ideas for additional research programs to help the South. 
Odum recommended visiting six southern state universities, and some serious trip planning 
got started. The trip actually happened the following April, as Odum and Ruml were joined 
by UNC president Harry W. Chase and Memorial assistant director Leonard Outhwaite. The 
group evidently visited nine southern colleges and universities in rapid succession.201 
As to progress at UNC, many research programs were begun there between 1925 and 
January 1929, which was the date of the end of the Memorial. One important program was 
“Negro Studies,” which germinated largely through discussions between Odum, Ruml, and 
Outhwaite. Outhwaite wrote Odum a letter with his understanding of what the Memorial saw 
as the heart of the matter: that “so far as the American Negro is concerned, the problem of his 
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economic status and economic opportunities is extremely important.” If economic 
opportunity could come first for blacks, then many good results should follow. Odum agreed, 
offering that Outhwaite was “right in saying” the economic situation is the foundation point 
for getting major change underway. All persons were agreed that “concrete information” on 
specific research problems was what was needed first.202 
UNC’s institute made valuable studies of black culture and race relations in the upper 
South. Yet it was along the line of race studies that the institute’s work became sensitive. In 
1925, for example, UNC sociologist Guy B. Johnson wrote a paper declaring a kind of policy 
position for UNC’s research. Johnson believed what was needed for any experiments to 
improve race relations was at most a slow and steady rate of change. Reformers ought not put 
into immediate policy action all available conclusions coming from scientific study. The 
main reason for Johnson’s stance regarding policy delay had to do with the level of resistance 
to be expected in the South. A social scientist working on problems of race and race 
relations, Johnson explained, “would have trouble down here if he tried to put into immediate 
action the ideas he had developed from his study of the race problem, but I think we are 
absolutely free to study what we please and to form any opinions that we think the facts 
justify.”203 
UNC’s Institute for Research in Social Science got much public recognition in North 
Carolina. According to one news article at the time, the Institute “has a single aim: to 
improve the State.” The goal of the institute was to “collect and sift existing knowledge in 
the social field” so that “no public official in the State ought ever be in doubt about where to 
 
202 Leonard Outhwaite to Howard Odum, February 18, 1925; Odum to Outhwaite, February 24, 1925, RAC–
LSRM, Series III, Box 103, Folders 1039-1042, esp. 1039. 
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apply for information regarding any question of public interest.” One cited research goal was 
to learn how much of each person’s tax bill goes to dealing with crime enforcement 
expenditures such as policing, jailing, reform, and the like. The institute also inquired 
whether the majority of crime really is committed by “semi-idiots.” If so, it was asked, what 
would be the least expensive way to keep these people out of such mischief? The institute 
also studied what roads the state required to get all products to market. What seemed 
important about this latter matter, according to the news piece, was the degree of objectivity 
involved. The study, the news piece said, “is being made by a man who owns no town lots or 
marketable timber, who doesn’t give a hoot whether a proposed railroad runs yan-side or this, 
but who has spent years studying transportation as an economic problem.” The article also 
cited approval of the institute’s “Studies in Social-Industrial Relationships,” which were 
designed to get a little more happiness for people by helping smooth a transition in North 
Carolina from an agricultural to a semi-industrial economy. Over the first three years of work 
at the Institute, research projects were seen as quite broad indeed. “It [the institute] does not 
inquire into the mysteries of chemistry or physics, for those are natural sciences, sciences of 
nature. It does not inquire into the origin of Greek verbs, for that is the science of language. 
But whatever touches society, that is, men in more or less organized groups, is within its 
fold.”204 
5.6 Columbia University–1925-28 
 
204 The undated news clipping, believed to be from 1928, is in The News and Observer, Raleigh, North 
Carolina, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 74, Folder 788.  
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In February 1925, Columbia University applied for a Memorial grant. Bearing some 
resemblance to arguments presented by the University of Pennsylvania and the University of 
Chicago, Columbia’s faculty cited a rapidly changing world as the chief reason why the 
social sciences needed strengthening. Columbia added a unique line of reasoning, suggesting 
that social science had recently passed through an accelerated shift in an attempt to overcome 
cultural lag by increasing its quantitative nature. Much acclaimed by 1925 was the book 
Negro Migration (1920) by Columbia sociologist T.J. Woofter, which represented the first 
application of multiple regression techniques in social science.205 
As the Columbia faculty saw things, the fact that “research in the social sciences has 
turned largely from qualitative to quantitative methods” was one reason why more 
cooperative organization was needed between the social sciences. There were two special 
needs for better social science then: to play catch-up to the changed social world; to get more 
interconnected with each other, thereby focusing the benefits attainable from quantification. 
In words that likely pleased Ruml, Columbia social scientists explained they wanted “to 
consider ways and means whereby their common interests in research in the Social Sciences 
might be encouraged and supported through mutual cooperation.” Columbia wanted to 
organize communications between multiple social science departments at the school, “which 
have a common interest in encouraging research in the social sciences generally.” Especially 
needed was tightened communication between social science in the economics department 
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and social technology in the college of business. Columbia also reported that an overall 
coordination plan for the social sciences was already under discussion at the school for 
several years.206 
Columbia’s faculty was fairly specific in their grant proposal, stating an interest to 
pursue thirteen projects. These projects ranged from studies of animal behavior, to research 
in anthropology (under the guidance of Franz Boas), to analysis of international economics. 
While some projects fit with established areas of Memorial interest, others fit best to 
Columbia’s own ideas about helping to unify social science. One project, which was to do 
research in the economics of business corporations, was something that Columbia described 
in detail to reveal an overall aim to be “a systematic and critical study of the laws – both 
judicial and legislative – governing the organization, control, and financing of American 
business corporations.” Columbia faculty had in mind a style of economic analysis willing 
“to criticize existing law from the point of view of its effectiveness in service to the public 
welfare, and even to suggest what changes in the law are desirable.” Columbia hoped for 
Memorial approval to study government policies based on rigorous economic evaluation. It 
would also be “essential to study, more systematically than has ever been done before,” the 
nature of “corporate conduct which is conditioned by this law.” They added: “Economics, 
like all the other social sciences, tends to lag behind the development of the social institutions 
which form its subject matter.”207 
206 “Columbia University–Social Science, February 25, 1925,” RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 50, Folder 526. 
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Columbia got a substantial grant in May 1925. The school became, along with 
Harvard, LSE, Chicago and UNC, one of the Memorial’s five academic research centers 
worldwide. Whereas each of the other four centers had a clear special focus, Columbia’s 
projects were fairly wide-spread. Columbia’s program grew quickly, and by 1926 the school 
even proposed a stand-alone project, one aimed at studying economic, cultural and political 
situations in contemporary France. Conditions in France were seen by Columbia researchers 
as representing “a most significant laboratory of the social sciences,” a place where 
capitalism, communism, socialism, nationalism, and fascism were battling it out. The 
Memorial approved the grant, and by 1929 the total number of projects operated with 
Memorial financial support at Columbia would expand to thirty-one. Projects in operation by 
the end of the decade at Columbia included research on black migration, economics of 
industrialization in the Far East, and many, many others.208 
Five major university research centers were in place by 1925. Yet in addition, there 
were also a variety of specifically targeted research fields under development with Memorial 
support. In the preceding chapter, for example, we identified the case of a research field in 
industrial psychology. Other fields of social science capable of being developed into specific 
research fields by means of sponsoring smaller projects at many schools included race 
relations, social and economic conditions in the American South, social and economic 
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conditions in the American West, non-capitalist economies, land use and population change, 
human biology, child development and welfare, international relations, coordinated 
collection of social statistics, business cycle research, social science perspectives within the 
area of humane studies, and the interaction between social science and legal studies. These 
dozen or so fields are studied in the next three chapters.209 
209 Some historians do not consider the program at UNC to be one of the Memorial’s “major” research centers. 
This view may owe to later interpretations by people at the Rockefeller Foundation that UNC and the 
University Virginia combined to form a unique “southern” center. I believe Ruml quite clearly interpreted the 
UNC program to count as a “major” center in its own right. 
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CHAPTER 6. RESEARCH “FIELDS,” PART ONE–1922-28 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Beardsley Ruml’s program to build five university-based research “centers” took 
place at the same time when he and the Memorial officers focused on building a number of 
“fields” of social research. Ruml and the Memorial officers did this by means of supporting 
smaller-scale projects at many schools. Specific fields of research emphasized by the 
Memorial and studied in this chapter are the following: race relations in the United States; 
general social and economic conditions in the American South; social and economic 
conditions in the American West; studies of non-capitalist economies. 
 
6.2 Race relations as a scientific field–1925-28 
The Memorial’s main research center for studies in race relations was at the 
University of North Carolina. A question for the Memorial was what other kinds of smaller 
centers or specific projects might be useful for advancing studies of race and race relations. A 
program already active in researching certain aspects of race relations was the community 
research program at the University of Chicago. Columbia University researchers, located as 
they were at the edge of the “Harlem Renaissance,” also did research on African Americans 
living in a major northern city. By 1925, the Memorial decided to add support of other 
university researchers to study particular issues in race relations.210 
210 The most substantial studies of the race-relations program begun by the Memorial are John H. Stanfield, 
Philanthropy and Jim Crow in American Social Science (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985); Stanfield, 
“Northern Money and Southern Bogus Elitism: Rockefeller Foundation and the Commission on Interracial 
Cooperation Movement, 1919-1929,” Journal of Ethnic Studies 15 (Summer 1987): 1-22. 
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A third race-relations study taking place in the North was at Western Reserve 
University, in Cleveland. In 1925, faculty members at Western Reserve applied for a grant to 
research urban issues of various sorts in a maladjusted world. Social scientists at the school 
were obtaining a firsthand view of extreme hardship. “Modern urban life has created a 
radically different society. There are many persons who cannot adjust themselves effectively 
to this new society; their need for assistance has made social work an imperative necessity.” 
To help provide social-work assistance, professors at Western Reserve wanted to do 
empirical research on family welfare, child welfare, group services, health administration, 
and public health nursing. Especially severe in Cleveland was the climate of race relations, 
which related to all five aspects of the research that Western Reserve intended to study. 
Western Reserve received a grant.211 
In February 1926, Fisk University, a traditionally African-American institution in 
Nashville, applied for a five-year grant to study the economic progress of African Americans, 
especially in the South. The premier objective expressed in Fisk’s application was to uncover 
“well-attested” and “true facts” about the causes of the African-American condition in 
American society. Faculty members at Fisk proposed establishing a department of social 
science at the school, and they requested some additional funds to help develop black 
leadership programs. This latter idea fit well with Howard Odum’s ideas at UNC, which were 
known to be appreciated by Ruml. The Memorial awarded Fisk a grant, and in evaluating the 
success of the Fisk program the following year, the Memorial saw that “considerable 
 
211 The statement of Western Reserve’s research approach is from “A Review of the Aims and Methods of the 
School of Applied Social Sciences,” November 1925. The Memorial encouraged Western Reserve to clarify 
additional research projects, specifically in childrearing studies dealing with both black and white groups in 
Cleveland; see Maud Morlock to Lawrence K. Frank, February 3, 1925; Maud Morlock to Lawrence K. Frank, 
April 4, 1925, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 62, Folder 666. 
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progress” was made and should continue to be made “in the development of scientific studies 
dealing with negro economic and social life.”212 
The same year the Western Reserve researchers received support to do research in 
Cleveland, the Memorial added support for a race-relations study in another northern city, 
Providence, Rhode Island. Problems of race relations were considered appropriate for 
scientific study by Brown University scientists. If the Memorial truly wanted scientific 
understanding of forces impacting race relations in urban life, then Providence was uniquely 
set up as a natural experiment, the Brown faculty argued. The professor to be in charge of the 
project was sociologist Bessie Bloom Wessel, who was new to the school’s faculty. Ruml, 
being unfamiliar with Wessel, requested information from outside people until he was 
satisfied with the decency of Wessel’s “personality” and of the genuinely “scientific” nature 
of her proposed project. James Quayle Dealey, chair of the Department of Social and 
Political Science at Brown, wrote Guy Stanton Ford at the Memorial to report on a meeting 
of Brown faculty. Dealey conveyed words of unanimous confidence in Wessel, and added 
that Brown’s faculty asked that funds “for a period of three years be granted so as to give a 
fair opportunity to make a thorough study of racial situations in the city of Providence. 
Related departments agree to give hearty cooperation in bringing the study to a successful 
conclusion.” In addition to this cooperative message, Dealey added, “I need not remind you 
that Providence, with its industrial population so largely foreign in birth and descent, 
 
212 Fisk University proposed a department of social science with a rationale that creating such a department 
would improve all their social science courses, which in turn would help the school develop black leaders “who 
will more fully understand the social background, problems and possibilities of their race in America.” Through 
improved social research it would also be possible “to assemble well-attested facts about the Negro.” Fisk 
received a five-year grant. “Proposed Department of Social Science, Fisk University,” RAC–LSRM, Series III, 
Box 52, Folder 550. Quoted Memorial words are from “Race Relations and Negro Work, 1926-27,” RAC–
LSRM, Series III, Box 98, Folder 996, p. 6. 
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furnishes a splendid field for a racial study involving a constructive program.” What Dealey 
had in mind for a racial study, then, included not only blacks and whites, but various 
immigrant groups as well.213 
Brown received its grant. After a few years of success with their “Study of Ethnic 
Factors in Community Life,” Wessel applied for additional funding. Only this time the 
funding was not to go to Brown University, since Wessel was returning to her old school, 
Connecticut College. The project she now proposed was an expansion of the study already 
done in Providence, which developed to involve race relations as well as population and 
migration issues. The program at Brown had been successful enough to serve as a training 
ground for many younger researchers to take their knowledge and apply it to experiments in 
other cities. A project that began by including a “single study testing out techniques for the 
examination of population changes” was now ready to develop as a project “to supply a 
working base for any students who might be interested in experimental work in this field,” as 
well as “the use of laboratory techniques in the study of community problems.” Perhaps there 
was even some potential to build a national-level research program. The expanded project 
 
213 Bessie Bloom Wessel, a professor of economics and sociology who moved from Connecticut College to 
Brown University in 1925, was in charge of an urban sociology program at Brown already showing success. 
Financial assistance was what was needed for further success. The project Wessel described was a study from 
the perspective of community research – an approach, she argued, that “is quite rare”; Bessie Bloom Wessel to 
Guy Stanton Ford, April 29, 1925. The interview that found the Memorial was “favorably impressed with Mrs. 
Wessel’s personality” was Guy Stanton Ford and L.K. Frank, “Interview with Bessie Bloom Wessel,” May 21, 
1925. The Memorial contacted quite a number of people for feedback on the qualities of Wessel and her 
research. Assurance was wanted that Wessel was up to the task, and that Brown was willing to cooperate with 
her study. Throughout the process of the Memorial obtaining such information it seems others at Brown 
tweaked the project slightly, turning it into one aimed at studying migration issues as well as race relations; for 
example, James Quayle Dealey to Guy Stanton Ford, May 25, 1925, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Subseries-Folder 
8. Dealey was a noted sociologist and author of James Q. Dealey, Sociology: Its Development and Applications 
(New York: Appleton, 1920). 
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would aim to use real-world applications to test social science findings, and Wessel received 
her grant renewal.214 
Of course the major location for studies of race and race relations needed to be the 
American South. Southern attitudes associated with race relations were, according to many 
persons at the time, in a state of acute maladjustment. Ruml and others at the Memorial 
decided much attention should to be directed to Southern race relations research beyond the 
capacity of UNC and a few smaller projects such as at Fisk University. In various grant 
applications as well as in-house documents, problems of race relations were seen as 
stemming largely from underlying economic circumstances. If, for example, the problem of 
concern was different rates of criminal behavior for whites and blacks, then root causes were 
seen as largely economic. If the focus was contribution to industrial production, African 
Americans might be seen as representing an underemployed economic asset. The Memorial’s 
focus for its research in race relations was to identify “concrete problems,” especially those 
for which comparable classes of facts could be obtained for whites and blacks. By such 
means, scientific studies would result in better understanding of conditions in African-
American communities. An urgent question existed: How to best apply scientific methods to 
race and race relations? A related question was also clear: Was there perhaps some best and 
most appropriate rate of change to be advocated for fixing problems of race relations in the 
United States? 
 
214 Bessie Bloom Wessel to Edmund E. Day, April 16, 1928; Bessie Bloom Wessel, “Memorandum for Dr. 
Day,” 1928; see also Benjamin Marshall to Edmund E. Day, June 6, 1928; RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 51, 
Folder 533. The Connecticut project produced an article, Bessie Bloom Wessel, “Ethnic Factors in the 
Population of New London, Connecticut,” American Journal of Sociology 35, 2 (September 1929): 263-70. See 
also William A. Satariano, “Immigration and the Popularization of the Social Sciences, 1920-1930,” Journal of 
the History of the Behavioral Sciences 15 (1979): 310-20. 
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In January 1925, at a time when Leonard Outhwaite at the Memorial and Howard 
Odum at UNC were still discussing how to establish the UNC studies of “concrete Negro 
problems,” the Memorial obtained a memorandum from an outside advisor, James W.C. 
Dougall. Dougall reported on the condition of southern black education, and based on his 
research in six states from Virginia to Louisiana, he focused not on educational methods in 
practice but “on the social reactions of negro education”; he focused on “the study of results 
as they are to be seen in the life of the negro communities and the relationship existing 
between white and colored people in the South.” The pernicious problem, Dougall found, 
was not any intrinsic inequalities between whites and blacks, but ideas that white southerners 
harbored about such inequalities. The really difficult problem was going to be how to educate 
southern whites. Fortunately there were groups of southern whites who were leading the 
advance of an equalitarian mindset. “The proof of the negro’s progress lies not only in what 
he has accomplished when given the chance but by the growing sentiment of faith in his 
possibilities which can be clearly seen in all sections of the South.” A fundamental factor was 
that “The South has begun to feel the negro’s value as an economic asset in the community. 
It has been seen that the South must offer greater inducements if the Negro is to refuse the 
call of the North with its greater wages, more abundant school facilities, and the removal of 
disadvantages, fears, and persecutions.”215 
Another race research report was produced in April 1926 by Leonard Outhwaite. 
Outhwaite submitted thirty-five pages (a 9-page summary letter and a 26-page memorandum) 
to Ruml and Arthur Woods. The purpose of Outhwaite’s report was to “set out some general 
 
215 James W.C. Dougall to Guy Stanton Ford, May 18, 1925; James W.C. Dougall, “A Memorandum of Some 
Observations Made in Connection with Negro Education During a Tour of the Southern States,” January 28, 
1925, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Subseries 8, Box 100, Folder 1016, pp. 3, 12. 
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facts regarding the position of the Negro in American social life.” Outhwaite addressed 
possible future research methods. “[A]n increasing acquaintance with the field leads me to 
believe that the general approach and methods [presently] advocated are the most likely to 
yield scientific and social results.” Yet scientific methods involved no quick-cure solution for 
the race problem “as a whole,” or “as a thing in itself.” In words that fit with the new 
functionalist method developed by anthropologists, Outhwaite said what he believed 
reasonable science should do: the goal should be to make “systematic” study along “broad 
functional lines of the various physical and social facts on which Negro life is based.” What 
was needed was to study all aspects of race and race relations as a whole. Studies of any 
particular facet of African-American life “should, wherever possible, be joined to similar 
studies or activities being carried on in the whole group” in the larger American society. At a 
time when Ruml and many others were focusing on notions about the ‘unity of social 
science,’ Outhwaite emphasized that not all scientific methods might be appropriate for 
studying race. Certain measurement fields, such as psychometry and anthropometry, for 
example, were anathema and to be excluded. At the other extreme, a “major field of genuine 
social as well as scientific importance” was psychopathology, particularly given that 
“hospital facilities for insane Negroes” were severely lacking.216 
Outhwaite recommended a number of specific areas to focus on. Useful would be to 
study “negro crime and the negro criminal.” Other areas benefiting from increased attention 
would include “negro business and negro credit,” “negro education,” and “negro legal 
justice.” Underlying many research problems were needs to investigate economic and social 
 
216 Leonard Outhwaite, “The Negro in America,” 1926, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 100, Folder 1015, pp. 1-4. 
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factors. “New economic and social pressures are developing and migration continues as a 
symptomatic phenomenon,” Outhwaite observed. “In particular the mores and social customs 
which served an older generation as methods of control and of adjustment are breaking up or 
are no longer adequate.” Broken community ties were cause as well as consequence of 
increased black migration. Accelerating patterns of black migration were something widely 
perceived as a serious problem, and community-level studies might be a key research 
approach to help solve it – particularly given Outhwaite’s emphasis on “mak[ing] our 
problems specific rather than general, approaching the whole field along a variety of 
functional lines.” Functional lines of analysis, Outhwaite argued, should include living 
conditions (such as building, housing, sanitation), economic conditions (such as employment, 
business, credit), health conditions (both physical and mental), education, social and political 
relationships, and legal and penal problems. When functionally separated, “the problems of 
Negro life are largely parallels of the problems of White life but appearing in a different 
context.” For a successful research program in race and race relations, the research focus 
needed to be on working “with concrete materials” while using the best available scientific 
methods.217 
All persons who were interested in a research field in race relations unfortunately 
needed to be realists. Perhaps recalling what UNC sociologist Guy Johnson had already 
expressed as a notion that changes in southern race relations would need to be done slowly, 
Outhwaite believed that pursuit of a scientific approach to problems of race and race relations 
“should not obscure the fact that we are faced…with the belief, and the behaviors growing 
out of the belief, that these physical differences are attended by differences in capacity and 
 
217 Leonard Outhwaite, “The Negro in America,” 3, 6-9. 
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adjustment which demand, for one group, necessary specialized treatment.” What mattered, 
in effect, was not any truth or fallacy of race equality by any measure; what mattered was 
that too many people still believed in inequality: “that as a social phenomenon, race counts 
because we think it counts.”218 
The Memorial proceeded to compile its own report on race relations in 1927. This 
policy statement, titled “Race Relations and Negro Work,” provided reasons for pursuing a 
“reasonable” rate of change. Evaluating a recent “intensification of effort” in the field of race 
relations research, the Memorial declared its own viewpoint: “That development in this field 
should take place slowly is both natural and desirable.” The report added words regarding 
society’s perception of a need for slow change in race relations. “That progress should be 
slow arises in part from the very nature of the field: from the fact that many of the important 
features of negro life and interracial relations have in the past been the subject of imperfect 
knowledge and acrimonious debate rather than of scientific inquiry.” The Memorial adhered 
to the commonly held view at the time that the situation was just not ripe for any rapid social 
change in the South. However there was a counterpoint idea as well, in that one particular 
contribution to slow progress was “the fact that aside from the sensational features of racial 
and social conflict there has been a certain public apathy which is frequently reflected in the 
work of organizations whose activities might properly cover negro as well as white welfare.” 
The problem, it was important to be clear, was that many welfare organizations had failed to 
do equal coverage of white-community circumstances and black-community circumstances. 
 
218 Leonard Outhwaite, “The Negro in America,” 5. 
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Southern states were therefore especially far behind in “the general rate of the development 
of social and scientific progress.”219 
Leading persons at the Memorial held great faith in the potential for achievements of 
the highest order by African Americans. The belief was that what happened in the American 
South was a kind of social evolutionary accident. The slow approach to remedy was to be 
taken not because of any belief that individual persons in the African-American community 
weren’t capable of rapid self-improvement, but because of an idea that the greatest prospect 
for long-term success in lifting the African-American community out of its forced 
impoverishment was to provide opportunities for the entire community to lift itself as one. 
“[T]he amount of work undertaken [in race studies] has to a certain extent been determined 
by deliberate Memorial policy,” the 1927 report concluded. The report further explained: 
“That progress should be slow arises in part from the very nature of the field: from the fact 
that many of the important features of negro life and interracial relations have in the past 
been the subject of imperfect knowledge and acrimonious debate rather than of scientific 
inquiry.” “The Memorial has felt that an orderly development along a variety of lines, negro 
education, the development of public welfare agencies and of channels for inter-racial 
cooperation was greatly to be preferred to a sudden or spectacular development in any of 
these fields.” All work needed to be done as a unified project, performed in the careful way 
that true science requires. The overall rate of change would be slow and steady because it 
needed to be based “upon the results of scientific studies and deliberate inquiry.” All applied 
activities also needed to be done with the full participation of those persons needing to do the 
community improvement. It is “wise to use every reasonable device to encourage negro 
 
219 “Race Relations and Negro Work, 1926-27,” 1927, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 98, Folder 996, pp. 1-2. 
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participation in undertakings directed at the development of negro welfare” – what were 
needed, in other words, were very special kinds of social experiments that could not go on 
without a great level of active community involvement.220 
6.3 Social and economic conditions in the American South–1925-28 
Support of additional studies in race relations was not the only way the Memorial 
could build new projects capable of connecting to research activities at UNC. Soon after 
UNC got its initial grant, other southern schools contacted the Memorial wanting somehow 
to connect to the broad program at UNC. Such schools had an idea to form a kind of larger 
southern “center,” as no fewer than three universities reacted with keen interest to connect to 
Memorial-supported research at UNC. 
In January 1925, Vanderbilt University asked the Memorial if they might join with 
UNC. Vanderbilt suggested that by doing so they would be able to help coordinate the social 
sciences between schools. New conceptual breakthroughs might also be added by the manner 
in which Vanderbilt could connect a number of social science departments at their school. 
Vanderbilt University Chancellor, J.H. Kirkland, hoped to set a personal meeting with Ruml 
to discuss ideas for research projects. Kirkland’s letter described the present organization of 
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the social sciences at Vanderbilt featuring thirteen instructors divided between five 
departments: history; political science; economics; sociology; and commerce. Kirkland 
described twenty-four current and potential future projects, ranging from “the economic 
position of the negro,” to “the county court in Tennessee,” to “the social origins of the 
aggressive personality.” Many projects focused on problems relevant to the state of 
Tennessee. A primary goal was to tighten connections between social scientists at the school, 
which would be helped by adding three or four new professorships to fill gaps in the unified 
structure of social science. Using the Memorial’s kind of language, Vanderbilt also drew 
some attention to what was going on at the school in the area of training undergraduate and 
graduate students in “social technology.”221 
Ruml responded by asking that more thought be given to unique contributions 
Vanderbilt could make. It took until November 1925 for Ruml actually to interview 
Chancellor Kirkland, yet when he did, Ruml provided additional guidance. He explained that 
the Memorial wanted not “to simply support the traditional type of teaching in social 
science,” but to focus on projects that show “an interest in any new experiments in that field 
that might be undertaken.” More clarification in Vanderbilt’s proposal remained needed, 
Ruml said, and so pressure was on Vanderbilt to think of innovative experimental 
approaches, especially for teaching social science.222 
In January 1926, Ruml contacted Vanderbilt’s Social Sciences Dean Walter L. 
Fleming to try to help Vanderbilt move in a direction that could get grant approval. 
 
221 J.H. Kirkland to Beardsley Ruml, January 19, 1925; J.H. Kirkland, “The Social Sciences in Vanderbilt 
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Consistent with what Ruml’s friend Leon Marshall worked on at Chicago, Ruml reported to 
Fleming that “The Memorial now has under consideration the question of strengthening 
undergraduate as well as graduate work in the social sciences.” Such a possibility of 
developing improved undergraduate education in social science was to be kept in mind by 
Vanderbilt, even though “no final decision has been reached as to whether we should enter 
this field.” What Ruml greatly wanted from Fleming was any specific information regarding 
Vanderbilt’s “plan for the development” of social science education, “both from the 
standpoint of research and undergraduate instruction.”223 
In April 1926, Vanderbilt’s revised application asked for five years’ support. 
Vanderbilt now said their potential contribution should be to help “correlate” the social 
sciences within teaching contexts, both undergraduate and graduate. Vanderbilt listed an 
expanded number of research projects, and based on this listing of 34 projects, enough 
substance existed for Ruml to hone in on what he wanted. Ruml asked for more information 
as to what was planned in two particular areas: (1) “problems and methods in the study and 
teaching of the social sciences” to undergraduates; (2) efforts to teach graduate students 
about “the relationship of the social sciences, the unity of the entire field, and to guide the 
student in working across the field regardless of departmental lines.” Vanderbilt concurred 
by saying these projects were what they wanted as well, and Vanderbilt soon received a 
grant. What we see in the case of Vanderbilt is a situation in which Ruml encouraged, or 
perhaps even pressured, a potential grant recipient to establish at the outset how and why 
proposed projects would relate to other useful projects in the social sciences.224 
223 Beardsley Ruml to Walter L. Fleming, January 30, 1926, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 78, Folder 815. 
224 In April 1926, Fleming submitted a five-year funding request, again stating one objective was “to stimulate 
and aid the progress of the Social Science Departments at Vanderbilt University.” Fleming’s proposal balanced 
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The University of Virginia wanted to join with UNC as well. In March 1925, E.A. 
Alderman, president of the university, contacted Ruml and invited a personal meeting during 
the planned southern road trip. The April visit would give Alderman a chance to showcase 
the development of the school’s social sciences, which were his “chief concern for some 
years.” About the same time, Alderman contacted Wickliffe Rose, of the Foundation’s 
International Education Board, to reinforce that he was highly impressed by the work 
underway between the Memorial and UNC. Alderman believed the UNC research center 
might be built upon at Virginia, and so the approach taken by the University of Virginia was 
to suggest that a larger, more useful center could be established. Virginia reinforced the 
familiar opinion that the South was deeply maladjusted, making it a region urgently in need 
of scientific social research.225 
Ruml visited Charlottesville in April 1925. Yet following the visit it took him until 
the following January (for various reasons, including a long trip to Europe) to make a second 
visit to the school. That month, UNC’s Howard Odum wrote Ruml to put in a word for 
Virginia: “We do not know of any step in the South which would help the whole situation 
now more than a definite progressive movement at the University of Virginia in the social 
 
research priorities and program improvements, and it dealt with graduate as well as undergraduate levels. 
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sciences.” Alderman contributed more of his own thoughts a couple weeks later, when he 
wrote Ruml to say, “The greatest need of the State of Virginia at the present time is for 
scientifically determined information regarding the vital problems in the life of its people and 
their institutions through which this life seeks to find its highest expression.” Alderman 
hoped that a sizeable, five-year grant could be used to redress “many defects in the path of 
southern development.” Virginia, which was well into the planning stages for its improved 
social sciences program, had a goal to organize six social sciences into an Institute for 
Research in the Social Science, which would be “modeled somewhat after Columbia and 
Carolina.”226 
It turned out that more interactions were needed between the Memorial and the 
University of Virginia, beginning with Ruml’s visit to Charlottesville in March 1926 to meet 
again with President Alderman as well as others, including agricultural economist Wilson 
Gee. Ruml recommended that Alderman visit with Virginia faculty members to learn what 
social problems they believed they were best-suited to study. By such means Alderman was 
then able to respond that Virginia could give Ruml “a more concrete idea of just what I wish, 
with your help, to get under way at this institution.” Alderman also submitted a “Suggested 
Program” identifying nine specific research problems, nearly all of which combined 
economic research and political studies in some way or another. Virginia emphasized its goal 
to study “very concrete situations” in the state, and the school said there was no question that 
numerous valid research problems existed. Virginia was fully willing to focus on the most 
relevant and urgent of these, yet above all what was needed was money. Alderman opined 
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that “the curse of intellectual undertakings in the south and southern institutions has been in 
attempting to do big things with small means, to make bricks without straws.”227 
Virginia received a grant in June 1926. Somewhat unusually, the Memorial then 
contacted Professor Gee, who Alderman (in communication with Ruml) had appointed 
director of the institute. The purpose of the contact was to allow Gee to personally emphasize 
that Virginia’s program, with its focus on economic research, had no aim to merely imitate 
research at UNC or elsewhere, in that Virginia was building a program uniquely suited to 
circumstances in Virginia, which had its own “very concrete situation” to deal with.228 
6.4 Social and economic conditions in the American West–1925-28 
Also wanting to join in some great big southern research center was a southwestern 
institution of some repute, the University of Texas. In January 1926, Texas officials 
contacted the Memorial through a letter from university president W.M.W. Splawn, asking if 
Texas could work in conjunction with projects underway at UNC. Texas, perhaps having 
learned from the Memorial’s responses to Vanderbilt and Virginia, advertised at the outset 
certain societal conditions unique to the southwestern region. Ruml answered back that no 
direct extension of the UNC program was planned. However, even though the program 
 
227 Wilson Gee to Beardsley Ruml, March 23, 1926; E.A. Alderman to Beardsley Ruml, March 30, 1926. 
Alderman’s “Suggested Program” in the March 30th letter identified these nine problems: (1) literature of 
Southern political and economic history since Reconstruction; (2) government at the county level in Virginia; 
(3) the public welfare system of Virginia; (4) Virginia’s revenue system and tax laws; (5) Southern labor; (6) 
banking in Virginia since Reconstruction; (7) comprehensively gather all statistical sources of information on 
Virginia; (8) the mountain population in the Blue Ridge area (including their social, physical and psychological 
characteristics); (9) crime in Virginia. Alderman’s added comment about the “the curse of intellectual 
undertakings in the south” is in E.A. Alderman to Beardsley Ruml, April 22, 1926. RAC–LSRM, Series III, 
Box 78, Folders 813-814. Wilson Gee, in addition to being a respected agricultural economist, was a respected 
social scientist; see Wilson Gee, ed., Research in the Social Sciences: Its Fundamental Methods and Objectives 
(New York: Macmillan, 1929). 
228 The grant award was made in a letter dated June 4, 1926; see also “Memorandum of Interview” with Wilson 
Gee, n.d., RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 78, Folders 813-814 
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begun at UNC stood as a unique research center with projects “on a purely experimental 
basis,” Splawn could do well to think about research problems uniquely “concerning the 
Texas situation.”229 
Ruml was willing to help get Texas’s application process focused. He appreciated 
rich potential for research in the American southwest, and he advised Texas to focus on 
projects suited to their region. Texas quickly produced an application that came to agree with 
Ruml’s emphasis that Texas could contribute toward “coordinating the work in the social 
sciences.” Splawn considered some relations between the six social sciences at Texas – 
namely, anthropology, economics, sociology, government, history, and psychology – and he 
emphasized a goal: “To promote closer and more stimulating relationships between the 
faculties of the several departments of the social sciences,” the separation of which had been 
“in large part artificial” and was clearly “disadvantageous” to the continued advancement of 
useful social science. The ideal situation would be that researchers in different social science 
departments “should work in cooperation with one another on a common problem or 
problems.” Researchers would, in this way, come to “realize more clearly the importance of 
each of the social sciences as an approach to the study of man and his environment.” In the 
official grant proposal, Splawn emphasized diversity of peoples and unique conditions in the 
vast Texas region, “truly constitut[ing] an empire.” Splawn and others at Texas wanted to 
focus on developing “studies relating to the conditions and the problems of the Southwest, 
such as the study of the Mexican population in this section of the country.” Texas reasoned 
 
229 W.M.W. Splawn to Beardsley Ruml, January 18, 1926; Beardsley Ruml to W.M.W. Splawn, January 26, 
1926, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 77, Folder 805. 
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that they could best merit a grant if they studied problems and social relations unique to the 
southwest, and also if they declared they would do so with all the social sciences at once.230 
Texas received a generous grant. President Splawn then resigned his university 
presidency so he could serve as Director of research projects under the grant. The application 
effort that turned out successful for the University of Texas was the case made for southern 
uniqueness. Texas did not quite become a major research center, but they did at least receive 
substantial Memorial funds. Texas was not even the first southwestern or western school to 
make a case for regional uniqueness.231 
Two other schools playing to Ruml’s strategy to maximize the Memorial’s coverage 
of research fields were the University of Denver and Stanford University. Both schools rated 
highly among major universities in the Rocky Mountain and West Coast regions. 
In April 1925, the University of Denver presented to Ruml its case for ‘unique’ 
western conditions. Denver claimed that economic problems and social welfare issues were 
unique enough in the Rocky Mountain Region to merit detailed study. Denver social 
scientists recognized that an attempt for “organization of the economic facts pertaining to the 
great area west of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers presents one of the important social 
problems of today. The future of this area,” Denver’s faculty added, “depends upon the 
enlistment of outside capital.” A specific need was for financial resources to support “some 
agency of a scientific nature that can take the problem of organizing the economic 
 
230 Splawn and others at Texas got into a quick flurry of communications with Ruml. For example, Mary 
Gearing, chair of Texas’s Department of Home Economics, drew attention to the possibility of research in child 
care and parent training; Mary Gearing to Lawrence K. Frank, February 3, 1926. Splawn and Ruml then met, in 
New York, and agreed the Southwest was an important place to get Memorial-sponsored research underway. 
Splawn accepted Ruml’s “suggestion” that Texas prepare a proposal emphasizing ways that Texas could 
contribute to “coordinating the work in the social sciences”; W.M.W. Splawn to Beardsley Ruml, May 13, 
1926. The proposal itself is W.M.W. Splawn, “Grant Proposal,” January 25, 1927, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 
77, Folder 805, pp. 18-9, 25. 
231 See C.D. Simmons to Beardsley Ruml, August 26, 1927, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 77, Folder 805. 
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information of the Rocky Mountain and Prairie States and work it out.” Upon Ruml’s 
encouragement, the University of Denver put together a preliminary proposal. Social 
scientists at the school were developing a research program, Denver reported, that “has been 
directed toward the collection of fundamental statistical data dealing with the physical, 
economic, industrial, business, social, political and legal aspects of this region.” Denver had 
in mind a unified social science program, including studies of the “growth and character of 
population,” “consumption of products,” and needs and activities of industries in the west. 
After some interaction with the Memorial, Denver received a three-year grant in 
November.232 
Denver’s proposal, even prior to its approval, was one that the Memorial’s Arthur 
Woods believed was an important one. Woods worried, however, that a grant to Denver 
might set a precedent that other schools would try to follow, thus producing an “avalanche of 
appeals” based on unique geographical circumstances. Such a danger could be gotten around 
by including mining conditions and engineer training specifically within the fold of why 
consideration was given to Denver. Ruml accepted Woods’s argument and got some 
additional outside feedback as well – and only then did Ruml recommend the grant.233 
Stanford University also claimed regional uniqueness. Stanford already had a 
program with the Memorial to study Russia’s national economy as a unique economic system 
(as will be discussed below). In May 1926, Stanford’s School of Social Sciences suggested 
California was unique enough as a state economy to represent a distinct case to be studied. 
 
232 “Letter of inquiry” from M.M. Jones to Arthur Woods, April 15, 1925, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 73, 
Folder 768. Denver stated its broad research proposal in “Research Program,” April 1925, RAC–LSRM, Series 
III, Box 73, Folder 768, pp. 1-2. 
233 Woods’s thoughts are shared in Arthur Woods to Beardsley Ruml, April 16, 1925, RAC–LSRM, Series III, 
Box 73, Folder 768. 
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Stanford wanted to develop research in such areas as regional water conservation, Pacific 
Coast public finance, and cooperative marketing practices in the West. They wanted to 
expand a program of inter-racial studies in California, and they also requested additional 
funds for research on Russian Revolution studies. After slightly adjusting how all their 
proposed regional projects were defined – and with Stanford President Ray Lyman Wilber 
emphasizing that the university’s School of Social Sciences needed “general social science 
development” – Stanford received a five-year grant in March 1927.234 
In a way, Texas, Denver and Stanford combined to represent a field of social research 
supported on a geographical basis: a field in southwestern and western studies.235 
6.5 Studies of non-capitalist economies–1923-28 
Leaders at the Memorial believed an important research field would involve a pair of 
overseas problem areas: the need to learn what works and what doesn’t work in the ways 
non-capitalist nations do things; the need to help other nations get prepared for eventual 
participation in Western-style capitalism. The latter goal really was to prepare peoples of 
certain nations to be ready for such participation if and when their nation’s leaders decided to 
allow such participation. During the early to middle 1920s, the Memorial applied funds for 
such purposes in the Far East, the Middle East, the Communist world, and even in Europe. 
 
234 President Ray Lyman Wilber to Beardsley Ruml, May 6, 1926; Beardsley Ruml to President Wilber, May 
11, 1926; President Wilber to Beardsley Ruml, January 21, 1927. President Wilber’s January letter to Ruml 
divided proposed projects into five, slightly differently stated categories: Russian Revolution studies; racial 
problems in the Pacific; social, political and economic developments in Europe; governmental, economic and 
historical studies in the American west; social aspects of human development. RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 69, 
Folder 724. 
235 See Thomas C. McCormick, “Development of Social Research in Leading Northern Universities, and Its 
Status in Colleges and Universities in the Southwest,” The Southwestern Social Sciences Quarterly 13 (March 
1933): 368-71. 
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When Ruml joined the Memorial, he inherited programs to support a couple of 
schools in China. As early as 1908 Rockefeller Sr., motivated by religious belief, joined with 
his chief advisor Frederick Gates to work with the Rockefeller-supported Oriental Education 
Commission (OEC) to establish a new university in China. The new university, to be 
modeled in ways on the University of Chicago, was to produce home-grown leaders to go 
into Chinese society and help “civilize” the nation. The idea, according to an OEC report, 
was that “rationality, in particular the scientific rationality embodied in Western universities, 
was the solution to the riddle of China’s successful modernization.”236 
Although the 1908 effort came to nothing in the immediate term, a similar idea was 
enacted seven years later when the Rockefeller Foundation established the China Medical 
Board, which in turn founded the Peking Union Medical College. Though the school took six 
more years to be built and dedicated (in 1921), the Peking (Beijing) school had a mission to 
contribute, perhaps above all else in the estimation of Rockefeller Jr., to the “mental 
development and spiritual culture” of China. The model put in place for medical training and 
practice at the school was one promoted by Abraham Flexner at the Rockefeller Institute of 
Medicine, and which is sometimes also called the “Johns Hopkins model.” The plan was that 
scientific laboratory research and clinical practice must tightly combine in a dynamic, back-
and-forth process in which new knowledge gets tested and tests of new knowledge are used 
to help identify more gaps in knowledge that need to be addressed with science.237 
236 Quoted in Frank Ninkovich, “The Rockefeller Foundation, China, and Cultural Change,” Journal of 
American History 70 (March 1984): 799-820, esp. 801. 
237 Ninkovich, “The Rockefeller Foundation,” 803-4. See also Mary Brown Bullock, An American Transplant: 
The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical College (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1980); Laurence A. Schneider, “The Rockefeller Foundation, the China Foundation, and the 
Development of Modern Science in China,” Social Science & Medicine 16, 12 (1982): 1217-21; Socrates 
Litsios, “Selskar Gunn and China: The Rockefeller Foundation’s ‘Other’ Approach to Public Health,” Bulletin 
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Another interest of the Rockefeller Foundation by the early 1920s was to support the 
North China Union Language School, an academic program in Beijing designed for Chinese 
students and visiting westerners who wanted to focus on “the teaching of things Chinese and 
missionary methods.” Ruml provided some limited support to the school when he took over 
the Memorial.238 
Ruml was also able to find opportunities to support programs aimed at teaching 
people of China about economic, cultural and political matters of the West. A specific 
proposal for social research projects eventually came to the Memorial in 1928, from another 
university in China, also in Beijing. A kind of natural experiment was described somewhat 
by Yenching University faculty, as an experiment resembling what had happened in the 
American South during three centuries of slavery. The idea introduced by Yenching was that 
entire regions of the world may have lagged behind the industrially advanced regions of the 
world in certain ways. Yenching University, originally created as the Christian Peking 
University in 1916, had begun a program of economics education in 1917, introduced at the 
school by British-trained economist John Bernard Taylor. Taylor approached economics in 
ways akin to the so-called American “institutional economics” with which the Memorial’s 
Lawrence Frank was familiar. Taylor’s goal was to make economic research relevant to 
Chinese culture and social institutions, and his efforts at Yenching were joined by three 
additional economists (one European and two Chinese) between 1922 and 1928. The group 
had an overriding objective, which according to one economic historian was “to develop 
 
of the History of Medicine 79 (2005): 295-318. Flexner Report (1910) was put into effect at the Rockefeller 
Institute by Simon Flexner, the brother of Abraham Flexner. 
238 The idea to focus on “the teaching of things Chinese and missionary methods” is expressed in W.B. Pettus to 
W.S. Richardson, September 21, 1921. Money was donated to the school, named the North China Union 
Language School, somewhat informally by Rockefeller Jr. as “a private matter” as early as 1920; see Frank B. 
Stubbs to Russell Carter, April 2, 1924. RAC–LSRM, Series III, Subseries 8, Box 106, Folder 1070. 
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innovative institutional forms to enhance China’s economic performance.” The goal, in short, 
was to get China active in capitalism.239 
By 1928, the last year of the Memorial, Ruml’s interest in China turned into an 
interest to assess the social and economic consequences of unique historical circumstances. 
Social science professors at Yenching University stated their belief that the rate of social 
development in China had been particularly retarded compared to most of the rest of the 
world. Not only could China be assisted by outside funds, but all nations of the capitalist 
world would stand to benefit by helping China catch up. An argument in Yenching’s 
proposal was that “China will in the future become a very important part of the family of 
nations,” and that “earnest effort is being made to improve human conditions in the country 
and to evolve, through education, a system that will elevate the Chinese and command the 
respect of Western nations.” Different fields of social science would also benefit by learning 
“the facts and conditions” that caused such “a slow evolution” of an entire region of the 
world. The Yenching faculty wanted financial assistance “to knit closely together all 
departments of study, instruction, and research constituting the social sciences.” Their hope 
was that research based on objective methods would allow social scientists “to investigate 
with unbiased clarity of observation” the true facts about China’s slow evolution. Social 
researchers were not to judge but to “discover where the economic factor is dominant and 
 
239 Paul B. Trescott, “Institutional Economics in China: Yenching University, 1917-1941,” Journal of Economic 
Issues 26, 4 (December 1992), 1221-55; Trescott, “American Philanthropy and the Development of Academic 
Economics in China before 1949,” in Soma Hewa and Philo Hove, eds., Philanthropy and Cultural Context: 
Western Philanthropy in South, East, and Southeast Asia in the Twentieth Century (Lanham, Maryland: 
University Press of America, 1997): 157-81. 
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where the social factor” is dominant in accounting for how China got so far behind so much 
of the rest of the world.240 
The nation of China was not the only non-European foreign nation to be of some 
interest to the Memorial. During the early 1920s, the Memorial had interest in supporting 
education programs for Russians. In 1923 the Memorial helped create a program to support 
Russian students who were dislocated in Europe and the United States. According to an 
outside advisor of Ruml, displaced Russian students were persons who should be prepared 
for when “the time comes and Russia does straighten out” – which was to say, for the time 
when Russia rejoins the free and capitalist nations of the world. Ruml evaluated the idea to 
support displaced Russian students by first obtaining some proof that the “Russian Student 
Fund” was legally established, including that it was incorporated under U.S. law. This was 
important given that communist Russia was establishing a practice of refusing to meet their 
financial debts owed to parties in the capitalist West. Ruml got trustee approval of a grant to 
support education of Russian students pursuing schooling in other nations.241 
Another example of spreading ideas about capitalism to people in non-capitalist 
nations arose in connection with a school in Beirut, Lebanon. In this region of the world 
known as the Middle East, an objective for Ruml was to promote better research and teaching 
in business and social science. The American University of Beirut was a considered the right 
place to pursue this, and in 1925 the Memorial trustees approved six year’s support for two 
 
240 The proposal added that as “the economic and social system of the Occident is the result of a slow evolution 
and that an evolutionary process must occur in China also,…the main emphasis should be on the facts and 
conditions actually prevailing.” It would be important “to investigate with unbiased clarity of observation” 
different regions of China; Olin D. Wannamaker, “Grant Proposal,” March 1, 1928, RAC–LSRM, Series III, 
Box 80, Folders 834-837, pp. 1-2. 
241 Quotation from Thomas N. Perkins to Arthur Woods, January 26, 1923. See also Beardsley Ruml to Norman 
H. Davis, April 9, 1923; Norman H. Davis to Beardsley Ruml, April 21, 1923; Frank B. Stubbs to Frank L. 
Polk, September 14, 1923, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Subseries 8, Box 106, Folder 1081. 
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new professors at the school, each of which was to be a person “native” to the region. The 
chief objective was to prepare Middle Eastern students to participate in world business.242 
Another approach to using Memorial funds for projects dealing with non-capitalist 
nations was to support research aimed at discovering what happens when non-capitalist 
economies operate on their own terms. The main idea here was that because non-capitalist 
systems already exist, they might as well be studied. 
In 1925, the Memorial got interested in Russia along such a line. The interest came 
about when it seemed likely that post-revolutionary Russia might sustain its government-
controlled, planned economy for a long time to come. The Memorial decided they might as 
well consider Russia to be a large-scale “experiment on society.” A research group at 
Stanford University proposed gathering data on Russia’s economy, with the importance of 
the project being carefully qualified: “In making a study of the revolution the purpose should 
be to ascertain what the leaders of the movement hoped to bring about, how far they 
succeeded and failed, and the actions and reactions of their experiments on society. It should 
not be the object of the study to prove anything in particular but merely to gather such social, 
economic, and psychological data as can be had at the present time.” The recent Russian 
Revolution, as F.A. Golder of Stanford concluded, “should be studied as a social experiment 
in the making.” Persons at the Memorial, while strongly disapproving of Russia’s move to 
communism, reasoned that since an unprecedented experiment of partitioning an 
industrializing country “into economic units according to resources and industries” had 
happened, scientists might as well study whether the division into economic units might rest 
on any kind of fundamental economic truths about an industrializing economy. Because 
 
242 RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 49, Folders 512-513. 
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financial support for such studies was unlikely to be made available from endowments at 
particular universities, Stanford and the Memorial agreed that the Memorial should fill the 
gap, which the Memorial did with a two-year grant.243 
The idea to interpret situations in non-capitalist countries as laboratory-like situations 
came up with regard to Sweden and Great Britain as well. These two nations featured two 
different degrees of so-called ‘mixed’ economies. 
A large-scale economic experiment catching the Memorial’s attention was in Sweden 
during 1924 and 1925. Swedish economists contacted the Memorial to say they saw their 
nation as “an almost ideal ‘laboratory’ for social research.” Because experiments in a new 
kind of “welfare state” were already in action across Sweden, persons at the University of 
Stockholm recommended the Memorial should support research to learn from the 
experiments. The University of Stockholm had a cadre of social scientists and social workers 
in the wings, and the school asked for a five-year grant. One objective, agreeable to the 
Memorial’s perspective, was to see an award used to promote tighter connection between the 
social sciences and the schools of social technology at the university. The University of 
Stockholm wisely included such a potential benefit in their proposal.244 
In the case of studying Sweden’s national experiment, an informative matter is how 
the grant proposal got presented and received. In September 1924, University of Sweden 
economist Gösta Bagge made a personal visit to Ruml. Bagge, once a student of renowned 
 
243 The initial proposal to study Russian “experiments on society” is in F.A. Golder to Guy Stanton Ford, March 
17, 1925. Other quoted words are from a supplementing memorandum; F.A. Golder, “A Plan for the Study of 
the Russian Revolution,” 1925. See also F.A. Golder to G.S. Ford, March 16 1925, which further discusses the 
proposed study of the “Economic Basis for the Territorial Division of European Russia,”  RAC–LSRM, Series 
III, Box 69, Folder 723. 
244 In 1924 the University of Stockholm applied for a grant supporting five years’ work by its Social Science 
Institute. The primary initial focus was to train persons specializing in social work and municipal work; see 
John M. Glenn to Beardsley Ruml, September 16, 1924. The substantial grant ($75,000 awarded in November 
1925) would end up serving a broader purpose. RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 77, Folder 804. 
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Swedish economist Gustav Cassel, came to New York equipped with a letter of introduction 
from Sage Foundation Director John M. Glenn. Bagge aimed to persuade Ruml that a lack of 
funds prevented fulfillment of an aim “to initiate and carry on scientific research in the social 
and municipal field.” “There is in fact no institution in Scandinavia today where scientific 
social research is being carried out on a systematic plan.” This lack of such research was 
“unfortunate not only from a Scandinavian point of view, but also it seems from an 
international viewpoint.” The rest of the world, after all, could benefit if a research group 
were supported to “analyze properly from a scientific point of view” the results and 
consequences of such institutional innovations as Sweden’s eight-hour workday law (in force 
already for five years) and the Swedish Trade Union. In the latter case, a goal should be to 
make “scientific investigation of the results of this kind of regulation of wages.”245 
In response to Bagge’s inquiry, Ruml sought advice from such economists as Cassel 
in Sweden and William Beveridge in London. Cassel, for example, though uncertain whether 
the University of Stockholm was “concentrat[ing] itself upon forming the habit of scientific 
thinking,” believed the school could potentially serve “to fill up the former lack of economic 
education of those who take care, in the democratic society of ours, of local government and 
of social work generally.” Bagge, when asked for further details, wrote in June 1925 (in what 
became the successful grant application) an added emphasis that, “from a scientific point of 
view,” Sweden is “in many respects an almost ideal ‘laboratory’ for social research”; 
especially to be emphasized was that many variables could be held constant. “Sweden is a 
 
245 Gösta Bagge to Beardsley Ruml, September 20, 1924, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 77, Folder 804. Earlene 
Craver has produced a study of Bagge’s contacts with the Memorial in the context of a longer-running 
development of a so-called “Stockholm School” of economics; Earlene Craver, “Gösta Bagge, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and Empirical Social Science Research in Sweden, 1924-1940,” in Lars Jonung, ed., The Stockholm 
School of Economics Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): 79-97. 
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small, well administered country with a homogeneous population, which makes it so much 
easier to get the necessary statistical and other material to isolate social phenomena, to make 
observations without all the bewildering tendencies in different directions, which 
characterizes the large countries and their mixed populations.”246 
The Memorial’s willingness to study Sweden’s economic experiment connected to an 
idea that while social science in Europe appeared to lag behind even the inadequate condition 
of social science in the United States, applications of social knowledge – or what was again 
called “social technology” – appeared to be running ahead in Europe, compared to the United 
States. The idea to support research projects in non-capitalist nations may have been part of a 
broader idea to study national economies as somehow involved in a kind of competitive, 
selection process between them. If such a process was what was happening, then it was a 
process with an as-yet-undetermined outcome as to what kind of national economy works 
best. 
A particular creation of a new economic form got underway in the English city of 
Liverpool. Here was an experiment not at the level of regional cultural-geography such as in 
China, nor at the Sweden-like level of a national boundary, but at an urban level. In March 
1927, faculty at the University of Liverpool contacted the Memorial with an idea to use their 
city as a field laboratory to better understand interactions between economic opportunity, 
family quality, and various urban social problems. “[U]nderstanding that the L.S.R.M. is 
interested in new schemes of social research and experiment,” the Liverpool faculty offered a 
letter of inquiry “taking the liberty of bringing to the notice of the Memorial certain projects 
 
246 Gustav Cassel to William Beveridge, November 14, 1924; Gösta Bagge to Memorial Trustees, June 30, 
1925, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 77, Folder 804. 
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which are in contemplation in Liverpool.” The University of Liverpool, with an established 
program in social work, had in mind a range of “experiments in child guidance, health 
education, employment and after-care of boys, social centres, and adult education among 
casual labourers.” Liverpool faculty believed they might even discover new approaches to 
“research into problems associated with the experimental work” on poverty alleviation 
throughout the city of Liverpool. One goal was to establish a “settlement research” center 
aimed at improving studies of child development, ethnic integration, and general social 
welfare from an experimental point of view. The grand goal, as one leader at the Memorial 
even interpreted it, was nothing less than “to discover the causes of poverty and its effects 
upon the population.” To be included for examination would be “physical geography” as well 
as “the economic, political, and social factors of present Liverpool organization.” As was 
emphasized in a number of exchanges between persons at the University of Liverpool and the 
Memorial, an urgent need was to get better research coordination between different British 
research programs doing poverty studies.247 
Ruml responded positively to possibilities for the Liverpool study. His thinking 
included support of an idea to connect the Liverpool study to an ongoing study in London, 
 
247 The initial letter is from Secretary-Treasurer of University of Liverpool to W.S. Richardson, March 23, 1927. 
Prior to any grant award, the Memorial’s chief contact, Sydnor H. Walker, visited Liverpool and learned that 
“No other school of social science in Great Britain, nor school of social study, exists which comprises a degree 
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different fields of social science; “Memorandum of Interview,” Sydnor H. Walker, May 23, 1928. Walker, in a 
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geography, the economic, political, and social factors of present Liverpool organization would be examined.” 
The plan for this integrated study in social science was to make house-to-house visits to collect data on at least 
10,000 households; Sydnor Walker to Beardsley Ruml, May 22, 1928, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 73, Folders 
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overseen by the LSE as the “New Survey of London Life and Labour.” And, indeed, both the 
Liverpool and London projects eventually produced useful results.248 
The research field created to study alternative forms of regional or national 
economies was not the last of the new research fields the Memorial aimed to help develop. In 
addition to the idea that Russia, the Middle East and China all suffered from some kind of 
evolutionary lag, and in addition to the idea that such places as Sweden and Liverpool might 
perhaps be attempting evolutionary institutional correction, and in addition to the idea that 
another region of the world where the idea of retarded evolution might even apply was the 
race-relations mess in the American South, still another possibility was that an entire sector 
of the American economy might perhaps be lagging behind: namely, the agricultural sector. 
This subject – one of a number of research fields yet to be studied – is where the next chapter 
picks up. 
 
248 Liverpool researchers saw their study as a companion to the seventeen-volume study, Charles Booth, The 
Life and Labour of the People of London (1885-1902). See D. Caradog Jones and Colin G. Clark, “Housing in 
Liverpool: A Survey by Sample of Present Conditions,” Read before the Royal Statistical Society, May 20, 
1930, and published in Journal of Royal Statistical Society 93, Pt. IV (1930): 489-537; Caradog et al., The 
Social Survey of Merseyside (Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool, 1934). 
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CHAPTER 7. RESEARCH “FIELDS,” PART TWO–1922-28 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter we identified and studied four research fields receiving serious 
attention from Beardsley Ruml and the Memorial. In this chapter we consider developments 
that Ruml and the Memorial helped to accomplish in five more research fields: land use, 
population and agriculture; human biology; home economics and child welfare; international 
relations; coordination projects for gathering social statistics. Three more research fields will 
be included in Chapter 8 as well. 
 
7.2 Land use and population studies–1922-28 
A major field of social research pursued by the Memorial between 1923 and 1928 
was research on land use and population trends. By the 1920s, a recognized interest in many 
industrialized nations was to study manifestations of regional under-population or over-
population, including causes of migration patterns linking the two. This area of study also 
related in certain ways to problems of race relations, in that there was an extraordinary 
amount of black migration in the United States immediately following the world war. For 
African Americans, in addition to the factor of wanting to get away from the harshest social 
and political conditions in the American South, entire families wanted to find the most 
favorable economic circumstances in which to live and work. The issue of bringing white 
179
families and black families into peaceful and productive coexistence was seen by some social 
researchers as an issue relating to the picture of maladjusted land uses around the nation.249 
By January 1923, a broad proposed study of population and land usage arrived at 
Ruml’s desk, as sent by Richard T. Ely, a well-established economist specializing in land 
economics. Based at the Institute for Research in Land Economics and Public Utilities in 
Madison, Wisconsin, Ely submitted a preliminary proposal for a project to make land-use 
studies that would be “vital to the national welfare and survival.”250 
Ely’s preliminary proposal had its supporters. Albert Shaw, editor of The American 
Review of Reviews, sent a recommendation letter saying he was convinced “not only of the 
scientific value but of the intensely practical character of the work in land economics” to be 
guided by Ely. The project would involve wide-ranging problems “relating to the public 
domain and the natural resources” of the nation. Shaw thought highly of “the methods of Dr. 
Ely’s institute [which] seem to me particularly adapted to the supplying of trustworthy 
information” in areas presently lacking it.251 
Following a personal meeting between Ely and Ruml in Washington, Ely wrote to 
express high appreciation for Ruml’s “interest in the scientific aspects of our work.” Ely 
expressed personal appreciation for rigorous science, believing “that economists have not 
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attained as high scientific standards as have other scientists, although I believe great 
improvements have been made in recent years.” Newly accessible statistical data was one 
reason for the improving situation. Ely recognized the next need was for greater coordination 
between social scientists, and he expressed that the problem of land-use analysis “has 
become too great for isolated workers. We require close contact in our group and that is the 
reason for our Institute.” Ely used a familiar analogy by comparing research in economics to 
research in medicine, saying he saw it as a “fact that the best scientific work in economics as 
well as medicine is the result of efforts by scientific men, following scientific methods, to 
solve actual problems.” Ely identified a trio of substantial social problems that could be 
addressed with granted funds: “prevention of human misery involved in unwise land 
settlements”; “problems of starvation in India and China”; “the problem of world peace to 
which we could make a contribution if we work out plans for the distribution of the food and 
raw materials among the nations of the earth.”252 
Ely and Ruml got into extensive discussion through much of 1923, with Ruml asking 
Ely for specifics, and Ely trying to oblige. Ely recommended adding a study of the 
consequences of large land holdings on the U.S. economy, as well as studies of problems 
associated with utilizing low-grade land and problems connected to extreme fluctuation in 
land values. Ely also emphasized the solid reputation of his institute, and he noted his keen 
concern to “take up practical problems of human welfare and attempt to solve them by 
scientific methods.” In the end, Ely’s proposal got denied. Were his proposed projects too 
general? Probably they were. Were they potentially too controversial? Perhaps they were this 
as well. One problem surely was Ely’s failure to make his proposal specific enough. In 
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addition to that, the Memorial may have feared the nature of any policy implications that 
might come from Ely’s studies; the Memorial may have believed, in other words, that some 
kind of policy advocacy might be present in Ely’s conclusions, and that whatever the 
advocacy was, it would likely be too radical for the Memorial to be associated with. At 
Ruml’s friendly tip, Ely withdrew the proposal just prior to its expected denial by the 
trustees.253 
Another proposal for a land-use study also denied by the Memorial came from 
Stanford University’s Food Research Institute. Stanford’s study clearly encountered the 
problem that the Memorial interpreted it as too large and impractical, and as too loosely 
defined. As to the Stanford project, which was proposed in May 1922 by Institute Director 
Carl Alsberg, the goal was to develop better harvest predictions by “dealing with the 
technique and methods of crop estimating.” Crop estimation, after all, “lies at the base of all 
rational agricultural production and marketing.” To the best of Alsberg’s knowledge, “no 
complete and thorough study of all the methods in use in the past and present for crop 
estimating and no critical study of their respective values have ever been made public.” 
Interesting was Alsberg’s idea that accurate crop estimation even “involves psychological 
factors” which “loom particularly large” in any estimation errors; and so in addition to the 
problem of its undefined nature, Ruml may also have hesitated to support a project that 
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seemed a bit grand and far-reaching in how it would try to connect estimates of seasonal crop 
levels to human psychological factors. As stated, Stanford’s proposal was denied.254 
Stanford’s Food Research Institute was, without question, a reputable institution. In 
the years following the world war, a number of new research institutes were established in 
the physical sciences, and in 1921 the Carnegie Corporation took a leadership role in helping 
establish the Food Research Institute. From the perspective of the Memorial, the institute 
surely was a trustworthy organization, and so denial of the proposed project must have been 
on its own terms.255 
A pattern in the two project denials may be the grand scale of what was being 
proposed, especially given that Ely never quite got his projects described specifically enough 
for Ruml’s liking. Also possible was that Ruml, who was not yet firmly established at the 
Memorial during 1922 and 1923, did not want to risk losing any ‘good will’ in his new 
position by presenting underdefined projects to the trustees during his first few year or so as 
director. 
Another proposed project was denied six years later however. At a time when Ruml 
was now well established, Stanford’s Food Research Institute again proposed a project, this 
time to compile a comprehensive study of world agricultural conditions. Again it was 
Alsberg who contacted Ruml, to propose an atlas-oriented project that would be a new work 
to replace an older survey of world agriculture published during the mid-1910s by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. The new version of such an atlas should be a world study on a 
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scale which “it was not deemed by those in authority possible for the [U.S.] Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics to undertake.” The new project should be “a complete and 
authorized work of the highest scientific value,” and to attain such status would require “a 
vast amount of pure research, statistical and otherwise.” Alsberg clarified that the planned 
project aimed to identify “the relationship of the increasing population of the world to the 
supply of food, fibre, and forest products, and sketch the economic structure of production 
and distribution of these commodities.” In the end this project was seen by the Memorial as 
too big to attempt.256 
In both of Stanford’s project proposals, researchers drew attention to a problem of 
some importance: maladjustment between technologies and institutions. There was a sense, 
especially in the case of Stanford’s 1928 proposal, that the economic structure of production 
technology and the economic structure of distribution practices were in discord. 
A number of grant proposals came along, however, that were approved for dealing 
with issues of land usage, population, and agriculture. 
In June 1922, the Memorial decided to support a study in population and migration 
patterns to be done through the National Research Council. A goal was to support better 
communication between different researchers and their variety of methods. It seems likely 
the Memorial may have hesitated to commit large sums of money to support any one 
particular method in a new research field, and so the NRC’s proposal made sense. The 
Memorial was willing to provide funds to support NRC-guided research in certain areas so 
long as these areas were relevant to Memorial interests. The nature of a research coordination 
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problem involved a need to identify uniform measurement categories and common standards 
of data collection. The Memorial’s support of the NRC project got started when Vernon 
Kellogg, NRC Secretary, wrote in response to Ruml’s request for any prospective research 
ideas relating to the social sciences. Kellogg believed funds could be directed towards the 
“promotion of scientific projects sponsored by the Council,” and that it would be best for 
funds to be awarded in a general endowment, “rather than to give the money for the support 
of a specific list of projects made up in advance.” NRC chairman George Ellery Hale, who 
was one of the nation’s leading physicists and astronomers, also submitted an opinion, 
expressing a view that any grant from the Memorial would best be awarded as a general 
award. As the NRC already was significantly supported by Rockefeller Foundation funds in 
various fields in the physical sciences, Hale recommended adding some kind of broad work, 
supported by the Memorial, to “briefly survey the wide field of science and discern its true 
place in any intelligent scheme of national development.” Here was a truly grand idea! 
Hale’s recommended project was, in effect, a study to find the best societal applications for 
every scientific discovery in the physical sciences. Though the Memorial had no difficulties 
awarding money to the NRC for certain specific areas of research, a line had to be drawn and 
Hale’s proposed project did not receive a grant.257 
The Memorial interpreted its projects activated through the NRC as successful ones. 
Following a period of positive support of the NRC, leaders at the Memorial got into 
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discussion about possibly developing a new organization for the social sciences, which 
would be a “Social Science Research Council.” In certain ways the SSRC (which will be 
studied in the next chapter) would follow the NRC’s committee-based model, doing for the 
social sciences what the NRC did for the physical sciences. Especially there might be some 
benefits to be attained by running a fellowships program through an umbrella organization 
with a structure akin to the NRC’s. Writing in July 1923, Ruml discussed the formation of 
the SSRC, summarizing his understanding of what Charles E. Merriam, the Chicago political 
science professor, reported as a decision reached by leading persons in the social sciences: 
that it would (in Ruml’s words) be desirable “to form a council similar to the National 
Research Council that should operate in the fields of Economics, Sociology and Political 
Science.” Ruml, while standing mostly on the sideline of the actual organizational effort, 
expressed his agreement with Merriam’s now-famous idea: “There is no question in my mind 
but that there must be brought into existence sooner or later an organization that will function 
in the field of the social sciences in the same way as the National Research Council functions 
in the field of the physical and biological sciences.” Various kinds of land-use studies would 
eventually be overseen by the SSRC by the end of the 1920s.258 
Another potential land-use study came along in 1924. A major part of any complete 
research program in land-use studies would need to include scientific development of 
agricultural economics. A relevant proposal came from economists at the New School for 
Social Research, in New York City. This was a school with which the Memorial had some 
ties, most notably through Lawrence Frank and Wesley Mitchell, each of whom had taught 
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there. The New School’s proposal was to study human migration patterns from a kind of 
evolutionary, or human “selection,” point of view. New School social scientists displayed 
nuanced understanding of connections between agricultural problems and excess migration, 
and their grant proposal opened by declaring: “The agricultural problem in the United States 
stands in dire need of reformation at this time.”259 
The New School’s proposed project was quite economic in its approach. A recent 
national recession had left agricultural prices out of balance with other prices in the 
economy, and had also left farmers facing problems of inadequate credit. The “deeper cause” 
underlying both situations, which was perhaps familiar only to the “hard-boiled economist,” 
was “that the problem is one of decreasing costs by improving the technical methods of 
agriculture.” Social and economic institutions were not easily catching up to technological 
advances. Part of the problem dated from the 1890s, when the last of ‘virgin land’ was 
brought under cultivation. “Sooner or later the food supply of our nation must begin to lag 
behind the growth of population,” the New School faculty declared. The proposed research 
would help connect understanding of technological, economic, and cultural dimensions of 
human migration.260 
Because the New School was located in New York City, faculty at the school 
believed they ought to say why they should be the ones to undertake the project. They 
explained that migration most often has as its destination the city, and that “the city-ward 
move of population which has been going on in this country for half a century is 
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undesirable.” This undesirability was partly because “the city is a poorer place in which to 
grow up than in the country.” Additionally: “As the process of migration from the farm to the 
city continues, a selection of persons who go as against those who stay is continually taking 
place. Is the city draining from the rural districts the most intelligent and energetic part of the 
population?” The New School, in wanting to research all possible causes of rural-to-urban 
migration, believed “the most difficult part of the problem is the formulation of an adequate 
culture for the rural community.” The idea was to find research applications that might keep 
more people from migrating to cities without being prepared for unexpected difficulties of 
urban life. In a second, somewhat more refined proposal, the New School faculty added that 
wide-ranging projects were ready to go. Many proposed projects aimed to apply scientific 
knowledge to strengthening the economic and cultural foundations of rural communities. The 
New School attempted to list separable and fairly specific projects: a study of federal taxation 
and finance; the “Agrarian problem”; organized labor in the public service; religious life of a 
typical American community; general work on race problems; social-psychological studies of 
races and cultures; crime and delinquency; personality development. Though such problem 
categories were still a bit general and motley in nature, a five-year grant was awarded.261 
By 1925 Ruml decided it was time to develop a stronger focus on agricultural 
economics within the land-use and population research field. He requested a report from 
Edwin G. Nourse, head of the agricultural section at the Institute of Economics. Ruml asked 
Nourse to provide information on the quality of research in the nation’s leading university 
departments of agricultural economics. Ruml and Nourse shared an idea that agricultural 
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problems and other rural land-use problems needed to be made part of an increasingly 
interconnected web of all the social sciences, which should in turn address an interconnected 
web of national issues. Nourse provided detailed information, reporting on all major 
agricultural economics programs in the country. He expressed opinions ranging from a low 
point of “No good men” at Penn State and “no one at Cornell who is regarding American 
farm policy from a national point of view,” to high praise especially for the University of 
Wisconsin (led by Richard Ely), the University of Minnesota (led by J.D. Black), and Iowa 
State College (led by C.L. Holmes).262 
Nourse’s views carried weight. As a University of Chicago-trained economist under 
Ruml’s friend Leon Marshall, Nourse was known for his advocacy of agricultural 
cooperatives. In a series of important papers between 1919 and 1922, Nourse argued that 
cooperative enterprise among farmers can improve the overall competitive performance of 
the national economy – and that the degree of cooperative enterprise can even be used as a 
yardstick to measure performance of the capitalist system as a whole. Nourse developed his 
“competitive yardstick” model as a democratic, grass-roots approach, based on a belief that 
the method of slow, bottom-up accumulation of a cooperative mindset is ultimately far 
superior to any rapidly imposed structure from the top down.263 
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Following discussions between Ruml and Nourse, Ruml decided to explore 
agricultural economics as a possible addition to the land-use research program. In 1926, a 
report by Ruml recognized agricultural economics as standing equal in importance to 
criminology research on a short list of areas representing the next fields of urgent concern. 
Stated in the report was also that a third problem area, race and race relations, stood in dire 
need of attention. But while the level of demand for social science research was something 
Ruml saw as increasing in many fields, the demand pressure was especially strong for 
research in agricultural economics.264 
Ruml asked for a planning report in 1927 emphasizing rural social problems, 
especially those agricultural-economic in nature. A companion report was also produced on 
the subject of social technology. The latter report suggested the Memorial trustees were 
extending their sense of the unity of social science to allow that discovery of knowledge and 
application of knowledge could mesh quite closely. Discovery and application were out of 
balance, however, and so a short-term focus needed to go towards getting more scientific 
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discoveries, which would help counterbalance the crash program that it seemed was 
attending more to social technology than to social science.265 
Ruml got more studies supported for research in land, population, and agriculture. 
Such research was central to a 1927 proposal from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, the quite specific aim of which was to study international migration patterns. A 
grant was awarded.266 
The following year, in June 1928, Ruml decided to pursue an agricultural economics 
study of his own on the problem of “Agrarian Reform.” The study – designed as an analytical 
exercise – was overseen by J.D. Black, now at Harvard, and by Theodore W. Schultz, a 
Wisconsin doctoral student respected by Black. The project was to explore an agricultural 
relief plan of Ruml’s devising for a trial experiment to study alternative approaches to tariffs 
on agricultural products. Black and Schultz assembled a research team to pursue research 
emphasized by Black as rigorously “scientific.” The project to explore the effect of tariffs on 
various farm products lasted until 1930 and became called the “surplus” study.267 
The 1928 “Agrarian Reform” (or “surplus”) study was not Ruml’s first self-initiated 
agricultural-economic study. It may even be that agricultural economics was the research 
field in which Ruml allowed himself to be personally most initiative. In 1923 and 1924, 
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Ruml helped build a study from an idea of leading agricultural economists Henry C. Taylor 
and Richard Ely. The study, taking place in Helena, Montana, became the “Fairway Farms” 
experiment. On land purchased by the Rockefeller Foundation, the “Fair Way Plan” was, in 
the words of one contemporary report, to test “the theory that farming in the northwest, when 
undertaken on a proper economic foundation and carried on in a scientific manner, will pay.” 
One main objective was to study landlord-tenant relations – specifically to identify those 
particular kinds of relations that best lead to eventual farm ownership by the largest number 
of farmers. Ruml and persons at both the Memorial and the Rockefeller Foundation 
(including John D. Rockefeller Jr.) got a Bozeman company, the Fairway Farms Corporation, 
to oversee the project on nine purchased farms for starters, and to build from scratch an entire 
farming community.268 
In June 1928, the University of Vermont got another sort of population-and-migration 
study approved for a grant. This study was an especially large one, designed to evaluate 
various causes of rural-to-urban migration. Vermont researchers had certain ideas somewhat 
similar to an idea underlying the study made by the New School economists. Like 
researchers at the New School, Vermont researchers wanted to make a study from a 
selectionist point of view. Such an approach they saw as an underappreciated method for 
understanding causes and consequences of declining rural population. In March of that year, 
director of the three-year-old “Eugenics Survey of Vermont,” Henry F. Perkins, contacted 
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Edmund Day at the Memorial to present an idea to add to their research plan a 
comprehensive survey of economic and social factors in rural Vermont. The Memorial asked 
for a detailed application, which became Vermont’s successful June submission. Director 
Perkins’s main concern, as stated in the original March proposal, was “the declining 
population of the rural areas of the state,” which “seem[ed] to be no local problem, but one of 
widespread significance throughout the country.” The reasons for this decline were not yet 
known, and in trying to discover them, “there are almost as many answers to the question as 
there are individuals who have investigated the matter.” The proposed study, as it was refined 
by June, focused on ten dimensions of social and economic analysis to try and explain rural 
population decline. The study’s overall goal was to learn how to better meet the needs of 
Vermont’s rural communities.269 
Henry C. Taylor, a leading agricultural economist, strongly supported the Vermont 
study. He wrote the Memorial to express admiration of the way “the human factor and the 
life of the people is receiving unusual emphasis” in the study. The Vermont study was 
different from somewhat similar studies done by rural commissions in Maine and New York, 
in that whereas these other studies tended to take as their “starting point” the issue of land 
utilization, the Vermont study began with community-level social and economic conditions. 
Taylor, in advocating for the Vermont study, believed the Vermont project could perhaps be 
the methodological basis for developing a national-level research program. He interpreted the 
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Vermont researchers as believing that government policies would likely be needed to guide 
more progressive land utilization. The grant proposal, as noted, was approved.270 
Agricultural and rural social problems in Europe were also of interest to the 
Memorial. One supported project was based out of Rome. The goal expressed in 1925 by 
those doing research at the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome, was to distinguish 
between rural problems specific to Europe and rural problems likely common to many 
industrialized nations. The Rome researchers wanted to stimulate better research as well as 
show how to translate current research results into an improved teaching program. The main 
question they asked was this: Were problems on the path to “rural life improvements” rooted 
in the same basic causes in all countries?271 
At the University of Copenhagen, in Denmark, a project in cooperative social science 
research was supported by the Memorial during 1926 and 1927. The goal for increased 
cooperation between social scientists in this case involved some focus on rural and 
agricultural problems. Copenhagen researchers shared with the Memorial their interest in 
working toward a “cooperative” structure in social science, as faculty at the school’s Institute 
of Economics and History aimed to study rural and agricultural problems while also 
“mak[ing] an organized study of political and social-economic history of the past few 
decades.” Copenhagen economics professor Aage Friis contacted the Memorial, in 
September 1926, asking about the possibility of applying for a grant. Friis’s rationale hit 
upon the kind of natural sciences comparison suited to Memorial interests. He explained that 
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194
“the subjects and the materials forming the history of the past generation are so 
comprehensive in extent that one investigator would be unable to work through all this 
material by his own unaided efforts.” Friis’s memo continued: “In the natural sciences the 
work of research is now carried on in great institutions,” where it seems every piece of 
research is “properly planned and organized.” However “in the historical and economic 
sciences, each investigator as yet works on his own particular subject, …without considering 
the possibility of cooperating with others.” Friis believed the isolated researcher could no 
longer succeed in the social sciences. Copenhagen received a grant.272 
At Heidelberg University, in Germany, certain real-world problems were of pressing 
concern. As expressed in a February 1928 grant application, the problems recognized by the 
Heidelberg faculty related to agricultural conditions in southern Germany, to economic and 
cultural questions of various sorts relating to western Germany and rural eastern France, and 
to problems in the sociology of government administration in many European nations. 
Heidelberg professors wondered if by beginning with such research areas perhaps a larger 
research program could be built over time. When Ruml asked for a more specific proposal, 
the Heidelberg faculty readjusted their statement of research interests just slightly as follows: 
“The population problem of Europe”; “The place of European Production in World 
Economics”; “The movement of Capital and the Economic Future of Europe”; “The 
Rationalization Problem of German Administration.” Agricultural problems in Germany 
were now included within multiple categories, which was important in order to see that 
 
272 The Institute of Economics and History was established at the University of Copenhagen in 1926; see Aage 
Friis to James Shotwell, September 18, 1926. Friis’s attached memo is titled “Memorandum, Institute of 
Economic History,” September 1926, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 52, Folder 581. Following the initial 
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agricultural problems connected closely to larger social problems. Although the described 
project was still fairly general (as was also the case for the University of Copenhagen), the 
Memorial wanted Heidelberg on board and were willing to allow Heidelberg a grant, which 
would last until 1936.273 
7.3 Human biology and social evolution–1923-28 
Part of the land-use problem that connected closely to ideas about population change 
was essentially the idea that too many people lived in some areas while too few lived in 
others. Furthermore, there was also an idea that changes in rural and urban population 
quantities involved change in population qualities as well. Population problems were a 
research priority as early as about 1923, at both the Memorial and the Rockefeller 
Foundation. An idea was even tried, primarily out of the Foundation, to make population 
quality an entire research field. However the idea was eventually rejected.274 
In 1925 Rockefeller Foundation Secretary Edwin Embree, in communication with the 
Memorial as well as with Foundation president George Vincent, set up a “Human Biology 
Program,” with one of its objectives to advance eugenic knowledge. The program was to be 
at an intersection between the Foundation’s work in medicine and the Memorial’s work in 
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See also Gerald Jonas, The Circuit Riders: Rockefeller Money and the Rise of Modern Science (New York & 
London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989): 130-1. 
196
social research. The idea was to develop a greater focus on the biological sciences that 
underlie human behavior. Perhaps research in biology would even be able to cast new light 
on all social institutions. The main idea was that human behavior and even social institutions 
were somehow deterministically based in biology, which was an idea fashionably called 
“human biology.” In Embree’s mind, as he wrote to Raymond Fosdick, greater knowledge of 
eugenics was needed because it was even “harder to give [children] a good inheritance than 
good surgery.” Embree fully recognized the sensitive nature of any Rockefeller philanthropic 
support of such a program, as did others. Abraham Flexner, for example, cautioned Embree 
to say that the Rockefeller Foundation “should not itself undertake studies, particularly in 
such controversial topics as population and eugenics. The fact that it is not proposing to enter 
directly into such fields should be made clear from the outset.”275 
Although support of research projects relating to human biology, sex research and 
eugenics was carefully spread across as many as six separate grant-awarding bodies affiliated 
with the Rockefeller philanthropies (i.e., the Foundation’s Medical Sciences Division, the 
Foundation’s Natural Sciences Division, Rockefeller Jr.’s Bureau of Social Hygiene, the 
Memorial, the SSRC, and the NRC), one of the largest projects was one attempted at the 
London School of Economics during the early 1930s, under the school’s continuing block-
grant.276 
275 Edwin R. Embree to Raymond Fosdick, August 26, 1925, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 915 P&P Human 
Biology, Box 4, Folder 33. “Conversation with Flexner,” RAC–RF, R.G.12.1, Series Diaries (Embree), Box 14, 
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276 The most complete study of the LSE’s program in human biology is in a dissertation chapter, “The Rise and 
Fall of the Department of Social Biology,” in Salma Ahmad, “Institutions and the Growth of Knowledge: The 
Rockefeller Foundation’s Influence on the Social Sciences Between the Wars,” Ph.D. dissertation, Manchester 
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Embree’s program in human biology was short-lived, however, coming to an end for 
the most part by 1927 – and to an end entirely by 1933. Such an outcome was partly due to 
caution at the Foundation about getting involved in anything hinting of “eugenics.” But 
although support of the research field was stopped because it was potentially too 
controversial, Embree’s short-lived project to build a human biology program was a project 
that made at least some sense to consider as part of the broad program pursued by the 
Memorial during the 1920s. 
In connection with many research fields which we have been seeing the Memorial 
explore during the early to middle 1920s, ideas of social evolution were a recurring theme of 
sorts. Social evolution was an issue of some interest to Ruml personally, who was willing to 
take a personal stance on the large controversy of the middle 1920s: whether evolution 
instruction should take place in public schools. The Scopes trial, in particular, was a current 
event in 1925 when Ruml worked with the University of North Carolina to establish a 
research center there. Ruml got to wondering about the cultural climate surrounding the 
teaching of evolution in southern schools, and he asked UNC’s Howard Odum about this. 
From Odum, Ruml learned that UNC President Harry W. Chase had, in February of that 
year, spoken before a state legislative committee to take a stand in defense of teaching 
evolution. Odum noted for Ruml at least one newspaper that commented editorially that 
Chase’s move was possibly “the most notable example of courage and faith in a high ideal 
which North Carolina has witnessed in recent years.”277 
277 Howard Odum to Beardsley Ruml, February 25, 1925; see also Howard Odum to Guy Stanton Ford, 
February 27, 1925. The local newspaper was The Greensboro Daily News. RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 74, 
Folder 776. 
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Ruml was also personally interested in questions of human evolution. We can figure 
out some about these views through other correspondences carried on by Ruml concerning 
research at UNC. Ruml shared his belief in the importance of a proposed anthropology 
project at the school, noting that he admired the project for its methodological design “to 
assist in the study of Australian aborigines.” Writing to Arthur Woods on the matter, Ruml 
communicated his hope concerning the study, “that a very definite step had been taken 
toward the opening up of the general field of anthropology, ethnology and biology as it bears 
on human evolution.”278 
A possible way to interpret a number of projects supported by the Memorial is that in 
part they were an attempt to help social evolution along. Frederick Gates, at the Foundation, 
contemplated social evolution in a 1926 Foundation memorandum in which he connected his 
idea of “scientific philanthropy” to the latest ideas in social Darwinism, expressing that 
grants ought to be awarded to try to “reach the sources of the evil they seek to correct;” this 
idea was now expressed in terms of getting money to where it could do the most good over 
the long term, as more than ever charity gifts that were not carefully targeted were merely 
“temporary opiates” working against the “stern logic of evolution.” Raymond Fosdick was 
another leader at the Foundation who contemplated the importance of a selection process of 
social Darwinism, specifically discussing evolution of human societies in The Old Savage in 
the New Civilization (1928).279 
278 Beardsley Ruml to Arthur Woods, May 12, 1924, RAC–LSRM, Series II, Box 63, Folder 39. 
279 Gates, like many social Darwinists, opposed government regulation and labor unions. He also believed in the 
superiority of Anglo-Saxon peoples; Frederick T. Gates, “Thoughts on The Rockefeller Public and Private 
Benefactions,” December 31, 1926, RAC–Gates Collection, Box 2, File 47, p. 1. Raymond B. Fosdick, The Old 
Savage in the New Civilization (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Doran, 1928). 
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One relevant area of social science comfortably supported by Rockefeller 
philanthropy having to do with the question whether all human groups are basically the same 
was case-study research on primitive peoples. With the exception of some Memorial funds 
that went to anthropology at such research centers as Columbia University and the University 
of Chicago, most funding for anthropology research actually came directly from the 
Rockefeller Foundation, beginning in 1924. In November of that year, $100,000 was 
awarded for anthropological studies in Australia over a five-year period; and more money 
would be added before the period was done. The premier name among anthropologists 
benefiting from this money was A.R. Radcliff-Brown, a highly-regarded Cambridge-trained 
researcher interested in studying his version of the “functionalist” method. In the hands of 
Radcliffe-Brown, the method was used to help explain how the aggregate of behavioral rules 
and guidelines in a society become “social structure.” Also through the joint efforts of the 
Foundation and Radcliffe-Brown, a new quarterly journal, Oceania, was created for 
anthropology research in Australia and the Pacific islands. Foundation support of 
anthropologists researching aboriginal Australians and Pacific Islanders continued well into 
the 1930s, as the program would be included as a “special field of interest” in the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s Division of Social Sciences, established when the Foundation absorbed the 
Memorial’s programs in January 1929.280 
When taken altogether, it seems likely that Embree, Ruml, Woods, Gates and Fosdick 
were not alone in having beliefs about social Darwinian – whether ultimately pro or con – by 
the middle 1920s. Yet significantly more historical research and analysis would be needed to 
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fully determine if, and how, these ideas may have contributed to directing certain grant 
awards during the 1920s and beyond. 
 
7.4 Home economics, parent training, and child welfare–1923-28 
Beginning in 1924, Lawrence Frank almost single-handedly planned the Memorial’s 
improved program in child development. One important part of the program involved the 
establishment of laboratory nursery schools at a number of universities in the United States 
and Canada. These schools made use of the ‘world-as-laboratory’ model that came into play 
during the time of the Ruml-led Memorial. Among more notable child development 
programs with lab schools focusing on nursery education were the University of Toronto, 
Cornell University, and Iowa State College.281 
In February 1924, the Memorial trustees stated four activities they considered 
important in their continuing effort to extend from the Memorial’s original focus on the 
welfare of mothers and children. Appreciating what Ruml, Frank and others were sculpting, 
the trustees agreed on an idea to make the attack on social problems at a fundamental level. 
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The question was, how far from the Memorial’s original focus should such an attack 
extend?282 
Frank directed the building of a scientifically-based child development program by 
expressing a belief that addressing symptoms of social problems was not good enough. In a 
series of reports between 1923 and 1925, Frank said that funding efforts at the Memorial 
needed to focus on underlying causes of social problems. As Frank reviewed the child 
welfare programs in his reports, he consistently concluded that a fundamental problem was 
faulty parental behavior. Parents were simply not getting the appropriate training to raise 
healthy children. Society needed to help parents attain the knowledge needed to raise healthy 
children, and support especially needed to go to organizations concerned with providing 
educational materials on child care. The ultimate goal, as Frank expressed it in 1925, was that 
the “home as a child welfare agency will tend increasingly to reduce the need for specialized 
remedial services.”283 
Frank recognized the possibility of tapping into the utilization of federal funds 
connected with so-called “extension work” in home economics. Extensive service programs 
– created by the federal government during the 1910s – were used at a number of colleges 
and universities to put academic experts in contact with the public. Frank had an idea to use 
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established extension networks at land-grant schools in a dual role as parent education 
networks. A question, as Frank stated it in 1926, was: “How can college Home Economics 
Departments best make their contribution to pre-parental education?” Particular schools with 
extension networks and child welfare institutes that would receive Memorial support 
included Cornell University, the University of California, the University of Minnesota, and 
Iowa State College. The strongest use of an extension network for the purpose of parent 
education may have been the program affiliated with Iowa State, where in 1925 Frank 
worked with the school’s Home Economics Dean Anna E. Richardson (also president of the 
American Home Economics Association) to establish parent education lessens as part of the 
school’s extension service.284 
As the Memorial decided Iowa State had research projects that were worthy of 
support, what seems to have helped in this decision was the presence of unique campus 
“laboratories” at Iowa State as well as a reputable program of extension service. An idea was 
to use established community contact (traditionally used to put farmers in touch with new 
discoveries in agricultural science) by spreading guidance about progressive home 
management. Richardson wanted to develop studies of child rearing and socialization in 
campus laboratories as well, and she proposed combining lab and extension work. Frank 
recommended a three-year grant.285 
284 RAC-LSRM, Lawrence K. Frank, memo of interview with Anna Richardson, Dean of School of Home 
Economics, Iowa State College, March 2, 1925, RAC–LSRM, Series 3, Box 32, Folder 341; Lawrence K. Frank 
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One project at Iowa State began in 1925 when Richardson set up a house on the 
campus where undergraduate home economics students could live with and help raise an 
infant (specifically a 16-month-old baby boy). The project succeeded, and continuing to the 
mid-1950s, baby wards of the state lived in campus homes where women students learned 
responsibilities of progressive rural home management. A related part of Iowa State’s “home 
management house” program during the latter 1920s was to study uses of the newest 
“household equipment” in homes where children were to be raised. In the tradition of 
“scientific management” (i.e., “Taylorism”), Memorial funds enabled research projects to 
study such matters as the placement and design of stoves, home freezers, steam flatirons, and 
various other appliances. The ultimate basis for Richardson’s holistic research program was a 
belief that women should receive rigorous, scientific understanding of “household scientific 
management,” including technology applications and childrearing practices blended together. 
Success of the program would result in significant grant extensions into the 1930s.286 
Another important example of an increased emphasis on scientific child development 
also took place in Iowa, at the opposite side of the state. This area of emphasis was research 
to better understand the development of child intelligence over time. Whereas Iowa State’s 
research focused on mothers and their skills at creating a modern home environment, 
research at the University of Iowa was more along the line of scientific experiments on 
children. The best-known project was to study long-term stability of a developing young 
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person’s “intelligence quotient,” or “IQ.” University of Iowa researchers, with financial 
assistance from the Memorial, developed what became widely recognized as “one of the 
child welfare centers of the country.” Drawing on the resources of a strong psychology 
department at the school, the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station (actually predating the 
Memorial by being created in April 1917) was the first research center of its kind in North 
America. At the “Iowa Station,” University of Iowa researchers established a preschool 
primarily for the purpose of bringing together groups of normal children between the ages of 
two and five years, to be observed under controlled conditions. Emphasizing that research 
was the central rationale for a university-based nursery school, researchers at the Iowa 
Station’s nursery school emphasized that only children of “normal development” are 
accepted, and that a goal was to offer a favorable environment for maximum development of 
the child.287 
Another possibility for increased scientific attention to ways of helping women and 
children was to focus on developing better social workers. This was done at Tulane 
University, in New Orleans. Tulane contacted the Memorial in 1928 with an idea to better 
connect together its social science programs so that these programs could better contribute to 
the school’s flagship program, its School of Social Work. Tulane already was moving to 
bring together its social science program into a unified cluster, and the university was even 
placing all these in one new building. Following some exchange of correspondence between 
Tulane and the Memorial aimed at testing whether the Memorial might want to help Tulane 
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add a program in psychiatric research, Tulane focused on a belief “that we should consider 
first the establishment of a comprehensive plan of child research and parental guidance in the 
University, which would furnish the proper background and facilities for all studies of the 
child and parent.” Tulane received its grant.288 
Also capable of being scientifically strengthened was research on urban social 
welfare. Already included in Memorial-supported projects by 1922 were donations to the 
American playground movement, immigrant settlement programs, and the Big Brother-Big 
Sister organization. These and other urban-oriented efforts continued receiving Memorial 
grants through the 1920s. What was added during Ruml’s directorship was an idea to better 
train urban social workers to contribute to the success of these programs.289 
Smith College, in Amherst, Massachusetts, had a social work program willing to help 
better mesh “social technology” and “social science.” Smith applied for and received a three-
year Memorial grant in 1924 to help produce better-trained social workers, especially suited 
with knowledge about conditions in Boston and northeastern cities.290 
In St. Louis the Memorial determined a beneficial use of Washington University 
would be to strengthen its programs in social work. These programs prepared social workers 
to contribute to problem solving, especially in Midwestern cities. The Memorial provided a 
grant in 1927 in response to an application for funds to help reorganize all the social sciences 
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at the school. The goal, then, was for social workers to benefit from a program having 
discovery of knowledge better support application of knowledge.291 
A central theme common to all the child development and social work grants seems 
to have been a confidence that young people, immigrant persons, and other people trying to 
assimilate by learning new things truly could be helped to learn things more efficiently. 
Confidence existed that people are not permanently stuck with set beliefs and habits, but can 
learn many new ideas and behaviors. Worthy of note in connection with this idea is that a 
shift took place in Americans’ perception of the intelligence-morality relationship. During 
the 1910s, something important about new mental tests such as IQ tests, U.S. Army mental 
tests, and even a proposed national intelligence test for all “races” is the way such tests 
crystallized a shift taking place with the rise of scientific “expertise.” Up to and during the 
1910s, a reason why social scientists were called upon to identify people of different abilities 
and intelligence levels was a belief that abilities and intelligence of a person tended strongly 
to determine the person’s life-long character and morality. But by and during the 1920s, such 
an idea started to give way, with such research as that at the Iowa Station playing no small 
part in the shift.  
Something else that happened with increased emphasis on scientific research dealing 
with parenting skills, was a tightening of the connection between social science and social 
technology. Although “social technology” was discussed by Memorial officers and trustees a 
number of times, an especially clear statement is in a 1924 memorandum where Memorial 
trustees made a focused effort to distinguish between “social science” and “social 
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technology.” “The Memorial’s interest in social science,” the memorandum declared, “leads 
naturally to a consideration of schools of ‘social technology,’ – to use a term to suggest the 
analogy between medical science and the professional medical schools.” This familiar 
analogy was used to emphasize the idea that basic knowledge that could be discovered at 
such places as the child development lab at Iowa State and the child intelligence lab at the 
University of Iowa could not really be separated from the uses of this knowledge in these 
laboratories; i.e., that the discovered knowledge almost could not exist apart from its 
applications. There were now understood to be three kinds of academic programs responsible 
for applying social knowledge: law schools; schools of business and commerce; schools of 
social work and public welfare. Although we have yet to consider the first group of social 
technology schools, there were indeed a few cases of law schools interested in using methods 
of social science – which we will make note of in the next chapter.292 
7.5 International relations–1923-28 
Another field of interest at the Memorial through the 1920s was international 
relations. The research center at Harvard in the United States was one place where the 
Memorial supported research in international affairs. In 1926, research in international affairs 
was also strongly emphasized in a memorandum stating specific missions for the European 
social sciences program; an urgent need for all of Europe was identified as “prevention of 
war,” and fitting with this need, the Memorial recognized the urgency to promote various 
projects in Europe seen as capable of increasing knowledge about international relations. To 
establish new centers for such studies would be especially desirable, and particularly useful 
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would be to use fellowships to move social scientists between nations, thereby promoting the 
sharing of ideas – and with this, the promotion of peace.293 
One of the first programs sponsored to do research in international relations was at 
Radcliffe College in the United States. The identified need was to help persons in 
government make sound policy “on an understanding of facts.” It actually took quite a bit of 
effort to get the Radcliffe program started. In November 1923, the Radcliffe faculty 
submitted their proposed program, aimed primarily at instruction in international affairs. 
Their goal, “requir[ing] no emphasis” for persons at the Memorial, was to help “spread 
authentic information regarding international affairs and relationships.” Persons at the 
Memorial had their doubts, but they guided Radcliffe to develop a more detailed proposal. 
Radcliffe did just this. In February 1924, they expressed their objective was to establish a 
Bureau of International Research, based on a belief that “sound policy in international affairs 
can be based only on an understanding of facts, and that such facts may be discovered and 
made known.” Radcliffe proposed a research program to be a scientific project to discover 
whatever facts were there for discovering. The Memorial responded again with an expression 
of doubt as they asked persons at Harvard if Radcliffe’s researchers were up to the task. 
Harvard’s head librarian believed the library resources at Radcliffe were adequate. However 
Harvard’s Economics Department Chair, Allyn A. Young, hesitated, saying “I find it difficult 
to formulate a definite proposal for the conduct of research in the field of international 
economic problems.” Harvard’s law school and president’s office were also consulted, with 
the president’s office supporting a grant by citing no fewer than thirteen Radcliffe faculty 
 
293 During 1926 and 1927 Memorial trustees put together a Committee on Reorganization to evaluate their 
strategy in Europe. One of the Committee’s memoranda, “Memorandum for the Committee on Reorganization 
by the Memorial’s Representative for Great Britain and Ireland,” was written in December 1926 by J.R.M. 
Butler of Columbia University; RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 50, Folders 529-531. 
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members whose research related mostly or entirely to international affairs. And so, just as 
Harvard’s studies in international affairs were getting underway, Radcliffe received its 
grant.294 
The University of Geneva expressed interest in promoting cooperative social science, 
centering on studies in political science and international relations. During 1925 and 1926, 
the Memorial decided to help establish a European program to study international relations at 
Geneva. What seems to have been important to the Memorial was that Geneva’s studies were 
connected to a focus on cooperative social science. Initial contact between the school and the 
Memorial took place in March 1925, when Memorial advisor Huntington Gilchrist, 
representing the University of Geneva, wrote Ruml to follow up on an earlier personal 
meeting in New York City – at which time Ruml shared guiding thoughts as to what 
Geneva’s institute might try to emphasize in the way of international research. Gilchrist now 
expressed interest in “establishing a special school or institute, for work in political science 
and in international problems.” He suggested the institute could get started on at least some 
research areas that Ruml asked for. In September 1925, on further encouragement from 
Ruml, the university submitted its formal proposal, emphasizing the rigor of what they 
planned: “a permanent center of scientific studies with special reference to [studying] 
problems coming up for discussion in various sections of the League of Nations.” Although it 
 
294 Radcliffe College submitted its initial inquiry on November 10, 1923. Their refined application was 
“Radcliffe College. A Proposal for a Bureau of International Research,” submitted by Ada Comstock President 
of Radcliffe,” February 1, 1924, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 54, Folder 573. Responses to the Memorial’s 
questions for Harvard faculty included: Harvard librarian, Archibald Cary Coolidge to A. Lawrence Lowell, 
May 3, 1924; Allyn A. Young to A. Lawrence Lowell, April 30, 1924; President A. Lawrence Lowell to 
Beardsley Ruml, May 5, 1924. A substantial grant was awarded in November, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 54, 
Folder 573. 
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took some additional months, a grant was awarded to the University of Geneva in June 
1926.295 
Undoubtedly of great importance in the years following the First World War was a 
need to understand European political situations. In late 1925, the Memorial awarded a grant 
to the Hamburg Institute of International Affairs for “work of scientific research” on six 
projects in European political affairs. The projects ranged from studies of specific conditions 
in Germany to studies of treaty-making between all European nations. The award to the 
Hamburg Institute came “at a time when such help is of the highest moral and material 
value…for the rebuilding and stabilizing of Europe.” To persons at the Memorial, political 
stability was seen as prerequisite for anything else happening that might be good for 
Europe.296 
7.6 Filling coordinative funds gaps–1923-28 
Another guiding idea at the Memorial was a goal to fill funding gaps between 
research groups at different institutions. This was an idea connected to many fields of social 
science. The basic notion was that certain research needs tended to fall entirely through the 
cracks by going unconsidered for university support. An idea of a funds gap came up in 
connection with data collection at the municipal level. There was a need for funds to 
 
295 Huntington Gilchrist to Beardsley Ruml, March 18, 1925. The proposal was submitted by Dr. A. Oltramare; 
see A. Oltramare to Beardsley Ruml, September 21, 1925. A five-year grant was awarded in June 1926. RAC–
LSRM, Series III, Box 105, Folder 1061. 
296 See Beardsley Ruml to A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, November 16, 1925; A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy to 
Beardsley Ruml, December 15, 1925. The six projects were a bibliography of foreign policy for the years 1919 
to 1925, a treatise on the constitutional position of Germany under the League of Nations, an analysis of the 
Arbitral Tribunal of Interpretation of the Dawes Plan, a study of societal impacts of the Mandate System, a 
study of the technique of treaty-making in pre-war diplomacy, and annotation of state documents on foreign 
affairs from 1871 to 1914. Support of the institute was maintained until 1930. LSRM, Series III, Box 52, Folder 
561. 
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coordinate research to standardize categories of data collection by local research bureaus, and 
in 1926 the Memorial awarded money to the National Municipal League for the purpose of 
achieving better coordination between research by “local bureaus of municipal research and 
other civic agencies.” Such coordination was needed to “make the most” of all discovered 
facts.297 
Another funds gap associated with the coordination of research came up at the state 
level as public welfare statistics were in serious need of standardization across states. A grant 
to the American Statistical Association in 1928 helped serve this purpose. The goal for the 
grant was to draft a “model law…for the development of uniform statistical procedures in all 
states,” and the hope was that meaningful national-level welfare statistics could be 
assembled.298 
The truly noteworthy success of Memorial efforts at promoting uniform statistical 
procedures was the completion (by the end of 1929) of a “Uniform Crime Reporting System” 
across the United States. Agreed upon by all states, the system marked one of the most 
important events in the history of crime research and crime fighting. Historians recognize the 
beginning of uniform crime reporting as taking place when the Memorial worked with the 
International Association of the Chiefs of Police during 1927 to provide administrative 
responsibility for the project. The Memorial also worked with the Bureau of Social Hygiene 
to oversee fieldwork and research analysis, as well as with the SSRC which had concurrently 
identified crime as a research area needing support. The SSRC sponsored a few criminal 
 
297 Frank L. Polk to Beardsley Ruml, 9 April 1926, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 56, Folder 613. See also 
Charles A. Beard, The Advancement of Municipal Science (New York: National Institute of Public 
Administration, 1910); Charles E. Merriam, “The Next Step in the Organization of Municipal Research,” 
National Municipal Review 11 (September 1922): 274-81; Merriam, “Human Nature and Science in City 
Government,” Journal of Social Forces 1, 4 (May 1923): 459-62. 
298 Horatio M. Pollack to Beardsley Ruml, January 24, 1928, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 49, Folder 511. 
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justice surveys in major cities, most notably in Cleveland, and the Memorial trustees received 
a 1926 report from the SSRC on possible improvements in crime research. The report 
strongly argued for the need for a uniform “crime accounting system” – which was a project 
typifying what could be accomplished by bringing together the Memorial, the SSRC, urban 
social workers, and academic scholars.299 
Another funds gap existed in connection with the publication of social research 
findings. By the middle 1920s, the Memorial recognized that increased publication of social 
research could help improve communications between scientists. During 1923 and 1924, the 
Memorial decided to help support college presses at the University of Chicago and the 
University of North Carolina. The basic idea, as stated by Arthur Woods, was that the 
Memorial “had been looking up the question as to whether or not worthy books are not being 
published because they are commercially unprofitable, and whether or not, perhaps, worthy 
books are not being written because the men who would naturally write them appreciate the 
difficulty, if not the impossibility, of having them published – and therefore is not 
scholarship being retarded”?300 
Another example of support of publications came in 1926 and 1927, when an idea 
was hatched to develop a multi-volume encyclopedia covering all the social sciences. This 
project, overseen by Columbia University economist E.R.A. Seligman, related closely to the 
idea to clarify a structure for the unity of social science by attempting to draw together “the 
interrelations of all these sciences” and to “make an attempt to take stock of our present 
 
299 Lawrence Rosen, “The Creation of the Uniform Crime Report,” Social Science History 19, 2 (1995): 215-38. 
300 Arthur Woods to Kenneth Chorley, October 25, 1924, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 109, Folders 1102-1103. 
The Memorial supported the University of Chicago Press from 1924 to 1931 and the University of North 
Carolina Press from 1924 to 1928. RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 109, Folders 1106-1107; Box 110, Folders 
1108-1110. 
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knowledge.” The encyclopedia was to be made widely available “so that the fundamental 
ideas would gradually percolate down to the wider public.” So, while the unification idea was 
under exploration by persons such as those at Chicago, Columbia and the LSE, a new idea 
grown from the idea to synthesize all social knowledge was an Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences. Funded nearly entirely by the Memorial, the encyclopedia was produced in many 
volumes during the early 1930s. The Memorial supplied nearly half a million dollars for the 
project by 1928, and would provide nearly $300,000 after that. When completed, the project 
truly helped create structure for and diffusion of social knowledge. The instrumental exercise 
in creating clearer understanding of the structure of social science was the very act of 
arranging content during encyclopedia planning sessions.301 
The work by the Memorial to fill funding gaps in data collection and information 
distribution was, in fact, the development of a research field – though applying not to a 
specific social problem, albeit. The field of data collection and information distribution was 
one of perhaps a dozen identifiable fields of attention by the Memorial between 1923 and 
1928. We have studied nine of these fields to this point. Three more will be studied in the 
wide-ranging Chapter 8. 
 
301 See “Memorandum on the Projected ‘Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences’,” 26 pp., Feb. 21, 1927, esp. pp.  
8-9, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 51, Folder 540. 
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CHAPTER 8. RESEARCH INSTITUTES AND EXPANDED 
BOUNDARIES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE–1922-28 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Development of research centers and the nine research fields already studied were not 
all the Memorial focused on. This chapter first studies how the Memorial got involved in 
supporting research in the field of business cycle studies. This chapter then studies how the 
Memorial worked to create new ways to direct funds toward promoting coordinated social 
research. Also in this chapter we return to an ongoing question concerning boundary points 
between social science and non-social science; we do such boundary study as we explore two 
other new research fields, in humane studies and in legal research. 
 
8.2 A fellowships program at the Memorial–1923-28 
One way to accomplish increased coordination of social research was by awarding 
fellowships. A program of foreign fellowships, for example, could be used to achieve a 
variety of benefits, including the movement of ideas and knowledge. The Memorial created a 
fellowships program in basic form in 1923 as a ‘direct fellowships’ program for non-U.S. 
researchers. The aim was to assist foreign researchers and scholars with a wide variety of 
interests. By 1924, when Ruml had available money to award foreign fellowships in earnest, 
he determined the time was also right to start a fellowships program to support younger U.S. 
scholars. Exploring ways to make the two kinds of fellowship programs work together, Ruml 
came up with a pair of basic needs: to use advisors in other nations; to establish an 
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overseeing council in the United States to help direct research fellowship awards within the 
U.S.302 
The program established by the Memorial as a “direct” foreign fellowships program 
initially was for European social scientists exclusively. An initial round of awards went to 
well-established names, with leading French economic historian Charles Rist as one such 
recipient. While recipient scholars could go to a variety of different places to pursue their 
research and continuing education, an overriding goal was to encourage European scholars to 
come to the United States.303 
The foreign fellowships program worked by having fellowship candidates get 
nominated by Memorial-appointed representatives in European nations. By 1924, 
representatives were in place in Austria, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, and Great 
Britain. Nominations were then evaluated by persons as the Memorial, as well as by a close 
circle of Ruml’s outside advisors. Edwin Nourse, of the agricultural division of the Institute 
of Economics, was one such American scientist who helped evaluate fellowship candidates. 
By 1927, a structure was well in place with five European representatives conducting 
interviews for a fellowships program extending beyond the original five European nations, 
and by 1928, at least 165 European scholars were awarded fellowships to travel to other 
 
302 See Frank Aydelote, “Educational Foundations with Special Reference to International Fellowships,” School 
and Society 22 (December 26, 1925): 799-803; Alexi Assmus, “The Creation of Postdoctoral Fellowships and 
the Siting of American Scientific Research,” Minerva 31 (June 1993): 151-83. 
303 Ruml noted the fellowships awarded to Charles Rist and others in Beardsley Ruml to Arthur Woods, May 
12, 1924, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 3, Folder 39. For additional information on the fellowships programs in 
1924, see a memorandum which records that one goal was to bring to the United States “unusually able, mature 
students in the Social Sciences.” The Memorial stated “the method of discovering students…would be to work 
quietly and without publicity; to place the responsibility for nomination in the hands of one man in a country”; 
“Memorandum: Fellowship in the Social Sciences, April 15th, 1924,” RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 63, Folder 
678, p. 2. Additional evidence about the nature of the interview process with prospective individual recipients 
of fellowships is in the file on the European fellowships program between 1925 and 1927. Prospective 
recipients were contacted in Europe during these years by William Lingelbach and four others; RAC–LSRM, 
Series III, Box 51, Folders 541-542. 
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nations, most often to the United States. A small number of other social scientists from 
America and Australia were also supported under the foreign fellowships program to travel 
to other nations, with Americans nearly always going to Europe for a period of a few months 
to up to a year or so.304 
The Memorial’s foreign fellowships program favored applicants with interest in 
economics. By the end of 1930, when the last remaining traces of Memorial-based decision-
making ended for the program, nearly half of all fellowships awarded by the Memorial to 
persons outside the United States went to persons listing either a field of education or a 
primary research area as something involving economics. Because these fellowship 
candidates were recruited by the Memorial’s European representatives, what seems clear is 
that persons with interest and skill in economics were actively sought. Even though the 
Memorial’s overall program included much more than economics, such an emphasis of the 
foreign fellowships program hints that economic research was a growing interest for the 
Memorial.305 
The Memorial’s foreign fellowships program was highly regarded by leaders in social 
science. Commenting positively on the program, for example, was Julius Rosenwald, a 
Chicago industrialist and philanthropist. Rosenwald recognized the value of scholar 
exchange as a useful instrument for coordinating international research. Promotion of 
 
304 Some details about Nourse’s work for the fellowships program are in correspondences between Edmund E. 
Day and E.G. Nourse, May 15, 1929; June 5, 1929, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 52, Folder 549. A list of 
representatives in five nations during one particular year is in Beardsley Ruml to Arthur Woods, April 22, 1924, 
RAC-LSRM, Series II, Box 3, Folder 39. Donald Fisher describes the process somewhat in Donald Fisher, 
“American Philanthropy and the Social Sciences in Britain, 1919-39,” The Sociological Review 28, 2 (May 
1980): 277-315; see also Stanley Coben, “Foundation Officials and Fellowships: Innovation in the Patronage of 
Science,” Minerva 14, 2 (1976): 225-40. 
305 From information in the main files for this program it appears that 81 out of 168 persons had either research 
preparation or a stated interest in economics; see “Foreign Fellowships–Yellow Sheets,” RAC–LSRM, Series 
III, Box 51, Folder 547. 
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international travel by social scientists particularly helped eliminate isolation of alternative 
viewpoints. In various communications between Ruml and Rosenwald, the fellowships 
program was consistently seen as an important aid to the development of social science in 
different countries, as well as to international cooperation between scientific institutions.306 
In addition to the foreign fellowships program directly operated by the Memorial, the 
other big idea was to begin operating some kind of a domestic fellowships program through a 
centralized council outside of the Memorial. Ruml made contact with leading social scientists 
during 1922 and 1923 to discuss the possibility that such a council could be instrumental in 
helping establish a U.S. fellowships program. To operate such a program would require more 
than the Memorial’s still-developing approach of establishing a trust that block grants would 
be properly used by a particular school. Instead what was needed was greater evaluation of 
specific research goals of individual persons, which was something the Memorial wanted to 
avoid any direct involvement in. The idea for a U.S. fellowships program, as Ruml discussed 
it in November 1923, was that it should be a main part of what a new organization such as an 
SSRC would be all about. Ruml suggested such an organization would be consistent “under 
the Memorial’s policies” as a means to help direct funds to projects of “almost a bewildering 
fertility”: “And yet the projects, in spite of far-reaching implications, are concrete and 
practical; and they associate themselves together with reasonable coherency.” The question 
was: How to get many individually-pursued projects associated in such a way?307 
306 Beardsley Ruml to Julius Rosenwald, January 28, 1925; Ruml described for Rosenwald the way in which 
particular scientists are brought into the fellowship program, which is by the method of “hav[ing] a 
representative in each country who is ordinarily a professor in that country, and [who] nominates to us 
candidates who he feels are suitable.” See this letter and additional Ruml-Rosenwald correspondence in RAC–
LSRM, Series III, Box 52, Folder 549. 
307 Beardsley Ruml, “Memorandum,” November 14, 1923, RAC – LSRM, Series III, Box 60, Folder 647, p. 26. 
In addition to the $800,000 by the end of 1924, by 1931 the graduate school received an additional two million 
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The Memorial also started a third grant program, aimed at making some direct grants 
to U.S. scholars, beginning in the middle 1920s. This program included travel grants which 
were seen as useful for diffusing and coordinating knowledge. A group of persons receiving 
such grants were recent doctorates who could benefit from spending a year or two visiting 
different academic institutions. Recipients could share what they learned at their home 
institution, and they could consider alternative points of view at other institutions. It could be 
of little or no concern to the Memorial what the different points of view were, and so this was 
a kind of program the Memorial could get involved in. A number of such traveling grants 
were awarded, with the majority going to persons trained in economics, particularly in labor 
economics.308 
Responding to the different Memorial fellowships programs in a unique way was 
Robert S. Brookings, a scholar with a well-established name in economic research. 
Brookings had the idea to establish a graduate school in Washington, DC, to serve as a kind 
of home base for travel-grant recipients as well as foreign fellowship recipients. The school, 
begun as a satellite campus of Washington University of St. Louis, was named the 
Washington University Graduate School of Economics and Government, in Washington, DC. 
In short time the school would be known as the Robert Brookings Graduate School, and in 
1927 the school would join with the Institute for Government Research and the Institute of 
Economics to form the Brookings Institution. Ruml and others at the Memorial saw the 
 
dollars from the Memorial and the Rockefeller Foundation. There were also times when the Memorial also 
supported specific projects at the graduate school. An example was in December 1926, when a grant was given 
directly to resident economics instructor Robinson Newcomb to do a year’s research on what was described as 
“the problems arising from the economic penetration of the so-called backward countries by other countries 
having surplus capital to export, in other words, the so-called question of imperialism”; see C.E. McGuire to 
Beardsley Ruml, 16 Dec. 1926, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 60, Folder 647.  
308 Ruml initiated the idea to sponsor new Ph.D.-holders in the social sciences to travel for a year or two (most 
often within the United States) to supplement their course studies at their home institution. A field of interest for 
a number of fellowship recipients was labor problems. RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 49, Folders 517-518. 
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Washington University Graduate School as playing an important role in the coordination and 
unification of scientific knowledge, in particular by bringing young scholars and researchers 
together in an interactive, educational forum. By the end of 1924, the Memorial awarded 
nearly $800,000 to get the school underway, and between 1924 and 1928 the Brookings 
Graduate School would receive $2.8 million in Memorial support, ranking them second only 
to the University of Chicago in Memorial funds received.309 
8.3 The NBER and business cycle research as a field–1923-24 
In the winter of 1919-20, Wesley C. Mitchell of Columbia University led the creation 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Mitchell was motivated by an idea that 
business cycles were complex phenomena resulting from the interdependence of supply 
levels and price levels of many goods in the economy. This new idea about business cycles, 
which was not really present in academic writings prior to the 1910s (which typically focused 
on the consequences of market “panics”), was the notion that a business cycle is a complex 
and extremely difficult-to-predict outcome of the aggregate of normal human behavior – 
including rational calculations as well as irrational habits and fears. What happened to form 
the NBER is that from the earlier debate of 1913-14 at the Rockefeller Foundation about an 
“Institute of Economics Research” finally came that institute that was seen as urgently 
 
309 For the beginnings of the discussion see Robert Brookings to Wickliffe Rose, November 13, 1923. See also 
the 1923 correspondences between Robert Brookings and Walton H. Hamilton, in RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 
49, Folders 517-518. See also Anon., “A University Center for Research in Washington, DC,” The Educational 
Record 3 (January 1922): 50-8; Malcolm Rutherford, “On the Economic Frontier: Walton Hamilton, 
Institutional Economics, and Education,” History of Economic Thought 27 (June 2005): 119-39. 
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needed; the NBER indeed was formally incorporated during a severe crisis of inflation and 
recession.310 
The first major research attempted by the NBER was to measure the national income 
in the United States and its distribution between social classes. The NBER completed this 
project, and economists and policymakers viewed the research results as important because 
of the ability to rigorously document what had only been anecdotally spoken of before. The 
NBER found that the top one percent of wealthy owners received 14 percent of all income. 
The NBER’s study still used an “owner” vs. “laborer” distinction to find that labor’s share of 
the national income was approximately 70 percent. Another early research concern at the 
NBER of course was business cycles. Through the 1920s, the vast majority of research by the 
NBER would be to gather raw data and develop arguments based on that data to advocate 
counter-cyclical public works to relieve high levels of unemployment. Some potential was 
soon identified for using raw data to construct what became known as a “national accounts 
system” (which later proved valuable as a planning tool during World War II).311 
A question at the Memorial throughout the early and middle 1920s was whether to get 
involved in helping create any new research institutes similar to the NBER. Ruml and the 
trustees considered the question, especially during 1922 and 1923, and they decided the 
 
310 See Hamilton Cravens, “The Social Sciences,” in Mary Kupiec Cayton and Peter W. Williams, eds., 
Encyclopedia of American Cultural & Intellectual History, volume three (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
2001): 163-172; Cravens, “The Social Sciences,” in Sally G. Kohlstedt and Margaret W. Rossiter, eds., 
Historical Writing on American Science: Perspectives and Prospects (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986): 183-207.  
311 See Wesley C. Mitchell et al., Income in the United States, its Amount and Distribution, NBER Publication 
nos. 1 and 2 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1921-22). The first major NBER report on business cycles was 
Business Cycles and Unemployment: Report and Recommendation of a Committee of the President’s 
Conference on Unemployment, 1921, NBER Publication no. 4 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1923). For a self-
reflective record of the first years of the NBER see For Social Disarmament: The Story of the NBER (New 
York: NBER, 1927); also Wesley Clair Mitchell, “The National Bureau’s First Quarter Century,” in Twenty-
Fifth Annual Report (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1945). 
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answer should be a qualified “yes.” One of Ruml’s first major decisions at the Memorial, in 
fact, was to decide the time was right to help establish a research foundation where 
professional economists could work on problems of their own choosing. So, working 
primarily with Mitchell, by the end of 1922 the Memorial was ready to establish an 
organization that could work in coordination with the NBER so that Memorial funds could 
help support NBER research. The goal for the Memorial was not the specific research itself, 
but was to find a workable way to help financially support the NBER without getting in any 
way involved in selecting or agreeing with specific research. In January 1923, the Memorial 
officially awarded funds to establish an “Economic Foundation” (EF) to be connected to the 
NBER. Legal establishment of the EF came with an express purpose “to encourage and 
support such public educational, charitable or benevolent uses and purposes as will in the 
judgment of the trustees and without resort to propaganda most effectively further the 
economic, social and industrial welfare of humanity.” In addition to not getting involved in 
any “propaganda” concerns, the EF was established by the Memorial “To conduct or assist in 
the making of exact and impartial investigations in the fields of economic, social and 
industrial science for the advancement of human knowledge.”312 
Fairly little work was needed by the Memorial and the NBER to get the grant created 
for the Economic Foundation. Mitchell, as leader of the NBER, had a well-established 
reputation. Mitchell helped oversee creation and operation of the EF. The first research 
agenda, which was agreeable to Ruml and the Memorial, was to support studies of 
“Unemployment and the Business Cycle.” Such research was an established field and was 
urgent enough and uncontroversial enough to make sense for the Memorial to support. 
 
312 “The Economic Foundation, Deed of Trust, February 2, 1923,” RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 51, Folder 538. 
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Mitchell also added personal assurance that the organizational structure of the EF would be 
kept sufficiently separate from all other structures at the NBER, as well as from Columbia 
University as a whole. The matter of the actual request for a Memorial endowment for the EF 
was easily handled through letters that converged upon specific requirements for a grant 
award safely separated from potential controversial research. One requirement was a need for 
an up-front statement of rationale for the EF, which M.C. Rorty (formerly of AT&T and now 
Chairman of the NBER) summarized clearly in October 1922. Rorty wrote that what was 
accomplished in framing the desired proposal for an EF was to “very cleverly overcome all 
the difficulties that exist in creating an endowment specifically for the National Bureau of 
Economic Research.” The NBER’s request for Memorial funds was made proper by having 
formal words explain that the money would first go through the ‘independent’ EF, so that all 
money making its way from the Memorial through the EF to the NBER “involves the support 
of scientific work of very general significance,” and seems “to lie clearly in the field which 
foundations can properly cultivate.” The door was open for the Memorial to begin supporting 
the NBER through the EF, and this was what mattered.313 
313 See “Memorandum,” October 22, 1922. The Economic Foundation was even willing to provide Ruml with 
an explicit statement of its relationship to any research objectives by the NBER. An additional stipulation, 
agreed upon between the Memorial and the NBER, was to have the trustees overseeing the Economic 
Foundation appointed from private sector positions as well as from universities. The NBER was now newly 
structured, as the Economic Foundation was run by trustees drawn from university economics departments and 
was overseen by a board of directors who came from a variety of research associations. The Economic 
Foundation was permanently created as a separate body; see M.C. Rorty to Beardsley Ruml, November 4, 1922, 
RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 51, Folder 538. All financial support would be arranged through the Economic 
Foundation, and the Memorial also decided to make this support conditional on other funds being raised by the 
NBER. Between 1923 and 1928, the level of NBER funds coming from the Memorial (as channeled through the 
Economic Foundation) averaged about 20 percent per year, with a low of 14% and a high of 26%. This data is 
compiled in tabular form in Martin Bulmer and Jean Bulmer, “Philanthropy and Social Science in the 1920s: 
Beardsley Ruml and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1922-29,” Minerva 19, 3 (Autumn 1981): 347-
407, esp. 393. 
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During 1924, Ruml considered supporting more economic research through the 
policy research center at the school created by Robert Brookings, which was now called the 
Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government. It was in this context that 
Ruml put on paper a formalized statement of guiding principles for all Memorial grants. He 
developed twelve principles in this particular version of principles, which he divided into six 
principles serving as criteria representing an organization “inadvisable” to support with a 
grant and six others concerning the kinds of approaches that would be desirable to support. 
The six principles aiming at problem avoidance dealt with such concerns as these: not getting 
involved with social welfare projects potentially seen as too politically aggressive; avoiding 
political controversy in general; avoiding direct involvement in research; refraining from 
making any attempt to influence research done by grant recipients; not favoring specific 
universities or research organizations; to not attempt to influence any research findings or 
conclusions. The six positive principles were to focus on: finding responsible and competent 
persons to study whatever problems they selected to study; strengthening social science in 
general; increasing the quantity of scientific publications; encouraging communication 
between social scientists; supporting occasional real-world experimental applications; 
supporting fellowships. All twelve principles were useful ones, especially when it came to 
situations in which new institutions and research fields might be designed by the Memorial, 
largely from scratch. Ruml presented his principles in July 1924.314 
314 To formulate his principles Ruml shared ideas with George Vincent, Wickliffe Rose, Arthur Woods, and 
Abraham Flexner; see for example Beardsley Ruml to Arthur Woods, August 13, 1924, RAC–LSRM, Series II, 
Box 2, Folder 31. The principles themselves are stated in “Conditions Affecting the Memorial’s Participation in 
Projects in Social Science,” July 3, 1924, RAC–LSRM, Series I, Box 1, Folder 9; also a copy in RAC–LSRM, 
Series II, Box 2, Folder 31. Ruml presented to the principles to the trustees on July 10, 1924. 
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The trustees approved Ruml’s principles, and in so doing they added certification to 
Ruml’s move to focus on fundamental scientific discoveries. These principles had a 
permanent place at the Memorial, and indeed, what we’ve been seeing through the last few 
chapters is these principles in action. 
 
8.4 The Social Sciences Research Council–1923-28 
 In 1921, Charles E. Merriam, professor of political science at the University of 
Chicago, and a friend of Ruml, expressed interest in possibly designing a new organization 
for social scientists. The organization was, of course, the “Social Science Research Council.” 
Merriam began by declaring the need for an organization to help coordinate all social science 
research. “Science is a great cooperative enterprise in which many intelligences must labor 
together,” he wrote. “There must always be wide scope for the spontaneous and 
unregimented activity of the individual, but the success of the expedition is conditioned upon 
some general plan of organization.” Here, in Merriam’s words, was a sentiment akin to 
Ruml’s beliefs (as expressed the following year).315 
Believing in the “communal nature of social research,” Merriam was a rigorous 
scientific thinker who called for hypothesis-and-data driven research. Merriam formally 
proposed the Social Science Research Council in 1922, in a committee report for the 
American Political Science Association. As chair of the committee, Merriam said what was 
needed was more interaction between social scientists. Planning meetings for the SSRC got 
 
315 Charles E. Merriam, “The Present State of the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review 16 
(August 1922): 315-21. 
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underway and Merriam contacted Ruml, who recognized the idea for a national organization 
made sense.316 
Merriam was the right person to spearhead movement in a new direction for social 
science. A consistent theme for Merriam was the need to integrate the social sciences, and 
yet the question was: By what principles and organizational design should this take place? As 
Merriam emphasized the communal nature of social research in 1925, in his address as 
president of the political science profession, he said: “The problem of social behavior is 
essentially one problem, and while the angles of approach may and should be different, the 
scientific result will be imperfect unless these points of view are at times brought together in 
some effective way, so that the full benefit of the multiple analysis may be realized.” Here 
was a guiding idea for the new organization: that unity of social science would not require all 
social scientists to agree upon common research problems or methods, but that scientists with 
different problems and methods should meet to exchange ideas and opinions.317 
Of great importance to Merriam and others was that there should be no return to 
older, “softer” research methods. Merriam was critical of earlier methods, seeing as 
particularly inadequate the descriptive style that was still too much a part of the “social 
survey” approach. What “political scientists have too often done,” Merriam said, is “to 
meditate and then elaborate in literary form an idea, without verification or with very 
inadequate verification.” While Merriam might allow some minor role for the “guess of 
 
316 Cited in Barry Karl, Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1974), p. 145; see also Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991): 401; Elbridge Sibley, Social Science Research Council: The First Fifty Years (New 
York: Social Science Research Council, 1974), chapter two. “Memorandum from Director to Trustees,” 
February 26, 1924, RAC–LSRM, Series I, Box 1, Folder 5, pp. 16, 18. 
317 Charles E. Merriam, “Progress in Political Research,” American Political Science Review 20 (February 
1926): 1-13. 
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hunch” in guiding the direction of “measurement and the analysis” of a particular problem, 
he firmly believed the world had fundamentally changed and that an increased complexity 
and scale of social problems necessitated greater research coordination.318 
The inaugural meeting of the SSRC was held in May 1923. The organization received 
Memorial funding the following year, and legal incorporation came in December 1924. The 
“social problems” approach of the SSRC was new, although such an orientation had been 
foreshadowed by the American Social Science Association, created in 1865. Since the time 
of the ASSA, the social sciences had branched into many disciplines, and so an idea for the 
SSRC was to work to bring these disciplines back together, creating a new and unified 
science of society. Following legal incorporation of the SSRC, an appropriation of $425,000 
was made by the Memorial in 1925 for fellowship awards over five years.319 
The main objective of the SSRC was to improve the quality of social research by 
developing an improved research infrastructure. By the spring of 1925, seven disciplinary 
associations were officially joined in sponsoring the SSRC. The organizations were: the 
American Political Science Association; the American Sociological Association; the 
American Economic Association; the American Statistical Association; the American 
Psychological Association; the American Anthropological Association; the American 
Historical Association. A permanent headquarters was also established in New York City 
 
318 Charles E. Merriam, “Politics and Numbers,” in Charles E. Merriam, New Aspects of Politics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1925): 184-219, esp. 189. 
319 See Donald Fisher, Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the 
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227
that year, and also that same year the SSRC began offering post-doctoral research 
fellowships.320 
Generous Memorial support played multiple important roles in the formation of the 
SSRC. Between 1923 and 1928, the SSRC was the third leading recipient of Memorial funds. 
Following the University of Chicago (receiving $3.4 million between 1923 and 1928) and the 
Brookings Graduate School (receiving $2.8 million over that time), the SSRC received $2.7 
million in Memorial grants by 1928. In fact, out of $4.2 million spent by the SSRC during its 
first ten years, $3.9 million came from the Memorial. Clarified early on between the 
Memorial and the SSRC was that the purpose of the SSRC was to strictly complement 
existing social science organizations, including universities and independent research 
institutes. The founding group of social scientists at the SSRC shared a confidence that such 
an organization could succeed without rivaling other established research groups, and so the 
SSRC received warm reception from social scientists.321 
320 The seven associations all joined the SSRC between 1923 and 1925. The legal incorporation, in 1924, was in 
Merriam’s home state of Illinois. The SSRC adopted a sponsorship pattern similar to that of the NRC, including 
individual fellowships, aid to group conferences, and assistance for cooperative research projects; see Wesley 
Clair Mitchell, “The Research Fellowships of the Social Science Research Council,” Political Science 
Quarterly 41, 4 (December 1926): 605-6. Also on the early years of the SSRC see Robert Lynd, Knowledge for 
What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1967 
[1939]). Information about the location decision between Chicago and New York City is in RAC–Accession 2, 
Series 1, Subseries 1, Box 2, Folder 16. Other relevant historical accounts in the Rockefeller Archives include: 
Robert Crane, unpublished recollections dated 1953, RAC–SSRC, Accession 2, Series 1, Subseries 39, Box 
187, Folder 2141; A.F. Kuhlman, “The Social Science Research Council,” RAC–SSRC, Accession 2, Series 4, 
Subseries 1, Box 704, Folder 8473. See also David L. Featherman, “SSRC, Now and Then: A Commentary on a 
Recent Historical Analysis,” Items 48, 1 (March 1994); Barry Karl, Charles E. Merriam and the Study of 
Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974): 136-137; Kenton W. Worcester, Social Science Research 
Council, 1923-1998 (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2001): 15; Elbridge Sibley, Social Science 
Research Council: The First Fifty Years (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1974); Social Science 
Research Council, Decennial Report, 1923-1933 (New York: SSRC, 1934): 104-5. As noted in the Decennial 
Report, the remaining $300,000 awarded to the SSRC between 1923 and 1933 came from seven other 
foundations. 
321 The Memorial awarded a major grant of $750,000 to the SSRC in 1927, as a block grant for undesignated 
support; some of the money got used to support individual research projects. 
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Psychology and economics were probably the two leading social sciences at the time. 
These two sciences were seen as somewhat more empirical than other social sciences. Each 
science could be useful for correcting maladjusted relations between people and society. 
Psychologists could show people how to adjust to the changed economic conditions, while 
economists could discover how to adjust the changed economic conditions. Both sciences 
could also play roles in helping people adjust to a changed workplace. Also receiving some 
attention was an idea that remedial work might be done to repair damage to everyday 
communities that was already inflicted by maladjustment, and so other social sciences – such 
as sociology, political science, anthropology, and history – were needed for such purposes.322 
Merriam led with a belief that the structure of truly “scientific” social research should 
begin with a foundation in social psychology. Psychology research would show how to 
establish all social science upon demonstrable conclusions, and this empirical boost would 
help move social science in the direction of idealized physical sciences. Yet Merriam also 
recognized that social scientists needed to keep their use of empirical tools in proper 
perspective.323 
Some historians find the SSRC indeed got underway strongly on a foundation of 
behavioral science, and that such a focus on observable, measurable behaviors was a 
centerpiece to Merriam’s “new synthesis of knowledge.” Yet also worthy of some note is that 
Merriam really encouraged plurality of research methods. A number of social scientists at the 
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323 Merriam, “The Present State of the Study of Politics,” 74. “[T]he constant recourse to the statistical basis of 
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toward scientific treatment of demonstrable conclusions. The practice of measurement, comparison, 
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time – including Wesley Mitchell – agreed with the idea to create the SSRC as an 
organization to coordinate multiple “angles” from which to study any particular social 
problem. Mitchell, who was a friend of Merriam, was instrumental in encouraging respect for 
the SSRC within the economics community. The SSRC, in turn, supplied generous financial 
support to economists, including a number of projects in the NBER.324 
Much of the groundwork for the SSRC, including its statements of goals and 
objectives, was created during summer meetings taking place annually between 1925 and 
1930. These meetings, lasting about two weeks during August and September, were an entry 
point for the Memorial to attain some degree of influence through the SSRC. One kind of 
influence was the Memorial’s financial support of the conferences themselves. Planning 
efforts for the first conference (initially called the “Dartmouth Convivium”) are informative, 
as Memorial leaders arranged the conference by inviting social scientists according to a 
division between psychology as one group and six other fields of social science as another 
large group.325 
Ruml began organizing the section of the conference for psychologists in February 
1925. The psychology section was to be separate from the section dealing with other fields of 
social science. Ruml sent letters to leading persons in psychology, bringing numerous 
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positive responses to produce a list of 42 names. The Memorial’s Executive Committee 
approved plans for the psychology conference, and a round of discussion concerning the 
conference stated two main points of concern: that it seemed the psychologists were working 
too much in isolation; and that particularly inadequate was the condition of clinical facilities 
for the study of infancy, early-childhood development, and abnormal conditions of 
development. Much communication got underway to arrange the conference, and when it 
happened, at least 35 psychologists were able to attend, producing two reports: one a 66-page 
compilation of comments; the other a 780-page final report. The main goal of the psychology 
conference, it seems, was to better understand the purpose of psychology research with 
respect to other fields of social science.326 
A second purpose emergent at the 1925 conference – more in connection with the 
portion of the conference dealing the other social sciences – was to compile a list of 
important projects on which to get started across the social sciences. The general section of 
the conference came about when at least ten social scientists from fields other than 
psychology were initially invited to the conference for psychologists. Charles Merriam, who 
was in that initial group, helped the non-psychologists expand in number by suggesting other 
names ought to be recommended for inclusion. Merriam, in particular, suggested sociologist 
Robert Lynd and economist Clarence Ayres. The overall conference became known as the 
“Hanover Conference.”327 
326 Ruml sent initial letters to psychologists on February 26, 1925. The Memorial maintained a file, categorizing 
such information for each invitee as date invited, date accepted, dates attending, subsection invited to, and 
subsection invited to lead. RAC–LSRM, Series III, Boxes 53 & 53a, Folders 564-565. 
327 Donald Fisher’s work on the SSRC is the standout study; see Fisher, Fundamental Development of the Social 
Sciences.
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It seems clear that all social scientists invited to the Hanover Conference believed the 
meeting was an important gathering. Wesley Mitchell declared “how large a service it seems 
to me that the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial is rendering to the social sciences” by 
arranging such a gathering. Other invitees expressed similar words of appreciation. The 
broader Hanover Conference of 1925 was a clear success. The total group invited was a bit 
heavy with psychologists as well as economists, but it seems all major fields of social science 
were represented. Whereas the psychologists represented a fairly well developed field of 
science capable of producing focused reports, participants in the general conference, with its 
six sections, produced their own style of reports. One, a 127-page statement by the 
“Committee on Problems and Policy,” listed 268 different social problems under a “Source 
List of Research Problems.” Included were such issues as a scientific study of child labor in 
the South, an analysis of the relationship between shopping centers and economic progress, 
and even a “study of thwarted ambitions” (i.e., a study of the psychology of frustration). A 
second report, a 192-page record of all presentations at the general conference, concluded 
with a 7-page list of recommendations for future SSRC projects. The overriding 
recommendation was for the SSRC to increase its efforts to promote interaction between 
social sciences. Specific recommendations were to compile a list of research agencies, to 
gather information on university endowments, to learn about the financial status of other 
agencies doing social science, and to recommend that SSRC members pursue “the gathering 
of data on specific interests and projects of those of its members engaged in research and that 
this data be at the disposal of the Council as well as of the individual societies.”328 
328 See Wesley Mitchell to Guy Stanton Ford, June 3, 1925; another noteworthy example of appreciative words 
is Charles Merriam to Guy Stanton Ford, June 5, 1925, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 52, Folder 562. Once it 
was set, there were six “divisions of inquiry” in the program for the general conference in 1925: (1) Questions 
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The initial Hanover conference was followed by many months of group meetings of 
various sorts. The SSRC also returned to Hanover each of the next five summers. In 
agreement with the SSRC’s goal to continually identify important projects, the Memorial 
generously supported all these meetings. Sometimes the meetings included discussion about 
the changing boundaries and structure of social science. In 1926, for example, Charles Beard 
emphasized a need to increase the research focus on “economic motives in politics.” “Some 
people,” he declared, “think that the economic motive has been overworked in the study of 
history and sociology and current politics, but I am inclined to think that it not only is not 
overworked but has never been systematically and thoroughly and intelligently applied as it 
might be.” Beard’s idea, shared by others, was to strengthen the economics component in the 
social sciences as a whole.329 
of Policy, Organization, Procedures; (2) Methods, Promotion, Cooperative Study; (3) Problems and Projects for 
Research; (4) Five Years of Ph.D. Research Subjects; (5) Two Hundred Suggested Topics and Problems; (6) 
Separate Illustrative Outlines of Problems and Projects. These divisions focused, respectively, on: (1) strategies 
of cooperation between social sciences, aimed at avoiding research duplication and waste; (2) ideas about how 
to “bridge the distance between scholar and people”; (3) whether the SSRC should select certain large problems 
for long-term study; (4) whether the SSRC should make a survey of ongoing social science research; (5) 
whether either the SSRC or the group meeting at Hanover should “consider the compilation of a comprehensive 
list of problems, projects and topics for research”; (6) the question of “what is the balance between larger 
problems and programs and concrete and isolated problems which may be carried out by individuals and 
institutions.” See “Tentative Agenda. Dartmouth Conference, Informal Summer Conference of Social Scientists 
and Allied Groups, August 24th to September 5th,” RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 52, Folder 563. Produced at the 
first meeting were: “Report of the ‘Committee on Problems and Policy, Social Science Research Council,’” 127 
pages; “Report of Joint Conference of the Committee on Problems and Policy of the Social Sciences Research 
Council Meeting with Other Representatives of the Social Sciences in Attendance upon the Dartmouth 
Conference of Social Scientists and Allied Groups,” 192 pages, quotation from p.186; RAC–LSRM, Series III, 
Box 52, Folder 569. 
329 The first “Hanover Conference” (alternatively the “Dartmouth Convivium”) was held August 24 to 
September 5, 1925; RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 52, Folder 562. See also Hanover Conference Minutes, 
August 9-20, 1926, RAC–SSRC, Accession 1, Series 6, Subseries 9, Box 329, Folder 1892, p. 492. In 
subsequent correspondence with Robert Crane, Executive Director of the SSRC, Beard added his belief that 
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A leading speaker at the 1927 Hanover Conference may well have been Ruml, who 
described some workings of the Memorial. Ruml shared the fact that each of his assistants at 
the Memorial had flexibility in his or her areas of specialization. One result of such an 
allowance was that the Memorial was an outfit rich in open discussion. Ruml also indicated 
his impression that the Memorial recognized the fundamental importance of economic 
research to any successful program of social reform.330 
Economists got their own major subsection within the 1928 Hanover Conference. 
Participants discussed many economic problems, as well as the overall structure of social 
science. They expressed interest in exploring contact points between economics and other 
social sciences, and they produced a 418-page report suggesting where economic science 
“ought to be headed.” Discussion participants included Frank Taussig, Jacob Viner, Frank 
Knight, Wesley Mitchell, William Beveridge, and E.R.A. Seligman, among others. The 
economists decided a goal should be to identify all economic problems to be studied. “In 
general, our idea is that the discussions ought to indicate where we are in economic science, 
briefly whence we came, where we seem to be going, and possibly the direction in which we 
ought to be headed.” The economists explored all the following: relations between 
economics and other disciplines; ways in which economic science may be affected by 
increased government activity in the economy; interrelations between economic studies and 
management studies; organization of economic research; and identification of promising 
lines of economic research. Much discussion focused on strengths and weaknesses in various 
research methods, and particularly discussed were ways that economists might better use 
 
330 Beardsley Ruml, “Introductory Remarks,” Hanover Conference 1927 Proceedings, RAC–LSRM, Series III, 
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ideas and methods in anthropology, including Thorstein Veblen’s famous adoption of a 
stages scheme of overall progress as well as the newly developed functionalist method.331 
All Hanover meetings were useful for organizing a committee structure for the SSRC. 
From early on, the committee structure included a stated general purpose: “The objectives [of 
a committee] are a coherent conception of the area in terms of its central or major problems, 
the subordination of its minor problems, and a decision as to the most promising point or 
points of attack…The Council’s aim is simply to attain the best picture it can through the 
agency of the most competent group judgment it can secure.” The SSRC also explicitly 
recognized “that continuous reworking of any plan of a field is necessary from the very 
moment of its formation.” The chief goal for any SSRC committee was to foster the highest 
level of “competent group judgment.”332 
Different committees oversaw different problem areas. At the first Hanover 
Conference, committees were established for the areas of eighteenth amendment studies, 
crime research, and agricultural problems. These committees lasted, respectively, until 1928, 
1932, and 1942. Two other committees established between 1923 and 1925 – both prior to 
the first Hanover meeting – focused on scientific aspects of human migration (lasting until 
1927) and the mechanization of industry (lasting only briefly). In 1926, a sixth committee 
was established to focus on industrial relations (lasting until 1930) and a seventh to study 
international relations (lasting until 1941). Noteworthy research problems also identified and 
approved by the SSRC in 1926 in connection with the committee on crime research were 
crime accounting, problems of juvenile delinquency, and the social causes of crime. 
 
331 “Hanover Economic Conference, September 3-8, 1928. Dartmouth College,” RAC–LSRM, Series, Box 67, 
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Conference participants in 1926 specifically proposed to the Memorial their need for 
financial support for a study of the “general problem of crime,” with special attention to 
developing uniform methods of crime accounting. This latter focus related to the uniform 
crime report, which was produced by 1930, through the work of many.333 
The Hanover meetings were important for building comradeship as well. Sometimes 
whole families even attended the conference. Conference participants tended to blend 
intensive work activity with much socializing, and indeed the Hanover meetings seem to 
have been great fun. A letter from anthropologist Robert Redfield, to his wife at the time of 
the 1930 conference, reported how plush the situation was for the attendees. “The Social 
Science Research Council pays their fares, and boards them, and feeds them and washes their 
clothes, and gives them carts to go to the golf club, and then expects them to produce 
‘significant results.’” Redfield added that “The place is overrun with pedants and potentates. 
The potentates are the executive secretaries of the big foundations – collectively they 
represent huge (staggering) amounts of money that has been set aside for research. The 
pedants have invited the potentates so that the potentates may see how the pedants do their 
most effective thinking, and how they arrange to spend that money.”334 
333 Other noteworthy committees formed by the SSRC included committees covering business research (1928-
1931), pressure groups and propaganda (1931-34), government statistics and information services (1933-37), 
and social security (1935-43). For more information on SSRC committees in place at different times see Social 
Science Research Council’s series of Annual Reports as well as Social Science Research Council, Decennial 
Report, 1923-1933 (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1933). See also Augustus Frederick 
Kuhlman, “Social Science Research Council: Its Origin and Objectives,” Journal of Social Forces 6 (June 
1928): 583-8. 
334 Quoted in David Sills, “50th Anniversary of the 1930 Hanover Conference: The Letters of Robert Redfield 
to his Wife,” Items 34, 2 (June 1980): 36. 
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Although the last of six Hanover Conferences was in 1930, annual SSRC summer 
meetings continued for some years thereafter. What is important, for us, is the effect the 
Hanover Conferences had over the quality and direction of social science.335 
8.5 Questions about the ‘boundaries’ of social science–1926-29 
SSRC committee reports of course were not the only instruments available to identify 
what projects social scientists ought to be doing. Another approach was tried in a 1926, with 
a 72-page report prepared for Arthur Woods at the Memorial. The report surveyed advances 
made by a handful of independent organizations supported by the Memorial. Three of the 
organizations were research organizations: the SSRC; the Institute of Economics; the 
Brookings Graduate School. Each of these programs was created from scratch during the 
early 1920s, and between them the report found a relative lack of project duplication.336 
The report for Woods found particularly many successes in the support of the SSRC 
and the Brookings Graduate School. Only positive things were reported about the SSRC. The 
conclusion about the Brookings school was that the school’s faculty was doing delicate work 
to clarify the ‘true’ line for separation between social science and social technology. For 
example, the practice of social science needed to separate from practices of political action. 
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The Brookings program had a project to analyze what social science is and how it differs 
from political action. The task included distinguishing between social science and its close 
neighbors such as human biology and the like. All this was important, in that evidently the 
Brookings school needed to be defended against a charge that it had somehow become a 
politically-aligned institution. As to the other independent research organization, the Institute 
of Economics, a question was getting asked whether it too had become a “propaganda 
institute.” The report stated: “The work of the Institute of Economics deals with international 
commercial policies, post-war international reconstruction, agricultural economics and 
industry and labor. There seems to be some question as to the actual purpose of the Institute – 
whether for unbiased research or propaganda to influence public opinion and legislation.” 
Also noted were Ruml’s own words in considering the institute, that while “Originally 
conceived as a propaganda organization, it has never, as a matter of fact, performed its 
intended function since, with the selection of its Director, Dr. Moulton, formerly Professor of 
Economics in the University of Chicago, the Institute became essentially one of research and 
not of propaganda.” The report also cited Abraham Flexner’s contrasting opinion, however, 
“that research and propaganda are inextricably mingled in the conception which was 
presented” by Dr. Moulton and others at the institute, at least as they had gotten it going in 
practice.337 
In addition to the report for Woods, there would be other times that people would 
raise the idea that the Memorial was in a position to evaluate and define what social science 
is. A possible role for the SSRC to contribute to the formation of public policy came up in 
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1928 when the SSRC recommended to the Memorial a potentially controversial area of 
research. Would the Memorial grant funds earmarked for family and sex research? A goal of 
the SSRC was to help scientists discover fundamental causes of social and economic 
problems, and the SSRC made it clear that by undertaking a research program involving 
fairly intimate family studies some progress might be made in this. The scientists advocating 
such research were careful to point out, as Columbia sociologist William F. Ogburn did in 
corresponding with Lawrence Frank, that they were pursuing “research in problems of family 
and sex from the social angle.” In line with the social angle, the planned research was to be a 
“systematic investigation of those social problems which pertain to the relationship of the 
sexes, such as marriage, sex education, and the family.” By advancing along relatively non-
invasive lines, certain kinds of research into family structure and behavior might be allowed. 
A “Committee on Sex and Family Relationships” indeed was established at the SSRC, fully a 
couple of decades prior to any kind of ‘Age of Kinsey.’ As a committee designed to 
cooperate with the “Committee on Sex Research” at the NRC, the SSRC’s committee hoped 
to soon complete a report “on the possibilities of research in the family and in the field of 
sex.” At a November 1928 organizational meeting of the combined NRC-SSRC sex 
committee, SSRC representatives identified potential lines of research to include: history of 
the family; family conflicts; home economics and home management; problems of 
consumption in the home; problems of family housing.338 
338 William F. Ogburn to Lawrence Frank, September 4, 1928; see also Lawrence K. Frank to Clark E. Wissler, 
August 20, 1928, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 64, Folder 682-690. The “Committee on Sex and Family 
Relationships” was also called the “Special Committee on Familial Relations of the Social Science Research 
Committee.” Publications produced by the program included: Ernest R. Groves and William Fielding Ogburn, 
American Marriage and Family Relationships (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1928); William F. Ogburn, 
“The Changing Family,” American Sociological Society 23 (May 1929): 124-32; Ogburn, “Social Change as 
Shown by Occupation Statistics,” American Journal of Sociology 34 (May 1929): 1169-80. For more 
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The following year, U.S. President Herbert Hoover got interested in the SSRC. 
Hoover asked that a new committee be assembled, which was done by October 1929, prior to 
the stock market collapse. Hoover’s interest was to create a committee to report on social 
problems. The committee’s goal was to put together “a complete, impartial examination of 
the facts” that “should serve to help all of us to see where social stresses are occurring and 
where major efforts should be undertaken to deal with them constructively.” The so-called 
“President’s Research Committee on Social Trends” did its work under the co-chairmanship 
of Merriam and Mitchell. Ogburn served as the committee’s director of research. The goal 
was to make order out of many facts in wide-ranging fields, while also keeping any direct 
policy recommendations to a minimum – since policy decisions were for persons in the 
legislative and executive branches, not for social scientists. To the SSRC, this was a 
boundary to be protected. The president’s committee envisioned long-term continuation of 
data collection and analysis, which in fact happened (being directed after 1933 by a 
coordinated national advisory council of social scientists, business leaders, and government 
personnel). Hoover’s committee indeed put together the two-volume report, Recent Trends in 
the United States, completed right near the end of Hoover’s presidency. The report aimed to 
be strictly empirical in covering such topics as population, race and ethnic groups, women, 
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family, labor, consumption, leisure, crime, health, education, public welfare, economic 
organization, public administration, and government.339 
Another U.S. president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, was friendly with the SSRC as 
well. As early as 1928, Roosevelt served as a member of an SSRC Advisory Committee on 
Business Research, a committee that aimed to encourage research problems of specific 
industries. A version of that committee, with its aim to do sustained research on issues in 
business and industry, would exist for some time – even with some explicit support from 
Rockefeller Jr. – in the form of a National Resources Planning Board, put together in 1933 
during Roosevelt’s first year in office.340 
In addition to high respect given to SSRC-supported social science by federal 
government leaders, another source of respect for the SSRC stemmed from the organization’s 
statements of guiding principles. Similar to what was done at the Memorial, the SSRC put in 
place a clear record of operating guidelines and objectives. In a document from about 1928, 
identified as “Definition of Council Objectives,” seven tasks are stated: improve research 
organization; develop personnel; improve research methods; preserve materials; disseminate 
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materials; facilitate research projects; and boost “the public appreciation of the significance 
of the social sciences.” In these seven tasks, the organization’s guiding goals were concisely 
summarized. Another SSRC policy statement introduced five “interlocking principles” to 
serve as additional guidelines. Chief among these principles was that social science is held to 
be a collective enterprise, requiring “interdisciplinary” interaction. The SSRC’s flexible 
committee design, aimed at flexibly discussing and reevaluating research plans, was an 
important foundation for the promotion of objective social research. Perhaps more striking 
than anything else concerning the SSRC’s approach to the structure of the social sciences 
was the “interdisciplinary” point of view they held. The very term “interdisciplinary,” 
according to historians, even began at the SSRC during the middle 1920s. One historian 
recalls that the term “seems to have begun life in the corridors and meeting rooms of the 
Social Science Research Council as a kind of bureaucratic shorthand for what the Council 
saw as its chief function, the promotion of research that involved two or more of its seven 
constituent societies.” The term “interdisciplinary” of course could be a tricky word when it 
came to dealing with contacts between research areas perhaps well-established within the 
social sciences and research matters outside the malleable boundary around the seven 
established social sciences participating in the SSRC.341 
8.6 Boundaries between social science and humane studies–1923-28 
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In various ways during the latter years of the Memorial, questions were dealt with 
concerning logical and functional boundaries between social science and other fields at or 
near the boundaries of social science. One field of research already noted was human 
biology, which the Memorial and the Foundation consistently recognized as too controversial 
to get deeply involved in. Another field possibly beyond the usual boundary of social science 
was so-called “humane studies.” 
As early as 1923, Ruml got in contact with French economic historian Charles Rist, 
asking for a survey of the conditions of social science in Europe. Rist produced a 
memorandum emphasizing the need to better connect economics, political science and 
sociology in France. This proposed tightened grouping of three social sciences would have 
“as its aim to direct and encourage scientific work in this field.” The grouping could be 
arranged as an “organized teaching system” comparable to what was already accomplished in 
France for history, psychology and anthropology – each field of which is “already provided 
with laboratories and libraries, scientific meetings and regular publications.” Important was 
Rist’s emphasis that the interconnected social sciences in Europe might be different breeds of 
social science than in the United States, and that social science in Europe might well include 
various facets of research in the humanities. Ruml recognized Rist as an instrumental figure 
in “the development of economic science in France,” and he shared an understanding that 
Rist’s survey “involves the bringing together on an extremely informal basis several men 
who have an interest in the scientific aspects of this subject, for the purpose of examining 
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what is desirable in the development of this field and for the carrying on of various 
investigations which will be determined upon from time to time.”342 
In 1925 and 1926, Ruml got into two exchanges of ideas with Abraham Flexner, as 
the two thought seriously about the nature of “good” social science. Ruml used the first 
exchange, during 1925, to explore how social science might be defined with a ‘we-know-it-
when-we-see-it’ approach. A person should not attempt a priori definition of all specific 
research that should appropriately belong in any particular field of social science, as the only 
way to identify such research was through a kind of laissez-faire process. Any “definition of 
the field in the abstract” would be dissatisfying, as “in concrete cases the limitation is easier.” 
Ruml explained to Flexner: “The field which the Memorial is exploring under the term social 
science is intelligible only in terms of our purposes. We are interested in the problems that 
arise in connection with the tendency of human beings to associate (or dissociate).” The 
Memorial relied on grant recipients to identify such problems. “In many cases the question 
hinges primarily on the interest and approach of the individual investigator or group of 
investigators.” The nature of “social science” will likely remain “extremely broad” in the 
future. Partly this was because the Memorial’s grant-awarding strategy was to provide 
awards to outstanding applicants whenever these came up. Also Ruml could not know 
specifics about the future structure of social science, as “It is difficult to predict whether the 
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development of the work will lead to a narrowing or a widening of our present range of 
activities.”343 
In 1926 Flexner and Ruml exchanged ideas again, this time focusing on research 
objectives for dealing with urgent international problems, especially those dealing with 
Europe. Flexner was optimistic about the prospect for continued progress of social science, 
believing it might be possible for a small team of science advisors to identify every important 
social problem in specific enough fashion that identified problems might be fruitfully 
attacked. The Memorial, he suggested, “must try to ascertain in every possible way what the 
specific problems are which could be studied, and a knowledge of which, if authoritatively 
disseminated, would give statesmen and officials who want to do right the light they do not 
now possess, or might influence public opinion.” Ruml, in responding to Flexner, 
emphasized a belief “that in our approach to the social sciences we should conceive the 
matter on the broad basis of a fundamental search for truth, without too much reference to the 
immediate possibilities of application.” Ruml, in other words, still favored a primary focus 
on social science over social technology. A useful illustration, he believed, was the 
international experiment of creating a League of Nations, which “present[ed] certain new 
educational and scientific opportunities and responsibilities.” The Memorial needed to focus 
on increasing awareness of “problems of an international character in the field of the social 
sciences,” which are problems which “may be political, economic, sociological, 
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ethnological.” Indeed, there were some university research groups beginning to work on such 
problems.344 
Another approach to exploring boundaries of social science came up as a direct 
question for the Memorial. The question, explored during 1925, was what boundaries to set 
for social science in Europe? Of importance was a belief that European social science could 
impact on future peaceful conditions in Europe; indeed, Ruml and others at the Memorial 
were quite concerned about “disorganization and depression in the social sciences in 
Europe.” An impression was that the boundaries between social science and non-social 
science in Europe were somewhat different from those in the United States. In 1925 Ruml 
assigned to the American Historical Society the task to attain historical perspective on the 
condition of the social sciences in Europe. He assigned the American Council of Learned 
Societies a project to comparatively study the state of “humanistic studies and the social 
sciences” in Europe and the United States. Work by the ACLS produced an extremely 
detailed report in 1928. Ruml also had Rist’s survey to draw upon for additional information 
about Europe.345 
Still another group interested in surveying the condition of the social sciences in 
Europe was at Cambridge University. This group had another approach to working on the 
boundary question. Cambridge submitted a grant application in 1925, emphasizing ideas 
about the value of what was called “humane studies.” Cambridge attempted to introduce 
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ideas in such ways that concrete studies might be defined. Because concrete studies were 
what Ruml wanted, he had to consider Cambridge’s proposal. In contrast to any focus on a 
broad research program such as that operated at the LSE, the Cambridge faculty played to 
their interests and strengths by asking for assistance to support one or two professors to do 
new styles of humanities research. Geoffrey Winthrop Young, the lead professor on one 
project, wanted to use concrete historical examples specifically to learn what makes great 
leaders. Knowledge of such attributes, Young argued, could be applied to assist future 
leaders to do more good for society. Memorial trustees approved Young’s proposal and 
granted funds for a survey of the condition of humanities research in Europe.346 
Young began work on his survey in September 1925. In October of the following 
year, at the continuing encouragement of Ruml as well as Abraham Flexner among others, 
Young submitted a 143-page report. Young’s report explored ways the Memorial’s social 
science program might better connect to the humanities, especially in Europe. He tried 
looking for ways to develop a scientific approach to gathering concrete facts from humanities 
research, and described for the Memorial a “scope of inquiry” to identify ways “of 
discovering the type of individual interested by nature to exercise an influence upon his own 
or succeeding generations.” Young’s goal was that “of developing – in the case of the still 
immature [leaders] – these natural characteristics, so that they should be used beneficially 
and in the interests of a better humanity.” The goal, in other words, was to develop 
beneficent leaders in politics and other realms of society. Young ended up compiling a kind 
of history of leadership, constructed from archival sources as well as interviews with living 
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persons. He fully recognized an aim was to knock down a boundary wall: “A little thought, 
and a good deal of conversation, soon made it clear that the distinction between ‘Humanities’ 
and ‘Science,’ in so far as the terms are popularly used in education or to define departments 
of learning, could not effectively be maintained. For hardly any single subject could a line of 
demarcation between the two be definitely traced….Any classification, therefore, into 
‘scientific’ or ‘humane’ must be of individuals, not by subjects.”347 
While Young’s report was still in the works, Cambridge University further committed 
to its decision to extend into the humanities as a field relevant to social science. Cambridge 
faculty made a proposal fitting with a recognized “project of extending the activities of the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund into the field of the humanities.” Cambridge’s 
Robert Eisler, who wrote these words to Abraham Flexner in April 1926, saw the importance 
of Cambridge extending into the humanities as a matter involving more than a ‘great person’ 
theory of history. The kinds of humanities research being proposed could be seen as social 
science, so long as a goal was to rigorously explore how and why people did things. Of 
related importance was a goal to help rebuild and strengthen European culture. Furthermore, 
studies of art and literature could also be used to learn about the condition of the United 
States. “Nothing could be more helpful for a student or professor of social sciences than the 
opportunity to see and study the rich, complicated social and industrial life of America” 
through studying art, music, literature, and the like. Such an opportunity was something the 
Memorial’s fellowships program for European scholars was helping make possible. “On the 
other hand, most of the material for study and research work in the field of the humanities is 
 
347 Geoffrey Winthrop Young, “A Summary of Impressions Received during an Inquiry Made on Behalf of the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial with a Recommendation,” October 1926, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 
105, Folders 1064-1065, pp. 1-3. 
248
concentrated in European libraries, museums, and excavation fields. Around these treasures 
European scholars have developed peculiar methods of dealing with such subjects and have 
put in motion a very efficient machinery of collective research in order to make those 
documents and monuments of its common part available to whole civilized worlds.” U.S. 
scholars therefore also needed to be going to Europe.348 
The idea for a Memorial program dealing with rigorous research standards for the 
humanities was supported by other persons as well. Arthur Woods wrote Ruml in 1925 to 
explore the subject of “the best methods of procedure with reference to securing men for 
looking up” facts pertaining to “Humane Studies.” Woods, who strongly supported the idea 
of a Memorial program to include the humanities as a kind of social science, stated goals for 
the program: “The plan that had gradually formed itself is for a survey of the field in Europe, 
to find out in general, what is the state of the Humane Studies, and in particular, who are the 
very great men in these subjects, under what conditions are they working, what, if anything, 
need be done to help them produce their best work, whether of aid of some kind at home, or 
the possibility of international intercourse.” Yet another Memorial memorandum, written 
about the same time, suggested that the achievable benefit for assisting progressive social 
change was “that the Humanities have had the tradition of putting a premium on originality, 
which has exercised a very marked influence on the development of culture.” Indeed “the 
role of the arts in encouraging originality and the breaking of tradition will be seen to be 
considerable.”349 
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Ruml took ample time to evaluate whether to support humanities-oriented research at 
Cambridge. Even though Cambridge was not much interested in trying to become a major 
recipient of Memorial funds, additional discussion took place during 1925 and 1926 to 
arrange an endowed chair in political science, with a second endowed chair, in sociology, 
likely to follow. Cambridge accepted the first chaired professorship in May 1926 (worth 
$150,000), but ended up declining the sociology chair.350 
Historians ask questions about how best to interpret the Memorial’s interaction with 
Cambridge between 1924 and 1926. Despite ample evidence that the program at Cambridge 
was part of a general increased emphasis on supporting humanities as a kind of furthest reach 
for an outer boundary of social science, historians tend to critically evaluate the Memorial-
Cambridge interaction as a stand-alone matter. When evaluated in isolation, the potential 
problem shapes up as follows: the Memorial possibly had a goal to use one grant for a 
political science professorship in order to encourage a specific direction for further research 
at Cambridge; that if Cambridge would do right with the first grant, they could receive more 
grants. So, Cambridge was tentatively offered the two endowed chairs in 1925, seemingly as 
part of a single package in Ruml’s mind. Cambridge, through its Vice Chancellor, 
communicated with Ruml to accept only the chair in political science, which was the only 
endowed chair officially offered at the time. Historians argue that the prospect of a 
Memorial-supported chair in sociology was not yet officially offered because Cambridge 
authorities opposed sociological research of the kind that would meet Ruml’s scientific 
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standards. Ruml kept an open door to persuade Cambridge to consider future acceptance of 
financial assistance in the field of sociology. Historians debate whether Ruml decided to 
withhold support for the sociology chair until Cambridge stated its sociology research plan in 
some way that he could agree with it. This, then, is a line of explanation as introduced by 
historians. Such an interpretation about the Cambridge case does not seem to hold up under 
scrutiny.351 
Historians, particularly Donald Fisher and Martin Bulmer, incompletely interpret the 
Cambridge situation. Ruml’s interaction with Cambridge began in the context that, when 
supporting research at European schools, his method was to commission trusted academic 
acquaintances to travel to Europe to personally assess the fitness of potential grant recipients. 
A factor involved in the Cambridge case was a report Ruml received in February 1924 from 
advisor J.J. Coss, who explicitly recommended that Ruml “not do anything at Cambridge,” 
based on the school’s evident contentment as an “isolated” institution “not at all anxious to 
grow.” Leading Cambridge economists such as John Maynard Keynes and Joan Robinson 
were, Coss added, “little interested in social side, but only in financial analysis.”352 
In addition to the value of Coss’s 1924 recommendation (which Ruml ignored), it 
seems Fisher and Bulmer each fail to quote pertinent language in a letter that each cites for 
other reasons. In August 1926, Ruml wrote to a friend, E.M. Hopkins, saying he maintained 
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hope that the Memorial was making progress in “getting an edge into one of the most 
conservative of universities,” which was Cambridge. Based on all else that was underway at 
the time in the way of encouraging rigorous methods of humanities research, the direction 
forward was to allow that certain historical and descriptive approaches might possibly be 
made more scientific. In the case of sociology at Cambridge, the real matter that concerned 
Ruml was simply that Cambridge’s statement of intent in the field of sociology was not yet 
stated in concrete-enough terms – regardless of the methods to be used. In correspondence 
between Ruml and Cambridge, the Cambridge faculty even said: “the outline of what was 
proposed in Sociology did not seem sufficiently detailed to justify recommending that Chair 
at this time.” Ruml’s hope was to encourage people at Cambridge “to re-examine their 
position in Social Science a bit.” His goal was not to try and persuade Cambridge to adopt 
any specific theory or method, but was a goal “of meeting the Cambridge people on their 
own ground and not trying to inject too many of our own notions into a foreign soil.”353 
The best way to understand the Memorial’s interaction with Cambridge is in light of 
the Memorial’s goal to encourage specific projects along the line of scientifically-inclined 
humanities research in Europe. Doors had to be opened to allow this to happen, and one such 
door was Cambridge University. By April 1927, Lawrence Frank came to believe the overall 
Memorial strategy was made stronger by including (along with economical, political and 
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psychological aspects of social science) “that branch of philosophy which deals with the 
history of ideas.”354 
The question remained open as to how exactly the humanities might also serve as a 
contact point between social science and social technology. Worthy of note was a 1927 
Memorial statement on “social technology,” where the Memorial provided words concerning 
the definition of such a thing. Expansion in the “social technology” program had been 
accomplished in recent years, and the Memorial wondered if it was best to hold off on further 
effort to promote social technology, with the reason being that “the social sciences have as 
yet contributed few tested facts upon which a social technology may be constructed.”355 
In light of a perception that more scientifically tested facts were needed, one idea was 
to reconsider the nature of contacts between social science and legal research. Perhaps 
research work in the law schools, previously identified as social technology schools, might 
be placed more in touch with social science than had been thought possible. 
 
8.7 Legal studies as a boundary question–1927-28 
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A boundary question that came up in 1927 involved the matter of where legal studies 
should fit into the Memorial’s work. Somewhat resembling the pliable abutment between 
“social science” and “humane studies,” for which the Memorial focused on Cambridge 
University as a kind of test case, another question was how legal analysis and social science 
might interconnect. Was legal analysis ready for closer connection to social science? Was 
legal analysis perhaps just as much social science as it was social technology? Was legal 
analysis, like other social sciences, lagging behind a changing society? Such questions were 
attended to especially at Columbia University and Yale University. 
The Columbia University law school contacted the Memorial in January 1927, 
introducing an idea that legal analysis needed tighter connection to social science. Such a 
movement in the young field of ‘law and economics’ had been in the works already for about 
a decade, and what was now needed, according to Columbia, was to develop an entire body 
of law based on realistic facts. Columbia cited the work of economist Leon Marshall, who 
was visiting the law school to help organize a study of law along economic lines. The idea 
for a ‘law and economics’ project at Columbia was to pool together the several branches of 
law applicable to business and industry, and to “assemble the rules which apply to the 
different processes and stages in the economic activities.” Columbia experienced difficulty 
maintaining funds to support Marshall’s work, and could use financial assistance. Funds were 
also lacking for another law school project to link criminal law to branches of social science 
bearing upon it.356 
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Dean of the Columbia Law School, Huger W. Jervey, in a February letter, said the 
main issue was that “the development of thought in the law” in recent years had come “to the 
point where we see clearly the necessity of having definite studies made towards 
programming the establishment of two lines of work in those fields where law and economics 
and sociology overlap.” The hope, particularly for Marshall’s work, was that “the fence” 
between abstract law and real-world problems “can be broken down.” The goal, as Jervey 
described it, was “to project the so-called logical system of legal doctrine against a realistic 
background of contemporary social and economic thought and fact.” Such a connection 
would be the beginning of “a sustained effort [that] must be made by the lawyers and the 
economists working together.” Prospective new projects in social research would try to 
“tackle the fundamental problems scientifically.” The Columbia law faculty’s overall 
argument was that only by making contact with real facts provided by modern social sciences 
would legal researchers be able to do truly scientific work on society’s problems. The grant 
was awarded in May 1927.357 
The Yale law school, also in early 1927, argued the time was right to place their legal 
research more in contact with empirically founded knowledge based on “the facts of life.” 
Under the leadership of Yale President James R. Angell, Yale knew what was important to 
Ruml, which was to inject the influence of social science into all possible fields. Yale’s law 
faculty drew up a prospectus, declaring administration of the law is a “chaotic and 
maladjusted field, chiefly because of inadequate knowledge of the rules of procedure, their 
operation and their relation to the social sciences, psychology, criminology and penology, 
 
357 Huger W. Jervey to Lawrence K. Frank, February 3, 1927. The grant was awarded May 5, 1927; RAC–
LSRM, Series III, Box 50, Folder 525. 
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which is consistently exhibited by bench and bar.” The law faculty believed “that this lack of 
knowledge can be removed only by a definite and concrete program of research, directed to 
the collection of facts.” The proposed program was “imperatively necessary,” yet “definitely 
an experiment.” The program must be undertaken, as “eventually the entire field of law 
administration must be subjected to rigorous investigation.” Because law schools were 
classified as programs in social technology, Yale’s law faculty emphasized that the 
separation between scientific objectivity and reform activity should be maintained. “[W]hile 
ultimately various reforms should be suggested by the program, the Faculty believe it unwise 
to set as their goal the achieving of particular reform. The objective is therefore to supply 
accurate information soundly analyzed, which may be available to those active in the field of 
legislation, rather than to devise legislative programs.”358 
Yale’s application was more general than Columbia’s, and it was denied. In the words 
of Lawrence Frank, written to Yale Law School Acting Dean Robert M. Hutchins in March 
1927, the Memorial hesitated because it felt “hedged in by matters of policy and precedent 
which make it difficult to move unless conditions and prerequisites are present.” After the 
negative decision with respect to Yale’s application, the better part of a year went by with 
only minor discussion between Ruml, Frank, Angell, and Hutchins.359 
In December 1927, President Angell contacted Ruml again, believing the time was 
right to get the ball rolling. Angell was ready to convince Ruml that Yale’s law faculty had 
established the kind of program the Memorial could support. Yale’s law school had, over the 
year, shown initiative by “carry[ing] forward much further” the planned program “by new 
 
358 Yale Law School, “Program of Research in the Administration of the Law,” 1927, RAC–LSRM, Series III, 
Box 78, Folder 830, pp. 1-2, 7. 
359 Lawrence K. Frank to Robert M. Hutchins, March 2, 1927, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 78, Folder 830. 
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appointments and change of procedure, whereby the various social sciences have been 
brought into much more intimate contact with our legal teaching and study.” Examples 
included connections forged between criminal law, evidentiary procedure, and psychology. 
Strong links were also made between public utility economics, labor research, tax studies, 
and corporate finance. Even some connections were being tried between law and sociology. 
Angell reported that Yale had contacted the University of North Carolina to learn how legal 
research was included in decisions made by UNC with respect to applying its block-grant 
funds. Yale had UNC’s support in recommending a pair of connected studies of law 
administration be established, one in a northern state, the other in the South.360 
Hutchins wrote a letter at the same time to Edmund E. Day, reporting the law school 
had in fact already begun a five-year program to connect law and social science. Hutchins 
presented a case that Yale’s law school “has gone further than any other in the attempt to 
place the law among the social sciences.” Hutchins reported he and Angell were each about 
to publish articles to lead the project to connect law to social science. Yale was also bringing 
in Walton Hamilton, a Memorial-supported professor in the field of law & economics, who 
was well established at the Brookings Graduate School. Hutchins reported on future plans, 
doing so in words typical of what Ruml liked to hear: “The general drift of the School is 
toward the social sciences and toward the facts of life rather than the library alone as the 
material for research. These two aims are in fact one.”361 
360 James Angell to Beardsley Ruml, December 8, 1927, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 78, Folder 830. 
361 Robert M. Hutchins to Edmund E. Day, December 9, 1927, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 78, Folder 830. 
Angell’s article was James R. Angell, “The University and the School of Law,” American Bar Association 
(April 1928), 1. The articles by Hutchins were a six-part series of articles he coauthored with Donald Slesinger 
between 1927 and 1929 under the title “Some Observations on the Law of Evidence.” Different installments of 
Hutchins’s article addressed “Competency of Witnesses,” “State of Mind,” “Memory,” “Family Relations,” 
“Spontaneous Exclamations,” and “Consciousness of Guilt.”  
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Ruml replied to President Angell in December 1927, saying it was likely the 
Memorial could soon approve financial support of such “an experimental project” as Yale 
was undertaking. Day responded, at the same time, to Hutchins, reporting that the Memorial 
would soon submit Yale’s proposal to the trustees, and the hope was for a grant that “would 
carry the Memorial into a field in which it has as yet developed no definite program.” A five-
year grant was soon awarded.362 
In December 1927 Howard University’s law school contacted the Memorial. Howard 
expressed a goal to strengthen the presence of social science in its law school, particularly by 
bolstering social science library holdings. As a traditionally black school located in 
Washington, DC, Howard’s background and location were of some interest to the Memorial, 
possibly as a kind of lever point for better addressing problems associated with race relations 
and the quality of black life in the South. Of course there were already some substantial 
Memorial programs underway in the South, notably at North Carolina, Virginia, Tulane and 
Vanderbilt, but still a fairly specific award to another school could be considered. Ruml and 
the Memorial trustees agreed that in order for Howard to best contribute to lifting the 
prospect of southern African Americans, social science improvements at the law school were 
needed, and a grant was soon awarded.363 
Development of closer contact between law and social science likely benefited from 
discussions between 1923 and 1927 to attain tighter contact between humane studies and 
 
362 Beardsley Ruml to James R. Angell, December 16, 1927, E.E. Day to Robert Hutchins, December 22, 1927, 
RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 78, Folder 830. 
363 In December 1927, Howard submitted a request for $33,000 to help bring the journal and book holdings of 
their law library “up to the minimum requirements of the American Association of Law Schools” and to bolster 
their regular library holdings in the range of social sciences; see Mordecai W. Johnson to Leonard Outhwaite, 
February 3, 1928. Howard also faced a problem of uncompetitive salaries; see “Memorandum of Interview,” 
1928, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 54, Folder 576. 
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social science; possibly this was even a line of discussion that enabled the Memorial’s 
financial support of law schools at Columbia, Yale, and Howard to take place when it did – 
which was right before the end of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. The end of the 
Memorial is taken up as the next chapter begins. 
 
259
CHAPTER 9. ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE 
ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION–1928-33 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter studies different facets of the Rockefeller Foundation’s absorption of the 
Memorial’s social sciences program in January 1929. First, we observe actions by persons at 
the Memorial who were aware of the coming end of the Memorial. Through 1928 they 
prepared for the change by initiating a critical self-evaluation process. The goal at the 
Memorial through 1928 was to do what they could to help the Rockefeller Foundation’s new 
Division of Social Sciences get off to the best start it could. Second, we study the condition 
of a few fields of social science during the late 1920s and early 1930s. Third, we recognize 
that by about 1934 the Division of Social Sciences decided to focus mostly on supporting 
economic research. 
 
9.2 The Memorial’s self-review–1927-28 
By November 1927, Beardsley Ruml had guiding principles well hashed out for 
philanthropic support of social research. He got a refined batch of principles, eleven in 
number, adopted by the Memorial trustees that month. These eleven principles were 
substantially the same at Ruml’s twelve earlier principles, only a bit more consolidated. The 
1927 principles were: to increase the stock of knowledge and appreciation of scientific 
methods; to promote diffusion of knowledge; to pursue broad subject matter; to include pure 
and applied scientific projects; to have a program that would be international in extent; to not 
allow the Memorial to directly influence any research findings; to find workable ways to 
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study controversial subjects; to support a variety of institutional types (including 
“coordinating agencies”); to recognize that tests through practical applications are necessary 
for scientific progress; to offer fellowships; to recognize that “The general aim of the 
program is better understanding of modern society.” Throughout our study we have been 
seeing Ruml’s principles in action.364 
At the time the Memorial trustees officially adopted these principles, a phase in the 
relationship between Rockefeller philanthropy and social science was about to end. As begun 
in 1922, Ruml’s crash program had done well. Yet the program was also nearing a potential 
ending point, as a plan was in place for the Rockefeller Foundation to absorb the Memorial’s 
social science program at the end of 1928. Memorial leaders decided the time was right to 
begin a self-review of the Memorial’s goals and accomplishments. One objective for the 
review was to analyze methods and structure of social science. The Memorial also wanted to 
better understand ideas for the future. 
Memorial officials and trustees established a “Committee on Review” in November 
1927, the purpose of which was to make a self-evaluation of different areas of social science 
 
364 The main points to the eleven governing principles were as follows: (1) “Increase the body of knowledge in 
the hands of competent technicians,” “enlarge the general stock of ideas which should be in the common 
possession of all intelligent members of civilized society,” and “spread the appreciation of the appropriateness 
and value of scientific methods in the simplification and solution of modern social problems”; (2) avoid a 
narrow focus by continually recognizing there is a broad list of subject matter of the program; (3) recognize that 
“the program is not to be restricted to the so-called pure, or unapplied, branches of social science”; (4) 
emphasize that “The general aim of the program is a better understanding of modern society”; (5) the program 
is to be international in extent; (6) it is inadvisable to carry on investigations and research directly under the 
Memorial, or to attempt to influence findings, conclusions, specific problems to be attacked, methods of 
inquiry, or to concentrate too narrowly on particular institutions; (7) “Subjects of a controversial nature cannot 
be avoided if the program is to concern itself with the more important aspects of modern social life”; (8) In 
addition to the development of major university centers of research, “the support of other institutional types is to 
be undertaken when conditions are favorable,” and particularly important are “coordinating agencies” like the 
SSRC; (9) “The hypotheses of social sciences can only rarely, if ever, be proved or disproved by laboratory 
methods; the tests of practical applications in the field are ordinarily indispensable”; thus “social 
experimentation” and “practical demonstration” are valued; (10) promote diffusion of existing knowledge; (11) 
use fellowships and existing professorships to help develop outstanding personnel. “Principles Governing the 
Memorial’s Program in the Social Sciences,” November 22, 1927, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 63, Folder 678. 
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and social technology supported by the Memorial. Fields of scientific research were 
classified into “economics, sociology, political science, and the related subjects of 
psychology, anthropology and history.” Boundaries around the fields of scientific application 
were open for critical evaluation as well. The Memorial got many responses, which taken 
together, suggested a range of matters to be considered. Was the Memorial spreading its 
financial support widely enough, or perhaps doing so too widely? Were too many applicants 
simply opportunists, taking advantage of Memorial generosity? Should the Memorial 
increase or diminish its attention to fundamental science? Was it even clear what “social 
science” was? What about “social technology”? And, how did the two relate to each other?365 
More than any other field they were asked about, respondents to the self-evaluation 
focused on economics. One respondent was Henry S. Pritchett, Director of the Carnegie 
Foundation. Pritchett wondered if application of physical science methods to social 
phenomena was misguided at some fundamental level. Is it possible “we are seeking to apply 
the methods of physical science to phenomena that are not amenable to such treatment?” The 
fundamental social science, Pritchett believed, was economics, “which affects profoundly the 
conditions that make for true happiness or unhappiness of society, [and] is on a somewhat 
different basis” than other social sciences. While economics potentially could be genuinely 
scientific, the difficulty in attaining this “does not arise from the fact that the methods of 
exact science cannot be applied, but from the fact that the phenomena to be observed are 
 
365 Possibly as an expansion of its review of the European program, the Memorial’s Board of Trustees decided 
to review their operations across all fields. By November 1927 they put together a “Committee of Review” to 
evaluate “the field of social science and social technology.” The Memorial distributed a notification letter 
regarding the project, with at least eighteen persons at ten different universities receiving these. Submitted input 
from in-house commentators would also be accepted; comments were invited specifically from all trustees and 
officers at the Memorial, from six persons in leadership at the Rockefeller Foundation, from five persons at the 
General Education Board, and from a number of persons in the office of John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Six fields of 
social science were to be evaluated. RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 50, Folders 529-531. 
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often times so complicated that it is not always possible to disentangle separate factors.” 
Pritchett yet held to an optimistic ideal that “Economics as applied to human conditions can 
be completely scientific when the facts are ascertainable.”366 
A number of respondents were economists. Wesley Mitchell potentially provided 
more feedback than any one else. He contemplated relationships between discovery of 
knowledge and application of knowledge, and he noted the importance of remembering that 
any social problem will require study with all social sciences – that is, that all the social 
sciences share one aim, which is better understanding of causes and consequences of social 
behavior. Problems in the social sciences “are not purely economic, purely psychological, 
purely political, or the like, but problems which have economic, psychological, political, 
sociological and other aspects.” Already a number of scholars were beginning to deal with 
the social sciences as “a family” of sciences “having common interests.” Mitchell supported 
this and advocated a far-reaching project based on the idea that social scientists could 
somehow agree upon which problems required immediate attack. “What seems to be 
needed,” he declared, “is a reformulation of the problems which engage the attention of 
psychologists, economists, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, jurists 
and educators – a reformulation which will present a series of fundamental questions 
concerning human behavior, each of which has aspects of special interest to the several 
disciplines listed, and doubtless others as well.” Mitchell concluded with his belief that “the 
time may be ripe for attempting such a reformulation in an experimental spirit,” particularly 
 
366 Henry S. Pritchett to Raymond B. Fosdick, January 5, 1928, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 50, Folder 530. 
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to help connect progress in the discovery of knowledge to progress in the application of 
knowledge. Yet he also conceded: “How such an effort can best be made is not clear.”367 
Other responding economists included Walter F. Willcox, H. C. Taylor, and Leon C. 
Marshall. As Cornell University statistical economist known for his research on the 
economics of race discrimination, Willcox recommended that better development of 
statistical analysis, whether ultimately “a science or a method,” ought to “be more adequately 
recognized in the Memorial’s program.” To Taylor, a leading agricultural economist, more 
attention needed to be paid to agricultural economics and rural sociology, particularly in their 
relationship to the welfare of rural people; there was serious need to support more scientists 
in these fields. As to Marshall, he summarized what he understood to be the Memorial’s 
position: “Let us foster social science research, hoping thus to find generalizations from 
which may be derived rules of action in social technology. Research comes first; its 
technological applications come second.” Marshall agreed with the Memorial’s guiding 
principles, yet struggled with a question of whether “the Memorial is going about its chosen 
task as wisely as it should.” Marshall had questions: Is there too much emphasis on “pure” 
science? Is there not enough attention to disseminating knowledge? Is there enough 
encouragement of experimentation?368 
367 Among leading social scientists responding were: Wesley C. Mitchell (Columbia); Herman Oliphant 
(Columbia); Joseph P. Chamberlain (Columbia); Walter F. Willcox (Cornell); Manley O. Hudson (Harvard); 
Henry C. Taylor (Northwestern); Leon C. Marshall (Chicago); Charles E. Merriam (Chicago); Clark Wissler 
(Yale); William Beveridge (LSE). One memorandum dealing with the Committee on Review lists twenty-five 
such letters from so-called “outsiders.” Wesley Mitchell to Raymond Fosdick, January 20, 1928, RAC–LSRM, 
Series III, Box 50, Folder 530. 
368 Walter F. Willcox to Raymond Fosdick, January 8, 1928; H.C. Taylor to Raymond Fosdick, January 17, 
1928; L.C. Marshall to Raymond Fosdick, January 30, 1928, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 50, Folder 530. For 
additional information on Willcox, see Mark Aldrich, “Progressive Economists and Scientific Racism: Walter 
Willcox and Black Americans, 1895-1910,” Phylon 40, 1 (Spring 1979): 1-14. 
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Other responses to the self-review came from various officers and trustees at the 
Rockefeller philanthropies. Frank P. Bachman, of the General Education Board, observed 
how “wide-flung” the “field of social science and social technology” had become. Perhaps 
the Memorial’s project had gotten too wide-spread. “Is not the Memorial undertaking to 
cooperate with so many different agencies that nothing impressive or permanent will be 
accomplished?” Maybe part of the problem of excess breadth was that the Memorial 
insufficiently distinguished between functions of universities and functions of other 
organizations. Bachman, who was particularly concerned about an explosion of research 
projects recently underway at Columbia, wondered if “social science research is not being 
overstimulated – whether problems are being studied, not because they are pressing and have 
far-reaching significance, but because money is now available for such work.” Another 
respondent from the General Education Board, H.J. Thorkelson, believed that the Memorial 
“is correct in its policy of contributing toward research in these fields [of social science], for 
the accumulation of human knowledge regarding any aspect of social welfare is of 
fundamental importance.” Thorkelson recognized continuing value in maintaining the 
distinction between research done by scientists and applications by technicians. He asked: 
“…does not the first field represent the more important one for a board to consider?” 
Bachman and Thorkelson’s views we can expect would have been seriously considered at the 
Rockefeller Foundation, as a focus primarily on science might be considered best for the near 
future.369 
369 Frank P. Bachman to Raymond B. Fosdick, December 21, 1927; H.J. Thorkelson to Raymond B. Fosdick, 
December 30, 1927, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 50, Folder 529. 
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Also looking at the science-applications distinction was Selskar M. Gunn, of the 
Rockefeller Foundation. Gunn interpreted inclusion of “social technology” as indicating a 
recognition that “much that has to do with social science is incapable at the present time of 
true scientific analysis.” Indeed such a broad heading as “social science” seemed to include 
areas that “probably will never be capable of complete scientific evaluation.” Gunn 
recommended encouraging more applied experiments.370 
Cleveland E. Dodge, chair of the Memorial’s special committee overseeing the 
review, even responded. Like Gunn, Dodge favored more work not on fundamental science 
especially, but on applications of scientific findings. The question Dodge asked was “whether 
we should give more study to the helping out of practical demonstrations along social lines 
rather than giving so much to developing theoretical work in the universities.” Dodge 
recommended more active pursuit of experiments.371 
George Vincent, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, expressed his agreement 
with Ruml’s original guiding principles. Vincent considered there was something to the 
widespread idea to do more experiments, as he believed the Memorial had created a sound 
structure to help keep financial support of science separate from any research implications. 
“The delegating to universities or other agencies of the actual work in administration of 
investigation has vindicated itself…,” he said. “The Memorial has done well to limit its 
support of individual projects and to work towards institutional responsibility.” Also to be 
noted (at least for precautionary attention) was the fair degree of success being achieved 
when it came to meeting the principle of “independence of responsible agencies,” as it 
 
370 Selskar M. Gunn to Raymond B. Fosdick, December 20, 1927, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 50, Folder 529. 
371 Cleveland E. Dodge to Raymond B. Fosdick, January 5, 1928, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 50, Folder 530. 
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remained “important to detach agencies of investigation so far as possible from sources of 
funds.” The precaution to be taken was what might happen to this separation if Rockefeller 
philanthropy got more involved in supporting real-world experiments. “[I]s there danger of 
too close contact which might be interpreted as supervision and is possibly unconscious but 
nevertheless a real influence being brought to bear upon institutions with respect to their 
policies and programs?” Vincent offered additional criticism as well. Even though the 
Memorial was “wise” to select only a few strong institutions, “The danger of restricting aid 
to so small a number of centers as to preclude a variety of working hypotheses and social 
attitudes should be kept in mind.” On the whole what Vincent did was add focused questions. 
Is “science” in “social science” really “science”? Shouldn’t financial supporters of social 
science be aware of potential conflicts with “the pressure of ‘interests’”? Should there be 
tighter connection between Memorial-supported social research and sponsorship of work in 
medicine and public health work by the Rockefeller Foundation?372 
As to this last question, Vincent was not alone in asking it – as we shall see. There 
were some shared points of concern in the feedback letters, and all points made in the letters 
were compiled by the committee into a digest, of which there were one hundred and sixty 
main points, divided into “General Objectives”; “Scope of Program”; “Agencies or Means of 
Making the Program Effective”; and “Internal Organization or Machinery of Operation.” 
Along with the complete digest, a summary report was prepared, boiling all responses down 
to two overriding objectives: the need to advance science; the need to achieve social control. 
In the summary report, the Memorial declared: “[T]he purpose of the program in social 
science and social technology is so to increase the knowledge and understanding of social 
 
372 George E. Vincent to Raymond B. Fosdick, January 5, 1928, RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 50, Folder 530. 
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phenomena as to assure a more purposeful, satisfying, and beneficent development of human 
society.” Many respondents had asked questions about “The necessity of a more careful 
definition of the field of social sciences,” and most respondents were agreed it was proper 
that the Memorial “does not make reform its immediate objective.” Reform could, however, 
be made a more active objective; that is, if social conditions warranted. For the present time, 
however, the main objective remained “to increase the body of knowledge which in the 
hands of competent technicians may be expected in time to result in substantial social 
control.” What was essential remained “the advancement of human knowledge.”373 
And thus it was that the nature of social and economic reform would continue to 
depend upon what facts were scientifically discovered. The conclusion of the Memorial’s 
self-review was that it was not yet time to use accumulated scientific knowledge to begin any 
earnest pursuit of reform. 
 
9.3 The last days of the Memorial–1928 
As 1928 came to a close, stock could be taken of Memorial successes in various 
terms. One measure could be monetary. During the time of the Ruml-led Memorial, large-
scale appropriations began in 1924 and reached over 20 million dollars distributed for social 
science and social technology by the end of 1928. The peak year for appropriations was 
1927, when nearly 8.5 million dollars went to a mix of projects in social science and social 
 
373 Points made in the compilation summaries came together as four bodies of recommendations. The section on 
“General Objectives of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial” contained 56 points gathered from the letters. 
“Scope of Program of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial” consisted of 48 points, “Agencies or Means of 
Making the Program Effective” consisted of 48 points, and “Internal Organization or Machinery of Operation” 
consisted of 8 points. RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 50, Folder 530. “Report of Trustees Committee on Review,” 
RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 50, Folder 530, pp. 1-2. 
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technology. Of course there were considerations other than simply the amount of money 
allocated.374 
Ruml’s personal opinion could be considered an important measure. In his “Final 
Report,” Ruml reflected on the Memorial’s many accomplishments. Ruml was of the opinion 
that the money infusion since 1922 was beginning finally to take hold in promoting 
accelerated development of fundamental social science. He also expressed a belief about the 
future, “that through the social sciences might come more intelligent measures of social 
control that would reduce such irrationalities as are represented by poverty, class conflict, 
and war between nations.” Ruml’s forward-looking hope, in other words, was that more 
experimental applications would soon be tried.375 
Ruml’s idea for the Rockefeller Foundation was to recommend that the Foundation 
should maintain the Memorial’s long-term perspective in forging connections between 
science and applications. In words he would express in 1933, Ruml believed it was urgent 
time for the Rockefeller Foundation to aid “in the advancement of social understanding of 
control.” This was noteworthy wording, as to Ruml the Foundation’s goal ought not be the 
direct pursuit of social control, but should be to work in the present time to advance 
“understanding of control.” In other words, something intermediary was needed. One who 
agreed with this was E.E. Day. Writing on the subject of Ruml’s view, Day said that “the 
activities of the Rockefeller Foundation must be increasingly concerned with the means by 
which social understanding and social control in the public interest are to be achieved.” To 
 
374 See Annual Reports of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. Principal appropriations for social science 
for the years 1923 through 1928 are summarized, in table form, in Bulmer and Bulmer, “Philanthropy and 
Social Science,” 386-387. 
375 Ruml, “Final Report,” 10-11. 
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Day, the lofty goal still remained: preservation of the democratic tradition, which “is of 
paramount importance and to be sought by all possible means.”376 
Another measure of Memorial success could be the fact the Ruml’s guiding principles 
worked and were soon adopted by the Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of Social Sciences. 
In particular the chief rule remained for all that the Memorial had done: to stay clear of 
controversies. The importance of this rule cannot be understated. Attention to guiding 
principles was reinforced a number of times in the history of the Memorial, particularly in 
1927 when the “Principles Governing the Memorial’s Program in the Social Science” were 
formally approved by the trustees. At the final meeting of the Memorial, in December 1928, 
Memorial trustees transmitted to the Foundation’s new Division of Social Sciences their 
statement of guiding principles. Two overriding objectives adopted were to promote 
appreciation of scientific methods and to increase knowledge. Foundation leaders stated their 
view that social technology had an important role to play: “The hypotheses of social science 
can only rarely, if ever, be proved or disproved by laboratory methods; the tests of practical 
applications in the field are ordinarily indispensable. Consequently, the possibilities of social 
experimentation are to be kept constantly in mind; and opportunities for practical 
 
376 In December 1933 Ruml introduced his ideas to the Trustees. He emphasized a tradition of experience at the 
Memorial showing that “it is desirable to look some years ahead in the determination of objectives.” Though the 
widespread economic crisis was a difficult one for such a strategy, Ruml nevertheless believed significant 
benefit could come from discussing four objectives that “may be thought of together as a general enterprise in 
the advancement of social understanding of control.” The objectives were: “establishment of several well 
rounded centers of social science research and teaching”; “improvement of public administration”; 
“establishment of endowed press”; “improvement of the political parties.” The first of these objectives related 
“primarily to social understanding, the other three to the principle mechanisms of control, the governmental 
administrative organization, public opinion, and politics”; Beardlsey Ruml, “Memorandum,” December 1933, 
pp. 1-2. Day shared his opinion of Ruml’s view in E.E. Day to Raymond Fosdick, December 12, 1933, RAC–
RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 2, Folder 13. 
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demonstrations may be utilized whenever they promise to throw light upon the validity of 
tentative social findings.”377 
9.4 Establishing the “Division of Social Science”–1929 
Through 1928, the Rockefeller Foundation refined a plan to absorb the social sciences 
program that had been independently operated for ten years by the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial. Foundation leaders committed to the plan in May 1928, and the date 
of execution was to be at year’s end. One important goal for the move was to strengthen the 
Foundation’s ability to promote better social control based on valid science. Foundation 
trustees expressed their desire that programs in the social sciences should continue to 
“concern themselves with the rationalization of social control,” and that whatever kinds of 
reform were going to be needed, these kinds should be achieved through applying 
scientifically based knowledge.378 
Not all persons at the Foundation in every way favored absorption of the social 
sciences program. Contrasting views are worth considering. Selskar M. Gunn, Vice President 
of the Foundation’s program in Europe, wrote to George E. Vincent, President of the 
Foundation. Gunn summarized some concerns: “Of course, I have known for a long time that 
 
377 A statement of eleven principles confirmed by Memorial trustees  to be transmitted to the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s Division of Social Sciences is in “Principles Governing the Memorial’s Program in the Social 
Sciences,” presented at the Rockefeller Foundation meeting, December 31, 1928, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, 
Box 2, Folder 11. The bequeathed statement also emphasized that “The general purposes of the program are to 
(a) increase the body of knowledge which in the hands of competent technicians may be expected in time to 
result in substantial social control; (b) enlarge the general stock of ideas which should be in the common 
possession of all intelligent members of civilized society; and (c) spread the appreciation of the appropriateness 
and value of scientific methods in the simplification and solution of modern social problems.” 
378 On May 23, 1928, an Rockefeller Foundation Committee on Reorganization officially resolved “that the 
Trustees approve in principle a plan for extending the scope of the work of the Foundation to include the 
advancement of knowledge in the fields of the Natural Sciences, the Humanities and Arts, and Agriculture and 
Forestry”; “Report,” May 23, 1928, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 1.   
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some of the important officers of the Memorial are antagonistic to adoption in the RF as they 
have considered the RF as a rather hidebound organization and have felt that the strength of 
the Memorial resided largely in its elasticity.” Yet Gunn also added, “I do feel that whatever 
happens in connection with the reorganization, the work in social sciences should be in closer 
relation with the other RF activities than exists at the present time.” Here was the main point, 
even as recognized by a critic: that there were valid reasons why the social sciences program 
should be in closer connection with other Foundation programs. Gunn recorded, for example, 
an idea that others – including Vincent – believed about how the Foundation’s work in health 
and medicine could benefit: “…that if aid from the Division of Social Sciences were 
available, a really complete picture could be obtained of the conditions under which people 
live in the areas which are about to be surveyed – this would probably be much more 
significant than a mere survey of health conditions.” Gunn’s main points were really the 
essence of the matter: that whereas a benefit of flexibility had existed under the Memorial, by 
1928 there was a recognized cost of continued maintenance of the separation between social 
sciences and other sciences. The social sciences had grown up, and the cost of continued 
separation was beginning to be a failure to develop various Foundation programs as 
effectively as they could be. Foundation leaders also concluded that some established 
divisions at the Foundation already had a bit of a social science dimension to them. The 
International Health Division, for example, was in the business of doing projects along the 
line of social surveys, and this was work which could benefit from an inclusion of the best 
available social science methods.379 
379 Selskar M. Gunn to George E. Vincent, March 6, 1928; Interview by Selskar M. Gunn of R.M. Taylor, 
September 29, 1928, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 1. 
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The official beginning of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of Social Sciences 
came on January 3, 1929. The statement of guiding principles was ratified. Edmund E. Day 
was appointed Director. The immediate focus for the new division was to maintain the social 
sciences program as already structured. Existing financial commitments were maintained, 
and evaluation of grant proposals was continued. One substantial open commitment was an 
obligation to the University of Chicago to support construction of a Social Science Research 
Building on the campus. The occasion of the grand opening turned out to be a suitable time 
to take stock of the past, as well as raise ideas about possible futures for Rockefeller-
supported social science.380 
The dedication ceremony for the new building took place in December 1929. A 
number of social science leaders presented papers at the event, with Wesley C. Mitchell, 
Howard Odum and William Beveridge among them. Beardsley Ruml presented a paper 
exploring “Recent Trends in the Social Sciences.” The paper was Ruml’s first detailed 
exploration of the overall state of social science since his 1922 policy memorandum. Ruml 
spoke in detail about the structure and direction that the Memorial had helped create for 
social science.381 
The question was outdated whether social science was true science, Ruml believed. 
Genuine scientific status had been solidified by new quantitative methods, by raised 
empirical standards, and by opportunities to apply knowledge. Further adding to the 
 
380 On January 3, 1929, the Rockefeller Foundation’s Executive Committee adopted an eleven-point “Program 
and Policies in Social Science,” RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 1. 
381 RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 70, Folder 760. Formal opening of the Social Science Research Building took 
place on December 16 and 17, 1929. Persons speaking at the two-day event included Robert M. Hutchins, 
Wesley C. Mitchell, Howard Odum, John C. Merriam (President of the Carnegie Institution), Milton C. 
Winternitz, William Beveridge, Harold G. Moulton, Célestin Bouglé, Franz Boas, C. Judson Herrick, Edwin B. 
Wilson (President of the Social Science Research Council), and Beardsley Ruml. 
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attainment of scientific status was actually a more holistic and descriptive method in the 
works. This latter development stemmed partly from the need to use multiple social sciences 
to study any particular problem. Ruml explained this unity of scientific study was the only 
way to obtain complete understanding, i.e., that the only way to bring multiple scientific 
reports together as one competent explanatory package was with a holistic, descriptive 
method. This method was required, in part, because more attention needed to focus on “the 
importance of irrational factors” in society. The new mix of quantitative and descriptive 
social science, based on principles of rationality as well as irrationality, Ruml believed was 
going to complete the journey to objective social science that was now ready for its time of 
earnest application. “The value of descriptive analysis at the present stage of social inquiry 
seems to be much more generally accepted by those who have seen clearly and who have 
emphasized the value of quantitative methods when properly applied.” Evidence for this 
acceptance included recognition of “the tremendous importance of irrational factors in 
shaping the conduct of an individual.”382 
A potential drag on progress, however, was that too many social scientists still held 
onto provincial territory. It was time to end artificial divisions between social sciences. It was 
time for an end to “the anachronistic categories of history, economics, sociology, psychology 
and so forth.” Social scientists now recognized there were “no fundamental segregations in 
the world of experience.” The holistic nature of real-world social problems meant that all 
social problems were ultimately intertwined with all others. And so all the social sciences 
were necessary. Ruml was optimistic on the whole, believing that social scientists were, at 
 
382 Beardsley Ruml, “Recent Trends in the Social Sciences,” RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 70, Folder 760, pp. 1-
3, 5; copy also in RAC–RF, R.G.3, 910, Box 2, Folder 12. Reprinted as Beardsley Ruml, “Recent Trends in 
Social Science,” in Leonard D. White, ed., The New Social Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1930): 99-111. 
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long last, pushing past the “vested academic interests” that were so “very strong” in trying to 
privilege one social science in competition against others. Although increased pursuit of 
quantitative methods had stemmed partly from “a desire to acquire academic prestige,” the 
“passing of interest in status” was having “a wholesome effect” on research.383 
Ruml spoke as a person “who has had much to do with social scientists and very little 
indeed to do with social science.” Yet his experience allowed him to speak about relations 
between “the internal situation in social science” and “the external situation as it affects and 
is likely to be affected by the development of social science.” This distinction was close to 
the familiar one between discovery of knowledge and application of knowledge. Ruml 
believed social science can be completely separated from advocacy. Idealizing the motives of 
social scientists, he admired their “increasing emphasis on a point of view in social research 
that seeks to eliminate the motive of social reform and betterment, and that views social 
phenomena as complex behavior of a naturalistic world.” “The interest of the investigator,” 
Ruml added, “is centered simply on an understanding of social events, and he attempts to 
eliminate judgments of value and as far as possible the presence of any ethical bias. This 
tendency toward an emphasis on objectivity is no doubt on the whole one of the more 
hopeful signs in social research today.” The separation between scientific discovery and 
political activity was, it seemed to Ruml, finally achieved.384 
383 Beardsley Ruml, “Recent Trends in the Social Sciences,” 1-3, 5. 
384 Beardsley Ruml, “Recent Trends in the Social Sciences,” 1-3, 6-7. Ruml added: “It is a sound instinct which 
causes the social scientist to avoid the humanistic approach in the statement and study of problems requiring 
scientific analysis, and to deplore the presence of the humanistic bias when it creeps in to vitiate what purports 
to be objective analysis of social behavior.” (p.7) Note might be made of a paper presented by Selskar M. Gunn 
at Princeton University in 1930, also on the subject of the Foundation’s new policy in the social sciences; RAC–
RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 2.  
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Also speaking at the grand opening was Robert M. Hutchins, the Yale law school 
friend of Ruml, who was now Chancellor of the University of Chicago. Hutchins highly 
admired Ruml and his Memorial leadership. In his speech at the building’s dedication, 
Hutchins nearly credited the creation of modern social science to the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial, which “in its brief but brilliant career did more than any other agency 
to promote the social sciences in the United States.”385 
9.5 A shift in psychology projects by the early 1930s 
By the 1930s, support of various important research projects still progressed under 
Rockefeller Foundation support. One field of serious attention continued to be psychology, or 
as it was now more often called, “behavioral science.” The rapid rise of the “new” 
psychology is typified by the famous case of the Hawthorne Study, which has been noted. By 
1930, the latest discovery by researchers at the Hawthorne factory was that the creation of 
work clusters, often times with teams of six employees, produced conditions in which certain 
worker decisions were no longer being made by individuals, but by the work groups as a 
whole.386 
In November 1931, Harvard University’s G. Elton Mayo, who had moved to Harvard 
from the University of Pennsylvania, was invited by Western Electric to study how the new 
work groups reached group decisions about how productive to be. Mayo reevaluated 
essentially all that had been done in the Hawthorne Study since 1924. The outcome of 
 
385 Robert M. Hutchins, “Address in Dedication,” in Leonard D. White, ed., The New Social Science (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1930): 1. 
386 In addition to the few psychology projects cited through this short section, some psychiatry research was also 
supported by the Rockefeller Foundation; see Katherine Angel and Edgar Jones, European Psychiatry on the 
Eve of the War: Aubrey Lewis, the Maudsley Hospital and the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1930s (London: 
Wellcome Trust Center for the History of Medicine, 2003). 
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Mayo’s half-year reevaluation fit with his long-running approach by bridging psychology to 
economics. In one particular study Mayo looked at a group of fourteen male bank-wiring 
operators and found a phenomenon of peer pressure helped explain how group-level values 
actually determine each individual’s performance. Because ultimately a worker in any work 
group wants job security, all workers in a group reach a subtle understanding to “belong” to 
the group by having each one not work so productively as to show up the others in the group. 
Based on worker interviews, Mayo’s research team concluded that the prevailing factor was 
not individual compensation for individual output (which of course still played some role), 
but was a need for group “belongingness.” The situation of group behavior was shown to be 
dynamic and complex, possibly even beyond what any reasonable social science could hope 
to fully explain. Each person in a group was part of the whole, yet each part was not separate 
from every other part. The group was the combination of its parts, and above all, it was the 
relationship between the parts that really mattered. A new kind of social science argument – a 
complexity argument – was being born.387 
Another Memorial-supported research development in psychology that continued into 
the 1930s was at Yale University. As a result of what was accomplished in Yale’s 
psychology research between 1924 and 1929, Angell proposed the time was right to create a 
more formalized structure for Yale’s psychology research. In 1929, Yale took its 
Rockefeller-supported projects and grouped them into two institutes, an Institute of 
Psychology and an Institute of Human Relations. One noteworthy accomplishment by the 
Institute of Psychology during the 1930s was a line of research that by decade’s end came 
 
387 See Richard C. S. Trahair, The Humanist Temper: The Life and Work of Elton Mayo (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books, 1984). See also Richard P. Gillespie, Manufacturing Knowledge: A History of the 
Hawthorne Experiments (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Stephen R.G. Jones, “Was there a 
Hawthorne Effect?,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1992): 451-68. 
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together in Frustration and Aggression (1939). Written by a team of Yale social scientists, 
the book argued that social science was on the cusp of consolidating enough knowledge of 
human behavior to end all wars. The work, however, was still a deterministic kind of 
holdover at a time when a new view of social reality – and therefore of the abilities and 
limitations of social scientists – had already come to the fore. The book, to its credit, was 
interdisciplinary, which was a strength. Another strong-point to the book was that the 
argument did at least purport to be environmentalist – which was another important shift in 
social science between the early 1920s and late 1930s. However the environmentalism in the 
book was so overshadowed by the simplified, complexity-ignoring argument that the book 
likely did more damage than good for the environmentalist argument. The goal of Yale’s 
social researchers in the book was “to place within a common discourse such diverse 
phenomena as strikes and suicides, race prejudice and reformism, sibling jealousy and 
lynching, satirical humor and criminality, street fights and the reading of detective stories, 
wife-beating and war.” At the center of such an eclectic and awkward grouping was to be one 
core principle: that “Aggression is always a consequence of frustration.” Entirely missing 
was any other kind of reason for aggression between people, groups, and nations.388 
388 Angell proposed the change in James R. Angell, “A Program for an Institute of Human Relations at Yale 
University,” May 20, 1928, RAC–LSRM, Series 3, Box 79, Folder 826. The study by Yale University is John 
Dollard et al., Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939): 26-7. On the subject of 
research by Yale’s Institute of Human Relations during the 1930s, see Jill G. Morawski, “Organizing 
Knowledge and Behavior at Yale’s Institute of Human Relations,” Isis 77, 287 (1986): 219-42; James Capshew, 
“The Yale Connection in American Psychology: Philanthropy, War, and the Emergence of an Academic Elite,” 
in Theresa Richardson and Donald Fisher, eds., The Development of the Social Sciences in the United States 
and Canada: The Role of Philanthropy (Stamford, Conn.: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1999): 143-54; see also 
Gregg Mitman and Richard W. Burkhardt, Jr., “Struggling for Identity: The Study of Animal Behavior in 
America, 1930-1945,” in Keith R. Benson, Jane Maienschein and Ronald Rainger, eds., Expansion of American 
Biology (New Brunswick & London: Rutgers University Press, 1991): 164-94. For a history of the aggression 
theory of war, see Paul Crook, Darwinism, War, and History: The Debate over the Biology of War from the 
Origin of Species to the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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At the University of Pennsylvania, social researchers of the early 1930s saw the Great 
Depression as a natural experiment to be studied. Penn already had an interest in studying 
impacts of factory conditions and industrial environments on individual well-being. The 
suddenly extreme impact of catastrophic levels of unemployment was a pressing research 
concern. A provocative programmatic piece, assisted by financial support of the Rockefeller 
Foundation (as well as by the SSRC), asked: “Is Industrial Psychology Making the Most of 
the Depression?” Penn’s Rex B. Hersey articulated a central idea to identify “those research 
opportunities which the present depression offers.” “What unique opportunities does this 
depression present for gaining new light on the feelings, attitudes and efficiency of workers 
as affected by their experiences?” Hersey believed he found that the widespread principle of 
psychological “irrationality” might be better studied by understanding the relationship 
between “economic cycles” in the industrial economy and “emotional cycles” in man. This 
idea, again, typified the beginnings of a shift: a shift to a world of complexity.389 
Also in the field of psychology by the 1930s, two decade’s worth of fine research at 
the Iowa Station resulted in an informed opinion that adherents to the Stanford-Binet “IQ” 
test (most notably Lewis M. Terman of Stanford University and Florence L. Goodenough of 
the University of Minnesota) were mistaken to believe a child’s intelligence could not be 
markedly affected by environmental stimulation; the nature-nurture relationship was much 
more complex than that. At the end of the decade of the 1930s, Iowa Station researchers 
would publish the important article, “Intelligence: Its Nature and Nurture,” elevating the 
argument that nature and nurture are interdependent variables, and that the development of a 
 
389 Rex B. Hersey, “Is Industrial Psychology Making the Most of the Depression?,” The Personnel Journal 10, 3 
(October 1931): 157-166, esp. 157. Also Rex B. Hersey, “Emotional Cycles in Man,” Journal of Mental Science 
27 (January 1931):151-69; Hersey, “The Subjective Side of Factors in Industry,” Journal of Industrial Hygiene,
13, 6 (June 1931): 185-203. RAC–LSRM, Series III, Box 75, Folders 794-795. 
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person’s intelligence can be strongly influenced by positive nurturing experiences. This 
argument, although not immediately and warmly accepted by every psychologist, led to calls 
by Iowa Station Director George D. Stoddard to develop a national system of nursery 
schools. Stoddard’s calls began by 1930 and gained momentum on the confidence that a 
child’s intelligence was a product mostly of nurture.390 
9.6 Ideas about the overall structure of social science by the early 1930s 
During the first couple years of the Foundation’s Division of Social Sciences, various 
efforts were made by Foundation officers to understand the overall structure of supported 
social science. One continuing conceptual division remained the guiding distinction between 
studies in child welfare and studies in broader social science. Another long-standing division, 
also reaffirmed by the Foundation, was between support of social science through academic 
institutions, support through fellowship programs, and support through independent “central 
bodies” such as the NRC, the SSRC, the NBER, and the Brookings Institution. Something 
new was added after the January 1929 transition, which was a method of financial support 
known as the “fluid-funds” approach. This approach was a new twist on the older idea of 
block-grants to research centers, only that fluid-funds grants were for shorter periods of time, 
and had their renewal decisions more critically attended to by the Foundation. The fluid-
funds program was a way to continue awarding general funds, both to established centers as 
 
390 Two balanced treatments of intelligence research at the University of Iowa between 1917 and 1940 are 
Henry L. Minton, “The Iowa Child Welfare Research Station and the 1940 Debate on Intelligence: Carrying on 
the Legacy of a Concern Mother,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 20 (April 1984): 160-76; 
Hamilton Cravens, Before Head Start: The Iowa Station and America’s Children (Chapel Hill and London: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1993): esp. 135-9 for the beginnings of a national nursery school system 
during 1933 and 1934. The article “Intelligence: Its Nature and Nurture” is published in Guy Montrose 
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well as to schools that were not centers. Numerous schools thereby had some opportunity to 
do with their grant money somewhat as they pleased. As it turned out, the fluid-funds 
approach also provided an incentive that recipient centers recognized they would eventually 
need to satisfy persons at the Foundation with the quality of their research 
accomplishments.391 
Foundation trustees held a series of Staff Conferences through 1929 and 1930. In 
connection with these meetings, the trustees added a regular self-evaluation process through 
yearly reviews. At a January 1930 Staff Conference, for example, Director Day pointed out 
that Foundation-supported programs at universities were now being developed on the basis of 
three basic means: (1) continuing work “to establish high grade social science research at a 
number of centers scattered geographically”; (2) development of particular projects in 
“relation more to general schema [i.e., fields] in which effort in the S[social] S[cience] 
program is founded”; (3) the “fluid research funds” approach. The four U.S. centers were 
identified as Harvard, Chicago, Columbia and Brookings, while the LSE remained the 
premier research center in Europe. After these five major centers came UNC and Virginia, 
really “constitut[ing] one center” in the South. Also there were secondary centers such as 
Yale, Stanford, Vanderbilt, Tulane, and Texas. Day expressed encouragement of future 
officer reports on potential research fitting with the three basic means of supporting social 
 
391 A move made early in the period of transition was to focus on institutional centers with “fluid research 
funds.” Eleven schools were under the category of schools already assisted, with seven others listed as “possible 
additions” under a regional plan for granting fluid research funds. Twenty more schools were listed as also 
“entitled to consideration”; see “fluid funds” files, RAC–RF. 
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science. Day especially wanted to think more about subject areas fitting with the fields, or 
“general schema,” approach.392 
Ruml, who was no longer active in Rockefeller philanthropy by this time, was willing 
to contribute some ideas as well. In October 1930, speaking to Foundation trustees and 
officers, Ruml addressed the subject of involvement in controversial research. The research 
centers and fluid-funds approaches worked well by allowing controversies to get hashed out 
by persons at academic institutions. Work done through the SSRC also succeeded at avoiding 
controversies, at least once the Memorial had figured out how best to interact with the 
SSRC’s work. Ruml even recalled that his list of guiding principles was originally created 
partly in response to early discussion about how to support the SSRC, as “there was a 
tendency at one time on the part of Memorial trustees to select from the projects which they 
[the SSRC] submitted a group which interested us mostly.” This latter point of Ruml’s 
recollection is important, revealing as it does that at certain points in its relatively short life 
the Memorial actually considered whether to try pursuing specific directions of social science 
research that it preferred. Clearly the Memorial had been conscious of this possibility, and 
had tried to protect against it. Ruml re-emphasized his hope that social scientists would 
increase their contact with real-world problems, saying that social science is useless when not 
in “intimate contact…with concrete social phenomena.”393 
392 Edmund E. Day made his presentation about major centers and regional centers in “Staff Conference,” 
January 14, 1930. Other staff conferences during 1930 were held on October 3rd and October 8th, RAC–RF, 
R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 2. 
393 Beardsley Ruml, Report–Princeton Conference of Trustees and Officers, October 29, 1930, RAC-RF, R63, 
Series 900, Box 22, Folder 167, pp. 156-7. Ruml expressed additional words to the SSRC in September 1930, 
explaining he believed “the introductory courses in the various departments of social science are highly 
intellectualized, bookish and abstract.” Ruml again recommended that more first-hand experience be included 
as part of any graduate-education program in the social sciences; Ruml, “Each According to the Nature of His 
Own Experience,” September 30, 1930, Beardsley Ruml Papers, Special Collections Department, University of 
Chicago Libraries, Series II, Box 1, Folder 11. Another relevant document is a final Memorial report written by 
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9.7 The boundary question again–1931-34 
In the beginning of the ‘age of complexity’ a matter again coming to the fore was the 
boundary question. In December 1931, in connection with the European program, Selskar M. 
Gunn asked, for example, whether to support research in public administration and 
community organization; such research would be more reform-oriented than anything 
previously tried in Europe. A clearer example of interest in the boundaries of social science 
came up with respect to the question whether urgent projects should include language 
research. According to Gunn’s line of reasoning, such research even had some potential to 
assist peaceful international relations in Europe.394 
Another idea with respect to the question of the structure and boundaries of social 
science was to evaluate uses freely made of fluid-funds awards. The specific idea was to 
identify categories of social science based on self-initiated projects as they were pursued by 
fluid-fund grant recipients. Columbia University, for example, came up with sixty projects 
towards which they applied fluid funds. In 1933, Sydnor Walker (who Day had retained from 
 
Ruml, and submitted in 1931; Ruml, Final Report, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1918-29, RAC-
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394 Discussion about the European program in terms of how much effort to put into the fields of community 
organization and planning and public administration is in Selskar M. Gunn to Edmund E. Day, December 31, 
1931, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 2. The example of the language-research boundary question 
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RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 2. 
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Ruml’s staff) and Raymond Fosdick also discussed an idea to study all uses of fluid funds. 
Yet another new evaluative approach came up in 1933 in the form of in-house analysis, as 
Day offered an opinion that the Foundation’s efforts could be usefully analyzed by exploring 
the division of grants between the “General” and “Specific” programs, which it seemed were 
being allocated approximately equally.395 
In 1934, in a memorandum considering “grants-in-aid” over a five-year period, an 
added idea was to identify every kind of research covered by such grants, of which there 
were ninety-two projects, classifiable into four broad categories. In early 1934 Sydnor 
Walker and John Van Sickle asked about the possibility of studying all supported psychology 
projects to see what distinguishable subfields may have emerged over time in these grant 
applications, and during the next couple years Day would also recommend perhaps trying to 
learn more along similar lines by evaluating all fellowship applications. An especially clear 
proposal to study fellowship applications was to analyze how the applicants described their 
own projects.396 
395 R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 3. Florn M. Rhind, writing to Edmund E. Day, had an idea to make “a study 
of the use of fluid S[social] S[cience] research funds in the various universities.” Rhind cited Columbia 
University where sixty projects were undertaken between 1928 and 1932. Rhind’s main point was to suggest 
much might be learned by studying all grant recipients to see what fields were emphasized at different schools; 
Rhind to Day, March 13, 1933. Day the same wrote a memorandum recommending that over the next three to 
five years the amount of two million dollars ought to be awarded roughly equally between the “General” 
program (including institutional centers, fellowships, and small projects & grants-in-aid) and the “Specific” 
program (including research on economic stabilization, international relations, and community organization & 
planning). Day saw this division as consistent with the way the social science program “falls into two main 
parts: (1) a general program designed to promote certain interests over the entire range of the social sciences; 
and (2) a program of specific concentration in fields of special interest,” “Proposed Social Science Program of 
the Rockefeller Foundation,” March 13, 1933, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 3, pp. 1-2. 
396 More discussion about classifying the uses of fluid funds is in Sydnor H. Walker to R.B. Fosdick, November 
16, 1934. In a December 1934 memorandum, four main categories of grants-in-aid to social science were: 
development of potential social science centers; development of work in economic planning and control; 
development of work in international problems; aid to former fellows. This four-category division evidently had 
held since 1931; see “Analysis of Foundation Grants-In-Aid in the Social Sciences,” December 10, 1934, RAC–
RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 3. Sydnor H. Walker, Associate Director of the Division of the Social 
Sciences, shared with John Van Sickle the idea that attention to psychology ought to be drawn along “several 
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Perhaps the idea somewhat widespread during the 1920s to unify social science 
would not pan out after all. The trustees admitted in December 1934 that the social sciences 
division covered “a most difficult field” in which to identify which fields and subfields are 
which. The field titled “social science” was made so difficult partly because of “a generic 
title which includes many areas of thought and discipline.” A question to be asked was, What 
kinds of projects did people around the world put under such a broad title? By enacting an 
idea to peruse fellowships awarded by the Division of Social Sciences in the year 1933, the 
trustees came up with 26 fields of social science that were covered that year. The field of 
economics (with 43 awards) and the field of sociology (with 24) received well over forty 
percent of the total 163 awards. Yet there was also quite a range of classifications, as only 
half the number of total fields (13 out of 26) received more than two grant awards.397 
The extensive discussion during the early 1930s on the subject of classifying 
subfields of social science is evidence of ongoing change and uncertainty about what lines 
might exist between social science and non-social science. 
 
9.8 The Great Depression and the idea of economic experiments 
In addition to the psychologists mentioned already in this chapter, there were other 
social scientists beginning to understand that evidence rapidly gathered by social scientists 
through the 1920s revealed few if any single-factor causes existed for behavioral or social 
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397 “The Social Sciences,” December 11, 1934, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 2, Folder 13.  
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phenomena. By the 1930s, psychologists at Penn were not the only social scientists seeing 
the Great Depression as a situation worth studying. Depression-era social problems needed 
answers more than ever, as the condition of the 1930s represented such an extreme national 
laboratory that reform experiments really seemed called for. One group of social scientists 
taking a lead in this mission were economists, such as Wesley Mitchell, who began to 
understand that the world of factors to be studied and explained is a complex, interactive, and 
interdependent world.398 
Effects of the Great Depression took hold at the Rockefeller Foundation by 1931. 
Realization set in that funds were limited, and that summer, Director Edmund E. Day 
presented a series of memoranda. Day, a Harvard-trained statistician and economist, came to 
the Foundation at Ruml’s invitation in the mid-1920s. Just prior to that Day was dean of the 
school of business at the University of Michigan. In one memorandum in 1931, Day dealt 
with his personal view of the relationship between social science and social technology. 
Day’s discussion of social technology was, in effect, a policy statement. His words reveal the 
Foundation’s continuing awareness of duties to aid economic and social reform. The 
increased urgency of economic and social reform was evidence that it was again time to 
evaluate the relationship between social science and social technology. What seemed needed, 
to Day, was more focus on points of contact between the two, such that social technology 
could be used to help social science establish validity of scientific discoveries. Schools of 
social technology could be used to “bridge the gap between research and practice,” thereby 
seeing to it that results of research are given “practical effectiveness.” “The social scientist is 
 
398 Wesley C. Mitchell, Business Cycles: The Problem and Its Setting (New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1927); Mitchell, “Research in the Social Sciences,” in Leonard D. White, ed., The New 
Social Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930): 4-15. 
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almost helpless in testing his hypotheses and conclusions unless he secures the collaboration 
of those in direct contact with social situations.” It was time, Day believed, to get in such 
direct contact. It was time to take an experimental approach to testing scientific ideas. It was 
time to start doing real reform. “If the Foundation is interested in the practical consequences 
of research in the social field, it cannot safely ignore the fundamental forces brought to bear 
through the major lines of social technology.”399 
A second of Day’s memoranda in 1931 concerned the value of studying the success 
of Soviet Russia’s planned economy. In his report on Russia’s planned economy, Day stated 
“that unless the problem [of economic recession] can be solved or at least measurably 
reduced, the present social order [in the United States] is in serious jeopardy...This prognosis 
is given added force by recent developments in Russia.” Russian activities seemed to be 
showing that a radically different kind of economic order could eliminate cycles of booms 
and recessions. Day emphasized the value in seeing the Soviet economy as an experiment 
meriting careful study. “The Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Government is manifestly an 
experiment of uncertain outcome. It may end in complete collapse. On the other hand, it 
threatens to succeed at least to the extent of establishing an economic order in which, 
 
399 The “general thesis” of Day’s statement is that “Schools of social technology in bridging the gap between 
research and practice and in training future leaders in the major branches of social administration play a most 
important role in the fruitful advance of knowledge in the social fields.”(p.2) Day argued for “limited” 
continued support of social technology on the premise: “The social scientist is almost helpless in testing his 
hypothesis and conclusions unless he secures the collaboration of those in direct contact with social situations.” 
Day added at-length: “Since in the last analysis, the Foundation is interested in the advancement of knowledge, 
not as an end in itself, but as a means to the ‘well-being of mankind throughout the world,’ attention has to be 
paid to the processes by which the results of research are given practical effectiveness. This proposition, so far 
as the social studies are concerned, leads at once in the direction of social technology – or social engineering – 
with its well-recognized divisions of business, law, public administration and social work. It is largely through 
the operations of these branches of social technology that changes in our social institutions and social practices 
take place. If the Foundation is interested in the practical consequences of research in the social field, it cannot 
safely ignore the fundamental forces brought to bear through the major lines of social technology.” Edmund E. 
Day. “Continuation of Limited Program in Support of Schools of Social Technology,” July 1931, RAC–RF, 
R.G.3, Series 910, Box 2, Folder 12. 
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however low the standards of living achieved, instability will be largely eliminated. The 
Russian system is in principle in unparalleled degree a planned system.”400 
As to the factor of Depression-era spending limits at the Foundation, by August 1931 
the Foundation trustees knew they were dealing with significantly curtailed available 
resources. They responded with new measures of success. One idea was to begin evaluating 
return on the dollar, that is, to learn more about the status of different fields of social science 
by applying a kind of cost-benefit analysis. Citing the “statement of governing principles” 
prepared for the Foundation by the Memorial in 1928, the Foundation trustees said: “The 
time now seems ripe for a restatement of specific objectives so that the activities of the 
Foundation in this field may be planned more pointedly and the results gauged more 
accurately. In this connection estimates of the financial implications of the program should 
be carefully weighed.” With supported programs being evaluated partly in terms of return on 
the dollar, results of reform programs could be evaluated by objective standards.401 
Reform results were especially wanted from the Division of Social Sciences’ program 
in “economic stabilization.” The overall economic situation of western nations, especially the 
United States, was severely “destabilized” by 1931. In a September report, Day opined that 
instability of the U.S. economy threatened the entire social order, and that the urgent need 
was to respond to the economic crisis. “The present crisis has developed to a point such that 
little of immediate importance can be done except by political, financial and industrial bodies 
that can act directly.” Because of the economic crisis, direct reform action seemed required, 
 
400 Edmund E. Day, “Memorandum,” September 21, 1931, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 2, pp. 1-
3. For further information on the idea of control and its limits, see A.L. Kroeber, et al., How Far Are Social 
Forces Controllable? (San Francisco: Social Science Research Council, 1933).  
401 “Proposed Social Science Program of the Rockefeller Foundation,” August 10, 1931, RAC–RF, R.G.3, 
Series 910, Box 2, Folder 12. 
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and Day started narrowing down a preferred research direction: “It seems likely that the 
major problems affecting the well-being of mankind will be, for some little time to come, 
economic, social and political problems. We do not foresee shortages of basic materials such 
as copper, oil or iron; nor limitations on sources of power or of food; nor catastrophic climate 
or geological changes; nor pestilence.” Thus, there were certain facets of economic research 
that Day ruled out for any need to attend to, and these were matters concerning technological 
capacities. “If it is plausible,” he added, “that the major problems of this and the next 
generation are and will be economic, social and political in character, it follows that attention 
should be directed toward those activities which may provide the means of their solution.” It 
might even be necessary to consider areas “in which work not conforming to conventional 
conceptions of research might be undertaken.” Some specific areas of research could even be 
advocated, including basic statistical series (“a major necessity for the advancement of all 
scientific efforts in the social field”) and “A comprehensive project for the study of American 
national political policy should be supported.” Day also pointed out that there were now five 
special areas in which the severity of problems justified “an intensive program of study, 
experiment, demonstration and operation”: economic stabilization; public administration; 
international relations; education; and urban life. The Foundation’s Division of the Social 
Sciences had its stated opinion, then, that the most urgent problems now revolved largely 
around economic matters.402 
Also in the September 1931 report, Day stated for the Foundation’s board of trustees 
why a program of study was needed for business cycles: “The costs imposed by serious 
 
402 Edmund E. Day, “Proposed Foundation Program in Economic Stabilization,” September 14, 1931, RAC–RF, 
R.G.3, Series 910, Box 2, Folder 12. 
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business depression – of demoralization, broken health, disorganized families, neglected 
children, lowered living standards, permanent insecurity, impaired morale, as well as 
financial distress – are so appalling when viewed socially as well as individually that no 
problem of this generation calls more clearly for solution than this of economic 
stabilization.” Day added that the ability of “the present social order” to measurably reduce 
acute economic and social ills was highly in question – that the need “for more constructive 
experiment is all too obvious.” In fact it was past time for the Foundation to get involved in 
“the wise development of that social planning and control which seems ultimately so 
necessary and inevitable if contemporary civilization is to survive.”403 
The next chapter picks up the story of an increased focus on economic research where 
this chapter leaves off. Day remains the guiding figure, while the new factor on the scene is 
increased uncertainty about financial and political conditions.  
 
403 Day, “Proposed Foundation Program in Economic Stabilization.” 
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CHAPTER 10. ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND THE END OF 
THE “GENERAL” PROGRAM–1932-38 
 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter studies how the Rockefeller Foundation increasingly turned to 
emphasizing economic research during the 1930s. Many developments in social science 
through the 1920s and into the early 1930s reached a point that social scientists recognized 
limitations existed when it came to explaining causes and consequences of human behavior 
in a complex world. The “unity of science” movement came to an end with the discovered 
fact that social situations are made from many complex and interacting variables. In this 
chapter we find economists facing the extreme complexity of the Great Depression and its 
causes and consequences. 
 
10.2 Outside opinion about the value of an economics focus–1932 
In late 1932, roughly a year following Director Edmund Day’s programmatic 
memorandum for a research field in economic security, the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
Division of Social Sciences began seeking outside input concerning possible goals for an 
economics program. Day contacted Rexford G. Tugwell, an economic advisor to Franklin 
Roosevelt during the 1932 presidential campaign, and asked Tugwell for thoughts about 
where the Foundation’s social science program should go. Tugwell responded with an idea 
that the nation’s economy desperately needed experimental reconstruction. Tugwell 
questioned whether there could ever be clean separation between social science and social 
technology. Economists weren’t going to find clear, distinct and predictable economic truths 
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about all economic conditions, and they needed to begin active debate of alternative reform 
applications of scientific knowledge. For decades economists had believed “that laissez-faire 
and rugged individualism assured the maximum production of goods, and that the unguided 
prolific productivity of the machine for purposes of business success would disperse comfort 
and leisure throughout society.” But it now seemed clear, “the machine has broke down.” 
Prolonged depression conditions showed Tugwell “that we have almost no social mechanism 
to cope with the situation.” A specific barrier to change, Tugwell reasoned, is that “we have 
not become habituated to processes of thought which might enable us to commence an 
experimental reconstruction of our present milieu.” The social sciences must become 
“implements of progress.”404 
Tugwell suggested that major weaknesses of modern economic research could be 
seen when “illustrated by surveying three major aspects of economics today: (1) the rigid and 
unrevised theoretical basis of economics, (2) the non-ethical character of economic science, 
(3) the unguided and prolific character of economic research.” He addressed what he meant 
by “non-ethical character,” saying a question to be asked in any economic research, as in all 
social research, was this: “[W]hether they should be purely factual and descriptive [sciences] 
or whether they should deal with values in the form of social desiderata”? “[S]hould the 
general direction of research follow social needs, these needs being constantly redefined in 
the light of new findings, or should research be ‘pure research’?” Tugwell presented his 
criticism of any supposed separation between detached science and reform applications, 
saying that “The limiting of the social sciences to examination and description is justified [by 
 
404 Rexford G. Tugwell, “Proposal,” October 1932, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 2, pp. 1-2; also 
Sydnor H. Walker to R.G. Tugwell, October 25, 1932, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 2.   
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some] on the ground that it is ‘scientific.’ Only quantitative measures are employed, and an 
attempt is made to banish all ethical concepts and all ideas arrived at philosophically. Of 
course, it is impossible to do this.” The truth is that any economist imposes values simply by 
the act of selecting which problems to study; “the pursuit of facts is accompanied always by a 
moral purpose.” “In research, definite areas must be designated for exploration. By making 
more articulate the basis for the selection, the trend of economics would become clearer and 
the opportunities for an economics of social welfare would increase.”405 
Tugwell explored what economic science should become. The social sciences as a 
whole “deal largely with [institutional] organisms that exist only because men established 
them.” In dealing with entities willfully built, any social scientist studying such entities deals 
with “questions of ought.” Should a particular institutional form have been established? 
Should it be adjusted or dismantled? Tugwell suggested what was needed was “new 
theoretical formulations.” What was needed was research “directed along socially needed 
lines.” Economics, in particular, must become “a science of social welfare rather than of 
wealth.” The time was right, Tugwell declared, to create a new kind of economics institute. 
“Facilities must be created for the synthesis, interpretation, evaluation, animation [i.e., 
application] and use of particularistic studies in the light of general welfare theory.” Tugwell 
understood why the great foundations did things cautiously in the past when it came to 
creating new economic research institutes; “insofar as they aid research, [foundations] must 
guard against two dangers: first being charged with favoritism, and secondly, being accused 
of using their influence to advance pet projects. In steering clear of these evils, the 
 
405 Tugwell, “Proposal,” 3. The “trend of economics” was something Tugwell worked to understand at the time; 
see Rexford Guy Tugwell, ed., The Trend of Economics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924). 
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foundations have developed a policy of wise eclecticism in selecting research organizations 
deserving of aid. Beyond this, the foundations are not policy forming institutions.” But it was 
time for this to change.406 
Tugwell proposed an “Institute for the Study of Social Administration.” The institute 
“would be a research and cooperative group rather than a teaching institution or an organ for 
directing outside research projects.” The institute would be “a compact well-coordinated 
body” with as many as fourteen research divisions corresponding to an explosion in fields of 
modern economics as they had been distinguished in recent years. Each division “ought to 
draw to it an average of five or more of the world’s greatest scholars.” The institute would be 
quite large and would be overseen by perhaps three committees, held “separate from the 
departments but coordinate with them.” One committee would be a central statistical body; 
one would be responsible for “develop[ing] tentative five-year plans”; one overseeing 
committee would need to work to promote “democratic procedure everywhere in society.”407 
Director Day appreciated Tugwell’s proposal, even recommending in-house 
discussion of the “useful material” in his outline of an organizational structure for a new 
institute for scientific study of social administration.408 
Day’s invitation for ideas also brought a response from Florn M. Rhind, one of Day’s 
outside advisors, who joined others in believing it was time for the Foundation to start 
identifying specific projects to pursue. The unique financial position of the Foundation 
during the depression meant the Foundation had unique responsibilities with its discretionary 
funds. Specifically the Foundation had a duty to support applied experiments. However the 
 
406 Tugwell, “Proposal,” 6-7, 12-13, 15-16. 
407 Tugwell, “Proposal,” 33-35. 
408 Edmund E. Day, notes on board S.S. Manhattan, December 31, 1932, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, 
Folder 2. 
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Foundation’s social sciences program was still overly broad, according to Rhind, and even 
though such breadth may have been fine as a starting point, “there is much to be said for a 
gradual concentration of effort, for the selection of certain outstanding social problems upon 
which we can bend every effort.” Rhind, like others at the Foundation, was interested in 
measuring progress. “How,” he asked, “can we measure where we are going if we dabble 
here with a phase of one problem and there with a phase of another?” The Foundation’s work 
in social science could benefit from “a careful reformulation of the more important 
contemporary social problems and a further examination of the means in our hands for 
contributing toward the solution of some of them.” The Foundation needed to get away from 
working with the whole meshing of the social sciences and begin channeling all efforts to a 
few specific problems. The Foundation needed to identify specific problems in specific 
enough ways that possible solutions could be focused on.409 
Rhind believed social science works best when using social technology as a means to 
test scientific propositions. To establish any scientific truths, “the tests of practical 
applications in the field are ordinarily indispensable.” However this could be precarious stuff. 
“Embarking upon an aggressive campaign is delicate and dangerous work, but the 
Foundation is in position to take a bird’s-eye view of the situation and can better determine 
the steps in a long-range program than a man or group whose vision is of necessity limited to 
certain fields in which he must work.”410 
409 Florn M. Rhind to Edmund E. Day, October 31, 1932, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 2. 
410 Rhind concluded “it would seem that we are devoting too large a share of our funds to the accumulation of 
data, and paying too little attention to efforts which seek a realization in society of current advances in social 
science.” He also affirmed that “The hypotheses of social science can only rarely, if ever be proved or disproved 
by laboratory methods; the tests of practical applications in the field are ordinarily indispensable. Consequently, 
the possibilities of social experimentation are to be kept constantly in mind; and opportunities for practical 
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A third response to Day’s request came from the Brookings Institution. Brookings 
social scientists argued the time was right to create an “Institute of Social Engineering.” 
Similar to the letters from Tugwell and Rhind, the Brookings report focused on the need to 
toss the false dichotomy between pure and applied social science. Discovery of knowledge 
and application of knowledge must interconnect. “While many social agencies have been 
concerned with particular phases of the [nation’s economic] problem and special studies have 
here and there been made, there has been no comprehensive attack upon the problem as a 
whole.” The Brookings Institution added that “the inadequate and unstable program of relief 
efforts call attention anew to one of the greatest problems with which modern society is 
confronted,” making “the present time particularly appropriate for improving the 
administration of private and public relief agencies of the sources of poverty and distress.” 
The Brookings Institution strongly proposed a new research institute that should attempt “to 
conduct a series of studies into the sources of poverty designed to lay the foundation for 
constructive relief policies.” The new institute would, “as far as possible, work with and 
through existing agencies concerned with the broad field of social relief.”411 
Between 1933 and 1937 much indeed would be done by the Foundation to promote 
economic research, including creation of a system of new research institutes. Through a mix 
of ideas received from outsiders as well as officer’s reports, the Foundation began its work to 
get urgently needed economic research underway. 
 
demonstrations are to be utilized whenever they promise to throw light upon the validity of tentative social 
findings”; Florn M. Rhind to E.E. Day, October 31, 1932, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 2. 
411 “A Proposal for an Institute of Social Engineering in the Brookings Institution,” November 1932, RAC–RF, 
R.G.3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 44. Some examples of Brookings Institution publications at the time were 
Harold G. Moulton, ed., America’s Capacity to Consume (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1934); 
Edwin G. Nourse, ed., America’s Capacity to Produce (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1934); Harold 
G. Moulton, ed., Income and Economic Progress (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1935). 
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10.3 The need for economic research–1933-35 
In April 1933, after taking into account many recommendations, the Foundation 
trustees began their move to increase support of economic research. An active stance for the 
Foundation was newly recognized as needed in order to fully address “the existing 
emergency” of the national economic recession with “realistic” research. But what exactly 
would it mean to take a more active stance? In a period of reflection of Memorial activities 
during the 1920s, Foundation trustees recalled what Ruml’s program was all about: 
“Scientific research in the social field was recognized as a major interest not as an end in 
itself but because of its possible usefulness for the advancement of human welfare. The 
social sciences were felt to be important for the shaping of measures of effective control to 
reduce such social ills as poverty, class and race conflict, and international warfare.” Though 
it was now a few years since Ruml’s period of directorship ended, it was now time to get 
busy identifying specific projects. The all-important rule was to be maintained, of course, 
that the Foundation should not directly do research.412 
A variety of ideas were introduced and weighed during 1933. Lawrence Frank, in 
April, emphasized doing broad research on economic planning. He even cited as an example 
the increased role of chain stores as a new institutional form capable of helping achieve 
economic stability and social control. Chain stores were agents perhaps “mak[ing] the 
greatest single contribution toward a solution,” Frank even believed. Also in 1933, President 
Roosevelt appointed a few Foundation trustees to leadership positions in his federal 
emergency relief program – a matter which historian Donald Fisher interprets as a specific 
 
412 “Special trustees meeting,” April 1933, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 2, Folder 12, p. 38. 
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case in which the Foundation attained some direct influence on matters of economic policy. 
A particular idea encouraged by the Social Sciences Research Council in 1933 again 
somewhat resembled proposals by Tugwell, Rhind and the Brookings Institution the previous 
year. The SSRC’s idea was for a new commission to study public policy.413 
Foundation trustees considered the SSRC’s proposal in particular, taking note of the 
SSRC opinion that “Prevailing economic and social conditions suggest the high desirability 
of [a] Foundation program directed specifically towards the existing emergency in so far as 
appropriate opportunities can be found.” The trustees also noted the specific possibility under 
exploration: “The plans under consideration by the [Social Science Research] Council 
contemplate the creation of ‘Commissions of Inquiry’ to deal specifically with broad issues 
of public policy…Each Commission would consist of three to five social scientists of 
outstanding reputation, a publicist or man of affairs perhaps being sometimes included.” The 
SSRC also stated a task for the commission, which would be “to canvass influential opinion 
on the issue under investigation, to assemble available dependable information on the issue, 
to sharpen and redefine the issue as far as possible, to expose its more significant 
implications, and finally to publish a report bringing all these matters effectively to the 
attention of governmental authorities and the public.” In response to the SSRC’s idea for a 
“Commission of Inquiry,” the Foundation requested an outside report from Edgar S. Furniss, 
an economics professor at Yale University. The report was to help identify research problems 
 
413 Lawrence Frank addressed a Foundation proposal for “studies of economic planning.” He recommended 
including a study of retail distribution, the idea being that the chain store industry perhaps had “made the 
greatest single contribution toward a solution” of the problem of planning to meet consumer needs; L.K. Frank 
to Edmund E. Day, April 16, 1933, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 3. See also RAC–RF, 1933, 
RG.1.1, Box 393, Folder 4657; RAC–RF, RG.3, Series 904, Box 4, Folder 25, 13 November 1933. See also 
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on which the Foundation-supported SSRC could do well to get more active. The 
Foundation’s interest to work more through the SSRC indeed produced the “Furniss Report,” 
aiming to identify problems for which the SSRC was best suited to help, particular if a 
“Commissions of Inquiry” were to be established.414 
10.4 Planning to end the “general” program–1935-38 
In December 1934, a major announcement was made at the Rockefeller Foundation: 
it was time to try an altered strategy at the Division of Social Sciences. Foundation trustees 
asked division officers to get busy submitting “concrete” program proposals. Emphasis was 
on the need for applied, real-world projects, and the Foundation trustees indicated they were 
tired of waiting. The trustees were even willing to act directly to identify what these applied 
projects should be. “In the Social Sciences, we recommend a frank shift of emphasis to 
concrete fields of application,” the Foundation trustees declared. Division officers indicated 
to the Foundation trustees their readiness to respond by “develop[ing] carefully matured 
programs” as “officers’ proposals.”415 
The idea to have social science division officers submit proposals focusing on 
applications was determined to be the beginning of a bigger transition at the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s Division of Social Sciences. At the same meeting, Foundation trustees and 
division officers settled on a plan that the six-year-old Division of Social Sciences ought to 
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be terminated as a supporter of any kind of “general” research program. The social sciences 
had been put into better contact with other Foundation concerns since January 1929, and 
clear benefits had come from this. But now it was time to redefine, once again, the role of the 
social sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation. Probably it would be best to begin finding 
ways to end the general program by 1940.416 
Of all the facets of the Foundation’s program in the social sciences, one of the most 
up-in-the-air in the immediate term was the program in Europe. The new director of the 
European program, Tracy B. Kittredge, was understandably concerned about the December 
1934 resolution. Director Day wrote Kittredge to admit the December resolution could make 
it “appear that there is no S[ocial] S[ciences] program” for the future. Day got directly to the 
point: “The Appraisal Committee recommended that the general SS program which we have 
been conducting be discontinued. In discussion it was stated that the termination of this part 
of the program should be effected ‘as soon as practicable.’” Day wanted Kittredge to 
recognize, however, that “The Appraisal Committee also recommended that the officers be 
instructed to bring to the Board as soon as feasible recommendations with regard to [a] new 
program in the S[social] S[ciences] in fields of special interest.” Day recognized that 
personnel in the Division of Social Sciences might feel in limbo, as “even the old programs 
of concentration are essentially in abeyance” until a specific future plan is formally approved. 
Day, who was a strong supporter of the European program, wanted Kittredge to begin getting 
ready for the transition. “Will you not canvass the present status of items in this program on 
the European side to which we are giving current support and send…such recommendations 
as you may have.” Day hoped Kittredge could focus on economic research, and he explained 
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that Kittredge’s report would join with other reports already requested from divisional 
officers – reports covering the fields of international relations, economic stabilization, and 
public administration.417 
Kittredge provided feedback expressing a belief that European work on the 
applications front remained ahead of that in the United States. “[T]he general development of 
factual study” was comparatively farther ahead in the United States, Kittredge allowed, 
whereas applied projects aimed “at providing a minimum security and economic stability to 
the masses by social legislation” were comparatively further ahead in Europe. During the 
1920s, the Memorial, “in initiating a program in Europe, had in mind primarily the 
introduction of more realistic types of social study [which] has necessarily influenced the 
programs of the institutions aided.” While Kittredge was not going to attempt “to work out in 
any detail suggestions as to a specific new program” in Europe, he was glad to help identify 
unique strengths offered by the European situation.418 
Kittredge’s report, submitted in February 1935, discussed three kinds of economic 
research projects already receiving Foundation support in Europe: economic projects pursued 
at schools receiving institutional grants; research supported at specific institutes willing to 
take on economic projects requested by the Foundation; general support for institutes known 
to be concerned specifically with economic questions.419 
417 Edmund E. Day to Tracy Kittredge, January 1935, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 3. 
418 Kittredge added: “The grants that have been made by the Foundation in the last five years have to a great 
extent had in view the same objective as had determined the grants of the Memorial.” This objective held true at 
European “institutional centers” at Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oslo, Paris, and the LSE. Kittredge also identified 
possible new fields for research in Europe: national government services; administration of economic activities 
and of social services; problems of local government and city planning; government of colonial dependencies; 
“General Policy Affecting Future Social Science Programs in Europe,” Tracy Kittredge to Sydnor Walker, 
January 23, 1935, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 3. 
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Since Day’s proposal memorandum, in September 1931, the division’s program in 
“economic stabilization” was one of three main research programs for the division. Two 
years prior to that memorandum Day appointed Harvard-trained economist John Van Sickle 
as director of the social science division office in Paris. Tracy B. Kittredge was brought on 
board about the same time to assist Van Sickle. Van Sickle and Kittredge set to work 
gathering proposals from leading European economists, such as Friedrich Hayek in Vienna. 
Between 1931 and 1937, the Division of Social Sciences awarded grants to economics 
institutes in Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, Heidelberg, Kiel, Krakow, Louvain, Oslo, 
Paris, Rotterdam, Sophia, Stockholm, and Vienna. Several agencies of the League of Nations 
also received support, which among other studies, produced a series of business cycle papers 
by Gottfried Haberler. Research at the five institutes in Germany was especially impressive, 
as Kittredge reported to the trustees in late 1932.420 
Day moved Van Sickle to the New York office in 1934, to take charge of the entire 
“economic stabilization and social security” program, and Kittredge assumed directorship of 
 
the LSE and the Institute of Social Sciences at Stockholm. “Fluid Research Funds” were used to support the 
University of Paris and the University of Oxford. Examples of institutes willing to take on economic projects 
were an Economic Research Department at the University of Manchester, a Vienna Business Cycle Research 
Institute, and other institutes at Kiel, Bonn, and Heidelberg. Examples of the third category were the Institute of 
Economic and Social Research at Paris, the Institute of Economics and History at Copenhagen, the Institute of 
Economics at Oslo, the Netherlands Economic Institute at Rotterdam, and the Economic Research Institute at 
Louvain. For some information about eonomics in Germany during the 1920s and early 1930s, see David 
Meskill, “Characterological Psychology and the German Political Economy in the Weimar Period (1919-
1933),” History of Psychology 7 (2003): 3-19.  
420 Kittredge noted the German accomplishments in Tracy B. Kittredge, “The Social Sciences in Germany,” 
August 9, 1932, RAC–RF, R.G.1.1, Series 717. Kittredge later surveyed the entirety of economic research in 
Europe in Tracy B. Kittredge, “European Institutes of Economic Research,” February 7, 1938, RAC–RF, 
R.G.1.1, Series 700. In the latter report, Kittredge took time to evaluate differing degrees of success in different 
European nations. While impressed by research results in Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, 
Kittredge was little impressed by the program in France. Especially worrisome by 1938 was the situation in 
Germany. See also Earlene Craver, “Patronage and the Directions of Research in Economics: The Rockefeller 
Foundation in Europe, 1924-1938,” Minerva 24, 2-3 (Summer-Autumn 1986): 204-22, esp. 213-5; Neil 
DeMarchi and Peter Dohlman, “League of Nation’s Economists and the Ideal of Peaceful Change in the Decade 
of the Thirties,” History of Political Economy 23 (Spring 1991): 141-78. 
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the Paris office. Also in 1934, Day hired Stacy May as the fourth member of his 
administrative staff. (Day’s assistant director was Sydnor Walker, who was retained from the 
Memorial days.) The Kittredge-led Paris office, which continued overseeing identification of 
European scholars for fellowship awards, began studying European research institutes to see 
if larger financial awards could be made. Probably the most noteworthy recipients were the 
University of Oslo, the University of Kiel, the University of Heidelberg, the Dutch Economic 
Institute in Rotterdam, and the Romanian Institute of Social Science in Bucharest.421 
10.5 Outside views of possible explanations for the shutdown process 
Kittredge was by no means the only concerned respondent in 1935. Also responding 
to the Foundation’s December 1934 decision to terminate the general program were 
concerned social scientists. In preparation for a March 1935 staff conference, for example, 
not only were six officers’ reports to be prepared, but also some feedback was put on record 
from such persons as Columbia University economist Wesley Mitchell and University of 
California anthropologist A.L. Kroeber. Kroeber, in particular, worried that the decision to 
end the social sciences program might be interpreted as expert opinion that fundamental 
work in social science had failed. Citing the “reported recent intent to diminish or perhaps 
discontinue support of pure research in social science in favor of increased practical efforts in 
the contemporary social scene,” Kroeber said he believed such a plan “raises certain 
fundamental questions.” Any complete curtailment of general support of social science “will 
almost inescapably be construed as a verdict that social science has been tried and found 
 
421 See the Rockefeller Foundation’s Annul Reports for the years 1930 through 1936 (New York: Rockefeller 
Foundation, 1930-36). See also the unpublished work diary of John Van Sickle in the Rockefeller Foundation 
Archives. 
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wanting.” One problem seemed to be a “premature and unfortunate use of the term “social 
science,’” which by its imitation of “natural science” brings expectations impossible to 
realize. Kroeber identified “good” social science by emphasizing that such science was a 
compound of historical studies, logical-deductive techniques, efforts to make a “genuine 
scientific approach to the determination of processes,” and some strategy to implement real-
world experiments. The scheme of social science described by Kroeber ought to be clear, he 
believed, given that a dozen years’ attention has been paid to supporting economics, which 
clearly “contains all four strands.”422 
New president of the Rockefeller Foundation Max Mason (formerly president of the 
University of Chicago) took time to consider Kroeber’s point of view. Mason identified 
workable points and responded that the overall argument was “interesting.” However it 
seemed Kroeber believed a more radical curtailment was coming than what was truly 
planned. In actuality a number of specific projects were going to be continued. Mason agreed 
with Kroeber’s point that – in Mason’s words – “no more difficult question can be put before 
the Trustees of an institution like the Foundation than the determination of the direction of 
effort ‘for the well-being of mankind.’” After recalling the Foundation’s charting motto, 
Mason conceded that the goal to increase emphasis on concrete experimental applications 
was difficult to execute in an objective and impartial manner. In contrast to 1929, when the 
goal for the social sciences program was still to work for “the advancement of knowledge,” 
by the mid-1930s a fundamental change at the Division of Social Sciences was seen as 
needed, that “With diminished income there was an added urge for concentration, and the 
 
422 The research field producing no report was economic stability, which was the central program of the six. The 
letters from Wesley Mitchell and A.R. Kroeber (a respected University of California anthropologist) are noted 
for the trustees in an in inter-office correspondence by Foundation President Max Mason. The letter itself is 
A.L. Kroeber to Max Mason, April 1, 1935, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 3. 
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Trustees were obliged to make decisions on the basis of relative values.” But, Mason 
explained, the question was “what was more important for the well-being of mankind 
today”? The question should never be what is of “no value,” but is always “a question of 
relative values under altered conditions.” Mason explained to Kroeber that he preferred not 
“to believe [this] is an abandonment of interest in the fundamental aspects of the social 
science fields.” There would still be an interest in fundamental knowledge! The move to be 
made by the Foundation’s Division of Social Sciences was “towards adopting the same type 
of concentration that had been adopted in the natural sciences and medical science field.”423 
In April 1935, officers’ reports began serving the shut-down purpose, as well as 
began trying to serve something new. The official record of that month’s trustee meeting 
declared what was now to be built was a “New Social Science Program.” As trustees got to 
the business of evaluating when and how to phase out different facets of the “general” 
program, they received five of the six requested field reports. The trustees decided more 
work was wanted on all these reports, with specific program proposals requested for 
submission by year’s end. The plan was also formally stated, at that time, that the 
“liquidation of Foundation obligations” to the general program in social science must be 
completed by June 30, 1940.424 
423 Max Mason to A.L. Kroeber, April 9, 1935, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 3. 
424 New proposals were to deal with research still to be pursued in international relations, economic security, 
public administration, public finance and taxation, housing, and criminology. The trustees also invited advice 
from leading social scientists. The Executive Committee, in exploring ways to execute “termination of general 
support of university research in the social sciences,” resolved to find every possible means to terminate 
obligations with “no injustice to the institutions hitherto aided and no irreparable damage to the programs in 
which Foundation funds have been invested.” “Support of certain institutional centers has been fundamental in 
the Foundations’ general program in the Social Sciences.” But the plan was now to end the “general program: in 
the social sciences. The Foundation respected the long-established strategy of building major centers at 
Columbia, Harvard, Chicago, Brookings and the London School of Economics. UNC and Virginia were now 
also considered as representing a kind of special southern center in the United States; see “Minutes of the 
Rockefeller Foundation,” April 10, 1935, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 1, pp. 99-100. The “New 
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While affirmation of the plan to terminate the general program no doubt came 
primarily for reasons that were openly offered (such as limited funds, urgent economic and 
social conditions, and the question of what successes the general program could have 
anyhow), there were other possible factors. One possible factor contributing to apparent 
retrenchment might have been the ever-present question of public perception. Some criticism 
got crystallized in 1934, for example, with publication of Matthew Josephson’s classic book, 
The Robber Barons. In October 1935, Jerome Greene also suggested in a memorandum that 
the true locus of power in the Rockefeller Foundations remained with a small number of 
people, that all outside persons “having dealings with the Foundations” deal ultimately “with 
the authority of Mr. Rockefeller or of the somewhat mystical center of influence associated 
with his office.” In some subsequent self-evaluative work, Raymond Fosdick also took time 
to ask whether there was bias within the Foundation. Fosdick made a survey that revealed the 
trustees indeed were drawn from the upper social classes, being persons primarily trained in 
the professions of attorney, banker, and businessman (and almost invariably working and 
residing in the New York City area).425 
The question, of course, remained: Did the Rockefeller Foundation had adequate 
mechanisms in place to ensure that increased selection of specific projects under the “New 
Social Science Program” would be executed in an unbiased, disinterested manner. During the 
shutdown phase between 1935 and 1940, the one particular social science that especially 
 
Social Science Program” was adopted, and some examples of fairly concrete programs over the next couple 
years would include a project (beginning March 1935) by Eveline Burns to research economic security, and 
another (beginning May 1936) by Winfield Riefler to study social security and low cost housing; see “New 
Social Science Program,” April 10, 1935, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 2, Folder 13. 
425 Matthew Josephson, The Robber Barons: The Great Capitalists, 1861-1901 (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 
1934). Jerome D. Greene, “Memorandum on the Relation of the Trustees to the Policy and Control of the 
Rockefeller Foundation,” October 20, 1935, RAC–RF, RG.3, Series 900, Box 19, File 141, p. 13. Raymond B. 
Fosdick to J.D. Rockefeller 3rd, October 20, 1936, RAC–RF, RG.3, Series 900, Box 1, Folder 2; see also 
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continued receiving substantial financial support was economics. And there is definite 
evidence that support of economic research made reasonable effort to be balanced and 
objective. 
 
10.6 Economic research–1933-36 
Events in Germany were turning worrisome. From as early as January 1931, in fact, 
Van Sickle recognized the importance of knowing who at the German economic institutes 
was Jewish. He admired Kiel institute director Bernhard Harms for appointing researchers 
without respect to religion or race. Among younger investigators appointed by Harms were 
Adolf Lowe and Hans Neisser, both German Jews. In charge of research on international 
trade at Kiel was Gerhard Colm, “an able, attractive young Jew.” In April 1933, just over two 
months after Hitler came to power, Colm and Neisser were forcibly removed from research 
duties at the institute. Lowe also departed the institute. Government interference with 
scientific research shortly led to Harms’s own resignation, by July. These removals and 
resignations were just a few of many across the sciences at German universities during 1933 
and 1934.426 
Van Sickle responded to the situation in Germany by withholding payment to the Kiel 
institute. However after reevaluating the situation, Van Sickle determined the withheld 
money should be paid. Because of Van Sickle’s perception in 1933 that “the only competent 
 
426 Various letters and materials concerning these events are in RAC–RF, R.G.1.1, Series 717, Box 20, Folder 
181. John Van Sickle’s words are in his “official” Foundation dairy, dated 10 January 1931, as located and 
quoted by Craver, “Patronage and the Directions of Research in Economics,” 216-7. Useful discussions of the 
state of social science in Germany around the year 1933 are Jack Jacobs, “‘A Most Remarkable Jewish Sect’? 
Jewish Identity and the Institute of Social Research in the Years of the Weimar Republic,” Archiv für 
Sozialgeschichte 37 (1997): 73-92; Hans Derks, “Social Sciences in Germany, 1933-1945,” German History 17 
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scholars there [at the German economic institutes] were the Jews who had now been 
expelled,” the money needed to be restored since “abrupt termination at this time would 
appear to mean that in the past the only scholars enjoying the confidence of the Foundation 
were Jews.” The Rockefeller Foundation also responded by implementing a special “grants-
in-aid” fund to assist permanent relocation of exiled scholars. Over the next dozen years the 
Rockefeller Foundation would spend nearly $1,500,000 for this purpose, which included 113 
social scientists who were assisted by the program.427 
By January and February 1935, John Van Sickle was busy at work on the specific 
economics research project for the future; this would begin with an “Economic Security 
Conference.” Fitting in ways with the kinds of ideas provided by Tugwell, Rhind, the 
Brookings Institution, the SSRC and the Furniss Report, Van Sickle’s underlying idea for the 
conference, as he emphasized in a letter to Columbia economist Evelyn Burns, was the 
problem “of economic security for the broad masses of the population.” Van Sickle teamed 
with Joseph Willits of the University of Pennsylvania to plan the conference, and Van Sickle 
 
427 Quotations located by Earlene Craver. The count of 113 refugee social scientists assisted by the Rockefeller 
Foundation is in Craver, “Patronage and the Directions of Research in Economics,” 218-9. Also cited by Craver 
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stated what the conference would be about: “We envisage the term ‘economic security’ in the 
broad sense of covering all the social insurances against unemployment, old age, accident, 
sickness, as well as public works, work relief and direct relief.” The goal for the conference 
was to explore the possibilities for comprehensive economic reform. Van Sickle, while 
optimistic, had to recognize that with respect to helping initiate any truly radical overhaul, 
“the difficulties of effective action on the part of the Foundation are obvious.” To some 
degree the United States government even already had a “definite program,” supported by 
“enormous sums of money” as well as by “the best councils in the country.” Where, then, 
might Foundation efforts fit in? This was an important question. “Certainly a program is not 
desirable unless it gives definite promise of important contributions to a more effective 
shaping of the long run program of economic security. If Foundation action is desirable, the 
question of ways and means needs to be thoroughly canvassed. Due consideration should be 
given to the question of possible delimitation of the field.” The conference where such 
questions would be discussed was set for that spring.428 
The Economic Security Conference took place in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in 
March. Much discussion at the conference focused on the specific agenda point of gathering 
opinion “regarding the desirability of the Foundation adopting the program” for a new, more 
specific research field in “economic security.” In fitting with the kinds of ideas presented 
over recent years, participants in the conference recorded that “The most important 
contribution that the Foundation could make to the field would be the setting up of a central 
planning board and service agency comparable to the Committee on Government Statistics 
and Information Service.” Such a call for Foundation action was a dramatic departure from 
 
428 John Van Sickle to Evelyn Burns, February 14, 1935, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 47. 
309
any prior precedent at the Foundation, although the call fit well with what many persons had 
recommended.429 
A variety of reports on economic problems were quickly produced by divisional 
officers. Included were reports with such titles as “Economic Security Program,” “Possible 
Foundation Program in Fields of International Relations and Economic Security,” and 
“Proposals for New Program: Public Finance with Special Reference to Taxation.” The latter 
report posed a specific scientific question, “which touches vitally upon other problems of 
Foundation interest. The question is this: How shall the timing of expenditures and revenue 
collections be related to the phenomena of the business cycle and to a program of economic 
security?” Such a question concerning the problem of business cycles clearly was a fairly 
specific research question for the Foundation to ask. The same report continued by noting 
what President Roosevelt’s administration was already doing, which amounted to a social 
experiment in action: 
This country is embarking on a new experiment in an uncharted field. It is going to 
try to guarantee continuous income at some minimum level to the broad mass of the 
population regardless of whether they are employed or unemployed. This involves the 
building up of surpluses in good times for dispersal in bad times. Taxes are one 
means of building up the surpluses. How large should the surpluses be? How much 
relief from taxation should be granted in periods of prosperity and budgetary 
surpluses? 
 
429 “Agenda for Conference in Economic Security, 22-23 March 1935,” RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 5, 
Folders 47-8, esp. p. 38. 
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All these questions were scientific questions, and they were questions the Foundation wanted 
to begin directing economists toward answering.430 
Foundation personnel also introduced some specific objectives and explored 
components to be made part of a comprehensive “Economic Security Program.” One 1935 
report, titled “The Social Insurances and Relief,” declared the program in the field of 
economic security has “two main objectives: a) economic research into problems of 
structural and cyclical change directed at better understanding and effective moderation of 
the costly ups and downs of business activity; b) development of more adequate protection 
against the major hazards of life – such as sickness, accident, old age dependency and 
unemployment – through improved provision for social insurance and organized relief.” 
Cleanly stated, there were to be two research objectives, which were research on business 
cycles and research on the social consequences of business cycles. The goals were to learn 
how the economy works and how to help people when they are harmed by an economy that 
works badly.431 
Increased attention focused on the world-wide economic depression by the end of 
1935. A hope remained at the Rockefeller Foundation that grant awards to support specific 
economic research might be managed in an unbiased, truly scientific manner. At the 
directors’ meeting in December of that year, the Foundation recorded where nearly all their 
focus was now turning: “The general field of the work of the Social Sciences is social 
structure and functioning. Support is given to realistic studies of importance pursued in an 
objective manner, and by the aid of those specially training in the appropriate techniques.” 
 
430 Quotation from page 5 of “Proposals for New Program: Public Finance with Special Reference to Taxation,” 
RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 44. 
431 Quotation from page 1 of “The Social Insurances and Relief,” RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 
44. 
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The two chief goals in the increasingly urgent research program (namely, the needs for 
research on the economy and on its effects on people) must be in light of the two goals “of 
obtaining tangible results and immediate social effects,” even though in many cases the 
difficulty of simultaneous obtainment would be great.432 
Coming up increasingly often for discussion was the familiar problem of how to get 
involved in controversial areas. One tried-and-tested idea was to rely on the SSRC as much 
as possible. A 1935 memo for the Economic Security Program, titled “Should Health 
Insurance be Included in the Foundation’s Social Security Program?,” raised the question: 
“Shall the Foundation enter the field in view of the certain criticisms that will result?” The 
answer, at least as offered in the same memo, was in the affirmative: the Rockefeller 
Foundation should include work on health insurance, especially if the Foundation could work 
through the SSRC. Quoting recent Foundation words, the memo noted the Foundation was 
looking to “the development and maintenance of minimum standards of security and decency 
in the living conditions of the mass of people.” Foundation trustees produced another policy 
memorandum on social security in 1936. What seemed important in this memo was to assess 
whether Foundation actions could be determined to be unbiased by identifying whether any 
politically controversial topics were directly supported. This memorandum addressed 
questions of social security and said: “Since these questions involve legislation and 
government policy of a controversial nature, the Foundation is working almost entirely 
through the Social Security Committee of the SSRC.”433 
432 “Minutes,” p. 35458; The conference for a Program in Economic Scarcity is noted in “Minutes,” p. 36064, 
RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 1. 
433 “Should Health Insurance be Included in the Foundation’s Social Security Program?,” 1935, RAC–RF, 
R.G.3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 44. 
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The more scientific question being raised by Foundation personnel was whether 
supported research in the economic security program could begin discovering how such an 
atrocious business cycle had happened. Indeed by 1936 a second economic security 
conference was in the planning as a “Business Cycle Conference” to be held in Geneva, in 
July 1936. Van Sickle proactively stated two goals for any Foundation support of business-
cycle research. Evidently a number of persons at the Foundation had introduced ideas 
regarding how a business-cycle research program might work, and Van Sickle considered 
these ideas and focused on dividing the focus on business cycle analysis into two sub-
projects. “[A]s the officers now conceive the problem,” Van Sickle wrote in September 1935, 
“…the Foundation’s efforts in encouraging business cycle research should take two principal 
directions.” One direction would be to promote improvement in “the adequacy and accuracy 
of the data now continuously issued from public and private agencies. The purpose here is to 
aid in the provision of a better day to day picture of significant fluctuations and trends and 
thus a more reliable indication of our momentary location in the business cycle.” The other 
direction would be to better understand “the dominant forces making for economic 
fluctuations.”434 
The latter few months of 1935 and first months of 1936 included much discussion 
concerning the upcoming business cycle conference. In October, Swedish economist Oskar 
Anderson outlined four needs for research institutes to run the business-cycle research 
program: one coordinating center; various “Business Cycle Institutes” overseen by the 
coordinating center; regional associations of other institutes “located in countries possessing 
 
434 John Van Sickle, “Nature of Foundation Program in Business Cycle Research,” RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, 
Box 5, Folder 44, pp. 1-2. 
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a similar type of economic structure”; aid to isolated scholars. Anderson also emphasized the 
need to improve the quality of “scientific performance” at all institutes. Van Sickle, for his 
part, further described the project in another letter to Anderson, saying that the goal was not 
yet to create an entirely new major research center, but was to convene a dozen or more 
leading economists “to advise” the Foundation “regarding the desirability and feasibility of a 
Foundation program aimed at encouraging economic research at the international level.”435 
In the continued planning process for the Geneva conference, Van Sickle 
communicated with Tracy Kittredge as well as Edmund Day. To Kittredge, who was still in 
charge of the Paris office, Van Sickle suggested that on the basis of many conversations he is 
now led to believe “the next logical step in the development of the business cycle program is 
the creation of a central coordinating agency.” Van Sickle reported he was at work on a 
memorandum to present proposals for the business cycle program. When he got the program 
outlined, Van Sickle described it for Kittredge. Van Sickle also recorded for Day his belief 
that one particular institute, the Institute at Geneva, “is the logical agency to undertake this 
task” of becoming the coordinating center. In these and other correspondences, many 
potential invitees were also discussed by Van Sickle. The biggest name in the field of 
business cycle research, all were agreed, was Gottfried Haberler, who was soon to publish his 
fine study, Prosperity and Depression (1937). Haberler was widely recognized by 
economists of the day for having a specific theory about business cycles that possibly should 
be adopted by all economists. This notion that the Foundation perhaps should encourage 
 
435 Oskar Anderson to John Van Sickle, October 30, 1935, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 44. 
Quotation from Van Sickle to Oskar Anderson, February 18, 1936, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 4, Folder 
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adoption of one specific scientific theory of business cycles, as an a priori position, is 
another example of increased initiative by the Rockefeller Foundation.436 
In addition to the European economists, the idea to focus efforts on a business cycle 
program was also appreciated by U.S. economists. Harvard University professor E.B. 
Wilson, for example, wrote to Foundation President Max Mason about the program. The 
planned research seemed genuinely scientific to Wilson, who outlined his idealistic view that 
the basic explanation of business cycles was already largely agreed upon, and that all that 
really differed between economists in different nations was different sets of available facts. 
Wilson also believed that objectivity in social science could never get separated from 
advocacy, which could be a problem. “[P]ersonnel in social science is self-selected of 
persons who do not wish to think carefully and who do not wish to separate their emotional 
reactions from their scientific thinking or even are so much more interested in their emotional 
reactions that they refuse to try to think scientifically.” Social scientists as a group, Wilson 
brutally stated, too often are just “rambling in our emotions.” He continued: “I fear that if the 
Foundation is ever to get anywhere with such matters as social security, the regulation of 
industry, and the various things in which I understand them to be primarily interested from 
now on in the social field as contrasted with such things as personality and culture it may be 
 
436 John Van Sickle to Tracy Kittredge, January 3, 1936; Tracy Kittredge to John Van Sickle, January 21, 1936, 
RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 44. For Haberler’s study, see Gottfried Haberler, Prosperity and 
Depression (New York: League of Nations, 1937). Van Sickle also proposed a kind of joint meeting at the 
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1935. Also considered worthy of invitation were Lionel Robbins (LSE), Joan Robinson (Cambridge), Bertil 
Ohlin (Scandinavia), Jan Tinbergen (Holland), Charles Rist (France), Oscar Morgenstern (Austria), J.M. Clark 
(U.S.), and Alvin Hansen (U.S.), among others; see John Van Sickle to Loveday, December 13, 1935. The main 
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necessary somehow for the Foundation to grow a personnel which will apply the scientific 
method in the social field.”437 
The Business Cycle Conference indeed took place, in Geneva in July 1936. As a 
project which was part of the Foundation’s Program in Economic Stability and Security, the 
conference produced many pages of “Discussions” and “Proceedings.” Van Sickle’s view is 
recorded: “the Conference had been very useful to the Foundation, but he [Van Sickle] 
thought it might be preferable in the future to build such a Conference onto meetings called 
to evaluate a complete or nearly completed piece of research, assuming that Haberler’s 
methods were to be adopted.” Recorded again, then, was Van Sickle’s guiding hope that by 
adopting one specific scientific approach a continuity of fairly specific projects could be 
promoted. The idea to begin by adopting one theory at the outset was an instrumental goal, 
aimed at getting concrete studies underway. Such continuity would provide added reason for 
regularly bringing a team of business-cycle economists together.438 
10.7 Deciding what to do–1935-39 
During the latter half of 1935 and into 1936 the Foundation trustees considered ways 
to begin ending the “general program” of social science research. The plan was to end only 
the general program, which “had as its purpose the advancement of the social sciences as a 
whole.” The future program – what the Foundation was calling its “New Social Science 
 
437 RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 44. E.B. Wilson to Max Mason, October 24, 1935. Wilson wrote 
about unity of theory and method in language that declared “there was only one system of logic, and that the 
difference between scientists of different sorts was merely that different individuals applied what mind they had 
and the universal logic as well as they could to that group of facts with which they happened to be familiar, and 
in which they happened to be interested.” 
438 The conference, during July 3-5, 1936, produced many pages of “Record of Discussions” and “Summary of 
Proceedings.” The summary of Van Sickle’s personal view is in “Summary of Proceedings,” RAC–RF, R.G.3, 
Series 910, Box 4, Folders 29 and 31, p. 58. 
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Program” – would need to focus on “concrete proposals” for initiating “concrete projects.” In 
April 1935, program officers were assigned the task to identify specific problems and make 
proposals for six fields: international relations; economic security; public administration; 
public finance & taxation; housing; and criminology. These reports began being presented in 
December 1935, and indeed, we’ve been seeing the kinds of reports produced in the field of 
economic security (which included business-cycle research).439 
Day put the transitional matter in direct words in November 1935: “[T]he former 
general program was to be liquidated as soon as practicable; the former specific programs 
involving certain designated areas of concentration were suspended; and the officers were 
instructed to bring in recommendations for new programs in fields within which there 
appeared to be exceptional opportunities for realistic work of more ready and significant 
applicability.”440 
In January 1936, Edmund Day and Jerome Greene got back to debating what an 
“urgent” economic problem might be. Greene suggested that nearly any economic problem 
could bear upon the national economic prospect, which surely would be one way to define 
“urgency.” Day countered that it seemed possible to hold a narrower definition of what kinds 
of economic problems truly have an “urgent” bearing. Day believed in trying to pick specific 
problems to be attacked first, because not everything could be done at once. So, while Greene 
still favored more of a general program, Day held confidence that there were ways to 
 
439 “Minutes” of April 1935 meeting, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 1, p. 23. 
440 “Memorandum on SS Statement Regarding Budget for 1936,” November 1935, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, 
Box 1, Folder 1, p. 1. What especially concerned Day was the high likelihood that persons in the social science 
division would lose their spirit with everything seeming to be shut down around them. 
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determine which economic problems bear more or less upon the national economic 
prospect.441 
Commitment to the liquidation process for the “general program” developed through 
1936. More officers’ reports were requested to explore possible concrete projects. At the 
December trustees’ meeting, the first phase in liquidating the Division of Social Sciences’ 
institutional centers was observed to be proceeding in an orderly fashion. Divisional officers 
were identifying valuable new undertakings in particular areas, and specific programs were 
getting reported on – although housing and criminology were not yet reported on, and the 
trustees definitely wanted such reports.442 
But things changed. By 1936, a major shift was in the works. On July 1st of that year 
Raymond B. Fosdick succeeded Max Mason as president of the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Fosdick, a bit surprisingly, held a lower opinion of the Division of Social Sciences than did 
Mason. Fosdick thought little of John Van Sickle’s work on the economic security and 
business cycles program, and he wondered whether Tracy Kittredge and the Paris office were 
worth keeping at all. Fosdick requested Van Sickle’s resignation from his charge over the 
economic security program based out of the New York office in April 1937, and Edmund 
Day resigned as Director of the Division of Social Sciences two months later. The business 
cycle research program ceased to exist by the end of 1937. As to the Paris office, one factor 
of serious concern was the changing political climate in Europe. By September 1936, 
Fosdick expressed he no longer could not share the “apparent belief” of Kittredge that 
 
441 With respect to the specific program in economic scarcity, Jerome D. Greene (recently moved to Harvard) 
wrote Edmund Day; see Jerome Green to Edmund E. Day, January 8, 1936; Day to Green, January 22, 1936, 
RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 3. 
442 The trustees’ memo from their December 1936 meeting noted their desire for reports on possible future 
programs in the fields of housing and criminology, requested for their meeting in April 1937; RAC–RF, R.G.3, 
Series 910, Box 1, Folder 4. 
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research at the German institutes was “sufficiently free of political control to make it possible 
to do objective work there.” Fosdick added: “Unless we are grievously misinformed in this 
country in regard to the German situation we would be merely throwing away our money in 
trying to promote any kind of scientific research in the social sciences.”443 
Yet another phase in the relationship between Rockefeller philanthropy and social 
science finally came to an end in May 1938, when Fosdick declared for Kittredge that it was 
time to cease “carrying on any work in the social sciences in the totalitarian states.” Fosdick 
had come to a conclusion: “We are not obliged to work there, and I see nothing to be gained 
for the world in general by supporting the cribbed and cramped type of research which 
present totalitarian ideology imposes. In the long run, I believe more will be accomplished by 
concentrating in those countries where tolerance is the intellectual rule than by trying to 
spread our activities in countries where real freedom of research is grudgingly acknowledged 
or sharply curtailed.”444 
With the departure of Edmund Day in June 1937, the end of business cycle research 
by December 1937, and the May 1938 decision to withdraw from supporting social research 
in European “totalitarian states,” a period in the relationship between Rockefeller 
philanthropy and social science was certainly over with. 
 
443 Raymond B. Fosdick to Sydnor H. Walker, September 25, 1936, RAC–RF, R.G.1.1, Series 717, Box 20; 
quotation in Craver, “Patronage and the Directions of Research in Economics,” 220. 
444 Raymond B. Fosdick to Tracy B. Kittredge, May 1938, RAC–RF, R.G.1.1, Series 717, Box 20; quotation in 
Craver, “Patronage and the Directions of Research in Economics,” 221. 
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CHAPTER 11. THE “NEW PROGRAM”–1938-46 
 
11.1 Introduction 
Every few years, Rockefeller philanthropists took time to explore the nature of social 
science and its uses. The period from 1938 to 1941 – spanning Edmund Day’s resignation as 
director to Joseph Willits’s assumption of directorial duties – was just such a period. Upon 
his arrival, Willits initiated projects to build a new program oriented around specific social 
and economic studies. Willits’s first phase of projects ended about 1946, when increased 
government support of social research began a new episode in the history of social science 
and its patrons. 
 
11.2 New officers’ reports and the search for unifying ideas–1938 
Rockefeller Foundation officers prepared a number of reports during 1938 dealing 
with Depression-era social problems, especially economic ones. An important question was 
how the Great Depression might impact research needs in the fields of economic and social 
security, international relations, and public administration. John Van Sickle, though no 
longer in charge of the economic security research program, wrote a memorandum that 
focused on what research needs might still exist: “What are the gaps in social statistics?,” he 
asked. Particularly important to fill would be any remaining gaps in knowledge pertaining to 
economic research. Van Sickle recognized that many volumes of data would be required to 
fully answer his memo’s lead question; better information specifically was needed on all 
sorts of economic problems, including trade cycles, banking, international investment, 
modern corporations, wages, worker health records, and education levels in different 
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occupations. Van Sickle produced an additional report for the Foundation trustees, this one 
specifically on economic research. Research on economic welfare, he argued, was doing the 
best it could given limited funds and the severity of current problems.445 
Another person who shared ideas was new Foundation President Raymond Fosdick. 
Fosdick emphasized studying totalitarian societies, particularly their economic systems. 
However Fosdick also stridently recommended the Foundation must watch its step while 
doing this, particularly because any financial involvement in a human rights-violating regime 
could result in both financial loss and moral compromise for the Foundation. Other studies 
also made during 1938 were to learn about political upheavals in Latin America and to 
develop projects to try and help reverse an “obvious and ominous deterioration of 
international relationships” in Europe. The latter situation was something the Foundation, in 
the May 1938 words of social science division officer Stacy May, conceded showed an 
“appallingly gloomy outlook” that could make it seem that “everything in the field is 
retrogressive.” The onset of grave concern about conditions in Europe meant that lessened 
support for European social science perhaps should be called for. And, indeed, that same 
month President Fosdick called for just this.446 
445 At least three reports were prepared for a March 1938 trustees meeting by the officers’ team of Stacy May, 
John V. Van Sickle, and Sydnor H. Walker. Included were John Van Sickle, “Gaps in Social Statistics,” RAC–
RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 4; Van Sickle, “Social Security–A Report on Program,” March 1938, 
RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 5, Folder 46. See also RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 2, Folder 14. 
446 See also memo from Raymond B. Fosdick, April 14, 1938; memo from Raymond B. Fosdick, May 13, 1938, 
RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 4. Latin American projects in the social sciences were an area 
receiving much support without being an official Foundation program. Examples of schools receiving grants for 
research on Latin America were Tulane University (a three-year grant in 1931) and American University (a 
two-year grant in 1938). Also receiving a grant was the Foreign Policy Association (a two-year grant in 1934); 
see yearly summaries of the work of the Division of Social Sciences in the Rockefeller Foundation Annual 
Reports; see also Stacy May, “Latin American Projects in the Social Sciences,” June 16, 1938. Shortness of 
funds through the 1930s is well established in the Foundation records; in an October 1938 memorandum, 
Sydnor Walker put it directly, saying “we are definitely limited in what we can do in the remainder of this year 
by a very small balance in our allocation for the social sciences.” Sydnor Walker, “Proposed Actions under SS 
Program in 1938,” October 27, 1938. The factor of increasing political uncertainty in Europe was something 
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Much of the problem associated with the shift away from the “general” social science 
program by 1940 involved a need for workable and reasonable evaluative standards for 
selecting projects. What seemed needed was some kind of a new overriding methodology. 
While the social science division’s economics programs were getting useful officers’ reports 
produced, a lack of any unifying method might have been a reason why officers’ reports in 
other fields such as the housing program and the criminology program, were lagging. It was 
time to explore whether a new theoretical foundation – and perhaps also a new organizational 
structure – might help. 
An example of the effort to identify new evaluative standards is the way that and 
article on “Organization of Social Research” in the British journal Nature evidently helped 
crystallize new ideas. Divisional officers reignited debate at the Rockefeller philanthropies 
about the nature and structure of social science. Officers discussed two ideas as presented in 
the article. One idea was a reductionist notion that social scientists should base all “actual 
investigation on higher biological lines.” A second idea was that coordination of all social 
research should be accomplished by a single, national body. What was needed to help solve 
the economic calamity through most of Europe and North America was “to establish a new 
scientific body, with adequate endowment from the State, which will do for human social 
research” what national-level organizations were already doing for medical, agricultural, and 
chemical research.447 
Stacy May described as the “obvious and ominous deterioration of international relationships in the theatre of 
the world”; Stacy May, Interoffice Correspondence, December 30, 1938, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, 
Folder 4. 
447 See “Organization of Social Research,” Nature 140, 3543 (October 22, 1937): 521-3. The idea that a 
centralized plan for social control was needed was widespread at the time. 
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Division officers Stacy May and Sydnor Walker commented on the article, as did 
Foundation President Fosdick. May doubted the feasibility of basing useful, real-world 
investigation on “higher biological lines,” and he worried about placing too much confidence 
in “controlled observation” and “guidance” by any new centralized institute. A version of the 
‘new institute’ idea which May was willing to consider was the article’s suggestion that 
“there should be some government body that takes a continuous over-all view of important 
social problems.” Worth considering, in particular, was whether “‘some centrally constituted 
scientific body’ should survey the field of social research and draw up a program of what 
needs doing.” Noting that the SSRC was already considering such a possible survey in the 
United States, May declared his “strong conviction that there is a kind of general survey job 
that the Council should be attempting and it may be in line with what the author of this 
Nature article has in mind.” May also pointed out that the SSRC had been formed originally 
“upon the conviction that numbers of important problems did not conform to established 
academic fields and persisted in escaping over the borderlines of economics, sociology, 
political science, psychology, and so forth.” Perhaps SSRC efforts were already all that was 
needed in the way of a centralized guiding organization.448 
Walker responded to the question, What is the next step for the SSRC? In addressing 
some thoughts in a letter to Fosdick, Walker believed the SSRC was coming to face the fact 
that social science had gotten lost from “the main road” it once was on. Such a road, to 
Walker’s idealized past, was one that seemed to have been “more definitely charted.” As to 
Fosdick, his thoughts went to the core of the matter: “It seems to me that the question can be 
 
448 The SSRC, May believed, “could best capitalize its strength and its limitations not by getting combined 
groups to criticize each academic field but by selecting a number of genuinely important current problems and 
calling upon selected committees from the several academic fields in social science to focus their attention upon 
them”; Stacy May to Raymond B. Fosdick, October 22, 1937, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 4. 
323
simply put: In a chaotic world like this, have the social sciences a contribution to make to the 
problem of human control? If so, what is it, and how do the social sciences propose to go 
about it?” This question of social control was a central question concerning whether some 
new fundamental idea – e.g., that perhaps all social phenomena could ultimately be explained 
by biological facts – could tie together all things in a new relationship between Rockefeller 
philanthropy and social science: Are the social sciences to be used for social control? And if 
so, then how?449 
Edwin B. Wilson, the Harvard professor of economics and vital statistics, got into the 
discussion as well. Wilson believed the Foundation needed to better distinguish between 
fields of social science the Foundation was willing to support and specific projects it wanted 
to directly sponsor. Wilson recognized an increased need for the second category of action. 
He also believed the SSRC could play a helpful role in identifying specific projects to pursue. 
In Wilson’s recollection, the SSRC was originally “started out to find out what ought to be 
done to make social science research more scientific.” Since the early 1920s the SSRC had 
done well, and particularly beneficial was the SSRC’s committee structure designed to 
determine grant-worthy projects. The SSRC had also succeeded in adopting methods to 
“broaden out and tune up the projects submitted to them before they voted appropriations, 
and thus did indirectly contribute in a practical way to the improvement of social science 
 
449 Sydnor Walker recalled the SSRC’s discussion at a recent meeting on the subject of future policy. In her 
view, the SSRC had shown a genuine interest “to find the way back to the main road, which was formerly more 
definitely charted than recent critics have inferred”; Sydnor Walker to Raymond Fosdick, November 10, 1937, 
RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 4. Raymond Fosdick, “Memo,” November 9, 1937, RAC–RF, 
R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 4. See also Raymond Fosdick to Sydnor Walker, October 14, 1937, RAC–RF, 
R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 4. 
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research.” Wilson recommended the Foundation “put your problem of what you ought to do 
in the social science field directly up to them.”450 
The SSRC was quite willing to share its ideas. In October 1938, SSRC Executive 
Director Robert T. Crane focused on the division between discovery and application of 
knowledge, saying he supported a more interactive relationship between the two. Crane 
argued that a Foundation program designed to apply knowledge to aid in the solution of 
social problems “should embrace two distinct lines of activity.” “One of these is 
improvement of the social sciences as instrumentalities for attainment and diffusion of 
knowledge. The other is utilization of these instrumentalities for attack on current and 
continuing questions of public importance.” The first line of activities “calls for 
consideration of research organization, personnel, dissemination of results, and above all of 
methods and ways of working.” As to the latter line of action, “The utilization of the social 
sciences for the study of current problems affords an opportunity almost as in a laboratory to 
make new contributions to science, new syntheses.” Crane concluded the SSRC “believes 
that it is of the utmost importance that practical studies originating in the present state of 
social science should follow through to the development of new science just as it believes 
that purely scientific studies in the social field should carry forward to a collation with the 
facts of the social world.”451 
450 Wilson added his hope that the Foundation staff would be able to “keep up their morale” during a difficult 
time of the transition. He worried that morale would suffer without having “the freedom [in upcoming years] to 
support projects which they wish to try.” Simply sitting and waiting had the prospect to be miserable stuff. 
“There are very many important problems in the social field the solution of which if it could be obtained would 
add greatly to human welfare.” Wilson thought it especially advisable that, as the Foundation continues to 
pursue specific projects, care be taken to “clear[ly] distinguish between the Foundation projects and the outside 
projects the Foundation was willing to finance”; Edwin B. Wilson to Raymond Fosdick, November 20, 1937, 
RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 4. 
451 Robert T. Crane, “Memorandum,” October 27, 1938, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 3, Folder 16, pp. 1, 
6. Part of what Crane had in mind stemmed from a distinction he introduced between so-called “central” and 
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The SSRC also produced a November report, “The Social Scientists Appraise Their 
Science,” the main objectives of which were to figure out the nature of cutting-edge social 
research and identify ways to determine which research projects ought to receive funding. It 
was time to develop a better “appraisal scheme” for “attain[ing] a workable technique for 
identifying values” that might help distinguish between good and bad social science. But 
what would such a scheme do? “It takes a product of social science research which the 
authorities recognize as good. But why is it good? What are the qualities that make it good? 
How are these qualities attained? To be successful and useful, the appraisal scheme must 
answer questions such as these.” The SSRC’s report humbly concluded that any evaluator 
hoping to separate examples of good social science from bad social science would likely 
need to proceed by identifying positive value on a case-by-case basis.452 
Input from the SSRC and other parties ultimately focused on ways that Rockefeller 
philanthropy could make continued progress while shutting down the general social science 
program. One way we might begin studying specific examples of the shift would be to 
consider how the Foundation interacted with two schools in particular. One relevant school 
noted by historians is the University of Oxford, where some interaction with the Rockefeller 
Foundation took place during 1937. The interaction happened in a way that it might seem the 
Foundation attempted to overly influence Oxford’s research priorities. According to John 
Van Sickle in a letter written at the time to Tracy B. Kittredge in Europe, economists at 
 
“peripheral” social sciences. In the first group belonged economics, politics and sociology; in the second group 
Crane placed anthropology and psychology. Statistics and history were best thought of, actually, as 
“methodologies rather than social science fields.” The new project to weave together knowledge and 
applications entailed work to see how these three groups would work together in new ways; Robert T. Crane’s 
words in 1940, as quoted in Fisher 1999, p. 82.  
452 “The Social Scientists Appraise Their Science,” November 1938, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 
4. 
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Oxford were on the cusp of making the desired change from old-style “abstract theoretical 
work to careful inductive analysis.” Oxford’s progress through this shift from general 
development to specific projects should be assisted, Van Sickle believed, as it represented a 
shift “so desirable that it seemed wise to encourage this line of attack (with a grant).”453 
What specifically happened in the social sciences at Oxford was that Foundation 
funds were allocated to three main research fields: experimental psychology, physical and 
cultural anthropology, and agricultural economics. In psychology, an infusion of Foundation 
money as a “Social Studies Research Fund” in 1935 helped produce an “Institute of 
Experimental Psychology” the following year. It took four more years, however, for teaching 
in experimental psychology to be formally incorporated in the program. As to anthropology, 
the established accomplishment at the school by the 1930s was Arthur Thomson success at 
amassing one of the largest collections of skulls the academic world has ever seen. What was 
needed was to save cultural anthropology from marginalized status at the school. Though this 
proved a difficult undertaking, a major step was taken with the permanent hiring of Yale-
trained primatologist Solly Zuckerman, in 1935. Improvements to the university’s 
Agricultural Economics Institute were made possible at the same time, as was the initiation 
of research projects in econometrics.454 
The Rockefeller-Oxford relationship during 1937 can be used to address the fact that 
historians of social science critical of Rockefeller philanthropy sometimes ask whether there 
was too much selection between different universities based solely on their conservative or 
 
453 John Van Sickle to Tracy B. Kittredge, January 19, 1937, RAC–RF, RG.1.1, Series 401, Box 71, Folder 944. 
454 Jack Morrell, Science at Oxford: Transforming an Arts University (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997): 85-92, 
200-3, 139-40. See also Warren Young and Frederic S. Lee, Oxford Economics & Oxford Economists (London: 
The Macmillan Press, 1993); Daniele Besomi, “Roy Harrod and the Oxford Economists’ Research Group’s 
Inquiry on Prices and Interest, 1936-1939,” Oxford Economics Papers 50 (October 1998): 534-62. 
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liberal research methods and goals, i.e., that selection between universities might have been a 
strategy adopted by the Foundation to gain increased control over the direction of social 
research. The period of the late 1930s was, after all, a time when persons at the Foundation 
were obviously willing to discuss how much more active the Foundation needed to be in 
picking specific projects. And as seen earlier, the late 1930s was also a time when 
performance of one specific theory of business cycles was possibly to be preferred. Perhaps 
the situation concerning Oxford may have been merely that the Foundation preferred specific 
projects over the more abstract style of social inquiry already established at Oxford.455 
Another possibility is that universities might have tailored grant proposals to fit 
research interests known to be favored by the Rockefeller Foundation. Such an example 
might be found at the London School of Economics during the 1930s, where William 
Beveridge used a sizeable amount of money from a Foundation grant to establish a 
“Department of Social Biology” to do fundamental research to discover basic causes of 
human behavior. For a variety of reasons – including any possible association with eugenics 
– persons at both the LSE and the Foundation came to disapprove of this use of funds. The 
Foundation informed Beveridge of its displeasure that funds were used to establish such a 
department and even made a payment to the head of the department to leave the department 
(so that the department could then be shut down). Yet even this was not enough, as the 
Foundation also informed LSE directors that all future grants were in jeopardy if the school 
failed to cease operating its social biology department on Foundation funds.456 
455 See Salma Ahmad, “American Foundations and the Development of the Social Sciences between the Wars: 
Comment on the Debate between Martin Bulmer and Donald Fisher,” Sociology 25, 3 (August 1991): 511-20): 
511-20, esp. 514. 
456 See Ahmad, “American Foundations,” 514. 
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What happened at Oxford and LSE, I would say, was that particular approaches to 
social science were either wanted or were too close to controversial terrain for the 
Rockefeller Foundation to mess with. An interpretation of what happened at Oxford and at 
the LSE that fits the overall picture developed herein is not a simple “yes” or “no” to the 
question whether the Foundation tried to attain undue control over the direction of social 
science. The best interpretation is that there was a playing out of multiple forces, which 
included the interplay between a Foundation ideal of neutrality and some increased interest in 
guiding specific projects; the best explanation is a combined ‘yes-and-no’ answer about the 
relationship between philanthropy and social science: that philanthropic work was itself 
experimental, and that choices in favor of preferred projects were based on identifying 
research methods that seemed to have greatest promise in terms of near term application. 
 
11.3 Evaluative reports and a new director–1939 
By late 1938, the Foundation trustees decided to hire a new director for the Division 
of Social Sciences, Joseph H. Willits, a University of Pennsylvania economist with long-
running contact with Rockefeller philanthropy. As the Foundation prepared for Willits’s 
arrival, they began evaluation of the social science program’s accomplishments and possible 
future directions. Foundation trustees asked for two reports to assess the social sciences as 
supported by the Foundation. Any actual program changes possibly suggested by these 
reports were to wait until after Willits’s arrival, in February 1939.457 
457 A December 1938 report notes the plan for Joseph H. Willits to assume responsibility on February 1, 1939. 
“In view of this development the committee feels that a precise statement at this time as to the future program of 
the Social Sciences Division would be premature. We would expect to be guided in our conclusions by the ideas 
and judgments which Dr. Willits will bring to his task.” “Report of the Trustees Committee on the Social 
Science,” December 7, 1938, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 3, Folder 16. 
329
One report for the new director was written by Janet Paine, secretary to the director. 
Paine’s overview covered ten years of social science projects defined as having “four definite 
and distinct objectives” through the period: projects in fundamental social science; projects in 
applied social science; research on particular problems of “social disturbance”; research on 
maladjusted social groups. Projects focusing on fundamental social science included seven 
knowledge fields (i.e., economics, political science, sociology, cultural anthropology, social 
psychology, human geography, and certain approaches to history), while projects in applied 
social science included the applied fields of business law, public administration, and social 
service. The Foundation’s focus on problems of social disturbance included studies in 
international relations, industrial relations, and interracial relations. Finally there was 
“promotion of research on problems of groups described as socially maladjusted,” which 
included research on Latin America, crime studies, and analysis of totalitarian regimes. 
However over the last five years, “the social science program of the Rockefeller Foundation 
has operated almost exclusively” in the fields of economic stabilization, international 
relations, and community organization & planning. (The latter field, which has not been 
much explored herein, was defined to include such research areas as interracial relations, 
crime studies, and public administration.)458 
Paine identified a turning point in April 1933 when the Foundation created a special 
fund to aid research on the most urgent problems of the worldwide depression. At that time, 
the Foundation recognized the need to face “peculiarly challenging opportunities for useful 
work, many of which could not be seized under earlier formulations of the Foundation 
 
458 Janet M. Paine, “Development of the Social Science Program: Summary Statement,” January 1939, RAC–
RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 3, Folder 16, pp. 1-2, 5. 
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program.” The new “formulation,” of course, was the decision to focus only on specific 
subjects. Over a million dollars of emergency grants were allocated between April 1933 and 
December 1935, focusing on economic projects to help government recovery as well as assist 
government in its effort to better collaborate with private agencies.459 
In addition to Paine’s report, a second report was prepared by Sydnor H. Walker 
focusing on the question, “What objectives will be set?” Foundation leaders had spent a 
decade reacting against a perception that the 1920’s Memorial program was too broad and 
diffuse – and even perhaps a bit irresponsible. So by about 1934, Foundation leaders began 
trying to selectively identify the most urgent problems and applications, so as to begin 
pursuing projects that would “give promise of direct aid in the promotion of human welfare.” 
Yet as the Foundation got active in selecting specific projects, worry cropped up that any 
projects directly selected by the Foundation might “seem to support or oppose public 
policies.”460 
Walker recommended increasing the Foundation’s reliance on universities to select 
their own projects. “The real question is how will funds be given, what objectives will be 
set?” Walker recalled there were reasons why the Foundation decided to end the general 
program. One reason was an idea that universities “should be pushed in the direction of 
absorbing the expenses” of fundamental social research. The immense infusion of Memorial 
money had been intended as a jump start only. Second, “The results of Foundation 
investment [since 1929] were in general disappointing in that 1) no satisfactory development 
of strategy and competence in the administration of research funds had taken place; and 2) 
 
459 Paine, “Development of the Social Science Program: Summary Statement,” 4-5. 
460 Sydnor H. Walker, “Future Support of the Social Sciences in the Universities,” July 1939, RAC–RF, R.G.3, 
Series 910, Box 1, Folder 4. 
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the research projects were diffused over so wide an area as to preclude integration and were 
seldom focused effectively upon practical problems.” The Foundation’s new way forward 
was “to define areas of special interest, to identify them with situations of immediate social 
significance, and to concentrate effort upon work giving promise of direct aid in the 
promotion of human welfare.”461 
The Foundation emphasized three special fields since 1935: economic stabilization 
and social security; international relations; public administration. Yet even these fields 
showed disappointing results. Even though Foundation funds were still being given to 
universities, such funds “were more explicitly for avowed interests of the Foundation than 
earlier when the responsibility of allocating for particular work rested with the university 
authorities or with a committee.” Perhaps the move away from broad, fundamental work to a 
specific program emphasizing applied work was a shift that might fail to “provide for the 
general development of areas which are of fundamental importance in advancing the social 
sciences in the opinion of the academic world.” But would such possible failure imply that 
the move away from the general program was too extreme?462 
Walker recommended the Foundation should survey all universities to obtain 
descriptions of their perceived strengths. Such a survey would help incoming director Willits 
identify specific projects. Walker introduced a possible approach in detail: “[I]n contrast with 
the procedure of the past four years, the Foundation would not select certain areas of interest 
and then invite the submission of projects and programs of that type. Nor would the 
procedure be like that of the preceding ten years when we handed over Foundation funds in 
 
461 Walker, “Future Support of the Social Sciences in the Universities,” 1-3. 
462 Walker, “Future Support of the Social Sciences in the Universities,” 3-4. 
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accordance with our judgment of the general importance that the institution had, or should 
have, in developing work over the entire field of the social sciences.” Walker emphasized 
that the Foundation should hold an open mind as to the “best areas of special interest that 
should be cultivated.”463 
11.4 Willits’s arrival–1939-41 
When Willits arrived at the Rockefeller Foundation in early 1939 he received the two 
reports, and especially appreciated Walker’s recommendation of a period of university self-
evaluation. Perhaps a kind of balance might be found so that although the Foundation might 
give away some “liberty of action” if Walker’s approach were tried, a benefit would be a 
return of greater responsibility to the universities. A worry was that by following this new 
idea, such a huge batch of proposals would come as certified by the universities that many 
more researchers than just the “best researchers” would be included. “I wish, therefore, to go 
slow & see whether we can not work out Syd[nor]’s desirable objectives in a little different 
way.”464 
Another report, prepared at Willits’s request, introduced the condition of things in 
Europe. Communications between the Foundation and its European advisors were beginning 
 
463 Walker’s recommendation noted how things will likely remain with the universities: “We shall be asked 
every few years what contribution can be made here and now to concrete social situations, what can be drawn 
off from the academic world for practical application.” She opined: “That point of view could be developed in 
extension and must be given due weight when our future program is considered as a whole.” Willits might 
begin with “a thorough survey of present work in the social sciences in leading universities.” One objective 
should be to learn what each institution “thinks itself best able to promote.” Sydnor H. Walker, “Future Support 
of the Social Sciences in the Universities,” 1, 3-4. 
464 Willits agreed with Walker’s idea that universities should “begin the process of self-examination & 
appraisal.” Yet he suspected the Foundation “would have to be prepared to finance a goodly share of the 
proposals that would result.” The Foundation might lose “full liberty of action” if the path forward was that 
“each of a number of Universities spent six months or so preparing proposals for us, –at our request.” Joseph 
Willits to Raymond Fosdick, August 25, 1939, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 4.  
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to revolve around questions of war and peace. Selskar Gunn, in Europe, wondered whether 
the Foundation should openly take a side in the war, this being the side of Great Britain of 
course. Gunn also believed it best to try and maintain ongoing research projects in all foreign 
nations with as much continuity as possible. Tracy Kittredge, still the director of the 
European program, also contacted the Foundation. In interactions with both Fosdick and 
Willits, Kittredge introduced the idea that an impending all-European war might affect social 
science projects beyond any real control of the Foundation. Yet the Foundation ought to try 
and interpret European events – unfortunate as they were – as real-world experiments to be 
studied. Kittredge was also willing to evaluate concrete research possibilities according to a 
new distinction, which Kittredge said owed to Willits: between projects to be continued 
without appreciable change and projects to be continued with modifications. In a follow-up 
report in July 1940, Kittredge added that a number of European research projects were 
underway on war causes and postwar peace arrangements.465 
Another view available for the Rockefeller Foundation to consider was that of Robert 
Lynd, Chairman of the SSRC. In 1939, Lynd published Knowledge for What? The Place of 
Social Science in American Culture. Lynd argued a severe point, namely, that the idea to 
 
465 In October 1939, Gunn was actually submitting a memorandum in response to Willits’s recent short memo, 
“Social Science Activities in Europe” (September 1939). Gunn, who had recently conducted interviews with 
British scientists, reported that interviewees were in agreement that the essential research would be aimed at 
winning the war. Also noted by Gunn was “The absolute necessity for continuity of effort at a sound academic 
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conditions of post-war settlement; Tracy Kittredge to Joseph Willits, October 10, 1939. In the follow-up letter, 
Kittredge recognized the number of proposals “bubbling up” across Europe that could soon “be legion.” The 
Foundation must be selective. “The task of the Social Science Division is, first of all, to develop and continue a 
fundamental program; but also to find the unique opportunities where, through regular program or emergency 
grants, Foundation support may really count”; Tracy Kittredge to Raymond Fosdick, November 20, 1939, 
RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 4. 
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emulate natural science was on the brink of destroying social science. The lack of 
engagement with real-world problems that resulted from adoption of natural science ideals 
and methods (including abstraction and mathematical rigor) had to go. What was needed was 
greater engagement with real-world problems. Social scientists also needed to return to the 
early idea that boundaries constructed to defend autonomous disciplines in social science 
must be shattered. “Social science is not a scholarly Arcanum,” Lynd wrote in presenting his 
holistic, reconstructive argument, “but an organized part of the culture which exists to help 
man in continually understanding and rebuilding his culture.”466 
Soon after his arrival at the division, Willits gathered all these kinds of perspectives 
and then obtained yet another perspective, from an outside report by a friend. Willits 
requested advice from economist Simon Kuznets concerning what policies might move the 
Foundation’s social science program forward. Discussion between Willits and Kuznets 
brought agreement that the Foundation’s new strategy ought to be a balance between 
multiple interests. Society’s problems were “so vast,” with “factors so numerous and 
elusive,” that Kuznets hardly knew where to begin. He stated what modern social science 
seemed to be: “[T]he function of the social scientist,” he declared, “is to provide such 
intellectual organization of social phenomena as would serve to indicate the relations and 
relative importance of distinctive groups of forces over time.” Good social science can help 
everyday people “to understand the sequence of specific events and problems” that affect 
their lives. Social science can also help policymakers “to ascertain the probable 
consequences of any step of policy which they would consider undertaking in an attempt to 
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make adjustment to changing situations.” Kuznets illustrated with an example he knew well. 
“To suggest a concrete example, it is the task of economists to indicate the relations and 
relative importance of various parts of the productive system and their responsiveness to 
various types of stimulation as shown by their changes in the past. This should make it easier 
to forecast the effects of certain policies…”467 
Kuznets tried defining social research in terms of a clean break between discovery 
and application of knowledge. He intended to establish that any potential problems of biased 
usage of social knowledge were not even relevant anymore; that the “honest civil servant” 
can be trusted. Kuznets explored the idea of a separation between persons in scientific roles 
and persons in the role of “social engineer.” “It is not the function of social scientists as 
scientists to apply this knowledge to certain specific situations.” Looking at the natural 
sciences as an example, “there is a whole body of specialists, not scientists, who are engaged 
in translating the discoveries of the research students so as to make them bear upon practical 
problems calling for solution.” Yet some people tend to believe an analogy between social 
science and natural science might not be perfectly constructed: “It may be argued that in the 
area of social problems such groups of appliers of results of scientific research are absent; 
and that it is, therefore, the function of the social scientist himself to apply his findings to 
current specific problems.” Kuznets himself, however, would strongly “deny this argument, 
because it seems to me that such groups do exist.”468 
467 On July 14, 1939, Willits wrote Simon Kuznets; see Joseph Willits to Simon Kuznets, July 14, 1939. 
Responding with a lengthy letter, Kuznets said he fully “realize[d] the difficulty of the problem that the 
Foundation faces in trying to apply its funds in such a way as to further progress in the social sciences and their 
development to a level at which they can render efficient help in the solution of the various social problems”; 
Simon Kuznets to Joseph Willits, August 1, 1939, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 4, pp. 1-2. 
468 Simon Kuznets to Joseph Willits, August 1, 1939, pp. 2-3. 
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Clear examples of knowledge-appliers were politicians, statesmen, advertising 
specialists, and economists doing forecasting. Also there stood the “honest civil servant” who 
works “within the framework of social welfare as determined by a democratic consensus of 
opinion.” Kuznets emphasized not only “that there is and should be a clear distinction 
between the functions of scientists and those of the appliers,” but even more to the point of 
Willits’s concern, that “there is no need to be worried that significant findings of social 
scientists will not be given due consideration in the formulation of social policies and the 
determination of social action.” Kuznets added: “I cannot help feeling that the strategic 
lacunae are in the development of basic social science disciplines, not in the field of its 
application and not in the field of making findings available to a larger number of people.”469 
Kuznets, in other words, favored more work in science before getting involved in 
more applications of social science. He continued on: “I for one would consider that the 
major problem of the Foundation in the social sciences is to find the means by which it can 
best encourage basic work in the scientific disciplines; that the emphasis…would, in the long 
run, mean a most efficient application of funds from the viewpoint of the ultimate service of 
social sciences to society.” Kuznets conceded the big question was “how are you going to do 
it?...how are you going to find the people whose approach and method are profound enough 
and whose spirit is patient enough so that their work builds toward clarity rather than 
confusion?” Kuznets answered that as important as finding the right people to do science is 
finding the best specific projects to put people to work on: these projects were at “those links 
in the social system where strain appears, where the body social will therefore be willing to 
provide most data for the solution, and where the basic relations and forces in the body social 
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are likely to be reflected most clearly.” There was a place, then, for trying to pick specific 
problems to study – at least if Willits was willing to try a difficult thing and find the 
important ‘links in the social system.’470 
Willits believed Kuznets offered ideas quite worth considering. Particularly Willits 
agreed with Kuznets’s suggestion that the Foundation should find the desired “concrete 
proposals by using small groups of hand-picked advisors” – that, perhaps in this way, a new 
form of connection could be forged between the Foundation and universities.471 
11.5 Willits’s program in fields of special concern–1940-44 
The Foundation was in a period of great caution by 1940. Money restraint remained 
in place, and additional caution was needed in response to wartime circumstances. When 
considering European research possibilities for 1941, for example, it was clear that many 
more projects would be suspended or terminated than would be continued. Aid for refugees 
from fascist Europe continued, as between 1940 and 1945 twenty-two displaced social 
scientists received Foundation support. The place for Willits to focus was projects in the 
United States, some of which were to be part of a “national defense strategy.”472 
470 Simon Kuznets to Joseph Willits, August 1, 1939, pp. 2-4. Kuznets added: “The choice of problems by the 
social scientist is most closely determined by the changing conjuncture of social events. Whether he be a closet 
theorist, a mere describer, or an empiricist with an analytical bent of mind, the problems that he will choose for 
emphasis will almost inevitably be suggested by that point in the body social where the shoe pinches most.” 
471 Joseph Willits to Raymond Fosdick, August 25, 1939, RAC–RF, R.G.3, Series 910, Box 1, Folder 4. It might 
be noted that by the late 1930s, Willits is said to have held a skeptical view of the involvement of social 
scientists in Roosevelt’s New Deal. Willits particularly worried that social scientists were losing their 
objectivity and independence, and hence were losing their status as experts; see James Allen Smith, The Idea 
Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of New Policy Elite (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 
472 For discussion of projects in the United States as well as Latin America, see Joseph H. Willits to Raymond 
B. Fosdick, September 18, 1940; Sydnor H. Walker to Joseph H. Willits, June 5, 1940, RAC–RF, R.G. 3.1, 
Series 910, Box 1, Folder 5. For a summary description of aid to European refugee social scientists see RAC–
RF, R.G. 1.1, Series 200, Box 47, Folder 545a. For some information on Willits’s plans for 1941, see Willits, 
“Possible New Actions in 1941: Social Science Program in Europe,” RAC–RF, R.G.3.1, Series 910, Box 1, 
Folder 5. 
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Willits likely took into account all reports and their broad range of ideas as he 
developed his new program. Willits’s earlier contact with the Memorial’s crash program 
likely encouraged Willits’s information-gathering strategy. Perhaps also influential was 
Willits’s lifelong membership in the Society of Friends, for as a Quaker, he believed in 
seeking mediated common ground.473 
Willits maintained that fields of economic research ought to remain the primary focus 
of the Division of Social Science. Within this focus, he decided on three fields for special 
attention: research to obtain deeper understanding of people’s behavior; research to learn 
how to direct a complex society; research to understand totalitarian societies. These three 
fields can be interpreted partly as a product of much discussion since 1938, as well as direct 
advice Willits received – advice to emphasize economics, to base investigations on 
fundamental human motives, to use social science for social control, and to search for an 
appraisal scheme to select specific projects. 
In January 1941, Willits wrote a memorandum titled “Foundations of Economic 
Research.” He explored ideas concerning the Foundation’s proper role in society, even 
announcing what his role should be. “The proper role of a foundation official should be to 
learn, and not to pontificate.” One thing Willits had learned, and which might “best serve” 
him in his role as Director, is “the questions which social scientists themselves raise 
concerning Foundation policy.” The kinds of questions the Foundation was now receiving 
were often posed in light of available finances of the 1940s (and not in light “of the incomes 
and appropriation accounts of the twenties”). Willits took time to recall Ruml’s jump-start 
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program of the 1920s: “The philosophy that out of all the appropriations then made 
something will take root and grow was a wise and constructive policy for the twenties when 
income was abundant and appropriation accounts were large. It has by and large been proved 
by events.” However in tighter financial times the new question should be: “‘What would a 
wise and provident society direct us to do with the funds now available in the social 
sciences?’ That question is the real deity to which we all have to render accounting – whether 
we be social scientists or foundation officers.” Willits explained his strategy was to avoid 
hazarding any specific answers to specific research questions, but simply to help make order 
from the range of questions. Willits’s duty was to help clarify the overriding questions: “To 
what objects in the social sciences should a foundation devoted to serving human welfare as 
intelligently as it can, make its grants?” “Given certain changes in personnel in a foundation, 
what is the new ‘line’ of the foundation to be?” “What areas of work is it going to stress to 
the exclusion of other areas?” Willits also returned to one point above all others: “How are 
foundations going to find this ‘able person working fruitfully and intelligently on significant 
issues?’” “That,” Willits declared, “is the crux of the problem.”474 
Willits also clarified some thoughts in a subsequent letter to Fosdick, saying what he 
believed were the most important ideas to carry the Foundation’s social sciences program 
forward: that support must continue going to social scientists to pursue “understanding of 
fact and relationship,” but that also needed would be support of research aimed at social 
control. The burden now falling upon the social sciences was the extremely challenging one, 
Willits pronounced, of trying to take “the acts of two billion human beings” and create “order 
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and comprehension.” Willits added that “if wise decisions are to be made on the welter of 
issues which will confront the post-war world, they must be….The spirit of scientific inquiry 
needs most of all to be carried over and applied to social problems.”475 
11.6 Some projects under Willits’s directorship–1939-46 
A few arguments and recommendations made during the rich discussion period 
between 1938 and 1941 are logical to believe would have resonated for Willits. He would 
have been consistently aware of the need to have policy relevance while not specifically 
sponsoring any particular policy. Willits decided on his own policy of reasonable 
redundancy, relying on two or three research groups for each kind of economic problem. 
A handful of projects supported by Willits’s new program between about 1939 and 
1946 are worth noting – and in a few cases are worth considering in detail. No doubt much 
stands to be learned by having historians make detailed study of economic research projects 
during the Willits era, especially for what these projects can tell us about a challenging 
period of transition at the Foundation’s Division of Social Science. Indeed quite a number of 
projects supported by the division dealt with economic research. Income tax studies were 
supported at the University of Wisconsin (1939-42) and at the University of Delaware (1939-
45). Studies on conditions of war and peace were supported at the University of Michigan 
(1940-3), the University of Denver (1941-2), Princeton University (1942-3), Harvard 
University (1942-5), and the New School for Social Research (1943-6). Foundation-
supported price control research took place at Duke University (1939-44), the University of 
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Buffalo (1942-3), and Iowa State College (1942-4). Fiscal policy research was supported at 
Harvard University (1940-7), while national income studies were supported at New York 
University (1943-45).476 
Also supported was a different kind of economic study produced by a single scholar, 
namely Gunnar Myrdal’s classic study, An American Dilemma (1944). In contributing some 
financial support for Myrdal’s project, the Foundation clearly was willing to get involved in a 
field of research potentially resulting in controversial policy conclusions.477 
In addition to race relations, another research problem connected to economics at the 
time was population research. In November 1943, Willits discussed with Fosdick the 
possibility that the division might pursue such research. Willits believed population research 
should be a high priority for support. Yet Fosdick responded with a reminder that support of 
population research had already been tried by the Rockefeller philanthropies from as early as 
1911. “We did a lot of thinking in Memorial days on the subject of population,” Fosdick 
recalled in particular, “but we never started it” as a field. Fosdick added that an extensive 
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quantity of filed materials still existed on the subject. Under Willits’s leadership, the division 
indeed would pursue some support of population studies, covering numerous nations.478 
Two additional projects worth some interpretation were ones dealing with wartime 
twists on increasingly prominent Foundation interests: community strengthening and 
business-cycle research. 
A project sponsored by the Foundation between 1944 and 1946 was an experiment 
known as the “Montana Study.” Done in coordination between the Foundation’s Division of 
Social Sciences and Division of Humanities, the study began in April 1944 at a meeting in 
Chicago arranged by Northwestern University philosophy professor Baker Brownell. The 
meeting brought together Foundation representatives and Brownell as well as Ernest Melby, 
chancellor of the University of Montana. Discussions explored a communitarian ideal that 
local action must be strengthened as a basis for long-term survival of the American 
democratic culture. Chancellor Melby worked out a proposal for an experimental program in 
cultural revitalization, to be tried in Montana towns, with Brownell serving as director. The 
project was to test a new planning doctrine relying on forces of free local discussion to 
explore what kinds of new leadership and social changes would emerge. A goal was to help 
Montanans find ways to stabilize and enrich their community life, which in turn would 
strengthen American democracy by bolstering the small town. An urgent social and 
economic problem at the time was the decline in rural population numbers, and the question 
was: Did big cities have too great a pull to allow returning soldiers to return to their home 
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towns? The research problem, then, was to maintain a balanced labor allocation through the 
period of returning to a post-war economy.479 
A concern at the Foundation at the time was that the postwar world would be in 
danger of unraveling, even in the United States. At the Foundation, Humanities Division 
director David Stevens agreed to take a lead in overseeing financial support for the project. In 
words capable of recalling Beardsley Ruml’s idea for a European program in humanistic 
studies during the 1920s, the Foundation recorded: “We know what before we had only 
believed to be true – that a lack of awareness of the cultural situations in the various regions 
of the continent on the part of…[persons] in the fine arts, is a primary impediment to the 
cultural growth they might be fostering.” The chief idea was to support specific research 
aimed at finding specific ways to strengthen communities.480 
The plan for the study was refined by May 1944 as a project based out of the 
University of Montana which would promote outreach efforts in small Montana towns. In 
each town, the project would be to develop appropriate mechanisms to stabilize families and 
communities. Each small community was to form discussion groups to identify what they 
believed could help their community the most. The great expectation – which was left to each 
community to fulfill – was that small communities could develop as a kind of front wave of 
defense against mass society. The primary research instrument was to send applied social 
scientists to each of the small towns to help the townspeople establish their local study 
groups. Each group was created to interact democratically in discussing local problems and 
 
479 See Paul H. Landis, Loss of Rural Manpower to War Industry through Migration (Washington, DC: Social 
Science Research Council, 1943). A recent study is Carla Homstad, “Two Roads Diverged: A Look Back at the 
Montana Study,” Montana: The Magazine of Western History 53, 3 (Autumn 2003): 16-29. 
480 The opinion of the Foundation officers is quoted in Philip J. Nelson, “Community Dreaming in the Rural 
Northwest: The Montana Study, 1944-7,” Great Plains Quarterly 19, 4 (Fall 1999): 257-75. 
344
brainstorming for solutions. The fact that many groups were created was a case of strategic 
redundancy to attempt to produce multiple possible solutions to similar problems. Of course 
there were also various kinds of unique problems. In one town, for example, the urgent 
problem was how not to become a “ghost” town. At another town (Libby) a new performing 
arts center was identified as useful and was built. In a couple other towns the serious social 
and economic problem was how to control rapacious timber companies.481 
Particularly disapproved in many towns was the behavior of Montana’s two largest 
companies, Anaconda Copper and Montana Power, known as “the Montana twins.” Group 
participants discussed ways that towns might counteract the powerful presence of these two 
Montana companies. And, of course, the companies didn’t like this. A strong counter-
campaign got underway by the end of 1944, which aimed to depict the people in the study 
groups as advocating un-American ideals. Articles carrying this message appeared in the 
national press, for example in Harper’s and Reader’s Digest. Study-group participants soon 
got labeled as “intellectual communists” and portrayed as supporters of a controversial 
Missouri Valley Authority under debate in the U.S. Senate. Under the weight of such 
criticism, the Rockefeller Foundation decided to distance itself from the Montana Study, and 
the study was pretty much ended by the end of 1946.482 
A third specific project worthy of mention began in May 1943, when Jacob 
Marschak, a leading business cycle researcher, contacted Willits. As a Foundation-supported 
refugee scientist from Norway, Marschak reported he was in New York City working with 
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Trygve Haavelmo (also previously a Foundation-supported economist) to run a “weekend 
econometrics seminar.” With a variety of university and NBER economists in attendance, 
seminar discussion turned to whether a new statistical method might replace the NBER’s 
preferred statistical method known as least-squares analysis. The seminar discussed a three-
year-old paper by Haavelmo as well as a newer paper Marschak just published in connection 
with an institute called the “Cowles Commission,” which was receiving some support from 
the Foundation. The basic idea for Haavelmo and Marschak’s method was to test all the 
different business-cycle theories against a single body of real-world data. Statistical analysis 
was used to test whether the different theories fit the data closely enough (e.g., with “95% 
fit” or “95% certainty”) to be likely true.483 
Marschak informed Willits that economists at the Cowles Commission hoped to 
rigorously compare the new statistical method against the NBER’s established method. 
Marschak suggested the Cowles Commission was now permanently established at a secure 
home near the University of Chicago, and should receive greater financial support to explore 
the new method. Marschak’s goal was to keep Willits and others at the Foundation informed 
of work on the new approach that was quickly becoming what Marschak would before long 
describe to Willits as “the Gospel.”484 
483 See Trygve Haavelmo, “The Problem of Testing Econometric Theories by Means of Passive Observations,” 
in Report of Sixth Annual Research Conference on Economics and Statistics (Cowles Commission, 1940); 
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Marschak attempted to describe for Willits what he described as “a difference of 
opinions and sympathies between our approach here and that used by Mitchell and Kuznets 
at the National Bureau.” Marschak, who recognized a need to overcome Willits’s own 
admission that “I can’t quite understand what Marschak really has in mind,” provided a 
research proposal by early 1944, in which he commented that rather than focus on analyzing 
the consequences of “price controls” as some persons at Cowles were toying with, “it is now 
planned to revert the facilities of the Cowles Commission to its original and proper field of 
quantitative economic research.” The Foundation, in other words, was potentially going to be 
in the position of supporting an economic research institute directly.485 
The Cowles Commission in fact received its Foundation grant in 1944. Marschak 
kept Willits informed of progress as tests of the new statistical method proved successful; 
indeed what is today well-known as “simultaneous equations estimation” was born. By 
October, Marschak was enthused enough to report to Willits that the method is the “‘rational 
empirical’ approach: the only possible way of using past experience for current rational 
action (policy as distinct from passive prediction).”486 
Foundation-supported business cycle research reached a declared point of policy 
advocacy. Since at least as early 1942, in fact, an impending urgency of new economic policy 
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had been recognized. Leading U.S. and British economists recognized that when the shift 
from war- to peace-time production came, a policy of increased government spending and 
money infusion might be needed. British social scientist William Beveridge made such 
claims in 1942 in Social Insurance and Allied Services (also known as the “Beveridge 
Report”), a book making an analytical proposal for “cradle to grave” social welfare 
legislation. A version of such an argument published in the United States was clearly stated 
by Alvin Hansen, in After the War–Full Employment (1942).487 
Within about a year, a situation coming at the war’s end was a fear of post-war 
recession. Concern about severe consequences of post-war economic transition (which had 
also happened for a brief but severe period following the First World War) led the United 
States government to pass the Full Employment Act of 1946. Cowles researchers were 
quickly called upon to provide government policymakers with GNP and related data 
measures at a monthly rate. To Willits and others at the Foundation it was unclear what 
would be the consequence for continued Foundation support of the Cowles Commission – 
which might no longer be considered a neutral research body.488 
11.7 End of an era–1946 
The end of the Second World War also ended a thirty-five year period of Rockefeller 
philanthropic support of social research. With the quick beginning of Cold War efforts, a new 
approach to financial support of social research would be found to fit well with governmental 
support of university-based research. In many cases following 1946, U.S. federal support of 
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social research got directed at military uses. At the Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of 
Social Science, the direction forward was largely made up of projects to try and build 
autonomous communities of social researchers in reconstructing and otherwise 
‘underdeveloped’ regions – regions ranging from West Germany to Puerto Rico. But the 
post-1945 period in Rockefeller support of social research is a subject for study at another 
time. As to Joseph Willits, he remained director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of 
Social Sciences until 1954. During the decade following the war, Willits’s leadership 
practices came to recognize the fact of increased government support of social research. 
Foundation support of social science during the post-war period under Willits’s leadership 
surely should be looked upon as the beginning of a new period in the history of philanthropic 
support of social research – a period in which a new rigor of the grant application process 
was created.489 
489 For information about federal government support of social science beginning in the middle 1940s, see 
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(1995): 169-99; David J. Staley, “The Rockefeller Foundation and the Patronage of Germany Sociology, 1946-
1955,” Minerva 33, 3 (1995): 251-64; Chris J. Shepherd, “Imperial Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and 
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CHAPTER 12. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
12.1 Introduction 
Historians debate whether Rockefeller philanthropy tried to control the uses of social 
science. Some historians believe such an attempt was made, whereas others find no firm 
evidence of such effort. I believe Rockefeller philanthropists attempted little or no direct 
control as such, but that one manner of control actually was sought: by the simple fact that 
Rockefeller philanthropists aimed to discover how to develop a new institutional force – a 
“community” of “unified” social scientists – these philanthropists selected certain projects to 
meet perceived needs in the structure of social science. 
 
12.2 Summary 
The best way to begin understanding the relationship between Rockefeller 
philanthropy and social science is to understand the business-government-society model that 
guided the thoughts of John D. Rockefeller and John D. Rockefeller Jr. Each held deep 
conviction that a successful industrialist had responsibilities to help society develop the right 
matrix of institutions for a newly industrialized society. One institutional force seemingly 
missing was a community of independent social scientists who would discover solutions to 
problems resulting from the existing institutional forces – i.e., economic, political, and social 
forces – each doing what they were supposed to do. Business leaders had the responsibility to 
work within the framework of existing laws to maximize profits. Government officials were 
to efficiently execute all laws and policies demanded by the American public. Society in 
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general had the responsibility to work hard and maintain personal discipline. Yet these were 
just three institutional parts in what needed to be a four-part world. 
Rockefeller philanthropists recognized the need for a community of social scientists 
to discover “real” facts about modern economic, political, and social forces. To discover such 
facts, what was needed was genuinely “scientific” social research. Rockefeller philanthropy 
had a responsibility to discover how to develop the missing institutional force outside of any 
controlling efforts by business, government, and society. 
Multiple philanthropies supported some kind of social research during the first decade 
or so of the twentieth century. Rockefeller philanthropy’s first attempt at such involvement 
was in 1911 when John D. Rockefeller Jr. evaluated whether conditions were appropriate to 
support a “Bureau of Social Hygiene.” Rockefeller Jr. paid attention to public opinion, which 
communicated a message that great care must be taken before getting involved in supporting 
such research, and he decided not to directly support such research at that time. 
In 1913, the Rockefeller family created the Rockefeller Foundation, assigning to 
Foundation officers the task “to promote the well-being and to advance the civilization” of 
the United States and its territories, as well as foreign lands. During the first couple years of 
the Foundation, a series of conferences took place to evaluate whether it was time to directly 
sponsor a “Division of Economic Research.” One point of debate during these conferences 
was whether to support economic research purely to obtain factual “information” or primarily 
to wield existing information for “persuasion” purposes. A second point of debate concerned 
a model of Rockefeller philanthropy, known as “scientific philanthropy,” which was 
originated by Frederick T. Gates, a long-time advisor to the Rockefellers. This model was 
something of an efficiency argument that an overriding goal must be to get the greatest 
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results from any amount of donated money. A third important question was discussed: To 
what extent are methods akin to physical science applicable to social research? Rockefeller 
Jr. believed that ultimately what was needed was a “medium” path through such concerns. 
After April 1914, the Rockefellers and Foundation officers had to respond to the 
“Ludlow Massacre.” One way they did so was with a new model of modern society. 
Rockefeller Jr. expressed a notion that no single stockholder in any company (such as the 
Rockefeller’s mining outfit at Ludlow) can be directly responsible for everything the 
company does. A second response to Ludlow was a renewed attempt to get the Foundation 
involved in social research, this time by creating a “Division of Industrial Relations.” The 
Foundation appointed one industrial specialist to discover solutions to the particular problem 
of industrial violence. The goal was to use “scientific methods” to identify improvements to 
be made to management-labor relations. The scope of such research was to be unfettered by 
the Rockefellers, so as to be as comprehensive and accurate as possible. 
A complex relationship existed between the Rockefellers, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and the Division of Industrial Relations. In testimony before the United States 
Congress, Rockefeller Jr. explained this relationship by emphasizing the scientific freedom 
granted to the division’s director, W.L.M. King. Rockefeller Jr. also suggested that the 
Rockefeller family’s main direct responsibility in helping guide society was to use its 
stockholdings as an instrument of “moral influence.” Rockefeller Jr. also shared additional 
ideas along similar lines in a personal visit to the Colorado mines. 
When King’s project was completed, Foundation officials reacted to it by generally 
agreeing on the ideal of objective social research, but by expressing deep dissatisfaction over 
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how King tried to accomplish this. Foundation officials decided against directly sponsoring 
King’s conclusions, and they freed King to publish on his own. 
About this time, Foundation Secretary Jerome Greene began gathering new ideas to 
possibly guide a renewed attempt at involvement in social research. Greene reached two 
conclusions: the Foundation must avoid simply handing over money, and an ultimate goal 
should be to build research “communities.” Greene led the Foundation to try a new kind of 
involvement in social research by creating an independent institute, the “Institute for 
Government Research,” founded in 1916. This institute had an expressed mission to evaluate 
the efficiency of government activities. 
Of special interest to many observers in the philanthropic world was creation of the 
National Research Council, also in 1916. Although the NRC was established independent 
from any foundation assistance, Rockefeller Foundation officials watched closely to see 
whether a neutral, politically-detached community of scientists could be successfully 
supported to help serve the public welfare. Physical scientists at the NRC successfully 
administered research fellowships, which also interested the Foundation. 
A second new research organization, also created without Foundation assistance, was 
the National Bureau of Economic Research. Established in 1919-20, the self-declared goal 
for the NBER was to encourage “in the broadest and most liberal manner” the execution of 
“exact and impartial investigations.” NBER director Wesley C. Mitchell (who had 
participated in the 1913-14 discussion at the Foundation) wanted to show that economic 
research could be done rigorously and objectively, partly because the NBER needed to 
establish they could do this if they were to be considered for Foundation funds. 
353
In 1918, persons at Rockefeller philanthropy paid attention to the creation of another 
new research organization, the “Institute of Economics,” which was directly supported by 
Andrew Carnegie’s Carnegie Corporation. A second move by the Carnegie Corporation, also 
watched by the Rockefeller Foundation, was work to build “scientific communities” in the 
physical sciences. Such persons as Foundation President George Vincent, Foundation 
Secretary Jerome Greene, and Divisional Director Wickliffe Rose all took an interest in this 
new idea of direct action to build scientific “communities.” The kinds of communities being 
paid attention to were, however, communities of physical scientists. 
Creation of a new branch of Rockefeller philanthropy, the “Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial,” came in October 1918. Over its first few years, the Memorial 
focused on supporting programs helping women and children. By the early 1920s, however, 
persons at both the Memorial and the Foundation decided too little fundamental benefit 
seemed to be coming from Memorial efforts. Particularly questioned was the method of 
granting money to other agencies to further allocate. Gathering of ideas took place, with one 
idea being Rockefeller Jr.’s notion that an imbalance had cropped up between technical 
advancements from physical science and society’s awareness of the consequences of these 
advancements. What seemed needed to truly begin solving social problems was to develop 
“fundamental,” “scientific” social research. 
In 1922, the Rockefellers and Foundation trustees named Beardsley Ruml as director 
of the Memorial. Ruml had done a few studies directly for Rockefeller Jr., and had also 
assisted at the Carnegie Corporation for one year. The Rockefeller family provided the 
Memorial with substantially enhanced funding, as well as a loose leash for Ruml to direct a 
major experiment: to build the social sciences. As Ruml and the Memorial officers began 
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their work to enact this experiment, one idea (eventually of long-term durability) was a 
distinction between “social science” and “social technology.” As a kind of maturation of the 
earlier ‘information-versus-persuasion’ distinction, this new idea was well suited to helping 
Ruml build a division of labor throughout the social scientific community. 
In a “Policy Memorandum” in October 1922, Ruml stated his goal to get social 
researchers doing true science by studying “concrete” social phenomena. Ruml recognized 
the complexity of such work and decided the best way to promote genuinely “scientific” 
research was to build research communities throughout the social sciences. Such 
communities needed to be based in universities, where a “wide range of professional 
opinion” existed. Ruml made it clear that Memorial officers had great liberty of action, and 
that Memorial trustees (with ultimate authority over grant awards) would be insulated from 
any contact with actual research. 
Memorial officer Lawrence K. Frank drew the task of producing a supplementary 
memorandum, which he completed in March 1923. Frank evaluated social research in the 
universities, and he identified specific needs. One need was money to expand the ranks of 
researchers. Also needed was greater focus on concrete research, for which better training in 
research methods would be instrumental. America’s businesses were beginning to support 
social researchers, and increased support of university-based social researchers would help 
counter this force. Especially helpful would be any effect experimental methods might have 
in helping researchers avoid getting labeled as politically biased. 
Grant proposals came quickly to the Memorial. Some proposals were for psychology 
projects to deal with “concrete,” “real-world” problems. University of Pennsylvania 
researchers received support in 1923 to enter into industrial workplaces and study workers 
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attempting to deal with complex workplace environments. Under the leadership of G. Elton 
Mayo, Penn’s researchers had the Memorial’s trust that they could interact with businesses 
without becoming agents of business needs. The same year, Yale University’s psychology 
proposal described some research that could complement what was being done at Penn. Like 
Penn, Yale espoused an idea of future “social control.” Along with Penn and Yale, other 
projects in industrial psychology were supported as well. Support of Penn’s project was 
transferred to Harvard University in 1926, when Mayo made his move there. 
An overriding goal expressed in the reports by Ruml and Frank was to build 
“scientific communities.” Each agreed that such a project could be accomplished by 
developing “research fields” as well as “research centers,” an integrated package of which 
would help develop an interconnected structure for the social sciences. Industrial psychology 
was one of perhaps a dozen research fields to which the Memorial attended. The main idea 
for research centers, of which there would be five, was for specific universities to take 
leadership roles in developing specific methodologies. One center was developed at Harvard, 
where the arrival of industrial psychology in 1926 was an instigating presence. The main 
methodological project at Harvard, it seems to me, was to transform social inquiry from 
ethical argument to scientific method without loosing the ethical awareness entirely. 
The London School of Economics became a research center in 1923, largely because 
the Memorial needed a major program in Europe. LSE researchers expressed an interest to 
work on a unified conception of social science, with their primary specialization being 
economics. LSE researchers had some interest to use a blend of historical, theoretical and 
empirical studies as a means to help interconnect the social sciences. 
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At the University of Chicago, which became a center in 1923, experimental sociology 
was the centerpiece science. The Midwest was a good place for a research center, and an 
important factor in the Chicago-Memorial relationship was a level of trust established 
between Ruml and Chicago social scientists. Chicagoans had their own ideas for pursuing 
unified social science, particularly by focusing on a “local community” approach. Applied 
experiments (i.e., the “city as laboratory”) mattered greatly to Chicago’s researchers. 
At the University of North Carolina, a contribution to the overall project was to make 
race-relations research a central focus for bringing all the social sciences together. The 
Memorial needed a research center in the American South, and a level of trust already existed 
between the Memorial and leading UNC researchers. In the course of a bargaining act during 
1924 and 1925, UNC sociologist Howard Odum interacted with Memorial officers in such a 
way that properly “concrete” projects could be stated to make UNC a research center. 
Columbia University became the fifth research center. The Memorial likely had a 
goal to get at least one center located in a northeastern city, perhaps ideally the same city as 
the Memorial’s home office. Memorial officers also wanted a center to focus on strengths in 
quantitative methods. An emphasis on international political studies at Columbia also seems 
to have helped their cause. 
Although research centers were highly important, just as important was to develop 
research fields. One field requiring urgent attention was race relations. While certain kinds of 
research could be done at existing centers (especially UNC, Chicago, and Columbia), 
additional research was needed. Memorial officers focused attention on what race-relations 
research should accomplish, and they determined that a slow rate of change seemed best for 
race relations in the United States. Such a conclusion was based not on ideas about the right 
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degree of social change, but on a holistic impression that simultaneous elevation of the entire 
African-American population was needed. 
Memorial-supported researchers at Western Reserve University (in Cleveland) and 
Fisk University (in Nashville) got race-relations research underway in connection with 
projects to train urban social workers. At Brown University, a Memorial-supported project 
studied problems deriving from a mix of many ethnicities in a northern city. The Brown 
study, in its being directed by a woman, was a situation in which specific information (i.e., 
the qualities of Bessie Bloom Wessel’s personality and research abilities) was requested 
before the award was made. Yet similar to what happened when Mayo changed schools, 
Wessel was permitted to transfer Memorial funds when she later changed schools. 
Also created was a research field to specialize more generally in social and economic 
problems in the American South. Among numerous southern schools hoping to follow the 
research momentum established by UNC were Vanderbilt University and the University of 
Virginia. Each school contacted the Memorial, and each eventually received a substantial 
grant. Yet Memorial personnel first needed to work carefully with faculty and administrators 
at both schools to get their patterns of thinking past any notion of joining directly with 
UNC’s projects. Both schools proved capable of identifying unique contributions as well as 
finding ways to contribute to an overall constellation of projects desired by the Memorial. 
A research field specializing in the American Southwest and West also came into 
existence. University of Texas officials contacted Ruml, initially with an idea to join with 
UNC. The Memorial advised Texas to focus on unique regional problems, which Texas did. 
Another school expressing interest in doing research in a western region was the University 
of Denver, which in 1925 proposed specializing in problems in the Rocky Mountain region. 
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Some concern arose at the Memorial with respect to whether proper rationale could be 
identified to support Denver’s proposal as unique, both regionally and methodologically – 
the fear being that many other schools might flood the Memorial with arguments for their 
own regional uniqueness. Rationale was eventually found to award Denver a grant. Stanford 
University applied for and received a Memorial grant to study California’s unique 
geographical, social, and economic problems. 
The Memorial developed a research field to study successes and failures of non-
capitalist economies. Such economies were seen as large-scale, natural experiments. With 
respect to the extreme situations of Russia’s communist economy and the peasant-based 
economy in China, Memorial officials believed such economies unlikely to survive. Some 
portion of any funds directed to Russia and China therefore needed to be directed to 
preparing their people for eventual participation in capitalism. Also to be prepared for 
capitalism were people in Beirut, Lebanon. When it came to Liverpool, England, the 
important fact was that University of Liverpool researchers had a goal to study the 
consequences of a real-life, urban experiment. With Sweden, the experiment was at the level 
of a partially-capitalistic, national economy. These five projects ranged widely, obviously, as 
well as along multiple dimensions; however all were part of a group of projects working on a 
premise that some version of capitalism was better than non-capitalism. 
Land use and population studies represented another important research field. This 
was a field in which an arrangement of approved projects was accomplished partly by 
rejecting a small number of projects. One denied project, proposed in 1923 by Richard Ely at 
the University of Wisconsin, evidently got perceived as too general and undefined in nature – 
or perhaps it was a project believed to be associated with controversial political views? It 
359
turns out that more can be learned about which answer to select by assessing two other 
declined projects, both at Stanford University. The first of Stanford’s denied projects even 
came forth prior to Ely’s proposal, when Stanford’s Carl Alsberg described a broad and 
undefined project, which the Memorial denied on the project’s merit alone. A second 
Stanford project, also proposed by Alsberg, again was denied for the reason of being too 
broad and undefined. Such facts surely increase the likelihood that the same, favorable 
explanation should hold for Ely’s project as well. 
Among approved projects in land use and population studies was a 1922 study by the 
NRC to assemble data on human migration patterns in the United States. Another 
organization receiving Memorial funds for land use and population research was the Social 
Science Research Council (which the Memorial helped establish in 1923). Additionally Ruml 
helped with a project of his own. The Memorial communicated with researchers at the New 
School for Social Research to get a proposal, and while the New School’s 1924 project 
description was somewhat general, one fairly specific methodological principle was likely of 
some interest to the Memorial – namely, the idea to study rural-to-urban migration as a 
modern-day “selection” process. 
Ruml tried developing a better sense of direction for this research field by securing an 
outside report on agricultural economics in American universities. Upon completion of this 
report (by Edwin Nourse, assistant director at the Institute of Economics), the Memorial 
evidently decided to stick with their reliance on unsolicited proposals. Ruml initiated one 
additional experimental project of his own. Also the Memorial decided to expand into 
Europe, where a few studies were approved between 1925 and 1928, all having some 
regional dimension to them. A substantial project was proposed in 1928, by researchers at the 
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University of Vermont. Bearing some resemblance to the New School’s approach, a 
“selection” argument concerning rural-to-urban migration appeared within Vermont’s 
holistic, multifactored methodology aimed at helping rural communities recover as attractive 
places to live. Enough admiration existed for Vermont’s research methods that at least one 
noted observer recommended considering widespread adoption of these methods. 
A question can be asked: Did Memorial support of projects relying on “selection” 
ideas perhaps indicates some general approval of evolutionary arguments? To be sure, there 
were times when Memorial officers indicated some interest in evaluating evolutionary ideas, 
for example in association with “functionalist” anthropology’s program to study “primitives” 
as persons capable of living successfully in any culture into which they might have been 
born. On the whole, however, it is clear that the Memorial decided not to try any full-blown 
research field to study changing human biology in relation to societal changes. 
Child development represented a research field of great importance. Following early 
undistinguished work in this area, a clarified goal after 1922 was to strengthen child 
development research along experimental lines, including an approach to develop the home 
as “a child welfare agency.” A goal at some Memorial-supported schools was to better 
connect the social sciences to social work (a form of “social technology”), with a goal to 
better help mothers and children living in urban environments. The Memorial also paid 
attention to rural conditions, with researchers at Iowa State College focusing on studying 
interacting facets of a progressive rural home environment with young children included, and 
University of Iowa researchers focusing on studying mostly rural children with normal levels 
of intelligence, in order to discover the extent to which a child’s intelligence can be improved 
by a favorable, “nurturing” environment. 
361
Another research field of some emphasis was international relations, which had a 
concern to gather facts to help prevent war. In addition to international-affairs research at 
Harvard, Radcliffe College proposed a project to gather accurate facts about real-world 
relations between nations. Similar to what happened in the case of Brown University’s 
proposed race-relations project, persons at the Memorial decided that other scientists needed 
to vouch for research abilities at Radcliffe, which the professors at Harvard eventually did. 
There were other universities that did international relations research in Europe, which was a 
location clearly making sense for this field. 
Another research field dealt with “coordination projects.” Such projects were layered 
in a sense, with Memorial officers trying to pick precise intervention points in the overall 
structure of social science: data-coordination needs in crime fighting at the community level; 
data-category consistency at the municipal level; and data-sharing problems between public 
welfare agencies at the state level. Also identified as an addition to help connect all 
researchers was support aimed at increasing publication rates by social scientists. At least 
two universities received grants to help publish more works in social science, and a large 
grant was awarded to support a path-breaking “Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.” 
Another layered project was work to develop fellowships programs in the social 
sciences. Fairly quickly a successful arrangement of governance mechanisms was created to 
support such programs to assist researchers, to help in travel assistance, and generally to help 
in the movement of ideas. Memorial officials directly created a foreign fellowships program, 
including a system of advisors in Europe with responsibility to select candidates. When it 
came to creating a domestic fellowships program, the Memorial preferred using an 
overseeing council entirely separate from the Memorial, which was the Social Science 
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Research Council. For travel grants for U.S. researchers, the Memorial was comfortable with 
direct oversight, since no ‘vote’ needed to be cast for or against any particular research 
project. Also created was a new graduate school that could help by serving as home base for 
doctoral students and younger scholars receiving Memorial or SSRC support. 
The scientific study of business cycles was an important research field during the 
1920s. At the NBER, early projects included national income measurement and statistical 
analysis of the timing and severity of recessions. NBER successes were closely watched by 
persons at the Foundation and the Memorial. Under Ruml’s leadership, Memorial officers 
figured out how to financially support the NBER, doing so by creating the buffer structure of 
an “Economic Foundation,” which received Memorial block funds to distribute to specific 
projects. Such an allocation system worked in part because NBER directors were highly 
trusted by the Memorial. Soon after this, Ruml even crafted a statement of guiding principles 
to generally help separate financial support of research from scientific execution of research. 
Another approach to a created buffer was the SSRC. The SSRC developed a 
committee structure emphasizing interdisciplinary possibilities, and leadership at the 
organization worked to identify and coordinate useful research projects. The SSRC included 
seven social sciences, with some initial emphasis on psychology. Economists also became an 
important voice at the SSRC. Although the Memorial stayed separate from the SSRC, Ruml 
took a leadership role by arranging summer meetings for all SSRC members. 
Two research fields came about partly as a result of work by Memorial officers and 
SSRC researchers to explore “boundaries” between scientific social research and non-
scientific social research. One field involved an idea to develop scientific approaches to 
“humane studies,” while another aimed to build connections in “law and social science.” The 
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idea to support humane studies involved a question whether humanities research could be 
made scientific. Even though such a question was considered as early as 1923 (in Charles 
Rist’s report), it took a couple additional years for Ruml to get to discussing the idea in 
earnest, which he especially did in a letter exchange with Abraham Flexner. The Memorial 
decided to support projects by the American Historical Society and the American Council of 
Learned Societies to learn about the state of ‘scientific’ humanistic studies in Europe and the 
United States. An important event in building a research field in humane studies was contact 
established between the Memorial and the University of Cambridge, in 1925 and 1926. 
Contrary to other historians, I believe the evidence is clear that this contact was no effort by 
the Memorial to control specific projects or ideas at Cambridge. 
Another boundary crossing which produced a new research field involved the 
question whether legal studies (thought of as a “social technology”) could be tightly 
connected to social science. In January 1927, Columbia University got Memorial support to 
study connections between law & criminal research and between law & economics. By 
March 1927, Yale University’s legal scholars described their goal to rigorously study the 
field of legal administration from the ‘scientific point of view.’ For a time Yale’s proposal 
was declined, but renewed contact resulted in grant approval by the end of the year, 
specifically when Yale provided enough information that the Memorial could feel 
comfortable they would not get embroiled in any unexpected conflicts. In December 1927, 
Howard University’s law school successfully applied for a grant to assist in adding social 
science publications to the law library. 
There were other boundary issues as well. A 1926 report prepared for the Memorial 
asked whether researchers at the Institute of Economics and the Brookings Graduate School 
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should get involved in propaganda work, with the conclusion being no. A second question, 
present and slightly affirmatively answered at the SSRC by about 1928, was whether to get 
involved in supporting family research that might include inquiry into intimate sexual and 
moral practices. A third case was the SSRC’s involvement in the question whether to do 
research at the service of government requests, which they decided to cautiously try. 
By late 1927, persons at the Memorial knew their time of loose leash was soon to end. 
Memorial officers decided to do a self-review to gather input concerning Memorial successes 
and failures. The Memorial was willing to hear critique coming from many persons, both 
inside and outside the Memorial. Submitted letters enabled production of a digest of main 
points, with one especially important question raised by many evaluators: Was more contact 
now needed between “social science” and “social technology”? This question, in essence, 
was whether to increase the focus on helping policy makers achieve “social control.” 
In January 1929, the Rockefeller Foundation absorbed the Memorial’s social science 
program as a new “Division of Social Science.” The requirement to stay clear of 
controversies remained as important as ever, with the new division formally adopting Ruml’s 
guiding principles, and with Ruml providing a closing statement to say that social science 
seemed more prepared than ever to help in social control. The social sciences were more 
unified than ever, he declared, and social scientists had achieved greater ability to separate 
objective science from advocacy arguments. An overriding idea at the Rockefeller 
Foundation was that other Foundation divisions could now benefit from increased contact 
with the methods and instruments of the newly matured social sciences. 
Under Edmund E. Day’s directorship, the initial plan at the new division was to 
continue along the Memorial’s path while looking for new projects. Psychology was one area 
365
of continuing interest, as various advances in Foundation-supported psychology research 
were made throughout the 1930s. Researchers at Harvard, Yale, Penn and Iowa, for example, 
all seem to have concluded that psychological causes were not as simple as previously 
believed, which resulted in researchers doing all these projects according to an increasingly 
complex understanding of influences of human behavior. 
Day directed the new division’s officers to hold staff conferences, at which time Day 
typically presented memoranda. Some memos directed attention to the overall structure of 
social science. One new approach was to try studying university-level decisions for what to 
do with general (i.e., “fluid”) research funds. Another area of projects capable of evaluation 
was psychology research, with a goal to see what new subfields were emerging. Research 
fields could also be categorized from self-descriptions on individual fellowship applications, 
and another new measure was to study uses of grants-in-aid funds over a five-year period 
(1929-33) in order to identify every kind of research covered under such grants. 
Director Day decided early on to emphasize economic research. Similar to what was 
happening in psychology research, economists now consciously worked to understand and 
assist an increasingly complex world. In one of Day’s guiding memoranda, in 1931, he 
considered the relationship between social science and social technology, specifically an idea 
that social technology (i.e., law schools, business schools, and social work schools) could be 
used to help establish the validity of scientific ideas; Day believed it was high time to get 
active in social reform. Another memo reveals Day emphasizing the need to study Russia’s 
planned economy, which was a kind of economy also gaining proponents in a Depression-
ridden United States. In another memo Day described a new “program in economic 
stabilization” that would focus not on problems of basic material conditions, but on the real 
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problem: institutional arrangements. Many of Day’s ideas were indicative of a notion that the 
Foundation should actively identify specific projects, and an especially urgent concern was to 
study business cycles as a cause of human suffering. The trustees also provided a 
memorandum of their own, saying that with Foundation money now so limited, it was time 
for more aggressive restatement of the main objectives in social science. 
Day got busy doing more idea gathering by 1932. He contacted Roosevelt-advising 
economist R.G. Tugwell, who emphasized that Day needed to be aware that applied social 
science can never be separated from a researchers’ own values. It seemed to Tugwell that the 
time was right to create a more active kind of economic institute that would aim to change 
the direction of society. Foundation advisor Florn M. Rhind brought to Day’s attention a 
notion that in a financially tattered society the Foundation was in a unique position of 
responsibility. Rhind believed it was time to reformulate the social science program to focus 
on specific problems and to use social technology to test scientific ideas. Also contacting 
Day, with similar ideas, were the Brookings Institute and the SSRC. It seems all parties were 
agreed: it was time to get busy on more active applications of social science. 
Following an additional period of reflection, in December 1934 persons at the 
Division of Social Science decided it was time to figure out how to begin the new strategy 
based on “fields of application.” They determined that a major part of this strategy would 
need to involve officers’ proposals, some of which should focus on identifying requirements 
for terminating the “general” social science program based on research centers and research 
fields, and to replace it, by 1940, with a “new” social science program based on selected 
projects in a few most urgent areas. Day asked Tracy Kittredge, at the Foundation’s Paris 
office, for input concerning what could be done in Europe, particularly in the field of 
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economic research. Day asked John Van Sickle, at the New York office, to take charge of 
what was now called the “economic stabilization and social security program.” 
The planned transition toward 1940 was not without its concerned observers. 
Kittredge expressed a worry that too many projects might be curtailed too quickly in Europe. 
An outside observer, cultural anthropologist A.L. Kroeber, asked if by ending so many 
programs so quickly, observers might be led to conclude the Rockefeller Foundation 
officially declared the failure of fundamental research in the social sciences. Day’s response 
to Kroeber was to emphasize that the new program was no verdict that fundamental social 
science had failed. Mason Mason, the new Foundation President, shared this same belief, and 
added that with limited funds, a problem would always be the need to make choices – which 
was essentially a question of relative values. 
By the middle 1930s, conditions in Europe represented their own worrying 
circumstance. The situation in Germany turned especially foreboding by summer 1933, and 
worsened still through 1934 and 1935. The situation was complex, of course, and a proposal 
quickly under consideration at the Foundation was whether to withdraw all research funds 
from Germany. More important, it was soon decided, was a goal to refrain from creating any 
appearance of favoritism of one group (i.e., Jewish researchers) over others, which resulted 
in a decision not to withdraw all money. An additional move was to begin providing direct 
support for displaced European scholars, irrespective of their research interests, with the 
primary objective being that unencumbered research should continue. 
Also new by the middle 1930s was a research program designed to help connect 
business cycle researchers in the United States and in Europe. Instrumental in getting this 
group together was an “Economic Security Conference,” held in New Jersey in 1935. 
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Economists and Foundation representatives shared a goal at the conference to develop 
policies for economic assistance. The worldwide Depression was severe, and conference 
participants were willing to ask questions about ways in which Foundation-supported 
economists might help design new policies. 
Many of these economists met again the following summer, this time at a July 1936 
“Business Cycle Conference” in Geneva. Goals settled upon at this conference were to get 
better data records for day-to-day changes in a national economy and to obtain better 
understanding of underlying, longer-term forces that cause economic downturns and upturns. 
Discussed in some detail was an idea to create a “central” institute to coordinate and dispense 
economic research. One particular view expressed in these discussions was that of Van 
Sickle, who decided that a specific research method should be adopted for all economic 
projects. Such commitment was a practical decision that the next step in scientific progress 
for economics should involve all economists working together to learn what one particular 
theory or method could accomplish. 
At the Foundation, work progressed toward ending the general program. Day 
requested officers’ reports through 1935 and 1936, and a specific goal – expressed by Day in 
November 1935 – was to identify research projects that would be more “realistic” and 
“applied” than ever before. Attention also heightened concerning the need to debate what an 
“urgent” social problem truly was. 
Also in 1936 came another transition, with the July arrival of a new Foundation 
president, Raymond Fosdick, who almost immediately declared he wanted a major shift in 
the economic stabilization and social security program. Fosdick’s idea was to diminish the 
portion of research focused on analyzing business cycles, while retaining the project to help 
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alleviate human suffering. Fosdick wanted a second major shift of emphasis as well, which 
concerned the social science program in Europe. In order to continue insuring objectivity, in 
May 1938 Fosdick ordered the withdrawal of all support of social research in any 
“totalitarian” state. 
At about the same time, a major personnel turnover took place at the Division of 
Social Science, with Day’s resignation as director bringing to an end a nine-year phase in the 
relationship between Rockefeller philanthropy and social science. The division thus entered a 
period once again of evaluating what social science can really accomplish. Van Sickel, for 
example, looked for any major gaps that remained in data collection, while Stacy May helped 
Fosdick evaluate European political situations (agreeing with Fosdick that it was time for a 
lowered level of general support across Europe). A number of officers wondered whether 
some kind of clarified standard might be identified for selecting specific research projects 
meriting support, and in some additional discussion they wondered if enough had been 
discovered about the biological and psychological bases of behavior to begin placing social 
research on a firmer, more fundamental level of explanation than ever before. Division 
officers asked whether it was finally time to create a whole new kind of centralized scientific 
body, and they inquired as to what kinds of projects the SSRC should be doing. Persons at 
the SSRC agreed with the need for increased attack on real-world problems. 
Two illustrative cases during the middle and late 1930s concerned divisional 
communications with the University of Oxford and the London School of Economics. A 
matter of some interest to the division was a notion to help Oxford social scientists move 
away from their abstract style of analysis. At the LSE, an exertion of some control over the 
direction of research took place concerning social biology, with a decision made at the 
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division to withdraw funding. Clearly such controls as were exerted over Oxford and LSE 
were complex cases, yet the basic concerns were not to select between political views, but to 
help avoid potentially unempirical – even immoral – research approaches.  
In late 1938, the Division of Social Science selected Joseph Willits, an industrial 
economist at the University of Pennsylvania, as their new director. Any new policy changes 
were put on hold until Willits’s arrival. The division prepared two status reports, one by the 
director’s secretary, Janet Paine, and the other by division officer Sydnor Walker. Paine 
described the shift to specific projects pursued since 1933, which she indicated was now seen 
as part of an “emergency” program. She described four main problem areas (defined 
according to expediency), with the greatest emphasis going to research on economic 
stabilization and security. Walker focused on identifying future objectives. She described the 
“new” program with its aim to pursue specific projects, while continuing the concern to 
avoid any policy bias. Walker revealed there had been some disappointment in the “general” 
program as having become too “diffused,” and that the new program was working on a 
limited number of fields with the program in economic stabilization and security to be 
supported most of all. Walker wondered if a move might be made away from having division 
officers select specific projects, and if greater responsibility might be returned to the 
universities. She recommended surveying universities to learn what perceived strengths they 
would self-identify. 
Willits arrived in February 1939, and he received the reports. He commented in 
particular on Walker’s recommendation to canvas the universities. Willits appreciated this 
idea, and he emphasized the need to balance some Foundation loss of “liberty of action” 
against some potential gain from increasing the number of creative participants in project 
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selection. Willits asked for further input, and Selskar Gunn and Tracy Kittredge provided 
some realization that unfortunate social and political events were happening in Europe, 
whether the division liked it or not – and so the division might as well study these events. 
Willits received feedback from the SSRC, with SSRC director Robert Lynd even providing 
an essay arguing that social science had made major errors in trying to emulate natural 
science, including losing engagement with real-world problems. 
Willits received detailed input from Columbia economist, and personal friend, Simon 
Kuznets, who argued that Willits should use university-based research projects, especially if 
such research could focus on a limited number of concrete problems. Kuznets explored the 
familiar question whether any social scientist could separate scientific activities from 
advocacy of specific applications – with Kuznets tending to see a complete separation 
between two types of occupations: the scientists and the technicians, both of whom were 
‘honest types.’ Overall Kuznets took a view that more work in the social sciences remained 
needed before an idealized division of labor between social scientists and social technicians 
could really succeed. Willits shared with Kuznets his agreement on one particular idea: it was 
time to get more concrete proposals by using groups of hand-picked advisors. 
At a time when money restraint remained a factor, Willits decided he needed to begin 
developing his own guiding policy. Quickly he focused on three kinds of projects in tune 
with his overall emphasis on economic research: to understand deep bases of economic and 
social behavior; to study how to direct new institutions in a complex society; to understand 
totalitarian societies. Following the first few months of the “new” social science program, 
Willits introduced ideas about a way forward. A main responsibility of a foundation director, 
as Willits saw things, was to pay close attention to questions that social scientists raise. The 
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Division of Social Science must always be critically self-reflective, especially by asking: Are 
we doing what a “wise and provident society” really wants? And, what is the best way for the 
division to find quality researchers to work on significant issues? 
Between 1942 and 1946, Willits got more active. He split his attention between 
wartime research problems and issues likely to occur in a post-war world. He put something 
of a stamp on his own approach by exploring what might result from adding a ‘system of 
redundancy.’ The division began to support different university research groups in ways that 
could ‘double up’ to study a few specific problems, many of which were economic in nature. 
Willits approved a few grant proposals to develop fairly large and specialized projects. 
Through such projects it became possible, once again, to discover that controversies are 
difficult to avoid. An example was the project at the Cowles Commission, where methods of 
statistical analysis might supersede the NBER’s approach. A potential conflict of interest 
arose in 1946, when the United States federal government wanted Cowles researchers to 
begin applying their efforts to help support a new law known as the “Full Employment Act of 
1946.” The question now needed to be asked: Could such a request turn into a violation of 
the separation between research neutrality and political positioning? Similar questions of 
possible tampering with research neutrality took place in connection with other projects 
supported by the Division of Social Science, such as at the University of Montana. 
 
12.3 Conclusion 
In its support of social science between 1911 and 1946, Rockefeller philanthropy 
tried time and again to anticipate potential controversies and conflicts of interest, and to 
create mechanisms to avoid such problems. Occasionally, though, even the best efforts at 
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anticipation were not good enough; but this was no real fault of the Rockefeller 
philanthropists. Rockefeller philanthropy also consistently supported capitalism, doing so 
through a long period of time that actually saw more than one serious wave of debate in the 
United States concerning whether big business was getting too politically powerful – in 
particular, too powerful to ever allow lower economic classes to escape from frequent 
economic hardship. Yet Rockefeller philanthropy never ceased supporting capitalism. 
Through many phases of change, Rockefeller philanthropists worked to build an 
institutionalized system of unbiased social science that would help guide existing 
institutional forces – economic, political, and social forces – to use the system of free 
enterprise to improve all of society. A philanthropic foundation and a detached system of 
social science were not purely compatible, nor were they strictly conflicting – they were a 
complex relationship. To see this relationship requires detailed case study, which the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial provide. 
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